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PREFACE 
T H I S  volume has grown out of a series of letters written for The Times, to whose proprietors I 
am indebted for permission to make the fullest use 
of them, during a journey I made through Persia and 
down the Persian Gulf, as  well as  to different points 
of the Indian frontier, in the autumn and winter of 
I902 - 3, before and after attending the Coronation 
Durbar at Delhi. In order to place before my readers 
a more complete survey of the question which I had 
outlined in those letters, I have not merely revised 
them and brought them, a s  far as  possible, up to date, 
but I have, to some extent, recast them, and introduced 
a large amount of altogether new material. 
I must leave these pages to speak for themselves; 
but as  the book I published early in 1896 on Tlze Par 
Eastern Question was, I think, the first to call public 
attention to the gravity of the problems with which, 
as  the result of the war between China and Japan, we 
were about to be confronted in Eastern Asia, I may 
perhaps, without too much presumption, be allowed 
to say that the more subtle changes of which I have 
attempted to describe the progress in Middle Asia 
appear to me to be fraught with consequences of even 
greater moment to the British Empire. 
In Persia especially-where I had travelled eighteen 
years before, on my way back from a journey to India 
-it was sufficient to compare the conditions that pre- 
vailed there in 1884 and in 1902 in order to be im- 
pressed with the rapidity with which events are now ' 
viii PREFACE 
moving even in the immutable East. Under the 
impact of Western forces the disintegration of Asia 
is  proceeding apace, and new conditions are being 
evolved which, within a period perhaps no longer 
very remote, will seriously affect, both directly and 
indirectly, the position of our Indian Empire. For 
the pressure of European ambitions successively trans- 
ferred from the already overcrowded stage of our own 
small continent to the more spacious stage of Asia is 
destined to rob India of the precious advantages of a 
gunsi-insular position she has hitherto derived from 
the survival, all along her land frontiers, of dccadent 
Oriental states, incapable of any serious aggressive 
effort, and thus to draw her more and inore into the 
forefront of international politics. I hope I may have 
done something to convince the reader that issues are 
involved therein of which we, as a nation, can least of 
all afford to overloolr or to underrate the importance. 
I have collectecl in an Appendix some of the most irn- 
portant international treaties and extracts from olficial 
correspondence bearing on the subject. The Royal 
Geographical Society have been good enough to allow 
me to use one of their maps of Persia and adjoining 
regions, and I must crave the indulgence of the reader 
in the few cases in which the spelling of geographical 
names in the text diverges from that of the maps. T h e  
illustrations are taken from water-colour sketches which 
I made during my journey, or from photographs illostly 
taken by my travelling companion, Mr. Murray Stewart, 
who has kindly placed them at my disposal. 
VALENTINE CHIROL. 
QUEEN ANNE'S MANSIONS. S. W. 
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MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION 
CHAPTER I 
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUES'I'ION DEFINED 
T the close of the very weighty speecli with which A the Viceroy of India concluded the Budget debate 
in the Indian Council a t  Calcutta this year (March 25th, 
1903) occurs the follo~ving remarlrahle passage :- 
i d  There is one final subject that is rarely mentioned 
in  these debates, and that firlcls little place in the many 
utterances which the huacl of the Government is called 
upon to make i n  the course of the year, and yet in a sense 
i t  is the most important of all. I allude to Foreign 
Affairs ; and  it must be rcmemberecl that in the case 
of India the phrase includes Iler relations with the 
whole of her neighbours, and that this carries with 
it the politics of the greater part of tlie Asiatic Conti- 
nent. I doubt if even the thaughtful public has at  
all realised the silent but  rnornento~rs change that is 
going on, and that will one day l ~ a v e  a n  effect upon 
India that is at prcsclit but dimly cliscernccl. In the 
old days, nncl it 1ila.y almost he said u p  l o  rlle 
last fifteen years, the Foreign relations of India were 
practically confined to Ixer dealings with Afgl~nnistan, 
and to the designs or ~ n o v e ~ n e n t s  01 tlke grcab' Powcr 
11 
, I 3  
2 THE PI'IlDDLE EASTERN QUESTION DEFINED 
beyond ; and the foreign policy of India had little to 
do with any other foreign nation. I t  is true that we 
L 
, had territories or outposts of influence that brought 
us into contact with Persia and Turkey, and that we 
had occasional dealings with Arabian tribes. Now all 
that is changed, and events are passing which are 
gradually drawing this country, once so  isolated 
and remote, into the vortex of the world's politics, 
and that will materially affect its future. The change 
has been due to two reasons. Firstly, a s  our own 
dominion has expanded, and our influence upon our 
frontier consolidated, we have been brought into more 
direct and frequent relations with the countries lying 
immediately beyond. For instance, the annexation of 
Upper Burma brought us into contact with an im- 
portant corner of the Chinese Empire, and created a 
batch of frontier and other political problems of its 
own. But the second reason is much more important. 
I 
Europe has woke up, and is beginning to take a revived 
interest in Asia. Russia with her vast territories, her 
great ambitions, and her unarrested advance, has been 
the pioneer in this movement, and with her, or after her, 
have come her competitors, rivals, and allies. Thus, 
figures upon the stage. Thc great European Powers 
are also becoming the great Asiatic Powers. Already 
we have Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and 
Turkey ; and then, in place of all the smaller European 
kingdoms and principalities, we have the empires and 
states of the East-Japan, China, Tibet, Siam, Afghan- 
istan, Persia, only a few of them strong and robust, 
the majority containing the seeds of inevitable decay. 
There lie in these events and in this renewed contact 
or collision, as the case may be, between the East and 
the West, omens of the greatest significance to this 
country. Europe is so accurately parcelled out between 
I 
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the various States and Powers, the balance of power 
is suspended on so  fine a thread, and the slightest 
disturbance would imperil such wide interests, that 
short of some serious and unforeseen c o ~ l v ~ ~ l s i o i ~ ,  which
everyone would wish to avert, great changes a re  not ' 
to be anticipated there. Africa. is rapidly being over- 
run by the few European Powers who have obtained 
a foothold upon that continent, and before long its 
political destinies aild territorial grouping will have 
taken something like definite shape. But in Asia a 
great deal is still in flux and solution, and there must, 
and there will, be great changes. I t  will be well to 
realise what an effect these must have upon India, and 
how they must add to our responsibilities and cares. 
Our Indian do~ninions now directly touch those of 
Turlrey in many parts of the Arabian peninsula, those 
of Russia on the Pamirs, those of China along the 
entire border of Turkestan and Yunnan, those of 
France on the Upper Mekong. In  our dealings with 
them the Foreign Department i n  India is  becoming 
the Asiatic branch of the Foreign Ofice in England. 
Then rouncl all our borders is the fringe of Asiatic 
states to which I just now alluded, whose integrity 
and whose freedoin from hostile influence a re  vita1 
to our welfare, but over whose future the clouds are 
beginning to gather. In  Europe we are a maritime 
Power who are merely called upon to defend our  own 
shores from invasion, and who are confronted by no 
land dangers or foes. In Asia we have both a seaboard 
and a land frontier many thousands of miles in length, 
and though Provide~lce has  presented us on some 
portion of our land frontiers with the most splendid 
natural clefenccs in the world, yet the situation must 
beco~lle more and not less anxious as rival or  hostile 
influences creep up t o  these ramparts, and a s  the 
ground outside them becomes the arena of new com- 
binations ancl the fielcl of unforeseen ambitions. All 
these circumstances will tencl-they are alrcady tencling 
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-to invest the work of the Indian Foreign Department 
with ever-increasing importance, and they demand a 
vigilance and a labour of which there are but few 
indications in anything that reaches the public ear or 
falls under the public eye. Questions of internal develop- 
ment, administrative anxieties, agrarian and fiscal 
problems, fill all our minds, just as they have occupied 
the greater part of my speech this afternoon. But do 
not let the people of India think that we shall never 
have anything but domestic cares in this country. DO 
not let them forget that there are other and not inferior 
duties that devolve upon her rulers, that the safety 
of the Indian frontier, and the maintenance of the 
British dominion in those parts of Asia where it has 
for long been establishecl, and where it is the surest, 
if not the sole, guarantee lor peace and progress, are 
in their hands, and that this, no less than internal 
reform, is part of England's duty. I see no reason 
for anticipating trouble upon our borders, and I know 
of no question that is at present in an acute or menacing 
phase. But do not let anyone, on the strength of that, 
go  to sleep in the happy illusion that anxiety will never 
come. The geographical position of India will more 
and more push her into the forefront of international 
politics. She will more and nlore become the strategical 
frontier of the British Empire. All these are circum- 
stances that should give us food for reflection, and that 
impose upon us the duty of incessant watchfulness and 
precaution. They require that our forces shall be in a 
high state of efficiency, our defences secure, and our 
schemes of policy carefully worked out and defined. 
Above all, they demand a feeling of solidarity and 
common interest among those -and they include 
every inhabitant of this country, from the Raja to 
the Raiat-whose interests are wrapped u p  in the 
: preservation of the Indian Empire, both for the sake 
of India itself and for the wider good of mankind." 
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In these pregnant sentences ' lord  Curzon defined, 
with the authority belonging alike to his intimate know- 
ledge of Asiatic countries and peoples and to the high 
office he holds under the Crown, the question with 
which British statesmanship is confronted in what 
Captain Mahan has aptly christened "The Middle 
East," that is to say, in those regions of Asia which 
extencl to the borders of India or command the ap- 
proaches to India, and which are consequently bound 
up with the problems of Indian political as  well as 
military defence. The Middle Eastern Question is 
itself only a part of a much larger question upon 
which the future of Asia depends. It is not indeed 
a new question, for it has occupiecl the minds of 
far-sighted statesmen for generations past. It is a 
continuation of the same question with which we have 
long been familiar in the Near East. I t  is closely con- 
nected with the more novel development of international 
rivalry in the Far East. I t  is the outcome of that con- 
stant projection of Europeail forces-moral, commercial, 
and military-into Asia which is  slowly but steadily 
transforming all the conditions that enabled us to 
achieve, ancl so far to retain, as the  masters of India, a 
position of unparallelecl ascende~lcy in the Asiatic 
Continent. 
Owing partly to the innate conservatism of the 
British mind, which is both self-reliant and slow to 
move, prone to criticism yet f ~ ~ ~ ~ c l a m e ~ ~ t a l l y  optimistic, 
and partly to the imnlense conlplexity of our national 
interests scattcl-eci over a world-wide Empire which has 
been built u p  by a series of individual efforts rather 
than by any unifcorm and collective design, we are apt 
as a nation to talie things as we find them, and having 
qo reason to be dissatisfied with them on the whole, we 
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are also disposed to assume that they will g o  on a s  tliey 
are, without troubling ourselves over-much about the 
unceasing changes which are going on around us, and  
which, without malring themselves so  di rect l~and visibly 
felt a s  to compel public attention, are constantly and  
materially affecting the ground upon which we stand 
in our relations to the outside world. Considered solely 
as an absolute quantity, our position in Asia, with which 
it will be generally agreed that our whole position a s  
an Empire is largely bound up, is a s  strong as, if not 
stronger than, it has ever been. Can the same be said 
of it if we consider it not as an absolute but as a 
relative quantity, i.e. in relation to the various other 
quantities which make LIP the great political equation 
of the balance of Asiatic power? Not to spealc for the 
moment of the great continental powers of Europe, has 
the value of those other quantities in the equation, 
which are called Turlrey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, 
Tibet, Siam, remained constant? or  has it not, on the 
contrary, varied so considerably a s  to modify very 
seriously, and in most cases to our detriment, all the 
conditions of the equation? Whether such variations 
are due to internal or to external causes, they ~lecessarily 
affect the problem as a whole, and it will be my object in 
the following pages to try and measure their real im- 
portance and to indicate some of the consequences 


























CHAPTER I 1  
THE PERSIAN ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM 
0 F the factors of the Middle Eastern question which most closely affect our position in India, Persia 
is, with Afghanistan, the most important. Nowhere 
certainly can the conditions which are transforming the 
Asiatic situation be studied with greater profit. Nearly 
fourteen years have elapsed since the present Viceroy 
of India wrote for The Ti?lzer the admirable series of 
letters which he subsequently embodied and developecl 
i n  his exhaustive work, Persia nficl t l ~ e  Perdsian Questiolz 
-a work that deservedly ranks as  the most irnportailt 
modern contribution to our lcnowledge of the condition 
of Persia and to a proper understanding of the part she 
is destined to play, whether actively or passively, in 
the history of Asiatic politics. Persia herself remains 
to-day exactly the same inert organism that Lord 
Curzon described in 1889-90, but her inertia has not 
been proof against the influence of the motive forces 
which have been closing in upon her in the interval. 
Nor is it only that she has herself suffered changes 
which are none the less significant because they have 
been forced upon her. The  events which have taken 
place in Asia outside of Persia have reacted ~ ~ p o n  
Persia herself with a force, which unaided, she has 
been potverless to resist. She  has been gradually 
7 
caught up and overivhelmed in the of inter- 
national ambitions, which she C O L I ~ ~  neither escape nor I 
control. 
U p  to quite the end of the eighteenth century Persia 
had never been seriously thought of in Europe as a 
political factor. All that was lrilown of her had beell 
learnt from the narratives - singularly copious and 
romantic-of the merchant adventurers who had from 
time to time sought more or less successfully to open 
up trade relations with her from Western Europe- 
Curiously enough it was the British " M ~ S C O V Y  Corn- 
pany" that first attempted, in the days when Ivan the 
Terrible reigned at  Moscow and the good Queell Ress 
over these islands, to tap the trade of Persia in British 
interests by way of the Volga and  the Caspian in 
colnpetition with the Portuguese galleons that already 
sailed the Persian Gulf. There are few stranger pages 
of history when read in the light of the present situation Y 
than the records of that Compaily and  of its successor, 1. 
the British Russia Company, which for two centuries 
'p 
, applied themselves repeatedly, and with fluctuating 
fortunes, to conquer the markets of Persia for British 
trade from a Russian base. Their ultimate failure 
coiilcides with L11e period when British enterprise, which 
had been seeking access for some time past both from 
the Mediterranean and from India to the southern 
marlrets of Persia, at  last succeeded in securing a strong 
foothold on the Persian Gulf. T h e  British Caspian 
trade was abolished by a decree of the Empress 
Catherine of Russia in 1746, and the last English 
factories in Northern Persia were abandoned in 1749. 
In 1763 the Shah Kerjm Khan issued a solemn firman 
b 
I to ' ( the  Right Worshipful William Andrew Price, 
i Esquire, Governor-General for the English nation in 
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OUR FIRST RELATIONS WITH PERSIA g 
the Gulf of Persia," granting important rights and 
privileges for the establishment of a factory a t  Bushire, 
and for the sending of British goods customs free all 
over the' kingdom of Persia. It is true that long before 
that date there had been co~nmercial relations between 
India ancl Persia, and British factories in the Gulf, 
both at Jask and a t  Gombroon, or Bunder Abbas, as  
it is now called. A British co~nmercial agent had even 
resided at Isfahln. But British enterprise in the South 
had had to fight the ground inch by inch against other 
European rivals, Portuguese, Dutch, ancl French in 
succession, and it was not till the second half of the 
eighteenth century that that British commercial as- 
cendency was established, which in the course of the 
following century grew into an unchallenged ~nonopoly 
of political influence i n  the Persian Gulf, extending 
from its shores far into the interior of Southern and 
Central Persia, and even to the Persian Court in the 
north. 
It was the devouring genius of the first Napoleon and 
his gigantic schemes of world conquest which led for 
the first time about a hundred years ago  to the establish- 
ment of official diplomatic relations, and to, the conclu- 
sion of a n  important political treaty between this country 
and Persia. The conquests of Nadir Shah, who had 
carried the victorious arms of Persia down to Delhi in 
1739, and of Ahmcd Shah Abdali, who after Nadir's 
death proclaimed himself independent sovereign of the 
Afghans, and had led them down repeatedly to plunder 
the cities and overrun the plains of Northern India, had 
brought home to the British rulers of Ilindustan the 
ever-present danger of invasion from the North. As 
lately as 1796, %eman Shah, a grandson of Ahrned 
Shah Abdali, had advanced as far as Lahore with the 
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professed parpose of rescuing the Mogh~l l  dynasty from 
the domination of the Mahrattas. It is llot surprising 
in these circumstallces that British statesmen s h o ~ ~ l d  
have trembled for the safety of our Indian possessions 
when it became known in 1800 that a scheme was being 
planned in Europe for a fresh invasion of India from 
Central Asia, under the joint auspices of France and 
Russia. Not only had the scheme been discussed 
between Napoleon and the Tsar Paul, but   reparations 
were actually made on the Volga for the despatch of a 
Russian force, and a secret embassy had been sent 
from France to Teheran to arrange for the passage of 
a French army, which was to join hands with the 
Russians in the plains of Northern India. T h e  whole 
scheme was upset by the assassination of the Tsar in 
March, 1801, but the British Government had already 
taken steps effectually to thwart one of its main features. 
Lord Wellesley, then Governor-General of India, had 
despatched Captain John Malcolm to Persia, and ill 
January a treaty of defensive alliance had been success- 
fiilly concluded with Fath Ali Shah,  under which his  
Persian Majesty bound himself, in return for definite 
promises of inaterial assistance, to attack the Afghans 
in the event of lheir attempting to invade India, and to 
prevent the French from " establishing themselves on 
any of the islands or shores of Persia." A few years 
later, however, in 1805, hostilities broke out, not 
between Persia and France, but a t  the instigation of 
the latter, between Persia and Russia, with whom we 
were then in alliance against France. Hard pressed 
by the ~ u s s \ a n s  in Georgia, the Shah appealed to us  
for assistance, pledging himself in return to abandon 
the French alliance, under which Napoleon -was to 
help him to recover the provinces conquered by 
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NAPOLEON 1.3 GREAT SCHEME 
I I 
Russia, and Persia was to declare war against England 
and, as  had been already contemplated in 1800, give 
passage to a French army for the invasion of India. 
The  British Government naturally held that the Treaty 
of 1801 had contemplated quite a different caszbs foe- 
delis, and the Persian overtures were rejected, where- 
upon Fath Ali Shah threw himself altogether into 
the arms of Napoleon. General Gardanne arrived in 
Teheran in 1807 as the political and military pleni- 
potentiary of the French Emperor, who was then at 
the height of his power, and proceeded with the help 
of a large staff of French officers to reorganise and 
equip the Persian Army on European lines. 
But the Treaty of Tilsit, which had entirely changed 
Napoleon's policy towards Russia, cooled the ardour 
of the Persian monarch for a French alliance, which 
he had accepted with an eye to the recovery of his 
Caucasian provinces, rather than with any deliberate 
purpose of hostility towards England. The Indian 
Government, which had taken steps to consolidate 
its relations with the frontier states by despatching 
missions to the Ameers of Sind, t o  the Sikh chief- 
tains, and to the ruler of Kabul, where Mr. Elphin- 
stone concluded a treaty specifically directed against 
the French and Persian " confederacy," again des- 
patched Sir John Malcolm to Persia. By one of those 
strange confusions partly due to departmental jealousy 
alld partly to official carelessness and the want of 
proper co-ordination of our Imperial forces, which 
have been so frequently and seriously detrimental to 
British inter.ests in Persia, the home Government 
appointed at the same time without reference to India a 
plellipotelltiary of its own to proceed direct to Teheran) 
Sir I-Jarford Jones. The conflict of authority between 
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these two representatives, and the contradictory in- 
structions which they kept on receiving from Calcutta 
and from London, were not conducive to successful 
diplomacy. Nevertheless, though often a t  cross-pur- 
poses, our diplomacy " muddled through " in the end. 
On March 15th, 1809, Sir  Harford Jones signed a 
treaty with the Shah, by which Fath Ali annulled all 
previous treaties he had entered into with European 
Powers, and undertook to prevent the passage of 
European armies through his dominions towards India, 
whilst we promised to support him with troops and 
subsidies, and to abstain from intervention, except a s  
mediators, in any war between Persia and Afghanistan. 
This  treaty, though endorsed by the Governor-General 
of India, Lord Minto, was not however ratified a t  home, 
and the wrangling between Calcutta and London over 
the powers of S i r  John Malcolm and Si r  Hariord 
Jones, who were respectively ordered to hold the 
ground against each other, continued to bring both 
governments into ridicule a t  Teheran, until S i r  Gore 
Ouseley arrived in 1812, with authority to supersede 
the two rival plenipotentiaries. Even then the " defini- 
tive" Treaty, which Si r  Gore Ouseley concluded upon 
arrival, was not approved in Lonclon, and it was 
only on November 25tl1, 1814, that a final treaty "for 
the adjustment of the terms of the definitive Treaty of 
181 2 " was duly signed, sealed, and delivered, declaring 
in the preamble that 'lthese happy leaves a re  a nosegay 
plucked from the thornless garden of concord and tied 
by the hand of the plenipotentiaries of the two great 
States." The  most important modifications of the 
treaty of 1812 in the instrument which thus supel-seded 
- it consisted in the withdrawal of the clauses under 
which England had undertaken to assist Persia in the 
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establishment of a naval force and naval stations on the 
Caspian, and to supply officers and non-commissioned 
officers for the reorganisation of the Persian Army. In 
the event of an attack upon Persia by another power, 
England now also reserved for herself the option of 
paying an annual subsidy in lieu of military assistance. 
Fourteen years later, in 1828, when Persia was again 
involved i n  war with Russia, this obligation was com- 
muted into one single payment, at the price of which 
the articles of the treaty of 1814 binding us to give 
assistance to Persia were finally annulled. The  French 
danger in Persia, which even in the days of Napoleon's 
omnipotence was perhaps more visionary than real, 
had long since passed away, and the Russian danger - 
was not yet. So  we could, it was thought, afford to 
regard Persia as a qzsnntite' n&gZz&abk. 
Yet during the two following decades we had frequent 
opportunities of realising how seriously the loss of in- 
fluence we had incurred a t  Teheran by disappointing 
the expectations of the Persian Government could affect 
our interests beyond the frontiers of Persia. Russian 
diploinacy encouraged Fath Ali Shah to seek once 
more in Afghanistan compensation for the cessions of 
territory he had been compelled to make to his northern 
neighbour. From 1837 to 1857 our relations with Persia 
were periodically strained by hostile movements of 
Persian troops, sometimes openly and always covertly 
supported by Russia, against Herat. The  siege of 
Herat  in 1837-8 by a Persian army under the Shah's 
grandson has remained ever memorable for the gallant 
defence, organiscd mainly by the energy and ability of 
a single young British officer, Eldred Pottinger ; but it 
was not raised until a demonstratioil had been made in 
the Pcrsian Gulf, whcre our troops occupied the island 
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of Kllarak. Persia was, however, only temporarily over- 
awed. In 1851 she again attempted to interfere forcibly 
i n  the affairs of Herat, and in  spite of a definite ellgage- 
nle~lt to abstain from such intervention, which was 
signed at Teheran in January, 1853, the attitude of the 
Persian Court led to a complete rupture of diplomatic 
relations in the following year, and in 1855 another 
Persian espedition was despatched to Herat. Again 
the British Government was compelled to bring warlike 
pressure upon Persia, and when Herat was captured 
by the Persians in October, 1S56, a force was sent 
under Sir James Outram to occupy Bushire and 
ivIuhammera11, at the head of the Persian Gulf. The 
campaign was short and almost bloodless, the Persian 
troops being routed at every point almost without a 
struggle ; and in spite of the vain-glorious rhodomon- 
tades of the Teheran Government, which kept on 
issuing grotesque bulletins of fabled victories, the Shah 
deemed it expedient to invoke the good offices of the 
emperor of the French, and on March 25th, 1857, a 
treaty of peace was signed in Paris, by which Persia 
relinquished all claims to sovereignty or to the right of 
interference in Afghanistan. This was, indeed, the only 
stipulation we imposed upon Persia. W e  exacted no 
guarantees for its fulfilment; we asked for no com- 
pensation or concessions beyond a ceremonial apology 
to our Minister, on his return to Teheran, for the 
insults to which he had been subjected before the out- 
break of hostilities ; we agreed to restore every bit of 
Persian territory we had occupied ; we claimed neither 
political nor commercial advantages. One knows not 
whether to admire more the generosity or the im- 
providence of such a treaty. ~t is now sometimes 
suggested that there must have been some connexion 
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between the impending outbreak of the Indian meeting 
and the hasty conclusion of peace with Persia. But a 
mere comparison of dates disposes once for all of that 
fiction. The  treaty was negotiated in Paris in March, 
1857, and  neither a t  home nor in India had the official 
ear caught a t  that time even the faintest mutterings of 
the storm which was to brealc over India two months 
later. The  true explanation is that the importance of 
Persia a s  a factor in the Asiatic problem, which had ' 
I 
been momentarily realised under the pressure of the i. 
Napoleonic danger a t  the beginning of the last century, 
had then been once more entirely lost sight of. 
1 The Crimean war had just been fought, and the 
Eastern question, as the Asiatic problem was then 
called, centred a t  that time in Constantinople. I t  
was held to have been settled under the walis of 
Sebastopol. The  remotelless of Persia, the pressure 
we could always exercise upon her as the masters of 
India, and her vulnerability in the Persian Gulf com- 
bined to relegate her to a subsidiary position on the 
political chessboard. Russia, no doubt, had been for 
a long time pressing heavily upon Persia from the 
Caucasus, indeed ever since the days when Peter the 
Great made his descent upon the southern shores of 
the Caspian, and the Treaties of Gulistan in 1813 and 
of Turkman Tchai in 1828 had already demonstrated 
the powerlessness of Persia to arrest the southward 
progress of her northern neighbour to the west of the 
Caspian. But Russia's conquests appeared to consti- 
tute merely a not unnatural extensioil of her European 
Empire, and she hardly claimed a t  that time to be a 
great Power in Asia, notwithstanding the vast extent of 
territory over which she held sway it1 the north. Though 
the diplornatic records of Teheran coiltailled ample 
! 
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evidence of the subserviency which the Persian Gover*l- 
ment had already not infrequently been compelled to 
show to Kussia at the expense of its good relations with 
Great Britain, it was not until the tide of Russian con- 
quest swept over Central Asia in the latter part of the 
last cen'tury that Russia was able to challenge perma- 
nently in the Persian capital the positioll we had 
hitherto occupied as the greatest European Power in 
Asia. The military occupation of the Trans-Caspian 
regions and the annexation of the Khanates and of 
Merv gave Russia a frontier, marching for over five 
hundred miles with that of Persia to the east of the 
Caspian, and the construction of the Central Asian 
Railway from Khrasnovodsk secured her a strategic 
position which entirely envelops the province of 
Khorasan, and places it and Mazanderan as completely 
at the mercy of a Russian army as  were already the 
Westein provinces of Ghilan and Azerbaijan. 
Even then the results of this great change did not  
make themselves thoroughly felt in Persia until the 
sudden collapse of the Chinese Empire under the 
impact of Japan produced a fresh development of 
the Asiatic problem, pregnant with even more 
momentous issues. That Russia was not satisfied 
with the position she had gained in Central Asia, but 
was determined to make her power equally felt in 
Eastern Asia, had been evident from the moment when 
in 1891 she embarked upon so costly and formidable a n  
enterprise as the construction of a great trunk railway 
connecting her European Empire through the whole 
length of Siberia with her remote possessions on the 
Pacific. The events of 1894-5 in the Far  East took 
Russia, as they took the rest of the world, by surprise, 
long before the Siberian Railway could be completed. 
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RUSSIAN POLICY IN PERSIA 
But  it was already sufficiently advanced to serve her as 
a weapon, offensive a s  well as defensive, in the conflict 
of international ambitions to which the inheritance of 
the "yellow corpse," perhaps somewhat prematurely, 
gave rise. Indeed, if one loolrs back upon the events 
of the last eight years in China, it is difficult to conceive 
how Russia could have played the part she has played 
with such boldness and success in the Far East had she 
not been in a position to use the Siberian Railway both 
as  a n  excuse for pegging- out her claims and as an 
instrument for ultimately enforcing them. 
T h u s  in the brief course of some forty years-say 
between 1860 and 1900-the area of that Eastern ques- 
tion, which only a generation ago appeared confined 
mainly to the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea, has been extended, 
not only across the Caspian to the plains of Central 
Asia, but to the iar-away coast of the Pacific, and the 
problem has assumed a magnitude and a complexity 
which may well strain the powers of even the highest 
statesmanship. Before entering upon a discussion 
of the immediate objects of Russian policy at Teheran 
and  the methods it employs, it is therefore necessary to 
emphasise the point that the importance and signifi- 
cance of Russia's action in Persia cannot be measured 
lnerely by the international interests which it affects 
locally, though these sho~lld not be underrated. The 
of Russia in Persia is only part of a great , 
system of Asiatic policy-commercial, military, and 
political-which is  being steadily built up by the per- 
severing hands of Russian statesmen, wllose breadth 
of grasp and continuity of purpose are liable U) no 
djsturballce from the fluctuations of public sentiment or 
the  of parliamelitary majorities. To 
C 
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them Teheran is merely one link in a long chain which 
stretches from Constantinople to Peking, a n d  the pres- 
sure they apply in Persia is perhaps not infrequently 
meant to be  felt as much in the Far  Eas t  or in  the Near 
East as in the Middle East.  That  policy may  or  may 
not be incompatible with the interests of t he  British 
Empire-an empire whose fortunes can hardly be dis- 
severed from those of its great Indian dependency-but 
it cannot fail to affect them very considerably. I n  a 
minor or varying degree it must also affect t h e  interests 
of other powers who have, or hope to acquire, a stake 
I i n  Asia, hut none of these are a t  present comparable 
I with ou r  own. Not many years ago  the Persian question - 
was perhaps not unnaturaliy regarded a s  a separate 
issue to be dealt with on  its own merits. To-day it 
requires no exceptionally far - sighted statesmanship 
to see that it is merely part of the larger question, 
up011 the solution of which the Iuture of Asia must 
depend. That  question is whether Asia is really a field 
in which there is room for two of the greatest European 
Powers, wliich are also the two greatest Asiatic Powers, 
to fulfil their peaceful mission in  friendly competition, 
or whether their rivairy must ultimately degenerate into 
a struggle for exclusive mastery. T h e  special interest 
which attaches to the Persian branch of tha t  question 
is that, whereas in  other regions of Asia new factors 
are introduced into the problem by the aspirations 
of other powers that  claiin for themselves also a place 
in the Asiatic sunshine, Great Britain and Russia  still 
stand alone and almost face t o  face i n  Persia, in the 
presence of a sick-bed more desperate perhaps than 
that of any other Asiatic monarchy. 
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CI-IAPTER 111 
TI-IROUGI-I I' THE GATES OF TI-IE CASPIAN " 
T I-IE shortest and most convenietlt route for the traveller proceeding from Western Europe to the 
Persia11 capital is by rail through Russia to Baltu and 
thence by steamer acsoss the Caspian to Enzeli and 
Resht. I-Ie will find it also in many ways the most 
instructive, for it will afford him an opportuility of 
noting the energy and enterprise with which Russia 
has not only developed her means of coinm~~nicatiotl in
that direction, but has practically secured to herself the 
monopolyof access to Northern Persia. Less than twenty 
years ago,  when I was first in Persia, the main railway 
system of Russia was entirely cut off from the line, 
which had lhen only been quite recently completed - 
x 
between Baturn and RaItu, by the great mountain range 
of the Caucasus, across which there was only the old 
military road from Vladikavkas to Tiflis over the Dariel 
Pass. ICussia still considered herself hound by Article 59 
of the Treaty of Berlin, under which she had under- 
taken to makc Batum, which had been ceded to her 
under that instrument by Turkey, "a free port essen- . h 
tially commercial," and, by way of Batum, goods for 
Persia and Central Asia could still be imported from 
Europe under a transit pass which exempted them from 
the payment of Russian import duties. At that time, 
' 9  1 
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both for freight and passengers, the most commodious 
route to Northern Persia was therefore unquestionably 
by Constantinople and the Black Sea to Batum and 
thence by rail, vi6 Tiflis, to Baku. This has long 
since ceased. By a mere stroke of the pen Russia 
freed herself, in spite of Lord Rosebery's cogent and 
logically irrefutable protest, from the obligations she 
had contracted a t  Berlin. Not only has Batum ceased 
to be a free port, essentially commercial, but the exac- 
tion of Russian import ancl export duties on all goods 
sent through Batum for Persia or beyond has long 
since killed the old transit trade. On the other hand, 
the Russian railway system, which has been vigorously 
developed throughout Southern Russia, has been linked 
up with Baku and the lines south of the Caucasus to 
Batum and Kars by a line that runs along the northern 
spurs of the mountain range and the coast of the 
Caspian from Rostoff, on the Don, direct to Baltu. 
Besides the ordinary daily service, which is very com- 
fortable but very slow, a weekly t~.aziz I ~ C  L z & x ~ ,  known 
as  the Petroleunl Express," conveys tlte traveller in 
sixty-two hours from Moscow to the great oil city on 
the Caspian at an average speed of twenty-seven miles 
an hour, which, though from our point of view not 
excessive, is in the circumstances as  much as can be 
reasonably expected. There is another and even niore 
expeditious route from Centleal Europe, vi6 Vienna, 
Lemberg, Eltaterinoslaw, and Voroshisk, to Rostoff on 
the Doll and Baku, but it has the disadvantage of 
more numerous changes. I t  is, however, the route 
used for the mails, and whereas twenty years ago tbree 
weelts was the nzininzu?7a for the transmission of letters 
between London and Teheran, the mail from Teheran 
is now often delivered in London, or vice ver,rii, on the 
twelfth day a 
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twelfth day after despatch, and generally within the 
fortnight. 
Frotn another point of view Baku may be regarded 
also as  the  most i~lstructive as well as  the  most con- 
venient point of departure for the traveller passing out 
of Europe into Persia. As if to accentuate the contrast 
which the spectacle of an  ancient Asiatic monarchy in 
the last stage of decay is about to present to him, Baku 
offers him the spectacle of a young and progressive city 
in which the spirit of Western enterprise is far more 
conspicuous than, perhaps, in any other Russian city. 
Distinguished Russian writers lilce Prince Ukhtomsky, 
who claim for Russia a special nlission in Asia, are 
fond of urging that in a certain afinity of race and 
temperament the Russian possesses peculiar qualifica- 
tions for dealing with Asiatics which are denied to the 
Western European, and not least to the Englishman. 
There is no doubt much truth in this contention. The 
most superficial observer who passes into Russia from 
Germany or Austria can hardly help feeling that, what- 
ever the geographical text-books may say, when he has 
once crossed the Russian frontier he is no longer quite 
in Europe, though he is not yet actually in Asia. The 
comparison may seem paradoxical, but to anyone who 
has visited Northern China, Moscow itsclf, with its 
semi-sacred Kremlin, in which the barbaric splendour 
of palaces and  churches, stiff with gold and precious 
stones, has been accumulated for centuries to glorify 
the  mystical association of spiritual and temporal 
sovereignty in  the person of thc Tsar, carries more 
than a suggestion of Peking and its Forbidden City, 
sacred to the Son of I-Ieavcn, Even to the outward eye 
the view from the tower of Ivan Velilcy over the 
thousands of cupolas and domes, gleaming with gold 
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plates or painted in vivid tints of green and blue, and 
the green or brown roofs of the Russian houses, inter- 
mingled with trees and gardens, which mark the pano- 
ralna of Moscow, has no little in common with the 
spectacle which the yellow-tiled palaces and  temples 
of Imperial Pelring and the green or grey roofs of the 
Manchu and Chinese cities in a similar setting of foliage 
present from the walls of the Celestial capital. Just as 
there is no distinct line of demarcation drawn by nature 
between the Russian Empire in Europe and in Asia, 
and the Steppes of the Don and the Volga merge 
imperceptibly into the plains of Central Asia, so 
the Russian character seems to have passed through 
a series of subtle gradations from the Asiatic type 
out of which it was originally evolved into a type 
which can no longer be called Asiatic, but which 
should certainly not be labelled a s  European. In the 
history of nations there has bcen perhaps no more 
curious phenomenon than the experiment upon which I 
the rulers of modern Russia have embarked in their 
endeavour to blend with the fatalism and mysticism 
and passivity of the East the spirit of enterprise and 
individualism peculiar to the West. 
Whatever may be the case in other parts of Russia, 
in Baku, at  any rate, the West has triumphed. Though 
long strings of camels may still be seen jourileyiag 
towards its markets laden with tlie produce of Asia, 
though the Tartar city is still girdled with its ancient 
walls, though Persians and Turkomans in their quaint 
Oriental dresses still crowd its bazaars, Baku is essen- 
tially a European city in which the spirit of the West  
prevails. I t  is, in fact, more European than any other [ 
town in Russia, except, perhaps, St. Petersburg, 
Warsaw, or Odessa. It is not only that it possesses 
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THE OILFIELDS OF BAKU 
spacious streets, well - stocked shops, stately public 
buildings, and handsome private residences, as well as 
great commercial houses, and is in fact equipped with 
most of the modern appliances of a prosperous trading 
city. There is something in the air of the place which 
makes one feel that in Baku he is in what our American 
cousins would call " a  live city." I ts  extraordinarily 
rapid growth can indeed hardly be matched on this 
side of the Atlantic. When I passed through Baku 
in 1884 its population was about 60,000 or 70,ooo. 
To-day it is getting on for a quarter of a million. Its 
prosperity is, of course, entirely due to the great 
oilfields which surround it. I n  1884 they yielded , . 
89,000,000 puds (the pud = 36 Ibs.) ; in 1901 they yielded 
671 ,ooo,ooo puds, or approximately 12,000,000 tons 
of naphtha, which produced for exportation about 
z,5oo,ooo tons of kerosene and over ~,ooo,ooo tons 
of residuals used for fuel on the greater part of the 
Eastern and Southern Russian railways, as well as on 
, 
the Russian steamers on the Volga, on the Caspian, 
and on the Black Sea. A few years ago there was still 
a disposition to believe that the s ~ ~ p p l y  of oil must be 
limited, and that the increasing rapidity of production 
must lead to a n  early exhaustion of the fields., Nothing 
has happened to confirm that idea, and he would be 
a bold man who would attempt to set a limit either to 
the.. productivity or to the life of the Baku oilfields. 
Though from time to time individual wells are abandoned 
because they are exhausted or can no longer be worked 
at a profit, especially in view of the heavy royalties for 
which too sanguine speculatom made themselves re- 
sponsible d~iriilg the petroleum " boom " a few years 
ago, the numbcr of prod~lcing wells has increased 
steadily from 458 in 1891 to 1,924 in 1991. There were 
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842 new wells in boring last year, and 311 old wells One in 
were being deepened, and at the present moment an wide ra 
important scheme is being carried out for draining an  Islands 
inland lalre, which will lay bare an entirely new field Hence, 
reputed to be of exceptional wealth. Of the prodigious where, 
quantities of naphtha stored away in the bowels of the econou 
earth some idea may be gathered from the so-called munitit 
"fountains" or springs of oil that frequently burst respect 
forth in the course of boring and, defying all restraint, Caspia 
shoot up into the air in jets over zoo feet high, which well a: 
it takes days to bring under control. One of these prise, 
"fountains" caught iire on one occasion and burnt State. 
1 
steadily for three weelrs, giving away so much gas  that I ha 
* for that period the streets of Balru twelve miles away of suct 
required no other illuminants. Such accidents, dis- thougt 
astrous as they are, the people of Baltu mention, merely, outpos~ 
and with no little pride, as illustrating what their wells u p  to 
can do, and they do not for a moment disturb their serves 1 
faith in the future of an industry which, apart from 
other developments, already supplies more than half 
the world with petroleum. There is probably much more 
danger at present of over-production than of any falling 
off i n  productivity. The grave economic crisis through 
which Russia has been and is still passing could not 
fail to affect Baku, and, combized with other causes, 
it  has substantially depressed the price of naphtha 
products. During the boom of 1899 the price of crude 
oil rose to 16'7 kopeks per pud. In 1901 it fell to 5-45 
kopeks, and last year it had recovered only to just over 
8 kopelrs per pud. But during the cholera visitations 
and famines of 1892-3 it fell to very much lower values, 
and no fluctuations, however severe, can, it is believed, 
permanently affect the prosperity of a city which con- the Cas 
trols and handles such inexhaustible sources of wealth. sudden1 
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One important factor in the prosperity of Baku is the 
wide range of its trade, which extends from the British 
Islands in one direction to the Far  East in the other. 
Hence, also, the cosmopolitan character of the city, 
where, in spite of the exclusive tendencies of Russian 
economic policy, British and German and French com- 
munities are tolerated and encouraged to play their 
respective parts in endowing this arid reach of the 
Caspian with the social amenities of Western life as  
well as with the material equipment of Western enter- 
prise, to the unquestionable benefit of the Russian 
State. 
I have dwelt at some length on the wonderful picture 
of successful human activity which Baku now presents, 
though only a hundred years ago it was a neglected 
outpost of the Persian Empire, which then stretched 
up to the Caucasus, because, a s  I said just now, it 
serves to heighten the contrast that awaits the Western 
traveller when he lands on Persian soil at Enzeli after a 
voyage of barely two hundred miles. H e  steps at Baku 
straight from the quay of a well-appointed harbour on 
to a small but fairly comfortable steamer, which, after 
calling for some hours at two intermediate points on 
the coast, drops anchor a t  an  early hour on the second 
morning after departure 'from Baku opposite to a mud 
llat with a few low buildings over which the Persian 
flag displays the Lion and the S u n .  That i s  Enzeli. 
T h e  Caspian is so shallow along this shore that, 
thougli tlie steamer only draws about eight feet of 
water, she cannot, even in tlie most favourable circum- 
stances, approach within more than a mile of the royal 
port of Persia. In  unfavourable circumstances-and 
the Caspian has ever been farnous for the violence and 
suddenness of its storms-the steamer cannot even 
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attempt to cast anchor, and luckless passengers have 
been known to  be carried three times from Baku to 
within sight of Enzeli and back. without being able 
to land. In calm weather the traveller's experiences 
between the steamer and his destination at Resht are 
instructive, and, according to his own idiosyncrasies, 
may seem either entertaining or merely wearisome. In 
rough weather they are apt to be painful and sometimes 
even dangerous. From the steamer he transfers him- 
self and his effects as best he can on board a small 
steam launch, which conveys him over the bar to the 
Customs station at Enzeli. The rains caught up from 
the north by the great mountain range which divides 
the main Persian plateau from the Caspian descend 
with almost tropical abundance upon the belt of low- 
lying land which extends from the foot of the hills to 
the seashore, and the streams thus formed flow lazily 
to the Caspian in tortuous channels broadening out 
here and there into great lagoons, which are separated 
from the sea only by narrow spits of land thrown up 
by the action of its tideless waves. Enzeli lies on the 
extremity of one of these spits. After passing through 
the  Customs the traveller has to make his way again 
by water across the Ab-i-murcl, or Dead Water, as the 
Persians aptly call the lagoon some six or seven miles 
in breadth which still lies between him and his destina- 
tion. The  greater part of this can be done i n  a steam 
launch, but if you decide for the steam launch in 
preference t o  a native boat pulled by half a dozen lusty 
Ghilaks, you must have made arrangements beforehand 
for such a boat to meet you at the further end of the 
lagoon, for beyond a certain point there is not enough 
draught of water even for a steam launch, and you 
must, willy-nilly, transfer yourself again from the 
steam la 
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steam laun'ch into a native craft which, after another 
hour of alternate rowing and towing and poling up a 
narrow creek, lands you at  last in the shallow mud 
pond which is called Pireh-bazar, the harboul. of ICesht, 
still some six or seven rniles by road from the city. 
The wl~ole of this northern belt of Persia between 
the Caspian and the mountains is covered with dense 
vegetation, South European in its character, but almost 
tropical in its luxuriance; and on a beautiful morning 
in the early autumn, such as that with which 1 was 
favoured to~vards the middle of September, 1902, it is 
pleasant enough to glide in a native boat across tllc 
placid waters of the lagoon, rellecting the cloudless 
azure of the sliy, and up the winding creek between 
dense masses of jungle, wit11 tier upon tier of blue 
mountains rising mistily i n  the far distance out of the 
heat haze of the moist lo~vlands. 13ut what a contrast 
between the busy scenes, the strenuousness of modern 
life, one has left bel~incl him orlly a few hours ago at 
Baliu, and the old-world apathy arid squalid shiftless- 
ness of this royal road into Persia--a road conceived, 
it would seem, for the express purpose, not of removing, 
but of multiplying obsttlcles to traKc. For years past 
the Persian Government is s~~ppose t l  o have been 
studying sschurnes for cutting n cllnnnol through the 
bar and dredging a port at Enzcli, as  well as for 
providing :a, better :~pproat:h to Rcsht than that which 
l'ireh-haznr affords. Thcrc arc no serious cliilic:ulties 
in the way, tilit rust would [lot bc exr:r!ssivr, and the 
outlay would ibcrtninly be: rcrnurit:rativt:. O I I ~  might 
evttn imi~ginc: that thc ])ride of the Persian rulers, who 
are by no mearis rclut:klllt Lo oopy the West in other 
and less ust:firl matters, would I)(: i:nlist[!d it1 support of ' 
some such schernt: ; for i~ftcr all, apart from :ill economic 
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considerations of trade, it is by way of Enzeli and 
Resht that the mails between Europe and Persia are 
carried and the vast majority of European travellers 
'approach the Persian capital. But year after year 
passes, precious millions are squandered in other direc- 
tions, and the royal road into Persia remains what it 
has been for generations, so that he who travels by it 
may at once leave at  the gates of the Persian kingdom 
any illusions he may have brought with him as to the 
amenability of Persia to any other progressive in- 
fluences than those of compulsion. Between Enzeli 
and Resht he can see Persia as it is. 
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THE "RUSSIAN" ROAD T O  TEHEKAN 
I DESCRIBED in the last chapter those truly Asiatic stages of the royal road into Persia which give so 
much food for reflection to the Western traveller between 
leaving the Caspian steamer at Enzeli and finally land- 
ing on te7.1-rz $)#nzn in the mud-pond harbour of Pireh- 
bazar. There he still finds himself some six or seven 
iniles from the town of Resht. But, nevertheless, he 
feels himself once more almost in Europe, for he is once 
more on a fairly good carriage-road, and that road runs 
not merely into Resht, but thence for some 220 miles 
over difficult mountain ranges to the Persian capital. 
Needless to say, it is not a Persian road-that is to say, 
it is not a road built by Persians. I t  is a Russian 
road, built largely with Russian capital and wholly by 
Russian enterprise, and it constitutes the first, and to 
the traveller of whatever natioi~ality a by no means 
unwelcome, manifestation of the ascendency which 
Russia has gained in Northern Persia, Controlled 
though it be ostensibly by a private company, it is no 
secret that the road from Resllt to Teheran would never 
have bcen constructed and could not be maintained 
without generous assistance from the Iii~ssian State. 
Persia has not contrihutecl a penny towards it, though 
a few Pc!rsinns are ilnderstood to hold shares in the 
29 
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company, just as a few Chinese are supposed $YO fornz6 
to hold shares in the Manchurian Railway. The  outlay 
has been enormous, for, in spite of the undeniable 
difficulties of construction-the road rises to an altitude 
of over 7,000 feet ill crossing the mountaiil range-the 
cost, which is estimated a t  L3oo,cmo, must be pro- 
noui~ced excessive. I t  is, as  I have said, about 220  miles 
long, and of these 220 miles some go miles on the level 
plain between Kazvin and Teheran had already been 
made, a t  least in a rudimentary fashion, by a perstan 
company, which was bought up  by the Russians. T h e  
cost of i~nproving that section of the road must have 
been relatively trifling, and the bullc of the total outlay 
must therefore be assigned to the section between Resht 
and Kazvin, which does not exceed 130 miles in length. 
This represents an average of over La,ooo a mile, and,  
though the road is fairly well built and the engineering 
difficulties encountered in climbing the steep slopes-at 
first so beautifully wooded and then so barren and 
precipitous-to the north of the range, and iu threading 
a way through the gaunt and narrow gorges of sun- 
scorched rock which lead down on to the great plateau 
of Northern Persia, must have bee11 very considerable, 
so heavy an expenditure can be accounted for only by 
the lavish extravagance and absence of all financial 
control which generally characterise Russian under- 
takings of this nature. This, however, is an aspect 
of the question upon which it would be ungrateful to 
dwell, and, for my part, I was much more disposed 
to regret that the Russians had not undertalren the 
exploitation as  well as  the coitstruction of the road, 
instead of sub-letting the former to Persian contractors, 
who ran antediluvian carriages with wretclledly over- 
worked and under-led horses. The contractors, it is 
true, co 
chargec 
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true, complained that, in spite of the heavy rates they 
charged, they are running the road at  a loss, and 
I was assured that the Russians intended before long 
to relieve them of their contract and worlr the road 
themselves with an exclusively Russia11 staff. 
Whether the result of the undertalring be financially 
successful or the reverse, we may be sure that the 
Russians have not been throwing their money away. 
W h a t  their objects are is sufficiently obvious. There 
is no reason to suppose that they have ever contem- 
plated using this road for strategic purposes. The 
difficulties of approach froin the sea are sufficient to 
dispose of any such idea. Moreover, as  I s l~al l  show 
later on, fi-orn the strategic point of view, the north 
of Persia lies absolutely open to Russia i l l  so many 
other directions that she might well have left the 
Resht road to ta le  care of itself. Even without the 
road from Erivan to Tabriz, in North-Western Persia, 
for which the Russians have obtained a concession, 
they can a t  ally moment pour their troops a s  easily 
from Transcaucasia into Azerbaijan as they can along 
the coast of the Caspian from Baku and Lenkoran 
into the proviilce of Gilan. A few years ago, when 
there were troubles at Astrabad, to the south-east of 
the Caspian, the Russians gave Persia a foretaste 
of what they could do in Maenderail by despatching 
a few llundred men from Chikishliar, who remained for 
soine months in occulsation of the provincial capital. 
Further east, again, the Trans-Caspian or Central Asian 
Railway runs for some hundreds of iniles close along the 
northern frontier of Persia, and dominates the whole 
of Khorasan, in the nbscilce of any Persian force which 
can be cligtlifiecl with the narnc of an army. I t  is 
therefore quite unnecessary to suggest strategic reasons 
32 T H E  " R U S S I A N "  ROAD TO T E H E R A N  
for the collstruction of the Resht road to Teheran- 
But Russia, none the less, gets value for her money. 
Not ollly does the road serve the ends of Russian 
commercial policy, which is almost openly directed to 
the acquisition of an absolute monopoly in the trade 
of Northern Persia, but it is in itself a splendid and 
perfectly legitimate advertisement of Russian illfluence. 
Russian occupies the place of honour in every document 
drawn up in connection with transportation 011 the road. 
The names of all the stations figure conspicuously in 
Russian characters. The barriers at  which the Russian 
company levies its tolls are in  the hands of Russian 
officials. The Russians have the maintenance of the 
road, and all the gangs employed on repairs are under 
the orders of Russian overseers. Not only, therefore, 
is every Persian travelling along the main road from 
the north to the capital made to  feel that the Russians 
hold the right of access to it, but the inhabitants of all 
* the adjoining districts, who provide the requisite labour, 
are taught to look up to the Russians as their employers 
and their masters. But though the advantages which 
Russia thus reaps froin this undertaking deserve to be 
noted, it would be unfair as well as  futile to cavil a t  
them. The whole position which Russia has acquired 
in the north of Persia deserves, I think, to be studied 
in a spirit, not of idle recrimination, but of dis- 
passionate, and even friendly, consideration. 
Whilst the road from Resht to Teheran affords a 
perfect illustration of Russian activity, it happened t o  
afford, whilst I was passing over it, an accidental, but 
equally striking, illustration of Persian medizvalism. 
The Shah was on his way back from Europe, and 
in accordance with immemorial custom, the whole of 
his Court, numbering thousands of retainers, was 
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hurrying down to welcome him at the frontier. It  
was the strangest and most picturesque spectacle which 
the eye of an artist enamoured of quaint contrasts, 
or of a student in search of a typical presentment 
of the unchanging East, could hope to light upon. 
For hours at a time there streamed past us a cease- 
less procession of camels, mules, horses, carts and 
litters, laden with the person~zeZ and the paraphernalia 
of an Eastern Court, which, though it has to some 
slight extent adopted a travesty of European fashions, 
and has lost from other causes much of its ancient 
splendour, is still in most respects as barbaric as  when 
Tavernier's travels excited the wonder of the French 
people, accustomed to the magnificence of the R o i  
SoZeiZ. An advanced guard of Persian Cossacks- 
a squadron of the brigade of Persian ' ' Cossack" 
cavalry which, d r k e d  and officered by Russians, alone 
stands for efficiency in the Persian Army-opened the 
march with some show of ordered pomp. At  some 
distance behind them came a regiment of Persian 
infantry, slouching along the road in every variety 
of patched or tattered uniform-once upon a time sky 
blue-some with two shoes of different patterns, many 
with only one, and most of them with none, the 
majority old men or mere boys, with a sprinkling of 
every other age, from extreme youth to extreme senility. 
Their rifles, marked by the same variety of pattern and 
condition, came afterwards, stuck promiscuously on to 
the pack of any unobjecting mule. Those who had 
fallen out hopelessly on the way, or had a few coppers 
to spare-or were they, perhaps, the officers ?-we met 
later on, reclining in picturesque confusion on the top 
of cumbrous baggage carts. A military band was 
conveyed in an even more original fashion, each of the 
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larger instruments-big drums, trombones, horns, etc, 
-crowning in solitary grandeur the load of a pack 
camel, What  the endless strings of beasts of burden 
carried in the huge wooden chests and packages of 
every shape and size under which they slithered down 
the steep mountain slopes, one could only guess at when 
some mishap necessitated the repacking of a load in 
the middle of the road. Then one might: get a glimpse 
of costly carpets and tent walls of many colours, of 
robes of honour and sillre11 embroideries, of quilted 
bedding and cushions of soft texture, Here and there 
a silver ewer, or a piece of gaudy French furniture, 
which had been overlooked uiltil the last moment, or 
had proved recalcitrant to Persian packing, was tied 
on loosely with a bit of string, and kept clanking on 
the side of the load as the unconscious mule disported 
himself along the road. 
On brightly caparisoned horses officers of the house- 
hold, with their silver staves of ofice stuck jauntily 
under the thigh, and a leather peak adjusted to their 
black lambswool cap at  the proper angle to shield their 
eyes from the sun-a very practical adjustment, which, 
however, imparts to the wearer a curiously rakish air- 
Court attendants of various ranks-many of them, no 
doubt, generals of the first or second class, a rank which 
is liberally conferred in Persia for services entirely un- 
connected with the art of war-flunlreys in scarlet coats,. 
with faded bravery of gold and silver lace, high officials 
of State in full-waisted black broadcloth coats of semi- 
European design, ??ztelLn7ts in green or white turbans, of 
diflerent degrees of sanctity and learning, notabilities 
of the countryside from far and near, and hundreds of 
menials and camp followers of evcry description, real 
"beggars on horseback," jostled each other in be- 
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wildering confusion along the road, or sat in  groups a t  
the wayside resthouses, discussing the latest gossip 
over their waterpipes and tea. I n  hooded Russia11 
carts drawn by four l~orses abreast, or in wooden 
panniers slung on either side of a camel, Persian ladies 
of high and low degree-their faces and their figures 
alike shrouded beyond any recognition in the ample 
blaclc domino and thick white linen veil which all 
invariably wear out of doors-were following in the 
wake of their lords and masters. Further on, close to 
Teheran, we came across two huge camps in which the 
Shah's harem or nnde?~oo72, to use the Persian equivalent, 
which had been suddenly commanded by telegraph 
from Europe to wait upon his Majesty a t  the frontier, 
were resting after a night's march, during the heat of 
the day, in charge of Court officials and black eunuchs. 
At intervals the road was cleared for the passage of 
some Prince of the Blood or great officer of State, 
travelling down in an ancient brougham or caZ2che, 
with four or six horses Ei Zu D a z ~ ~ z o ~ z t  and .seedy postil- 
lions, followed by an uncouth retinue of pipe-bearers 
and ferrarhss on llorseback. 
It was a wonderful succession of tableaux vivants, 
embodying the whole story of what " Eothen " terms 
the glory and the havoc of the East-more especially 
the havoc. If only one could have recorded the scene 
on a cinematograph for production at the Ilippodrome, 
where the Shah had himself been seen but a few weeks 
bcfore surrounded by the well-ordered pomp of the 
West, it would have helped not only the British 
public, but even responsible statesmen a t  home, to form 
somc conception of men and things as they realIy are 
in Pcrsja. Just imagine what a reckless waste of time 
and money this motley pilgrimage means ! For a 
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month a t  least the whole business of the State, such as 
it is, is a t  a standstill. The  Shah  was, of course, stated 
to have given emphatic orders, immediately upon his 
accession, that the Court was not to prey up011 the 
country througll which it moved, and that everything 
was to be paid for a t  full value. Brit how is the S h a h  
to lctlow whether his orders are carried out? Of course 
they are not carried out, and 110 swarm of locusts lays 
a countryside inore bare t l~an  this ceremonial army on 
the march, As  for the drain oil the Shah's exchequer, 
it is impossible to form any trustworthy estimate, b ~ l t  I 
was assured that the mere cost of moving the royal 
iz~zde~-oon from Teheran to Resht arnountecl to 30,000 
tomans, or about £6,000. The  total expenditure 
probably did not fall far short of £40,000 or  £go,ooo, 
and this in  a country reduced t o  the utmost iinancial 
straits, of which the total public revenue for all pur- 
poses is not believecl to exceed one and a half lllillioil 
sterling per annum. But it is a n  ancient custom, and, 
if it is a plague La the people of the country and a heavy 
drain upon the exchequer, it is a source of spler-]did 
profit to many powerful individuals, whose vested 
interests even the Shah inust think twice belore he 
touches. The  East cannot, and  shoulcl not, be judged 
by the staiidards of the West. But in this procession 
of a moribund past, with its strange mixturc of magtlifi- 
cencc and squalor, passing unconcernedly clown the 
'<  Russian " road to the Persian capital, thc rnost casual 
o l  Western observers could llardly fail to find vivid 
reminder of the fateful writing on the wall, trn~lslated 
on this occasion into Russian c1laracte1.s. 
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CHAPTER V 
RUSSIAN ASCENDENCY IN TEHERAN : THE 
POWER OF THE SWORD 
P ETER the Great's celebrated will is doubtless an apocryphal document, but it call nevertheless 
hardly be denied that in it are to be found the germs 
of the Asiatic policy which his successors on the 
Russian throne have more or less deliberately pursued 
down to the present day. It was Peter the Great who 
gave the first impulse to Russian ambitions in the 
direction of Persia. In 1715 he despatched to the 
Persian Court a t  Isfallan under Colonel Walinslry the 
first of those semi-military missions with undefined 
and elastic powers which have played since then so 
large a part in the Asiatic diplomacy of Russia. 
Within eight years from that date Peter himself had 
advanced as  far a s  Derbend on the Caspian at the head 
of a Russian army, and xvrested froin the feeble young 
Shah Tahmasp 11,' in return for illusory promises of 
assistance against the Afghans, a treaty ceding to 
Russia the whole of the Persian littoral provinces of 
the Caspian. T h e  bargain was, however, never carried 
out, and on thu death of Pcter in 1725, Nadir Kuli 
Khan, whose fame as Nadir Shah was soon to spread 
throughout Asia, had little dilficulty in  re-establishing 
Persian authority in the provinces which his master 
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had so  lightly abandoned, and by the Treaty of R e s I ~ t  
in 1732, and by that of Gandja in 1735, Russia  forrnally 
restored them to Persia, and for fifty years made no 
further move. But Catherine 11. began to take an in- 
telligent interest in the fate of all the Christiarl popula- 
tions subjected to the yoke of her Mussulmarl neighbours, 
and  in 1783 she agreed to extend her protection to the  
Georgians of the Caucasus. She did not, it  is true, 
save them from the wrath of Agha Muhammed, thc 
founder of the present Persian dynasty, who, acc:ord- 
i n g  to a Persian historian, "gave to the Georgian 
unbelievers a specimen of what they were t o  expect 
on the Day of Judgment." But i n  1796 she  sen l  
a n  expedition to avenge them. Her dcath and the 
accession of Paul I. alone saved Teheran, to which 
the Kajar ruler of Persia had only recently transfcrrcd 
the capital, from actual occupation by a Russian army. 
Alexander I. prolnptly resumed the task which his  
predecessor had abandoned. The Treaty of Gulistarl 
in  October, 1813, merely arrested for a few years t11c 
tide of Russian conquest which had already perma- 
nently severed from Persia the provinces of Georgia, 
Mingrelia, Daghestan, Shirwan, Karabagh, and TaIish. 
Constant disputes rose over the new boundaries, a n d  
in 1826 hostilities broke out afresh with disastrous 
results to  Persia. By the Treaty of Turkman Cliai 
of February 28th, 1828, she finally ceded to  Russia  thct 
provinces of Erivan and Nakshivan in addition to tliosc 
which had already been wrested from Iler. Within  sonic? 
thirty years Persia had been drivcn right ou t  of tilt: 
Caucasus to the south bank of the Araxes, ancl off tlrc: 
western shores of the Caspian as far a s  Astcra. l'llc 
frontier between Russia and Pcrsia to the west of tlle 
Caspian, as laid down in the Treaty of Turkrnan Chai, 
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has remained up to the present clay ~rnalterecl. But to 
the east of the Caspian the steacly absorption by Russia 
of the ( (  no man's land," wllich formerly covered the 
northern and north-eastern frontiers of Persia, has led 
to various readjustments of boundaries, always, of 
course, for thc benefit of Russia. I n  1838 the island 
of Ashurnda, ol'f' the Bay of Astrabad in thc Caspian, 
was occupied hy the Russians. In 1869 the Russia~ls 
having established a military station a t  Khra~n~vods l i  
on the eastern shorcs of the Caspian, an agreement mas 
clrawn 1113 lixing the River Attrek as the frontier of 
Persia and Iiussin for some thirty miles from its mouth, 
and this was s~~pplemented in 1881 by a formal con- 
vention defining the~vl~ole  boundary of the two countries 
cast of the Caspian. 
From Mourlt Ararat in the west to the I-Ieri Rud 
River in the east Persia is dominated by the over- 
~v l~e lming  military forces of the Russian Empire. On 
either side of thc Caspian Iiussian Lroops could be 
poured at any moment across her land frontiers, from 
the borders of Turkey to those of Afghanistan. Between 
the Black Sea and the Caspian Russia has her Corps 
d'Al-in&c of the Caucasus. Its strength on a peace 
footing amounts altogether to 52,000 men, whereof 
38,000 infantry, z,& cavalry, and 5,000 artillery with 
156 guns, or altogethcr q6,m men, are in fixed garri- 
sons, ~v l~ i l s t  ix battalions of infantry, three regiments 
of Cossacks, ancl four Cossack batteries with twcnty- 
eight guns, altogether G,ooo men of all arms, are 
quartered in outlying stations and camps away from 
the fixed garrisons. T o  this forcc must be added, for 
war purposes, the 63rd, 64tl1, Gstli, ancl 66th Divisions 
of the Reserve and local Icvies. The Cbr$s CE)Ar)72t;C of 
the Caucasus is divided into two corps. Tbe head.. 
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quarters of the 1st Corps are at Alexandropol, where 
the 39th Division of Infantry with its brigade of 
artillery is permanently stationed, whilst its Cossack 
cavalry is thrown forward to Erivan. Alexandropol is 
138 miles distant from and south of Tiflis, where are 
the headquarters of the 2nd Caucasus Corps. It is 
only forty-eight miles from Alexandropol to Erivan, in 
close proxiinity to the Persian frontier, whilst the great 
fortress of Kars lies about forty miles west. The 
Trans-Caucasian Railway from Tiflis, a purely strategic 
railway, has been constructed through very difficult 
and mountainous country to Alexandropol, with a 
branch line to Kars, and on to Erivan in the direction 
of the Persian frontier. It is now being rapidly ex- 
tended from Erivan towards the Araxes, and from its 
terminus at Julfa 011 the frontier it will be an easy 
march of only eighty miles along the carriage-road, for 
wllich the Russians have secured the concession from 
the Persian Government, into Tabriz, the capital of 
Azerbaijan, and the most important city in North- 
Western Persia, where the Veli Ahd, or Heir Apparent 
to the Persian throne, now holds his court, as did his 
father, the present Shah, until his accession. East of 
Azerbaijan stretches the province of Ghilan, along the 
south-west shores of the Caspian. In this direction 
again the Russians have carried out surveys for a rail- 
way from Baku southwards along the coast through 
Lenlroran to the Persian frontier at  Astera, which will 
give them direct access into Ghilan. The project has 
been for the present dropped or postponecl, but it will 
certainly be put sooner or later into execution. 
The Caspian itself is a Russian lake in the fullest 
sense of the term, and would doubtless in any case have 
been so, even if Persia had not been compelled as far 
back as the ' 
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back as the Treaty of Turkman Chai in 1828 to sub- 
scribe to an engagement, under which she is debarred 
from flying her flag 011 its waters. The  monopoly 
which Russia thus obtained for her ships of war was 
further secured for her merchant flag by a decree of the 
Imperial Council of State a t  St. Petersburg issued 
November nqth, 1869, prohibiting the establishment of 
companies for the navigation of the Caspian by any 
but Russian subjects and the purchase of any shares in 
such conipanies by foreigners. To-day, in addition to 
a small flotilla of despatch vessels and  gunboats, there 
is in the Caspian a considerable fleet of mail and 
merchant steamers under the Russian flag, many of 
them with a large carrying capacity, employed in the 
Baku petroleum trade, which would be available a t  any  
moment for the transport of troops. T h e  island of 
Ashurada, in the south-east corner of the Caspian, 
just off the coast of Mazenderan, is occupied by the  
Russians as a naval station. 
East of the Caspian the Russian forces along the 
Persian frontier form part of the Turkestan Co@s 
d'Anlrh of a peace strength of 22,000 men with thirty- 
eight guns. Of the two corps into which the Turkestan 
Corjs rl'Arrlt6e is divided, the 1st has its headquarters 
a t  Tashkcnd, and may be regarded mainly as a Central 
Asian police force. T h e  2nd Corps has its head- 
quarters at Ashkabacl, the military and administrative 
capital of Trans-Caspia, and the greater part of i t  is 
distributed along thc Trans-Caspian Railway, which 
skirts the Persian frontier more or less closely for some 
zoo miles. As far as I have been able to ascertain, it 
consists, on a peace footing, of the sth, 6th) 7th and 8th 
brigadcs of Turkcstan Rifles, two brigades of Trans- 
Cnspiarl Cossacks, two railway battalions, four batteries 
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of horse and field artillery, and one mountain battery, 
the whole distributed apparently in about equal pro- 
portions between fixed garrisons and outlying camps 
and stations. Its most: advanced post 01.1 the Caspian 
is at Chikishliar, whence a few years ago, when disturb- 
ances occurred at Ashkabad, the capital of Mazenderan, 
in connection with quarantine measures, a Russian 
force was despatched to protect the Kussian Consulate. 
It marched into Ashlrabad within three days, and re- 
mained four months in possession, just to drive home 
the lesson. Further east the great province of Khor- 
asan lies equally at Russia's mercy. From Ashkabad, 
which is only twenty miles distant from the Persian 
frontier, a carriage-road, for which the Russians, of 
course, hold a concession, opens up an easy route 
through Kuchan to Meshed, the capital and holy city 
of Khorasan, which the Russians moreover now 
equally dominate from the east along the valley of the 
Heri Rud. 
Whilst with all the resources of a great military 
empire behind it, and linked up  with its base by a 
great railway system, which is being steadily extended 
and perfected, the Russian Army holds every strategic 
point that commands the northern provinces of Persia, 
what has Persia to show for the protection ot such a 
long and vulnerable line of frontier ? It is no exaggera- 
tion to say that with the exception of one small brigade, 
to which I shall refer presently, Persia has absolutely 
nothing in the shape of an  army which could evcn 
harass the movements of a hostile army. On paper the 
Persian Army numbers about 80,000 men, I11 reality, 
barely half that number could he mustered, and if they 
were mustered, they would merely swell what Lord 
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slovenly units," which in war lnust "dege~lerate on the 
least provocation into a rabble." Now and then 
reforms are tallted about, but they come to nothii~g, 
and the Persian solclier, ill-disciplined, ill-officered, ill- 
equipped, and ill-paid, even when 11e gets his pay, is 
nothing more than a coolic in a tattered uniform, who 
can far more often be seen doing odd jobs in the streets 
as  a manual labourer than performing any of the duties 
of military service. The sentries who are si~pposed to 
be "on guard" at  the foreign Legations and Consulates 
are only too glad to be lnorc usefully and lucratively 
employed in weeding the garden, or in "fagging " 
for the servants. Yet Persia unquestionably pos- 
sesses the raw material of an  cscellent army. The 
experiment of working up that n1ate1-ial into an efficient 
force is, in fact, being already macle, and the result is 
the one small brigade to which 1 alluded just now. 
But that solitary exccptio~l is not ollc which need cause 
Russia any apprehension. For the Persian ' ( Cossack" 
brigade has been formed, and is officered, by oficers of 
the Russian Army. 
I n  bygone times English, French, and Austrian 
officers have in turns taken in hand the task of re- 
organising the Persian Army, but owing to the lack of 
adequate support, if for no other reason, their efforts 
invariably ended i n  more or less ignominious failure. 
Russian oficers werc thc last to nppcar upon the scene, 
and their succc?ss has been duc, not only to the power- 
ful  backing upon whicli they could depend, but to the 
business-like fashion in  which they went to work, 
They never attempted to tackle the Persian Army as 
a ~vholc. Acting upon the French proverb, Qzii C.09 
e m b r a ~ ~ e ,  ?unl &rci9tf, they confined themselves to the 
organisation of a small forcc, entiruly under their own 
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control, which they could handleand mould to their own 
satisfaction. The whole brigade of Persian "Cossacks " 
consists of four regiments of cavalry, one of them 
called a Guards regiment, and of two battalions of field 
artillery. These regiments are not kept at  their f ~ d l  
strength, and the brigade only musters altogether 
about 2,000 men, originally recruited at random, but 
now chiefly drawn from one large tribe of Persian 
nomads. They are armed with Berdan rifles and 
Russian guns, and though they do not present on 
parade the spick-and-span appearance of our native 
Indian troops, all authorities concur in describing 
them as  smart, alert, well-drilled, and well-disciplined. 
There are only three Russian officers attached to the 
brigade, but they have succeeded in training Persian 
officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as i n  
drilling the rank and file. It is, however, only within 
the last few years that the brigade has attained its 
present high standard of efficiency, and this is largely 
due to the remarkable personality of its commander, 
Major-General Kosagomslry, whom the Tsar raised to 
that rank in the Russian Army, over the heads of a 
number of senior officers, in acknowledgment of the 
excellent work he had done at Teheran. Standing 6 feet 
3 inches or 4 inches in his boots and massively built, 
with a strong and energetic countenance, he looks every 
inch q born leader of men. A splendid organiser, he 
has thrown himself heart and soul into his work. He 
has p'ersonally designed and superintended the ~01.1- 
struction of the spacious new barracks overlooking the 
great Meidan or central square of Teheran, as well as 
the remodelling of some old Persian barracks adjoining 
them, and both men and horses are now housed in a 
way which had never before entered into the wildest 
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dreams of a Persian soldier. By the general's kind 
permission I was allowed to visit every part of the 
buildings, and in that land of universal dirt and un- 
tidiness it was a pleasure to see such order and clean- 
liness in the men's quarters, as well as  in the workshops 
and in the stables, while the smart, soldierly bearing of 
the men and their fine physique and general air of 
manliness and coiltentme~lt showed what admirable 
materials for an army Persia still possesses. No doubt 
part of the secret of General Kosagowslry's success is 
that the men are well fed, and, above all, regularly 
paid. On this point the General stands no nonsense, 
and, owing to the peculiar relations in which the 
Persian Govern~nent stands to the Russian Bank 
established a few years ago a t  Teheran, he has little 
difficulty in having his own way. He frames his own 
Budget, and he i~lsists upon its requirements being 
complied with. If the Persian Treasury procrastinates, 
he draws up011 the Russian Banlr, and when the latter 
presents the bill, ways and means have to be found to 
meet it. Moreover, the General's position is one of 
complete independence. He is not in any way sub- 
ordinate to the Persian Minister of War, but is under 
the orders of General Kuropatlrin, the Russian Minister 
of War. His position, a s  far a s  the Cossack brigade is 
concerned, is in fact very similar to that which the 
British Serdar of the Egyptian Army occupies in Egypt. 
Even his men are withdrawn from the ordinary juris- 
diction of the Persian War  Office, and a special depart- 
ment of the Persian Foreign Office deals with any 
question concerning them, 
The Shah is under deep obligations to General 
Kosagowsky, to whose influence the ease with which 
his Majesty made good his rights to the succession 
1 
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after the assassinatioll of his father must in no small 
measure be attributed. Muzaffer-ed-Din hesitated a t  
first to assume the burden of what may well have 
appeared to him a damnosn herediifos. The tragic 
circumstances of his father's death were calculated to 
unnerve a stronger man than he has ever show11 himself 
to  be. H e  suspected his brothers, the Zill-es-Sultan, who 
was Governor of Isfahan, and the Nai'b-es-Sultaneh, 
who was Minister of War ,  and he insisted up011 obtain- 
ing a written pledge of their loyalty before he seated 
himself on the throne. British influence secured the 
Zill-es-Sultan's adhesion, which he indeed gave with 
every appearance of goodwill. The Nai'b-es-Sulkneh, 
probably out of sheer fright of committing himself 
to  anybody or anything, showed more reluctance, 
and General Kosagowslry is believed to have used 
very peremptory arguments in overcoming it. When 
Muzaffer-ed-Din was a t  last solemnly installed, the 
Russian General's drawn sword played a not in- 
conspicuous part in quickening the loyal sentiments of 
his Majesty's lieges. That the Shah should have 
permanently a t  his disposal such an efficient force as  t 
the  Cossack brigade goes far to assure the stability of 1 
his throne. d i 
On the other hand, as  the Shall must be perfectly 
well aware that Russia's interest in the stability of his 
throne is conditioiled upon his subservie~lcy to her, it  
i s  obvious that the existence of such a force, which has 
been practicaIly created and is maintained solely by 
Russian influence, adds tremendously to the prestige 
as well as to the power of Russia, and not ~nerely in  
Teheran. Such is the confidence the Kussiails are now 
able to  place in the eficiency and devotion of their 
THE U 
Persian Cos: 
to keep ther 
ments are se 




Isfahan I me 
in South-Eas 
act as guards 
such they arc 
deal of useful 
in Teheran, 
siderable Ion 
carries to rem 
the story of F 
methods ; anc 
Nor mould it 1 
a force in the 
be a guarante 
which cnures 
nationalities, ; 
the bread riot 
the Governor 4 
Whether, in t 
woulcI be proo 
remains t o  be 
still considera 
costs true to 
great rncasure 
oficcr then ill 
of service in P 
to replace a m; 
THE USES OF THE PERSIAN COSSACKS 47 





i v  n himself 
bultnn, who 
,-Stmlt;\neh, 








i t ,  When 
~ h t ; ~ I l t * ~ \ ,  the 
, :k trot in -  
entiments of 
~t1011l~i have 
i t t l l  t force a5 
c .stiri)ilitj9 of 
\ H' l>t!ffif~oy 
ability uC his 
uvy ttx I~er, it 
;*a+, autbich has 
,cd F L T ) ~ L : ~ ~  by 
a tila. ~~rtdip 
[tot rnrqrdy in 
,siart% arth 
ut io~l  crf 
Persian Cossaclrs that they no longer find it necessary 
to keep them always under their own eyes. Detach- 
ments are sent away for a time into distant provinces. 
There are some, for instance, in the north-eastern 
province of Ichorasan ; there are some in Arabistan, 
the south-western province which marches with the 
Turlrish vilayet of Baghdad. On my way down to 
Isfahan I met a party proceeding to Yezd and Kerman 
in South-Eastern Persia. They are often appointed to 
act as guards or escort to provincial governors, and as 
such they are in a position not only to collect a great 
deal of u s e f ~ ~ l  intelligence for the Russian headquarters 
in Teheran, but to exercise in the same interest con- 
siderable local influence. Every one of these men 
carries to remote parts of the Persian lri~lgdoln not ollly 
the story of Russian might, but the praise of Russian 
methods ; and in this case the praise is not undeserved. 
Nor would it be fair to forget that the presence of such 
a force in the hancls of Russian officers may sometimes 
be a guarantee for the maintenance of public security 
which ellures to the benefit of foreign residents of all 
nationalities, a s  was clearly seen two years ago, during 
the bread riots provoked by the audacious attempt of 
the Governor of Teheran to engineer a corner in wheat. 
Whether, in the event of a great crisis, thc Cossacks 
would be proof against an appeal to religious sentiment 
remains to be seen, for the influence of the Jfzrlktlw. is 
still considerable. Whether they would remain at all 
costs true to their salt would probably depend, in a 
great measure, upon the personality of the Russian 
officer then in command. General Kosagowsky's term 
of service in Persia expired last spring. I t  is dificult 
to replace a man of his stamp, and Colonel Zuboff, the 
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, 
I - distinguished young officer who, a t  least temporarily, 
succeeded him, is of a different type. But the Cossack 
I 
brigade will anyhow remain a significant and per- 
, manent emblem of Russian military ascendency in 
I Teheran, which, short of a Russian army of occupa- 
, tion actually quartered in the Persian capital, could / 
i 
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CHAPTER VI 
RUSSIAN ASCENDENCY IN TEI-IERAN : TIIE 
POWER OF T H E  13URSIS 
B E S I D E S  the power of the sword Russia wields at the present moment in Telleran with at least equal 
might the power of the pursc. T h c  methods by which 
she has acquired it are similar to tllose which she has 
employed with so much success in China, and they 
aptly illustrate the intimate connectio~l which exists 
between the Far Eastern and the Middle Eastern ques- 
tions. The  activity of Iiussian diplomacy in Teheran 
during the last few years has consL~ntly lcept time with, 
and in many instances assumed exactly tlie same shape 
as, the activity which it has displayed during the same 
period in Peking. In both cases its guiding principles 
are the same, namely, that by bolstering up a weak 
and corrupt Oriental monarchy, ant1 securing its com- 
plete subserviency by a judicious combination of force- 
ful pressure and pecuniary suasion, the ends of Russian 
policy can be, perhaps more slowly, but more surely 
attained, and at infinitely less cost and risk than by 
open and violent aggression. Nothing can be more 
instructive than the way in wllicll history has been 
repeating, or rather duplicating, itself in Pelting and in 
Teheran. 
111 Peking the iirst maniiesta~ion ui tlic rtsce~xle~lcy 
1.; 19 
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she had gained over the Chinese Government by her 
intervention at the close of the Japanese war, when, 
with the help of France and Germany, she ousted Japan 
from the Liaotong Peninsula for her own ulterior pur- 
poses, was the loan which she compelled China to 
accept in June, 1895. The Customs revenue of China 
was still intact, and being practically under Western 
administration, it offered alnple security for a loan 
concluded on ordinary busiiless lines, which would have 
enabled her to meet the Japanese war indemnity. Ne- 
gotiations were actually proceeding with the representa- 
tives of leading European firms, whose joint co-opera- 
tion would have safeguarded the financial independence 
of China. Russia peremptorily vetoed the acceptance 
of those proposals and thrust the Franco-Russian loan 
upon the Chinese, as it were, at the point of the 
bayonet. It was a Franco-Russian loan in this sense, 
that Paris supplied the money, but it was the Tsar's 
signature which constituted the guarantee. It was 
towards Russia and not towards France that China 
found herself placed in a positior~ of financial depend- 
ence, whilst Russia a t  the same time obtained a first 
lien upon the revenue of the Chinese Customs, to which 
no great power contributes a smaller fraction than Russia 
herself. The inevitable results were not slow to follow. 
A Russian bank-euphemistically called the Russo- 
Chinese Bank-was established in China, which speedily 
developed into a regular branch of the Russian Ministry 
of Finance, and the Russians obtdined in the following 
year a concession for the construction of the " Eastern 
Chinese Railway" to be connected with the Siberian 
Railway, which from those modest beginnings has ex- 
panded into a charter for the occupation of the whole 
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Viceroyalty firmly entrenched behind the guns of Port 
Arthur. 
I have thought it necessary briefly to recall these 
circumstances because Russia is so clearly applying in 
Persia the methods which she has found so successful 
in China. Into the causes which have driven Persia to 
have recourse to foreign loans I shall have occasion 
to refer later on. Suffice it for the present to say that 
when Muzaffer-ed-Din succeeded to tbe throne, he found 
the Treasury a t  a much lower ebb than he had expected, 
and the enormous expenditure which a succession 
always involves in Persia very soon depleted it. In 
1898 the Persian Government begail to feel the pincl~ 
of poverty so severely that, when the Shah proposed to 
undertake a journey to Europe, there were no funds 
available for the purpose, and still less to rneet heavy 
arrears of payment he could 11ardly leave the country 
without discharging. I t  was therefore decided to try and 
raise a considerable loan abroad. The  Treasury had al- 
ready, in 1892, borrowed &~oo,ooo on the security of the 
Customs of the Persian Gulf from the Imperial Bank 
of Persia, a British i~lstitution founded with a great 
flourish of trumpets when Sir  Henry Drummond-Wolff 
was a t  Teheran, for the purpose of fulfilling some at  
least of the functions of a state bank, The proceeds 
of that loan had gone to the payment of compensation 
for the abolition of the Persian Tobacco Monopoly-an 
ill-starred undertaking which, lipkc the Persian Mining 
Corporation, had served mainly to give Persia a bad 
name in English financial circles, Unfortunately the 
Imperial Bank had also suffcrccl, quite unfairly, from 
the discredit into which all Persian ventures had fallen, 
and as soon as, a t  the request of the Persian Govern- 
ment, it began to feel the pulse of the London money 
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market, it became clear that without energetic Support 
from the British Government there was little prospect 
of success for a Persian loan; but in spite of the 
urgent advice of Sir Mortimer Durand, then British 
Minister a t  Teheran, official circles in London hesitated 
and  procrastinated. The security offered was unques- 
tionably adequate, namely, the Customs revenues of 
Southern Persia ; and in view of our important com- 
mercial and political interests in that region, it  was 
eminently desirable that their control should not pass 
into other hands than ours. Whether it was necessary 
to insist upon immediate control of the Custoin Houses, 
as the British capitalists demanded, instead of the 
eventual control which the Persians were ready to 
concede i n  case of default, is a disputable point. It 
was ostensibly on this rock that the negotiations were 
shipwreclted, though in return for a small advance 
of 650,000 to meet its most pressing requirements, the 
Persian Government had in the meantime consented to 
the Imperial Bank placing its own agents in charge 
of the Custom Houses a t  Bushire and Kermanshah. 
T h e  delay caused by discussions on this point at any 
rate gave time for other influences to be exerted to 
defeat the negotiations. Whether Russian diplomacy 
went to the length of explicitly vetoei~lg the loan in the 
same way as, a few months before, it had vetoed at 
Pelting the loan which was offered to China in January, 
1898, under the auspices of the British Government, 
i t  is difficult to say. The pressure that Russia was able 
to bring to bear indirectly upon the Shah through her 
own friends a t  Court was possibly suflicient for Iies 
purposes. The negotiations were broken off. The 
penury of the Persian Treasury went on increasing. 
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leanings, fell into disgrace, and the Atabeg-Azam 
became once more Prime Minister in his stead under 
the powerful patronage of Russia. 
0 1 1  the model of the Russo-Chinese Banlr, and 
destined to becoine quite as undisguisedly a branch of 
the Russian State Bank under the immediate control of 
the Ministry of Finance a t  St. Petersburg, a Russian 
bank-the Banque des Pr&ts, now called the Banque 
dJEscompte de P erse-had been opened a t  Teheran, 
and through its agency Russia, who had in the mean- 
time rejected a suggestion for a joint Anglo-Russian 
loan to Persia, agreed in rgoo to give the Persian 
Government a loan of £z,400,000, represented by 
bonds guaranteed by the Russian Government and 
bearing interest at 5 per cent., with a sinking fund- 
capital and interest secured on the revenue of the 
Persian Customs generally, with the exception of the 
Persian Gulf ports. Whilst the Russians waived, 
except in the event of default, the right of control over 
the Custo~ns upon which the British negotiators had 
insisted, they made it a condition that the proceeds of 
the new loan should be devoted, in the first instance, to 
the repayment of the balance of the British loan con- 
tracted in 1892 to provide compeilsation for the with- 
drawal of the ill-starred tobacco monopoly, and to 
redeeming the indebtedness of the Persian Treasury to 
the only two foreign banks in Teheran-the Imperial 
Banlc uf Persia, a British institution, and the Inter- 
national Bank of Comn~lerce of hloscow, a private 
Russian firm, wl~ich could not attempt to  compete with 
M. Witte's Bank, Further stipulations provided that 
Persia sliould contract no financial obligations in the 
shape of a new loan from any foreign power for a 
period of ten ycars, and also that shc  should not 
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lower her Customs duties, except with the consent 
of Russia. This loan, I should add, has never been 
publicly issued, nor has any information been made 
hublic as to the purposes, beyond those I have already 
mentioned, to which it has been applied. The relief 
that it afforded to the Persian Treasury was of short 
duration. It was issued nomillally a t  869, with a 
commission of I; per cent. Pcobably, therefore, when 
the outstanding, balance of the Tobacco Monopoly loan, 
amounting to .£4oo,ooo, and the other bank debts 
had been paid off, and commissio~l and other charges 
deducted, the Treasury was left with little more than 
one million sterliilg to meet its most pressing needs. 
That sum was, at any rate, very soon exhausted, and 
towards the end of 1901 a further loan was contracted 
on the same security and through the same agency for 
another 16,000,000 roubles, or over one and a half 
million sterling. Even less is lrnown as to the terms 
upon which this second loan was made, but the period 
during which Persia undertakes to contract no loans 
from other powers than Russia, without the consent of 
the latter, was extended to 1912, and, as a condition 
precedent, an agreement had been arrived at between 
Persia and Russia for a revision of the Persian Customs 
tariff. The proceeds of the second loan have not 
perhaps been quite so rapidly exhausted as  those of 
the first, but in neither case has a penny been applied 
to any visibly useful purpose. It was stated in native 
circles at Teheran in the autumn of 1902-and the 
report was generally credited-that, on his way back 
from Europe, the Shah had obtained the promise of 
another loan from Russia, and that it was in acknow- 
ledgment of this fresh favour his Majesty had spoken 
in such warm terms, at an  official banquet given to him 
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at Kurslr, of the close ties which bind Persia to Russia, 
and which lle hoped would bind the two countries still 
more intilllately in the future. The promise, if it was 
given, 'does not llowever appear to have been yet ful- 
filled, or, at least, only vely partially. The Persians, at 
any rate, only admit a total indebtedness to Russia of 
20,000,000 tomans, or ~4,000,000, which is the amount 
represented by the two above-mentioned loans. Even 
so, the significance of the financial dependence in ' 
which Persia has placed herself towards Russia in the 
course of such a very few years call hardly be over- 
rated. It cannot be f~tlly appreciated until we have 
taken a survey of the economic and financial position 
of Persia as a whole ; but when a weak Oriental state, 
whose annual revenue only amouilts to about one 
and a half million sterling, borrows from a powerful 
European neighbour, and spends within the short space 
of three years, sums which almost equal the whole of 
its revenues during the same period, and has absolutely 
nothing to show in the way of remuilerative expenditure 
for the debt which it is piling up, the ultinlate result must 
spell ruin. 
It  is often assumed in England that the financial 
policy by which Russia has reduced Persia to this state 
of dependence upon the Russian Treasury is directed 
solely towards building up her political ascendency. 
If that were so, those who contend that her political 
ascendcncy is not detrimental to British interests would 
be justifiecl it1 regarding it with indifference. But this 
assumpLion ignores another equally important aspect of 
the situation. The financial policy of the Russian 
Government in Persia certainly promotes the ends 
which the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs may be 
specially supposed to have in view, but i t  is immediately 
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illspired and controlled by the Russian Minister of 
Finance, and it is  directed towards building up the 
commercial supremacy quite as much as the political 
supremacy of Russia in Northern Persia. I t  is, in fact, 
merely part of the comprehensive system of policy to 
wh:ch M. Witte devoted his great abilities and untiring 
energy throughout his tenure of office. The  impetus 
~vhich he had given to the development of Russian 
industry by intensified methods of protection made 
it absolutely necessary for him to find new markets 
for the products of Russian i~~dustry .  The severe 
crisis through which Russia was passing as a con- 
sequence of overproduction under artificial conditions 
only served to stimulate his acti'vity. In  Persia he 
discovered a market in which the advantage of geo- 
graphical proximity goes far to counterbalance the 
disadvantage a t  which such a hothouse growth as 
Russian industry is npt to find itself placed when ill 
competition with the industry of other countries, and 
especially with British industry. If to geographical 
proximity he could superadd other advantages, he might 
well hope to turn the scales so completely in favour of I 
Russian industry as to drive its competitors altogether 
out of the field. That its chief competitor happens liere 
to  be British il~dustry, and that comlnercial rivalry 
therefore rims on the same lines as political rivalry, is 
merely an incident which no doubt aclds zest to t l ~ c  
game. 
Wha t  is the position, and what are the trump cards 
which Russia appears to hold? The chief routes by 
which British trade reaches Teheran are, by the Persian ' 
Gulf, the Bushire-Shiraz-Isfallan route, the Baghdad- 
Kermanshah route, and the new routcvih Muhammcrah, 
the Karun river, and the Ahwaz-Isfallan road ; and by 
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the Black Sea, the Trebizond-Tabriz route. T h e  time 
of actual transit through Persia to Teheran by these 
routes ranges from seventy to one hundred and twenty 
days, and the cost from £18 to £26 per ton. On the 
other hand, the shortest road for the import of Russian 
goods into the Teheran district is from Enzeli vih Resht 
and Kazvin, at  rates varying from A6 to  £8 per ton, 
the time of transit being from fifteen to twenty days. 
In these figures we see at  a glance the benefit which 
Russian trade reaps from the outlay of Russian money 
on the constructioil of the road from Resht to Teheran. 
Nor is this by any means the only, or even the chief, 
avenue Russia has for her trade with Northern Persia, 
lvhich enters the western provinces from Trans-Caucasia, 
and Khorasan from Ashkabad on the Trans-Caspian 
Railway. 
But the advantages of geographical proximity, sup- 
plemented by a judicious outIay of Russian capital on 
improved means of communication, were not enough 
to satisfy M. Witte. Until he was able to  secure a 
revision of the Persian tariff, by which the duties were 
to be manipulated as  far a s  possible in favour of 
Russian trade, he found means to counteract the 
competition of British goods in the Persian market by 
special railway rates for Russian products intended for 
Persia, and by an elaborate system of bounties paid by 
the Russian Treasury on all Russian goods exported 
into Persia. Great secrecy has been preserved with 
regard to the precise amount of these bounties, but they 
are believed in most cases to  work out, roughly, to 
from 15 to 20 per cent, nd oaZore?tt, and in some cases 
to much more. The Iiussiali manufacturer, it must be 
admitted, has done apparently all that lies in his power 
to show himself worthy of the support he receives from 
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the State. According to all accounts, he neglects no 
opportunity of cultivating the tastes of his Persian 
clients, and for variety, if not always for quality, he 
often succeeds in producing articles which are much 
better suited to the Persian market than his Bfitish 
competitor, whose intense conservatism will not stoop 
to any departure from time-honoured custom. Fashions 
vary in every province of Persia, and the Russians do 
their best to meet all their different requirements, whilst 
- we seek to impose upon the whole country our concep- 
tion of what ought to be the fashion all over it. 
Russia has not, however, confined helaself to the 
ordinary methods of promoting a state-aided industry. 
The Russian Bank at Teheran plays in this connection 
a scarcely less important part than in connection with 
the loans by which Russia has got so firm a grip on 
the Persian Treasury. The predominant position which 
the Banque dlEscompte de Perse has acquired as the 
creditor of the Persian State, it uses, without the sligllt- 
est disguise, for ousting British enterprise. Not only 
do its relations with the Persian Treasury give it special 
facilities for mgnipulating exchange on Europe for the 
benefit of Russian trade-a most important factor in 
all colnmercial transactions-but the large profits which 
it derives from its loan operations in Persia-Russia 
lends to Persia at a rate which works out to about 6 per 
cent. money which she can 11erseIf borrow in  Paris 
at  4 per cent.-enable i t  also to carry on other opera- 
tions which no banlr, run on purely business lines, 
could possibly undertalrc. Loans art? made to Persian 
custollzers on consignments of goods, so long as those 
goods come from Iiussia, on terms which simply set 
ordinary business principles at defiance, and facilities 
which tliey would find nowhere else are granted to new 
I 
7 





I vital i m ~  







only in 7 
to the d 1 such a b 
where tra 













1 the trans 
collected 
has a t  pr 
I larger obj 
Slt THE BATTLE O F  THE BANKS 59 
t! ~legkccts no t 
r f  his Persian 
, ~ r  tjitality, lw 
rich ;Ire much 
In  h i s  I3Htit;lr 
\ t i l l  I I L ) ~  s t o q ~  
om. 1;nrllion.s ' 
t4  ICushianb do 
r.t:rtl~r~ts, whilst 
ry o t l r  CO~l(:cp- 
)vtkr i t .  
hc*r?;elf to Lhe 
aided in Jiislry, 
t l l ib  i:r)t~ncctitrn 
:cr~,r~c*eiirsrr with 
fir111 ;L grip on 
e 11w.i i t i c r ~ i  which 
ac*iluirctl as the 
:Iltrut 1 1 1 ~  b l i g l ~ t  
~ t ' i h ~ ' .  Sitt on!)' 
ry givt*  it. special 
I2urcrptt fur the  
rort;Aat farxtt~r i n  , 
-gt: twofits which 
13r:rsiu- Kussh 
rrl t o  alurtlit b p!c.̂r 
,)tirrtbtb6 i n  ljaris 
4 ~ r 1  i1t11w olwra- 
t~araitlvss lint.$ 
tttttrlt+ ~ t b  Eii*rsian 
?pr) ir,r&g ah t l l t b ~  
,v tti6"h bir~rply %* 
1L-r. ;&nd bcilitirb$ 
rr granted tu rlrw 
customers on the express condition that they shall 
import their merchandise from Russia, or, a t  any 
rate, not from Great Britain. I t  is in colnpetitioll 
especially with the Imperial Dank of Persia, thc only 
British instittitiorl in t11e North, and one of almost 
vital importanct: to Uritisli trade, that these methods 
are  practised in the lllost barefaced manner. The 
incurable apathy of the Persians and the growth of 
Russian ascenderlcy have rrlaterially reduced the , 
Bank's opportunities of usefulness. T h c  one im- 
portant privilege it enjoys is tllc issue of bank-notes- 
a privilege of which the value is much impaired by the 
large specie reserve it is compelled to maintain, not 
only in Teheran, but  in its provincial branches, owing 
to the difliculty of making any large remittances sf 
such a bulky currency as Persian silver in a country 
where transportation has to be computed, not in  hours, 
but in weeks, R u n s  on the  bank have already bean 
engineered-hi thcrto unsuccessfully-in the hope of 
bringing about, by the sudden presentation of large 
numbers of bank-notes, a momentary suspension of 
specie payment, which would have furnished a pretext 
for procuring the revocation of its chatter. From the 
Persian authorities, who frequently even wink at the 
evasion of the bank-note privilege of the bank by 
native corporations in the pruvinces, little or no  crssistr 
ance wn he lookcd for. Beyond sundry advnnccs, 
such as an impecunious Oriental treasury always 
s ta~ lds  in need of, the only service for which the 
Govertlment still relies upon the Imperial Bank is 
the transmission to Tehewn of Customs revenue 
collected in outlying districts where the Russian bank 
has  at present nu agents. Nevertheless, though the 
larger abjects for which the Imperial Bank was created 
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have been so far defeated, the industry and perseverance 
of its staff, and especially the tact and ability of its 
chief manager, Mr. Rabino, whose personal ~nfluence 
with the Persians and with foreigners of all nationalities 
has been a most valuable factor, have in other respects 
maintained its credit and position. But the tactics 
which the Russian bank has adopted are hard to 
contend with, for the latter, baclred by the Russian 
Ministry of Finance, has evidently made it one of its 
chief objects to drive its British competitor out of the 
field. For this purpose it is   re pared to underbid it or 
outbid it, as the case may be, in every direction. A 
foreigner-not an Englishman-in an independent 
position at Teheran, who was in no way connected 
with business, told me that, when he wanted to draw 
upon Europe, the Russian bank was always prepared 
to give him a quotation fractionally more favourable 
than that at which the Imperial Banlc had offered to do 
business. The Russian bank invariably asked him 
what rates the British bank quoted, and gave its own 
quotation accordingly. It is the same thing with 
loans, advances, discount, etc. The British bank has 
to consult the interests of its shareholders, and cannot 
afford to work at  a loss. The Russian hank consults 
only the requirements of the policy it has been created 
to carry out, and is quite prepared to incur losses in 
promoting it. 
Such are the agencies through which Russia hopes 
to hold the central government of Persia-and with 
it the whole of Northern Persia at least-financially as 
well as militarily, in the hollow of her hand. The 
position of M. Struebe, the director of the Banque 
d'Escompte de Perse at Teheran, is the exact counter- 
part of that which M. Pokotiloff made fot- himself at 
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Peking as  the director of the Russo-Chinese Bank, 
M. Struebe, a financial expert of remarkable ability, 
is the nominee and confidelltial agent of M. Witte, 
and corresponds directly with the Russian Ministry of 
Finance, just as the officer commandillg the Persiall 
Cossaclrs corrcsponds directly with the Russian Ministry 
of War. It  is not surprising, therefore, to hear it 
whispered that the diplomatic representative of Russia 
at Teheran Ceels his position to be somewhat over- 
shadowed by his two powerful coadjutors. Possibly 
M. Arghyropoulo, who, when I was i n  Teheran, had 
just been transferred to another post, was not the man 
to assert himself, and his successor, M. Vlassow, who 
had hitherto represented Russia in Abyssinia, may 
be better qualified to play the part of "the masterful 
Resident," xvllich properly belongs, according to the 
Russian Press, to a Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
Tsar at the Persia11 Court. Perhaps, after all, the 
Russian Government is wiser than the Russian Press 
in assigning, as it has hitherto done, to its diplomatic 
representative the more congenial task of supplying 
the sz~avifcr zir. ?nodo whilst the fortiter in re is driven 
home through other channels. It has, at any rate, 
every reason to be satisfied with the results that have 
hitherto attended its threefold representation at Teheran. 
It would be easy to enumerate other indications of 
tlie paramount illfluence of Russia in the Persian 
capital. Telleran has grown considerably of late 
years, and in spite of the tawdriness of its buildings 
and the hollow pretence of its long line of battle- 
mentcd walls, its broad, shaded avenues and stately 
gardens, and, above all, the noble amphitheatre of 
m o u n b ~ i n s  which look down upon it from the north, 
give it a certaill cnchet of stateliness. But the red 
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Russian blouses of the Cossacks a t  the gates of all 
the most important buildings and public departments, 
and, in the foreign quarter especially, the prevalence 
of notices and inscriptions in the Russian language, 
show clearly the predominance of the Russian element. 
During my stay a new development specially calculated 
to appeal to the Oriental imagination had taken place. 
The right of coinage is one which has always been in 
the East one of the chief attributes of sovereignty, and 
though the Persian Mint is notoriously inadequate to 
supply the needs of the country, the late Shah would 
never listen to any suggestion for having part of the 
silver currency struclr abroad. I-Tandsome 5-lrran pieces, 
struck in Russia, or, more probably, for Russian account 
! in Belgium, had just made their appearance in the 
I 
bazaars of Teheran, and such is the state of the Persian 
A silver currency that the new coins were welcomed with 
great satisfaction by the trading community. But the 
people were not unnaturally strengthened i n  their fatal- 
istic belief that the sovereign rights of Persia were 
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CHAPTER VII 
BRITISH TRADE AND RUSSIAN COMPETITION 
T HE foreign trade of Persia resolves itself mainly into British trade, of which the trade to and from 
British India forins a very important part, and Russian 
trade. The trade between other Western countries and 
Persia is relatively insignificant, and the trade carried 
on between the adjoiiling provinces of Persia and 
Turlrey is only of local importance. Unfortunately, 
the statistics available for dealing with this subject 
have not hitherto been very trustworthy. The Board 
of Tradc returns include only the direct trade between 
the United Kingdom and Persia, and thus take no 
account of the large indirect trade from these islands, 
let aloile the trade of India and other parts of the 
Empire with Persia. The British consular reports have 
hitherto furnished the best information available, but 
they have never laid claim to absolute accuracy, as in 
the absence of official data the returns they give have 
been necessarily incomplete i n  some cases, whilst in 
others they are apt to overlap. Nevertheless, from the 
more than usually exhaustive reports recently pub- 
lished from the British Co~lsulates in the Persian Gulf 
ports, through which the bulk of our trade passes, a t  
Kermanshah, which is the centre of the considerable 
trade carried on with Wester11 Persia through Baghdad, 
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and in Meshed, which may be regarded a s  a terminus 
of the new overland trade-route from India ZJG Quetta 
and Seistan, a fairly complete estimate of British trade 
with Persia can be compiled for 1902. Only for Tabriz, 
through which British goods still enter Northern Persia 
from the Black Sea, are the figures for 1902 not yet 
available, and one must fall back upon previous 
estimates of the value of British trade by that  route :- 
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If we add £2oo,000 on the basis of former estimates 
for the British trade vid Tabriz, we arrive at an aggre- 
gate value of over ~ ~ , ~ o o , o o o  for the trade of 1902 be- 
tween Persia and the British Empire. This would not 
compare unfavourably with Lord Curzon's estimate of 
~3,ooo,ooo in 1889. But it is impossible to ignore the 
statistics which arc now forthcoming from an entirely 
new source, namely, the Belgian Administration of the 
Persian Customs, and the picture they present of our 
commercial position in Pcrsia is unhappily much less 
flattering, both positively and relatively. According to 
them, British trade in 1901-2 only amounted altogether, 
excluding the trade of Muhammerah, which had not 
yet been includecl within t l ~ c  operations of the Belgian 
Customs, to £f;z,35o,ooo, of ~ v h i c l ~  L1,895,ooo were im- 
ports into Persia, and less than half a million exports 
from Persia. Even if we add our own consular figures 
for British imports and exports vin  ̂hluhammerah, the 
total barely reaches d z , 6 o o , m  for the whole of our 
Persian trade, or  one million less than thc British 
official estimates. 
Still more unsatisfactory are the Belgian Customs 
statistics if we are to accept their evidence as  to the 
relative position of British trade and of that of our 
chief competitor in the Persian market, Russian im- 
ports are set down at  dz ,og~,ooo and Russian exports at 
6 1 , 6 o o , w ,  or altogether 63,631,000-just one  nill lion 
sterling in cxcess of the Custoins returns of British 
trade." If wc compare thcsc figures with Lord Curzon's 
cstimatc of 1889, which put down the Iiussian import 
and export trade wit11 Pcrsia at  almut two millions 
* hlorc tlaL:~ilcd strrtisticw or IZussian Lfirtlc wit11 IYcl.sial cor~lpilctl froni 
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sterling, Russian trade has increased 80 per cent. within 
thirteen years, whilst British trade has decreased 15 per 
cent. Even if we do not accept the figures prepared 
by the Belgiap Customs Admillistration as  absolutely 
conclusive-and a s  far as British trade is concerned 
it is .diffic~llt o do  so in view of our own Consular 
reports - it must, I fear, be admitted that Russian 
competition has already wrested from us the coinmercial 
supremacy we have hitherto enjoyed, and for many 
years, almost unchallenged, in Persia. 
Considering the irnnlense activity which Russia has 
displayed of recent years in Persia, the rapid strides 
she has made in this direction are not surprising. 
Russian trade already enjoys, in addition to the initial 
advantage of close proximity to the markets of Northern 
Persia, the benefit, first, of relatively easy access to 
them over roads the constructio~l and maintenance of 
which would have been impossible without the financial 
and political support of the Russian Government ; 
secondly, of an elaborate system of special rates to  the 
frontier and bounties on export of which the Russian 
Treasury is willing to bear the burden, recouping 
itself the while by profitable loan transactions with 
Persia ; and, thirdly, of the vigosous pressure which 
Russia's political and financial ascendellcy enables her 
to exert through the channel of a powerful bank, which 
is in reality nothing less than a branch of the Russian 
Ministry of Finance. Fierce as, under such conditions, 
the competition to which Russia subjects British trade 
has already become, its full pressure will only begin 
to be felt under the new conditions arising out of the 
abrogation of the provisions of the Treaty of Turlc~nan 
Chai, which until early i n  1903 governed the trade 
relations of a11 foreign countries (except Turkey) with 
Persia. T1- 
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Persia. The  sequence of events which has enabled 
Russia to proceed to a revision of her tariff relations 
with Persia is instructive. 
T h e  only notable reform which has been carried out 
of recent years in the Persian administration is the 
reorganisation of the Custon~s  service by a staff of 
Belgian Customs orficials, lent for the purposc to the 
Persian Governmcnt. Whcn  the pressure of financial 
stringency first drove the Shah to contemplate a loan 
from European capitalists, it becarrle evident that the 
only available security he had to offer was the revenue 
of the Persian Customs, and so long as the old system 
prevailed of farming out the different custom-houses, 
the security was not unexceptionable. Tllc Persian 
Government was brought to realise that its value wouIcl 
be considerably enhanced by remodelling the Customs 
service on European l i i~es ;  and about five years ago 
application was made to Belgium a s  a "neutral" 
state for the loan of the necessary $orso7zrzel. The 
King  of the Belgians thoroughly appreciates the value 
to his own country of the opportunities afforded by . 
such services, in countries where there is keen rivalry 
between the Great Powers, as, for instance, in China, 
where Belgium has been able to play an important and 
profitable part as the $rile-nom of Russia and France 
for the acquisition of railway concessions in the Yang- 
Tsze Valley and adjoining regions, which neither of 
those Powers could have invaded a t  the time without 
creating a dangerous amount of political friction. That, 
in the light of recent expcricncc a t  Peking, Russia 
shoulcl have welcomed the introduction of a new Belgian 
element into Persia was natural enough, but that the 
British Government should have encouraged it, is hard 
to understand, Credit must, at any rate, be given to 
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King  Leopold for the selection of highly-competent 
officials to perform the honourable task assigned to 
them i n  Persia. M. Naus, the present Belgian Director- 
B 
General of Customs, and the staff that his predecessor, 
4 
who died shortly after arrival in Persia, brought from 
i 
I 
Europe, have done excellent administrative work, and  the 
fact that they are merely seconded for service i n  Persia, 
and can a t  any time return to their own posts in Belgium, 
gives them a position, or, a t  least, an appearance, of 
independence here which the foreigners of all nation- 
alities who have from time to time drifted into the 
Persian service have generally lacked. Nevertheless, 
the success which has attended the reorganisation of 
the Persian Customs would probably not have been 
so remarkable as it has proved if, on the one hand, 
Russia had not, from the moment when she made her 1 
first loan to Persia, found it to her own interest to 
pronlote the improvement of the security on which she 
had lent her money, and, on the other hand, the Belgians 
had not displayed an intelligent readiness to accept 
Russian guidance and to deserve Russian protection. i 
Towards the close of 1900, after a couple of years' 
preliminary study and probation, M. Naus was able to 
point to an increase of 60 per cent. in the real revenue 
of the Customs over the returns of the last financial 
year under the farming system, and to propose a 
complete scheme of reorganisation. Under the old 
system the actual duties paid on importation 011 the 
frontier were supplemented by a number of imposts 
levied more o r  less irregularly in transit into the markets 
of the interior, or in the shape of octroi at the place 
of destination. Indeed, the duties paid on importation 
were often considerably lower than the 5 per cent. 
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Most of the custom-houses were farmed out by the 
Central Government, or administered by local chiefs 
subject to certain remittances to Teheran. The enter- 
prising farmer of one custom-house frequently en-' 
deavoured to attract trade to his own port by offering 
to admit goods below the treaty rate, and in many 
places these reductions or rebates had in the course 
of time acquired a semi-legal sanction by mere pre- 
scription. On the other hand, as the foreign trader, 
when once his goods were landed in Persia, was to 
some extent protected against the exaction of transit 
dues and octrois, he was often placed in a better 
position than the Persian importer. M. Naus proposed 
to do away with these abuses by abolishing altogether 
the old transit dues and octrois on internal as well as on 
foreign trade, subject to a small transportation tax 
of 22 shahis, or less than gd. per load on foreign goods 
for or from the interior; and at the same time he 
undertoolr to increase the legitimate revenue of the 
Treasury by insisting upon the uniform payment of the 
full 5 per cent. duty at every port or land frontier 
station on the value of all imports and exports. The 
reforms laid down by M. Naus were adopted by the 
Persian Government with such unwonted promptitude 
as to suggest very powerful outside backing, and within \ 
the next twelve months the event had already justified 
his most sanguine prognostications ; for, while both 
internal and foreign trade was relieved of the old 
irregular imposts and benefited by the uniformity of the 
new system, the net revenue yielded by the Customs in 
1901 amounted to about 1,600,000 tomans, or nearly 
L 3 2 0 , ~ o ,  a s  against little more than three-fifths of that 
sum under the farming system. 
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In  so far a s  Russian influence was exerted to promote 
these important reforms, it unquestionably cor~ferred 
a considerable boon upon the trade of all foreign 
nations as well as  upon the internal trade of Persia. 
But this was not the sole object of Russia in lending 
her support to  the Belgium Customs administration. 
In Tellelfan and in  the North, xvl~ere her ascenclency 
was too firmly established to require aclventitious aid, 
the Belgians were careful to preserve outward appear- 
alices, and in spite of occasioilal complaints, they did 
not on the whole show any systematic unfairness in their 
dealings with foreign traders of whatever nationality. 
In the South and in the East, however, the part they 
had to play was a very different one. Russia11 interests 
in those regions not having yet materialised, the 
Belgian Customs officials had to prepare the way for 
them, and, pending their advent in a positive shape, at  
least counteract the growth of hitherto predominant 
British interests and obstruct their consolidation. I shall 
show later on, in dealing with the Persian Gulf and 
with Seistan, how zealously they have applied them- 
selves to the task set before them. Not that, in my 
opinion, we have any right to complain. I t  is in- 
evitable that Russia, to whom the Customs have been 
pledged, should make the most of the special interest 
she is entitled to  take in their administration, and 
should insist even upon their administration being 
shaped in accordance with her own political aims. 
Unless she can rely entirely upon the devotion of the 
Belgians, she may easily be tempted, as the margin 
of her security diminishes with each additional loan, to 
insist upon taking the direct control of the Customs 
into her own hands, even in the absence of any specific 
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without strong external pressure no progressive work 
can be done in Persia, and that not only is Russia in a 
position to apply that pressure, but that it suits her 
to apply it with regard to the Customs. T h e  appoint- 
ment of a Belgian to the directorship of the Persian Post 
Office shows that Russia appreciates their co-operation. 
W h y  should they, who have no political interests of 
their own to serve, refuse their services to those who 
are willing and able to requite them generously? 
However valuable to Russia was the control she thus 
acquired over an important administration, whose staff 
she can use, to some extent, as her agents-in remote 
provinces of Persia, to which her own influence has few 
opportunities of direct access, it was only part of a 
much larger scheme. W h a t  she wanted was an ab- 
solute control of the fiscal policy of Persia with regard 
to foreign trade. A negative control she already pos- 
sessed ; for ever since 1828 the trade relations of Persia 
with foreign countries, except Turltey, have been practi- 
cally governed by the Treaty of Turkman Chai, which 
provided for a 5 per cent. ad valorem duty on Russian 
imports. Every Western country, including England, 
had been content, since then, to stipulate for the 
insertion in its treaties with Persia of a most-favoured- 
nation clause, under which it could claim the same 
commercial treatment that had been granted to Russia. 
Persia had, it is true, repeatedly applied to the Russian 
Government to modify the Treaty of Turlrman Chai, 
so as to allow an increase of her Customs duties. But 
until Russia was in a position to insist upon the re- 
visioll of the treaty being inade in her own exclusive 
interests she always turned a deaf ear to Persian 
appeals. The  recl~lessness of the Persian Govern- 
ment in piling up debts on the security of the 
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Customs gave her creditor the long-loolred-for oppor- 
tunity. It was now Russia's turn to insist upon tariff 
revision. The interest and sinking fund of the first 
Russian loan of 1900 already absorbed nearly half the 
net revenue of the Persian Customs, and whei? the 
Shah applied in the following year for a further loan, 
one of the conditions upon which it was granted was 
that the Persian tariff should be revised i n  accordance 
with the wishes and interests of Russia. 
It is very significant that when M. Naus was urging 
upon the Persian Government the fiscal reforms above 
alluded to, he recommended them explicitly a s  a neces- 
sary preliminary to the revision of the Iiusso-Persian 
Treaty and an increase of the general tariff. T h e  Shah, 
having entered upon a course of profuse expenditure 
which could only be met by continuous borrowing, 
could hardly be expected to resist the exigencies of an 
otherwise facile creditor. It was easy for Russia to 
satisfy him that his own interests would be served by 
tariff revision, since an increase of the tariff would 
place him in possession of fresh security to borrow 
upon, and so long as  she clid not claim any avowedly 
preferential treatment for Russian products, she could 
safely be allowed to manipulate the new tariff to her 
own advantdge without technically laying Persia open 
to remonstrances from other powers. Anyhow, the 
Shah, being a suppliant for further pecuniary favours, 
was not in a positioil to argue with Russia. I-Ic could 
only obey. Russia insisted moreover upon absolute 
secrecy, lest England should at the last rnoment make 
some attempt to parry the blow which threatened her 
commercial interests. Again the Shah obeyed, and 
his obedience on this point furnishes perhaps the most 
striking evidence of how entirely he has ceased to 
be a free agt 
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be a free agent in his relations with Russia. All the 
conditions of an Oriental court render the maintenance 
of complete secrecy with regard to affairs of State, 
however confidential, extraordinarily difficult, and in 
Teheran, above all, anyone would have been laughed 
to scorn who contended that. important negotiations 
could be carried through without any leakage of some 
sort. But on this occasion, a t  any rate, the Persians 
were made to feel the necessity of holding their tongue, 
and they held it, not for a few days or a few weeks, but 
for montl~s, whilst they continued all the time to lend 
an ear to our representations on points of tariff, as if 
the cluestion were still an open one. 
The new comnlercial co~lvention was signed at Tehe- 
ran by the Persian and Russian plenipotentiaries, one 
of whom was an official of the Russian Ministry of 
Finance specially sent out for these negotiations, on 
November 9th-October 27th, 0.S.-1901, and more 
than a twelvemonth elapsed before the secret was 
divulged. In the meantime the Shah visited Europe, ' 
and came over to London in August, 1902. It was 
then still believed that the Russo-Persian negotiations 
had not passed beyond the preliminary stage, and 
though there was much anxiety amongst those in- 
terested in Persian trade, it was not for a moment 
thought possible that Persia would have definitely 
committed l~erself to any measure so detrimental to 
British commercial interests of a century's standing 
witlzout communication with the British Government. 
In the course of a conversation I then had with 
the Atabeg-Azam, hc was indeed good enough to 
intirnatc to me that there could be no question of 
Persia doing sucb a thing behind England's back. 
That would, his Highness added, be a departure from 
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the policy of maintaining as stable an equilibrium as 
possible between the interests of her two po~verful 
neighbours, which the wisclotn of his august master and 
his own experience of public affairs alilre realised to be 
the only policy Persia could safely pursue. Positive 
assurances had been given to that effect to the  British 
Government. When the Persian Grand Vizier held 
this language to me with every appearance of sincerity, 
more than nine months had elapsed since he had 
appended his signature to the Russian Cotlventiotl ! 
An Oriental potentate is no doubt always reluctant 
to refuse to his hosts any assurances they may aslr for, 
especially wllen he anticipates receiving so coveted a 
distinction as the Order of the Garter has a t  all times 
been, and the assurances given during the Shah's stay 
in England should perhaps never have been taken for 
more than the usual forms of complin~entary rhetoric. 
M. Naus, the Belgian Director-General of Customs, who 
had been raised to the rank of Minister of State at Tehe- 
ran, in recognition of his services during the Russo- 
Persian negotiations, was just a t  that time engaged in 
renloving the last possible obstacle to the  success 
of the new arrangements. The  Treaty of Erzeroum 
between Turkey and  Persia was the only international 
engagement which still hampered thc latter's frecdom of 
action in the direction desired by Russia. S o  long as 
the special rCgime which governed the trade re1 a t' tons 
of Turkey and Persia had treaty force, other powers 
could claim the benefit of it under the most-favoured- 
nation clause if it was less unfavourable to their 
interests than the Russo-Persian tariff. M. Naus pro- 
ceeded to Constantinople for the purpose of corning to 
an agreement with the Porte, ancl with the help of some 
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THE RUSSO-PERSIAN CONVENTION 75 
suasiot~, which was probably still more effectual, his 
mission proved easily successful. By the time tbe 
Shah had returned to his capital, everything was in 
order. On December 27th-December 13th~ 0.S.- 
1902, the ratifications of the Russo-Persian Convention 
of October alth, 1901, were duly exchanged, and a 
protocol signed appointing February q t h ,  1903, as 
the date at which the new tariffs were to come illto 
force. 
CHAPTER VII I  
T H E  N E W  COMMERCIAL CONVENTION 
WITH PERSIA 
B Y a coincidence, of which the irony was presumably not undesigned, the first public announcement of 
the conclusion of the new Russo-Persian agreement, 
which dealt so deliberate a blow at the old-established 
trade relations of this country with Persia, was made 
from St. Petersburg on the very day-February znd, 
1903-on which Lord Downe, at  the head of a special 
mission from King Edward, was investing the Shah in 
his palace at Teheran with the most illustrious order 
that a British sovereign can confer upon the head of any 
friendly and allied state. The publication of the terms 
of t h e  Russo-Persian agreement was not calculated to 
remove the apprehensions of those who had repeatedly 
impressed upon the British Government the gravity 
of the danger which threatened British commercial 
interests in Persia. In none of our treaties with Persia 
during the last century had we taken any special pre- 
cautions to protect them, beyond the usual provision 
for the enjoyment by both parties of the treatment 
accorded by the other to the most-favoured nation. 
Russia was the only nation that had secured specific 
terms of treatment, viz. under Article 3 of the 
Separate Compact relative to Commerce, which was 
76 
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appended to the Treaty of Turlrman Chai of February 
z ~ s t ,  1828. Under that article imports and exports 
were to be subjected to a single duty of 5 per cent. 
ad vnlorenz. This was an eminently moderate rate, 
and so long as British trade was assured of its per- 
manency there was nothing to complain of. But it 
never seems to have occurred to anyone that its 
maintenance depended not upon Persia and ourselves, 
but upon Persia and Russia, and that there could 
not therefore be any assurance of its permanency. 
In 1841, when we at last concluded a commercial 
treaty with Persia which had been foreshadowed in 
the preamble to the political treaty of 1814, and in 
1857, when the Treaty of Peace was concluded at 
Paris after the Anglo-Persian war, it would have 
been easy enough to have procured the insertion of 
a clause specifying the same tariff rates for Anglo- 
Persian trade which had been specifically granted to 
Russia. But this was not done, and so we continued 
to allow our interests to remain practically dependent 
upon the maintenance of treaty provisions to which we 
were no party, and over which we could have no direct 
control. This would have been an unsound position 
even if we could have relied upon Persia continuing to 
be a free agent. But, from the moment when the 
Persian Government passed under the complete as- 
cendency of Russia and succumbed into financial 
bondage to her, the position became one of obvious 
peril, and the end was clearly to be foreseen. 
The new Russo-Persian agreement imposes upon 
Persia a tariff of which the details have been elaborated 
in the sole interests of Russia. It  is, as far as Persia 
is concerned, merely a revenue tariff, and as such, it is 
designed to increase just those revenues which she has 
78 COMMERCIAL CONVENTION WITI-I PERSIA I 
mortgaged to Russia, with a view, probably, to facilitate 
further financial operations of the same ruinous charac- 
ter. It confers scarcely a single advantage on Persian 1 
trade, and from a commercial point of view, contains 
hardly any of those features of reciprocity which char- ) I 
acterise commercial conventions between independent 
and equal powers. As far as Russia is concerned, it 
materially improves the security of the loans she has 
already made to Persia, and provides a margin for 
fresh loans should she deem it expedient to tighten her 
hold upon the Persian Treasury. I t  practically dis- I 1 
criminates in her favour against tlie trade of her only j 
serious rival in tlie Persian markets, viz. British and 
British-Indian trade, by substituti~lg for a single ad 
vnlorenz duty leviable at  the same rate on all imports and 
exports a complicated system of specific duties, under 1 
which the chief imports and exports in which Russia I 
i s  mainly interested are treated with relative lenience, I I 
whilst those which chiefly affect Great: Britain and I 
India are severely penalised. It is thus calculated to I 
prove a powerful instrument for promoting the com- 
mercial ascendency of Russia in Persia, which M. 
Witte set himself to establish, and it consecrates 
her political ascendency by stipulating that it shall 
I 
never be modified without the consent of the Russian 
representative a t  Teheran, and that Russian subjects 
shall be privileged to pay the duties in Russian bank- 
notes-a provision of which, besides the material bene- 
fit for Russian currency purposes, the moral effect 
cannot fail to be considerable in an Eastern country 
where the coin of the realm is an almost sacred symbol 
of sovereignty, and a peculiar significance will be 
attached to tlie right of legal tender in the paper 
currency of a foreign power. 
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The technical details of the Russo-Persian tariff it is 
hardly within the competency of a layman to discuss. 
But one of the leading British firms in the Persian 
trade subjectecl it to a careful analysis immediately after 
its publication, and embodied some of the results in a 
letter to the Board of Trade, from which I cannot do 
better than quote the  following extract:- 
" Under the most-favoured-nation clause British 
goods are  subject to the provisions of the Treaty of 
Turkmail Chai (1828)~ fixing the Persian duties, both 
import and export, at 5 per cent. ncE vnlorenz. W e  
have endeavoured to estimate the nature of the change 
which would be iiltroduced by the present tariff. For 
this purpose we propose to deal in the first place with 
imports into Persia, and next with exports from Persia. 
Our calculatiolls are based upon the value of the 
various articles at tlie Karun ports :- 
TABLE I.-IMPORTS INTO PERSIA 
Proposed Itate 
of Duty' 
.- ----- -. 
rz krans per 
r oba tn l a~~s ,  
o r  7s. rod. 
per cwt. 
3 shallis per 
balman, or 
~r@Z.pe~.cvt .  
3 shallis per 
batman, of 
i t~d ,percwt ,  
I toma11 COI. I 
balman, or  
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TABLE 11.-EXPORTS FROM PERSIA 
SOME LEADING ARTICLES OF EXPORT FROM PERSIA TO GREAT 
BRITAIN, CONTINENT (EXCLUDING RUSSIA), AND INDIA. 
Description. 
Opium . , 
Wheat . . 
Barley . . 
Linseed . . 








per cwt.  
2s. 6d. 
per cwt. 
7s.  6d. 
per cwt.  
6s. 








5 % ad z tomansabat  
~nZorent man,orrs.zd 
per Ib. 
5 % ad I kran for 10 
vaZore?tt batmans, or 
74d. percwt .  
5 % ad I Icran for 10 
ualoue?n battnans, or 
76d. per C W L ,  
5 % ad I Itrat1 for 10 
valore))~ batmans, or 
ggd. per  c\vt. 











"The following facts are deserving of notice in 
connection with these tables :- 
'( (I.) Inasmuch as our experience mainly bears upon 
the Persian Gulf ports, where Iiussian trade is as yet 
practically non-existent, we have not dealt with articles 
of export and import to and from Russia, But it is 
well known that some of the principal articles of import 
from Russia are piece goods, bounty-fed sugar, and 
petroleum. As regards the last, Mr. Maclean estimates 
that the proposed tariff works out to 14 per cent. ad 
uaZore?7z--a reduction of 34 per cent. on the present tariff. 
Russia11 piece goods will, of course, be taxed equally 
with British ; but it is to be noted that the change 
from an ad valorem to a weight tariff will very greatly 
advantage Russian goods. Russian piece goods are 
much more expensive at the port of entry on the north 
than are the corresponding Ma~lchester goods at the 
battnans, or 
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Port of entry 011 the south. Therefore, a hundred- 
weight of Russia11 goods pays much more under the 
Present tariff than a hundredweight of corresponding 
goods  made i n  Manchester. The benefit which we 
derive from o u r  better methods of production will now 
b e  taken a w a y  from us. For the proposed tariff is a 
tariff on the weight. I t  may be asked how Russian 
goods  of h igher  price at the port of entry can compete 
with British goods.  The answer is that British goods 
have to travel  further before reaching the principal 
Persian centres. They are under a disadvantage as 
regards the t ranspor t  by land, both in respect of distance 
a n d  facilities, as, for instance, roads. As regards 
sugar ,  it will be seen that the present tariff is not 
materially changed.  But no doubt this is due to the 
large  quantities of sugar which are imported from 
Russia. I t  is possible that this sugar is of greater 
value at the port of entry on the north than is the 
Continental s u g a r  on the south ; for we notice that 
Mr. Maclean works out the proposed tariff, presumably 
o n  Russian s u g a r ,  a t  2$ per cent., a reduction of 22 per 
cent. on the exist ing tariff. 
" (11.) As  regards  the exports, some of the principal 
articles which we export are wheat, grains of various 
descriptions, linseed, sesame seed. I t  is noteworthy 
that, whereas the duties on these articles have been in- 
creased by percentages varying from 34 to 20 per cent., 
t h e  corresponding articles of export to Russia on the 
Caucasian frontier, such as  dried fruits, raisins, almonds, 
&c., are exempted altogether from duty. Rice, which 
is  largely exported to Russia, but not to Great Britain 
o r  India, has a reduction of 2 per cent. on the present 
tariff. Cotton,  which is only taken by Russia, is to be 
exported free. On  the other hand, opium, practically 
all of which is exported to British possessions, will have 
a n  increase of 8 per cent. on the present tariff. 
(111.) Certain features of the tariff appear to us to 
be preposterous, such as the tax of 100 per cent. on tea, 
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practically all of which comes from India. Also the 
differentiation of the export duties, to  which we have 
already alluded, accordil~g as the products are such as 
are taken by Russia or by the United Kingdom and 
India. 
" (IV.) But perhaps the principal object of solicitude 
in the eyes of his Majesty's Government would naturally 
be the Manchester piece goods trade, because of its large 
proportions. W e  estimate that the annual value of 
piece goods, mainly of British or Indian origin, imported 
into Persia must be getting on for two rnillio~l sterling 
a year. These goods enter Persia from :- 
(a) Persian Gulf Ports ... ... &1,148,500 
(b) Via Trebizond . . . ... ... 126,000 
(c) T/i& Baghdad and Kermanshah . . . 500,000 --
.£~7774,500 
" W e  have not included the growing traflic upon the 
Quetta-Nushki route. All this valuable trade has been 
built up by an ilnlnense amount of individual e ib r t  
on the part of British merchants as well a s  of British 
officials, extending over a period of nearly a century. 
The substantial increase in the tariff will naturally raise 
the prices of these piece goods to the consumer, and 
will consequently restrict the import into Persia to a 
corresponding extent. Moreover, the advantage con- 
ferred by the tariff upon cotton goods of Russian origin, 
which we have explained above, will tend to  penalise 
the cheap goods of British manufacture as compared to 
the similar, but more costly, Russian goods, which, 
irnpelled by the energy of the Russian Government, 
are every day penetrating further into Persia. and dis- 
placing British goods. " 
The position in which British trade wit11 Persia was 
placed by the new Russo-Persian tariff was one not 
only of great difficulty, but of extreme urgency. That 
tariff was to come into force on February 14th, 1903, 
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and without any kind of notice British trade was to 
be subjected to its provisions. British diplomacy at 
Teheran, deliberately lulled to sleep, had a rude 
awnliening. A convention directly affecting some of 
our most ilnportant interests had been concluded by 
the Persian Government behind our back, and when I 
the Persian Government at  last obtained permission 
from Russia to communicate it to the British Legation 
at Teheran the British Government found itself in pre- 
sence of a fnit acco7npli more than a year old. I t  was 
far too late to attempt to reverse it, or even to secure 
a postponement of its effects. What formal grounds 
of complaint had we got? W e  had been content to 
put our faith in most-favoured-nation treatment. That 
treatment we still had and should continue to have- 
for what it was worth. W e  might plead that, apart 
from all the pledges given and broken by the Persian 
Government, such a bolt out of the blue was scarcely 
consonant with customary relations of amity, and that 
so sudden a disturbance of the conditions upon which 
our trade with Persia had been based for the best part 
of a century would be as injurious to Persian interests 
as our own, seeing that we were still Persia's chief 
customers. But such arguments could have no effect 
upon a Government which had ceased to be a free 
agent, and whatever Persia might have been willing to 
do, Russia was not going to forego for a single day 
the benefit of the diplon~atic coz@ she had so success- 
fully brougl~t off. 
There were only two courses open for the British 
Government, T h e  one was to enter a protest against 
the unfrielldly character of Persia's action in carrying 
out such a drastic revision of her tariff without con- 
sultation or communicatioll with her chief commercial 
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client, and to let the new tariff be enforced against us 
until an  opportunity should arise of bringing such 
pressure to bear up011 Persia a s  would compel her to , 
negotiate a commercial treaty on terms less unfavour- 
able to British trade. The other course was to acquiesce 
in thefait nccomplz' and, lest worse things should befall 
us, at  least tie the Persian Government down to a 
specific engagement that should prevent any  further 
tampering over our heads with the conditions of our 
own trade with Persia. The  first course might have 
been more dignified, but in the existing situation 
a t  Teheran we might have waited indefinitely for an  
opportunity of securing more favourable terms from 
the Persian Government, and, before such a n  oppor- 
tunity ever arose, Russia might, on the other hand, 
have discovered in the light of experience that  the new 
tariff still left room for improvement from her point 
of view, and compelled the Persians to revise it once 
more for her benefit. In that case, with still nothing 
but our most-favoured - nation clause to lean on, 
we should have been as helpless as  ever to resist a 
fresh turn of the Russian thumb-screw. T h e  second 
course, at  least, locked the stable door ; and though the 
best horse had already been stolen, we could make 
sure of keeping, at any rate, the nag, though a sorry 
one, which took its place. This appears to have been 
the view which commended itself to the British Govern- 
ment, and, in the circumstances, no doubt on the whole 
rightly, if one may judge from the annoyance mani- 
fested by the Russians. A convention was rushed 
through at  Teheran, and signed on February gth, 1903, 
four days before the Russo-Persian tariff came into 
effect. 
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have been very galling for Sir Arthur Hardinge to 
have to affix his signature t o  so unsatisfactory a docu- 
ment. On the face of it, it merely gives a British 
inzflrimntzw to the far-reaching changes in the com- 
mercial rkgime of Persia, which Russia had extorted 
from the Shah's Government for the  benefit of Russian 
interests in the struggle between this country and 
Russia for the Persian markets. The Persian im- 
port tariff, sanctioned by Article I. of the British Con- 
vention, is identically the same as that appended to the 
Russian Convention. Even in theory, we who give 
Persia the benefit of our open markets all over the world 
for her exports, get a t  best the same treatment for our 
imports into Persia which she gives to ultra-protectionist 
Russia. In fact, she gives us much worse treatment, 
for her tariffs have been carefully framed for her under 
Russian dictation lor the benefit of Russian trade and 
for the detriment of ours, the goods she talres from 
us being much more heavily taxed than those she 
takes from the Russians. The Persian export tariff, 
drawn up in the same spirit, presses heavily upon such 
Persian products as are chiefly exported to British 
markets, whilst those which are in demand in Russia 
are treated with conspicuous indulgence. 
Article TI. contains a very singular provision. It 
confers upon Persia the right to raise her duties upon 
British imports in the event of any change in British 
fiscal policy which would lead to duties being imposed on 
certain Persian goods higher than those enumerated in 
a tabular statement of Russian duties on merchandise 
of Persian origin, i.e. that, though in return for the 
benefit of our existing free-trade system Persia con- 
cedes to us nothing to-day which she does not concede 
to Russia, she reserves the right of penalising our trade 
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if we change our system. Nor is this all. As the 
Convention stands, she reserves equally the right of 
penalising any British colony with an independent fiscal 
system that should cease to accord to Persia the most- 
favoured-nation treatment-an extraordinary provision 
for the British Minister to have ever accepted, especially 
in view of the fact that British trade with Persia is 
largely Anglo-Indian trade. Fortunately this pro- 
vi'sion has been practically rescinded, under pressure 
from the Imperial Government, since the Convention 
was signed. 
Article III., by explicitly admitting without any 
limitation or control the right to prohibit the exporta- 
tion of cereals on the plea of securing the food of the 
people, is only too well calculated to perpetuate one of 
the Persian administrative abuses most detrimental to 
trade. There are few greater adepts in the lucrative 
art of engineering a "corner" in grain than Persian 
officials. 
The abolition of the local tolls levied on caravan 
routes which is conceded by Article IV., is a largely 
illusory provision, for the old caravan routes are being 
gradually superseded by roads built with European 
capital, upon which special tolls are leviable under the 
concessions granted for their construction. Moreover, 
it is the tolls levied on the Resht-Teheran road, con- 
trolled by the Russians, which are adopted a s  the 
standard of tolls to  be levied on other roads. 
a The  value of the detailed regulations respecting 
custom-house procedure to be drawl  up according to 
Article V. in agreement with the British Legation will 
be determined by the spirit in which they are applied. 
What that spirit is likely to be may be estimated from 
what I have already had occasioo to say about the 
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Belgian administration of Persian Customs. As a 
Belgian official remarlred in an audible aside to a 
colleague, which I was presumably not intended to 
overhear or expected to understand: "Mais nous 
sommes, donc, ici pour en~bCter les Anglais." 
Instead of simply laying down a normal rate of 
exchange between Persian and British currency for 
purposes of custom-house payments, such as is laid 
down in the Russo-Persian Convention between Persian 
and Russian currency, Article VI. of the British Con- 
vention enacts a circuitous nzodus operancEi, by which 
the Persian krans are first to be converted at a given 
rate into French francs-a coin absolutely unknown in 
Persia-and then the equivalent of the latter worked 
out in British currency. It is not surprising that this 
roundabout method has already given rise to com- 
plaints from British traders. 
The last article of the Convention, though purely 
formal, is by no means the least significant. All 
previous treaties between this country and Persia have 
been drawn up in English and Persian. This Con- 
vention is drawn up in  French and Persian, and ' 
Article VI. provides that, in case of discrepancies, the 
French text is to be deemed authoritative. Both from 
internal evidence and from a comparison of dates it is 
clear that the British Convention was very hastily 
drawn up, and is little more than a copy of the Russian 
Convention. It is easy also to surmise the reasons for 
this procedure, but it none the less shows only too 
plainly the shifts to which British diplomacy was re- 
duced. It is quite pathetic to note how in one of the 
11otcs nddressecl by Sir Arthur I-Iardinge to M. Naus, 
wklicll have been published with the Convention, the 
Britisll Minister assures the Persian negotiator in 
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almost apologetic terms that, though the new tariffs will 
not be promulgated in England until some weeks after 
they have come into force, the delay will be of no 
practical consequence to Persia, a s  they do not affect 
the treatment actually applied to Persian trade in the 
British Empire. A s  to the serious consequences to 
British trade of the enforcement of the enhanced tariffs 
in Persia without any adequate notice of impeuding 
change to those immediately concerned, the British 
Minister has not a word to say. 
I have dwelt at  some length on the significant pecu- 
liarities of this Convention, because even those who 
pooh-pooh our political interests in Persia can hardly 
view with satisfaction a situation which reacts so un- 
favourably upon our commercial interests. The value 
of our Persian trade, and especialljr of the direct trade 
between the United I<ingdom and Persia, is no doubt 
small when compared with the total volume of our 
foreign trade. But the importance of the question 
cannot be estimated solely in £ s. d, and it is certainly 
not diminished by the fact that our Persian trade ii 
largely an Anglo-Indian trade, and therefore directly 
affects the interests of our great Indian dependency. 
I t  is worth noting, as an illustration of our methods, 
that, whereas Russia sent out an expert from the 
Ministry of Finance to take part in the co~nmercial 
negotiations at  Teheran, the British Board of Trade 
waited until our Convention, such as it is, was con- 
cludecl before sending out an olficial to report u p o ~ . ~  it, 
mainly, it may be presumed, with thc object: of showixlg 
that it is not so  injurious to our 1;radc as it might have 
been. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PERSIA 
Face 1,. E g  
I T is difficult for the European to pass judgment upon an  Oriental system of government, or rather 
it is all too easy. W e  apply to it our own standards, 
and immediately rush  to the conclusion, not only that 
the system is in itself abominably bad, but that it must 
be a s  intolerable to those who live under it as it wauld 
be to ourselves, and that, therefore, it cannot possibly 
endure. But our standards are not those of the East. 
W h a t  is intolerable to us is not merely tolerated by the 
Oriental, but is invested in his eyes with the one 
, sanction which he reveres, namely, that of long- 
descended custom ; and the very notion of change is 
almost more abhorrent to his conservative mind than 
any  of the evils a t  the mere thought of which the 
Western mind revolts. Judged by Western standards, 
the  Persian system of government, which, now that the 
Khanates of Central  Asia have passed out of existence, 
represents-in a less  modified form than Turkey, or 
even, perhaps, t h a n  Afghanistan-the last surviving 
type of the mediaval  Asiatic monarchies founded by 
the Moslem sword,  stands irrevocably condemned. 
I t  is in theory a n  absolute despotism, and though, 
like every other despotism, it is subjected in practice to 
certain restraints, they do little to mitigate in Persia the 
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real evils of arbitrary and irresponsible power. The 
authority which the Shah delegates to his ministers 
and to the great provincial governors, and that which 
they in turn delegate to their subordinates through all 
the ramifications of the administrative hierarchy, is 
wielded in the same despotic spirit, and the restraints 
imposed up011 it are equally ineffectual to protect the 
public weal. Persia is governed by a huge bureaucracy, 
in which, to adopt one of Lord Curzon's severe general- 
isations, cupidity open, shameless, and universal, seeins 
to have been raised into the guiding principle of human 
conduct. Offices of every kind are bought and sold 
for a consideration which is in most cases solely, and in 
all cases, at  least in part, pecuniary ; and the buyer and 
seller are equally well aware that the price paid will be 
wrung out of those below in the descending scale of thc 
hierarchy until the burden of all this sharneless traGc1- 
ing falls at last upon the patient shoulders of the toiling 
masses. As fixity of tenure is the one boon which 
never attaches to the purchase of any post, the chief 
anxiety of a new occupant, after recouping himself for 
the original outlay, is to provide the means of securing 
its renewal whenever the customary indications show 
his position to be threatened, either by disfavour from 
above or by growing competition from below. I t  is 
obvious that under such a system, and in view of the 
inextricable coilfusion of the judicial and executive 
functions of government, there can be 110 question 
of justice in the sense in which we understand the 
word. Whether administered by the ecclesiastical tri- 
bunals on the basis of the Shari, or sacred law, or by 
the civil tribunals on the basis of the Urf, o r  common 
law, justice means a t  best a reasonable coinpromise for 
which both parties pay freely, and a t  worst the triumph 
of  the  longest  pur 
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of the longest purse, or of the strongest arm, over the 
most elementary principles of equity. 
Where the one object of every individual connected 
-in however high or however humble a capacity-with 
the govennment of the country is to enrich himself in 
the first place, and in the second place to enrich those 
above hiin who hold his own opportunities of wealth in 
the hollow of their hand, every penny spent upon other 
objects tllan these is naturally regarded as  so much 
diverted from the proper objects of expenditure. Hence 
in no other Eastern country that I have ever lcnown- 
except perhaps Korea-is so little money spent upon 
the public services or upon worlrs of public utility, or'  
is such money as is spent upon them so utterly mis- 
spent. According to the accepted estimates of state 
expenditure, the Teheran Treasury disburses about 
50,000,000 krans, or rather less than £r,ooo,ooo, per 
annum. Amongst the various items of expenditure no 
mention is even made of anything in  the shape of 
public works, though probably out of the modest sum 
of 2,600,000 krans (not quite L50,ooo) assigned to local 
government, some pittance is devoted to them, On the 
other hand, 18,ooo,ooo krans, or nearly two-fifths of the 
total expenditure, are squandered upon the maintenance 
of an army than which it is impossible to conceive a 
force more worthless for fighting purposes ; ~o,ooo,ooo 
krans are absorbed by a pension list, which merely 
represents an organised system of permanent bribery ; 
and ~ , ~ O O , G Q O  krans are assigned to the Shah's Court, 
to the royal princes, and to the clansmen of the Kajar 
tribe, from which the present dynasty has sprung. 
Yet, when all has been said that can be said in con- 
demnation of the Persian system of government, the 
fact remains that it is somehow a working system, and 
'3- 
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, has worked in much the same shape as we see a t  present 
for centuries past, surviving all the changes of dynasty 
and vicissitudes of fortune that Persia has endured in 
the course of her chequered history. Wi th  a few 
modifications of costume the bas-reliefs of Persepolis 
' might serve to illustrate just as well the manners and 
.- , customs of official Persia under Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah 
as  under Xerxes and Darius. Attempts are soinetimes 
made to palIiate the more gIaring faults of the existing 
system by explaining away the sale and purchase of 
ofices as a clumsy method of securing the payment of 
I revenue, and the elaborate machinery of nzudnklzil, or 
official perquisites, as a speculative substitute for the 
regular salaries attaching to office in more civilised 
I countries. These attempts appear to me to be laboured and needless. The true explanation of the survival of 
such an apparently ruinous system of government ought, 
I think, to be sought in its rudimentary simplicity, and 
in the scope it gives to the individual ability of a strong 
ruler. Time after time Persia has been on the point of 
sinking in the mire of corruption, which such a system 
in weak and incompetent hands is bound to produce, 
and the country, driven to desperation, has fallen into 
a state of chaotic anarchy, the ultimate expression of 
popular discontent. Then a strong man like Shah 
Abbas, or  Nadir Shah, or Agha Muhammed, the 
' founder of the reigning dynasty, has arisen, and by 
sheer force of character and rough-and-ready methods 
lias set thefprilnitive machinery of governmellt once 
more in motion. O n  a smaller scale the same process 
takes place from time to time in the different provinces 
of the ltingdom. Under a feeble or  inore than usually 
grasping Governor the province lapses into a state of 
chronic turbulence. That is the one administrative sin 
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for which it is hard to purchase forgiveness. A strong 1 
Governor is sent down to put things straight, and, 
whatever may be thought of the methods he employs, 
the desired result is achieved to the satisfaction not only 
of ihe monarch whom he represents, but of the people 
whom he is set over. For the highest praise which the 
Persians can bestow upon the man in authority over 
them is not that he  is a just man, or a lrindly man, or 
even a generous man, but that he is a strong man- 
so  instinctively do they realise that it is only a strong 
man who can work such an unwieldy system of 
government without abnormal friction. As for the 
merits or demerits of the system, it is the one to 
which they have been accustomed for centuries, and 
the vast majority know and can conceive of none 
other. 
On its own merits, though it may not fulfil a single 
one of the functions which we usually associate with 
the idea of government, there would be no more reason 
to assign a term to the Persian system of government 
to-day than at any  other critical period in the history of 
the country, were there any prospect that Persia would 
be allowed to work out her own destinies free from outside 
interference. In no Eastern land-not even in  China 
-have the moral and intellectual forces of the West 
penetrated so little amongst the people as  in Persia, or, 
to judge by the few Persians of the higher classes 
who have been educated or have travelled abroad, exer- 
cised so little permanent influence upon those actually 
brought into contact with them. In spite of a common 
Aryan origin to which the Persian language still bears 
witness, the infusion of other Asiatic strains of blood, 
and still more, the ascendency of Islam, have fixed a 
profound gulf between the Persian and the European 
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mind. Violent changes may take place again, as they 
have taken place in the past, from purely internal causes, 
in the $er.so?znel of government, but it is difficult to 
imagine from what quarter within Persia itself could 
proceed the initiative of any change that should radi- 
cally affect the system of government, unless perhaps 
it were the result of some great religious movement 
such as Babiism was, and still is by some, believed to 
portend. 
But an Oriental system of government, which may 
be proof against the moral and intellectual impact of 
the West, and, if left to itself, might continue to 
command submissioi~, and even approval, at the hands 
of a totally ignorant people trained to fatalistic resigna- 
tion, is exposed to entirely new perils when it is 
suddenly brought face to face with the material forces 
of the West. None of those material forces has  proved 
more subversive of the old order of things in Oriental 
states than the facilities which our modern system of 
credit has opened up for the facile acquisition of wealth 
by their rulers. Contact, even of the most superficial 
kind, with the Western world stimulates them to new 
conceptions of luxury, new forms of extravagance 
which cannot be gratified out of the resources hitherto 
a t  their command, and the Western world is generally 
ready enough to furnish them with the means of grati- 
fying these new tastes-on its own terms, bien entendu 
-whether in the shape of a financial operation on 
purely business lines, or in t11at of a politico-financial 
transaction such as the last few years especially have 
brought into fashion. Persia has been the last Oriental 
state lo avail itself of these dangerous facilities, but the 
reclrlessness with which it is making up for lost time is 
a feature of which the gravity can hardly be overrated 
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in co~lnection not only with its foreign relations, but 
also with the internal condition of the country. In 
proportion to her existing resources Persia is piling 
up a debt which in the course of a few years must, at 
the present rate, prove wholly unmanageable. 
All statistics with regard to Persia have to be accepted 
with great caution, as  there are no authoritative data 
upon which they can be based. None appear to be, 
on the whole, Illore trustworthy than those compiled 
for the Supplement to the Ls'jlzcycZopa?din Britnn~zica by 
a European official, whose long record of able and 
loyal service under the Persian Government affords an 
honourable contrast to the records of most Europeans 
who have from time to time drifted into Persian employ, 
and perhaps for that very reason have received but 
scant recognition. Imperfect as they llecessarily are, 
these statistics tell their owl1 tale even to those who, 
not having seen Persia, call hardly be expected to 
realise their full meaning. Persia is at present an 
essentially poor country. It extends, roughly, about 
700 miles north and south, and goo miles west: and east, 
over an area of 628,000 square miles. But the greater 
part of this area is very sparsely populated. A liberal 
I 
eslimate puts the population in 1881 at about 7,650,000 
souls, of whom 2,ooo,ooo in  the towns, $,8oo,ooo in 
the villages, and the rest nomads. But it is doubt- 
ful whether the population much exceeds 6,500,000. 
and this would give an average of barely more than 
tell inhabitants per square mile. Wit11 the exception 
of Teheran, there is scarcely a city that does not show 
unmistakable signs of sllrinkage, and one of tbe nlost 
rnelailclioly features all over Persia is the number of 
deserted villages. No doubt the potential resources 
of the country are considerable, and under an intelligent 
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administratioil capable of very great development ; but 
as things are at present Persia is growing, and is bound 
to grow, poorer every year. Estimated in krans, the 
base silver currency of the country, the revenue which 
1 reaches the Treasury has to some extent increased. 
In 1876 it amounted to 58,000,ooo krans, in 1890 to 
6o,ooo,ooo, and to-day it amounts possibly to 70,000,ooo 
or .75,ooo,ooo. But even this increase is due mainty to 
the new system of administering the Customs. The 
direct revenue produced by the nznliat, a sort of com- 
bined land and industrial income tax which affords the 
best test of national prosperity, has remained almost 
stationary. In reality, however, the conditions are 
very much worse, and the nominal increase is con- 
verted into a very considerable decrease as soon as r we take into account the heavy fa11 in the value of the white metal and the consequent depreciation of the 
Persian currency. The usual rate of exchange when 
I I was in Persia in 1884 was about 29 krans to the 
I pound ; to-day it is 56. At this rate the revenue, which 
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chievous, purposes as the maintenance of a worthless 
army, the payment of a huge pension list which serves 
as  a pretext for untold jobbery, and the expenses of a 
prodigal court, its expansion would be a very doubtful 
benefit. 
On the other hand, there has been of recent years 
a notable appreciation in the cost, not only of such 
imported goods as tea, sugar, cotton tissues, etc., which 
I 
must be regarded as necessaries of life in Persia, but 
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also in that of foodstuffs and other staple commodities 
produced in the country. For  imported goods the new 1 
tariff will still further increase this appreciation. The 
Persians, for instance, are a nation of tea-drinkers, but 
Il ! 1 
, * I  
tea is  not grown in Persia. Hitherto, under the old . 
, /I 5 per cent. ad valorem tariff, the duty on imported tea 
was trifling. The specific duties under the new tariff 
work out to 170 per cent. ad valorenz on the finer, and 
i/ 11 
I 14 per cent. on the inferior, qualities, i.e. that the cost I 
of one of the commodities of almost universal consump- I 
tion has been more than doubled. One would imagine j 
1 
that, a t  any rate, from the appreciation of foodstuffs 1 > .  
grown in the country the people in general would have 
derived some benefit. But it does not appear to be so. 
Prices have to a great extent been manipulated for the 
exclusive benefit of powerful officials and large land- , 
owners. Only a lew years a g o  the Governor of Teheran 
and a r ing of high-placed officials at  Court engineered a 
" corner" which drove bread up to famine prices until 
it affected the food supplies of the Cossaclr brigade, 1 !
whereupon General Kosagowsky took the law practically I J  
into his own hands, and swept away the barriers which I /  . I 
had been erected all round Teheran to prevent the 
ingress of fooclstuffs to the marlrets of the capitaI. 1 
This was, however, only a more than usually glaring 4 
instance of official greed. Hardly a year passes in 
l 1 ~vhicl? there is not a famine in  some province of Persia. I
' 31 
There may be the most abundant crops in other pro- 1 
vinces, but owing to the absence of any proper means of \ I  
communication, they cannot be transported, except at a 
prohibitive cost, into the famine-stricken region. Never- 1 !  
theless, the governors of the more favoured provinces, 
who would not lift a finger to relieve the famine if they 
could, rnake its existence an excuse for laying an - 
11 
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embargo on the exportation of grain from their own 
district, in order to buy it up  at reduced prices for their 
own account with a view to future speculation. The 
burden of all these sins of omission and cornmission 
fa lb  heavily upon the common people, for whom the 
cost of living, at Teheran at ally rate, is stated to have 
doubled during the last twenty years. During the 
same period the balance of trade has increased steadily 
against Persia, and, according to the returns shown by 
the new Belgian Administration of Customs for 1901-2, 
the imports amounted to just about .L~,ooo,ooo, while 
the exports fell short of ~3,ooo,ooo. These figures may 
not be altogether trustworthy, and in some respects they 
are even obviously misleading, as they take no account 
of the irregular trade along the land frontiers and in 
the Gulf which escapes the Customs, or of the constant 
and mysterious flow of Persian silver across the  north- 
eastern frontiers into Central Asia and Afghanistan. 
But they also do not take into account the importation 
of silver bullion for the mint. As a mere approximate 
estimate these figures probably suffice to show roughly 
how far the value of Persian exports falls short of that 
of Persian imports. Yet Persia has to meet the 
deficiency somehow, and in her case, at ally rate, there 
can be no question of " invisible exports " in the shape 
of foreign investments, profit on freights, etc., to re- 
dress the balance. On the contrary, she has become 
during the last few years a debtor state with relatively 
very heavy liabilities, There is, therefore, only too 
much reason to believe that she has met increasing 
deficits, at first by the simple process of drawing upon 
the savings accumulated during the earlier part of the 
last reign, wlziclz was a period of peace and relative 
prosperity, and of late by the still more simple process 
of borrowing wi 
in a country gov 
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of borrowing with both hands. I t  is impossible that, 
in a country governed like Persia, the impoverishment 
of the people should not go  hand-in-hand with the 
impoverishment of the Court and the bureaucracy, for 
whose benefit the people exist; and, though high- ' 
placed individuals may have waxed fat, there can be 
no doubt that the State as a whole-Court, bureaucracy, - 
and people-is being rapidly reduced to penury. 
CHAPTER X 
POPULAR DISCONTENT IN PERSIA 
T HE extent to which the process of national im- poverishn~ent I have just described has affected 
the people of Persia can only be surmisecl indirectly 
from incidental manifestations of distress, but the 
desperate shifts to which the Court has been reduced 
in order to gratify its growing extravagance, bear abun- 
dant evidence to the penury of the State as  a whole. 
The story is a simple one. It: is, in fact, nothing but 
the old story of the rake's progress. 
T h e  late Shah Nasr-ed-Din had not only many of 
the qualities which g o  to make a strong monarch, but 
he practised steadfastly for many years the  saving 
virtue of economy. H e  came to the throne in 1848, at 
the age of seventeen, and, judged by Persian standards, 
he showed himself, as he matured in years, a wise and 
firm ruler, and secured something like order and tran- 
quillity throughout his dominions. Favoured by the 
economic conditioils of trade which prevailed a t  the 
time in the outside world, the people of Persia enjoyed 
a fair measure of prosperity. Of that prosperity Nasr- 
ed-Din naturally took ample tithes for hitnself, and, 
being of a frugal disposition, he increased and  hoarded 
his wealth after the fashion of Oriental sovereigns. 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HIS MAJESTY THE SHAH 101 I 
41 
stones, gold plate and matchless objets de 'evert26 were 
accumulated in  the vaults of the palace. The  value of 
Nasr-ed-Din's treasure was at one time estimated by 
sober authorities at ;1;4,ooo,ooo, and that was probably 
no excessive estimate. During the last ten years of his 
I 
reign, however, his old habits of economy seem to have 1 \ 
deserted him, and as, owing to the fall in the price of 
silver and other untoward circumstances, the prosperity 
of the country began at the same time to wane, not only 
did he cease to add to his reserves, but he began to  
draw upon them with unaccustomed prodigality. Thus  
it came to pass that, tvhen his life was brought to a n  




his inheritance had fallen very far short of his anticipa- I 
tions. The succession to the throne always involves I 
1 
heavy expenditure. M uzaffer-ed-Din, who had held, I 
as Vali-Ahd, his own miniature court at  Tabriz, and I 
I 
surrounded himself with his own followers, chiefly I / 
drawn from the province of Azerbaijan, had not only t o  I 
reward on the usual scale the services rendered to him 
whilst he was Heir-Apparent, but also had to propitiate 
his father's e~ztou?~uge, whose powerful influence was 
indispensable to a peaceful transfer of the supreme 
authority. By the time his Majesty had transferred his 
Court from Tabriz to Teheran and seated himself 
securely on the throne, the remnants of Nasr-ed-Din's 
wealth were nearly dissipated. According to all 
accounts, Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah is a man of a kindly 
and easy-going disposition, full of amiable intentions, 
and by no means wanting in ability, indulgent to others 
I 
i if also addicted to gross self-indulgence. But he is  weak and timorous, except in the matter of expenditure, 
where he is lavish to a degree, and absoIutely undis- 
criminating in the objects of his munificence. Money 
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flows like water through his fingers, and after waiting 
so many years for his inheritance, he was determined to 
deal with it, now that he had at  last entered upon it, on 
the scale not of its meagre reality, but of the abundance 
he had fondly ascribed to it in his day dreams at  Tabriz. 
The  last of the ancient gold ingots bearing the cipher 
of Fath Ali Shah and, I believe, most of the jewels and 
other treasures which did not constitute an indispensable 
part of the regalia for exhibition on state occasions, 
were disposed of through discreet channels in the 
European markets, and principally in Russia. Then, 
for a time, retrenchment, taking the usual form of 
deferred payments, in regard to all expenditure which 
did not immediately affect the Court, and the enhanced 
offerings of loyal officials anxious to ingratiate them- 
selves with the new sovereign, staved off the day of 
reckoning. But at  last the moment came when these 
precarious devices could no longer be practised without 
danger of serious discontent at home. There is  a limit 
to the patience of even Persia11 soldiers in the matter of 
deferred payments, and a Persian sovereign fresh to 
the throne cannot afford to suspend indefinitely the 
gentle flow of largess which is required to  irrigate the 
parched soil of official loyalty. 
It was then that for the first time the credit of the 
country was pledged abroad to meet the requirements 
of the Court, and pledged not o n  busiiless lines to 
private capitalists, but to a foreign Power whose 
political ambitions already cast their shadow over 
Persia. About four inillions sterling nominally have 
flowed into the Persian Treasury in little more than 
three years, through the channel of the Banque 
d'Escompte acting as the agent of the Russian 
Ministry of Finance, and, after allowance for all 
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A ROYAL SPENDTHRIFT 1°3 
necessary deductions, the sums placed at the unfettered 
disposal of the Shah a s  the proceeds of the Russian 
loans must have amounted to at least two millions net. 
Russia ltnows how to ingratiate herself with Eastern 
potentates, and whilst we should have used our in- 
fluence a t  Teheran, had we become creditors of Persia, 
to press for reforms and to exercise some sort of control 
over the expenditure to  which such large sums were 
devoted, she has shown a discreet indifference as  to 
the purposes to which they were applied, and ltept her 
eye solely on the security which guarantees her invest- 
ment, and on the political advantages she can reap 
from it. The result is that not only has every penny 
of these two inillions been spent without the slightest 
tangible benefit to the country, but the unrestrained 
facility with which the money has been borrowed and 
spent has confirmed the Shah in his natural propensity 
to wasteful extravagance. T o  our ears two or three 
millions sterling may not sound a very formidable sum, 
but in Persia it means that the State is now spending, 
for the sole benefit of the Court, a t  the rate of nearly 
twice its normal revenue, and this when, in the usual 
course of things, an cnormous proportion of the normal 
revenue already goes to the support of the Court. 
Wha t  the Shall has actually spent all this money on 
it is difficult to say, and perhaps best not to inquire. 
English ears may be less prudish than they used to be, 
but the vices of Oriental courts are not yet a fit subject 
for public discussion, least of all those which prevail, 
according to the clwoniqz~e scn7zdaZez~se of Teheran, at 
the Court of Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah. Unworthy as many 
of the objects of the Shah's domestic munificence are, 
it would have been well for his popularity had he at 
least spent t l ~ c  money in his own country. What his 
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people most bitterly resent are the large sums he expends 
out bf the country in the  course of his European travels. 
Popular imagination is no doubt prone to exaggerate, 
but the cost of his Majesty's two journeys to  Europe 
since his accession must, I am assured, be reckoned in 
hundreds of thousands of pounds, and the Persians 
not unnaturally look with disfavour upon the growth of 
such unfamiliar and costly tastes. I t  is not so many 
years ago that a Teheran newspaper-for there are two 
or three newspapers printed in Persia, of a strictly 
semi-official character - boasted that whatever might 
be the shortcomings of Persia, she had no national 
debt, and none of the  resources of the country were 
pledged, none of its revenues mortgaged to foreign 
creditors. W h a t  has  become of that proud boast to- 
day? Is it surprisitlg that the Persians should loolr: 
askance at the importation of financial methods which 
graft on to the old abuses, to which Iong familiarity 
has reconciled them, a fresh growth of abuses clothed 
in a novel and foreign garb? T h e  story of these new 
loans, about which no official information has ever been 
vouchsafed, loses nothing in the telling as  it circulates 
through the bazaars of the capital and filters down 
from caravanserai to  caravanserai into the remotest 
provinces, and the people ask themselves what is the 
meaning of these mysterious operations by which the 
revepues of the  country are being signed away, whilst 
for the millions of krans they are supposed to produce 
not a road or a bridge has been built, not a caravan- 
serai has been repaired, not a canal has been d u g  to 
bring water to the vast tracts of fertile land which the 
want of irrigation alone condemns to remain wastes of 
arid desert. There are in many quarters signs of grave 
popular discontent, not the least significant among 
them being a 
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them being a great rcvival of Babiism; and what makes 
these manifestations of disaffection the more ominous 
is that the disaffection arises out of entirely novel 
developmellts in the misgovernment of the country, 
for a remedy to which its past history affords no pre- 
cedent. 
W h e n  I was at Teheran a year ago, popular resent- 
ment appeared to be directed not so much against the 
Shah, who, not being reputed a strong man, enjoys but 
little of his father's prestige, as against his powerful 
Prime Minister, the Atabeg-Azam. That the latter, 
however unscrupulous he may be, is in many respects 
the ablest Inan in the country is readily conceded, evcn 
by those who have the least liking for him. H e  then 
possessed, as far as it was possible to judge, the full 
and undivided confidence of his master, and what was 
perhaps even more important, the generous support of 
Russia, whose liberality to those who serve her is un- 
stinted. His  bright and genial manner, his ready wit, 
and his intellectual powers cannot but make a favour- , 
able impression upon all those who approach him, and 
amongst foreigners generally, whatever they might 
think of his policy, it was admitted that it would be 
difficult, even if it were desirable, to replace him. 
Yet, on the other hand, it was he who was, with 
good reason, held largely responsible for the reckless 
course of extravagance upon which the Shah has 
embarked, and for the heavy indebtedness into which 
an impoverished country is being dragged. His  
position, great as it still was, was, as that of every 
favourite Minister must always be, one of constant 
difficulty. The first duty of a Persian Grand Vizier 
is to minister to the financial necessities of his master, 
and on this point, though the present Shah may not 
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be a strong man, he is dearly not less exacting than 
any of his predecessors, Another and scarcely less 
important duty of the Grand Vizier is to maintain 
order throughout the Shah's dominions, In  this 
respect the Atabeg-Azam has not been, for some 
time past, altogether fortunate. In  addition to the 
chronic turbulence of the less settled parts of the 
country, such as Luristan, there havc been serious dis- 
turbances this year in most of the large cities, partly 
due to the discontent caused by tile new Customs tariff 
and the consequent depression of trade, and partly to 
more general causes of disaffection. Thcse disturb- 
ances were repressed for the time being by the  usual 
methods, but the moment was bound to corne when it 
would be hard for the Atabeg-Azam to fulfil both his 
duties with equal success, and he had already once 
before learnt from bitter experience that in Teheran the 
Tarpeian rock is very near to the Capitol. Powerful 
as he has been during his second tenure of office, his 
power was probably never quite so assured as  it 
seemed to be when he was suddenly hurled from 
office in 1897, and his life was believed to be in such 
imminent jeopardy that the British Minister deemed 
it expedient to take measures for protecting him during 
his journey to his place of exile at  Kum, by allowing 
the pllysician of the Legation to accompany him-a 
service which hc requited on his return to power by 
working tooth and nail, and ultimately with success, 
to procure Si r  Mortimer Durand's transfer to another 
post. That  the Atabeg was recalled to office within 
eighteen months, and loaded afterwards with still higher 
honours, afforded no permanent guarantee that  history 
might not repeat itself in his case. 
Apart from the support which he clcrived from Russian 
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influence, and which was, of course, conditional upon his 
subserviency to Russian policy, the Atabeg's strength 
lay mainly in the absence of any serious competitor. 
I-Iis chief rival was supposed to be the Amin-ed-Dowleh, 
who succeedcd the Atabeg after the latter's fall in 1897. 
Great hopes were founded upon his accession to office, 
as he had had considerable experience of state affairs, 
and was believed to be a man of enlightened views and 
honesty of purpose, as well as of undoubted intelli- 
gence. H e  did, indeed, prepare a fairly practical 
I 1 
I 
scheme of administrative reform. He  proposed to draw 
up a regular budget, which should set forth the actual 
revenue and expenditure of the country, and he laid 
great stress upon the necessity of separate adininistra- 
tion for the collection and for the expenditure of revenue. 
A revision of the assessment of the land tax, perhaps 
the most crying need of the country, was one of the 
main features of his programme, which included a 
reduction of the standing army to 20,000 eifectives, 
and the orgallisation of the irregular cavalry into a 
disciplined body of gendnlmerie, But excellent as were 
his intentions, he had not the force of purpose to carry 
them through, and his programme, like many other 
similar programmes in Persia, was practically pigeon- 
holed, even belore he, in turn, fell as suddenly from 
power, in the spring of 1898, as had the Atabeg, who 
was once more to succeed him. Some of the Amin-ed- 
Dowleh's ideas have, however, been carried out through 
other agencies, such as the reform of the smaller cur- 
rency by thc introduction of nickel coinage ; and a few 
of the schools which he opened by appealing to ~r iva te  
enterprise, himself setting the example of liberal sub- 
scriptinns and donations, still subsist. The Amin-ed- 
I)owleh was sent to live in compulsory retirement on 
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his own property near Resht. Another and perhaps 
the most formidable of the Atabeg's rivals was believed 
to be the Firman-Firma, now in exile a t  Baghdad. 
He is a great-grandson of Fath AIi Shah,  and Muss~lman co, 
brother of the chief wife, and a t  the  same time even fashionah1 
son-in-law, of the present Shah. H e  has filled i n  
turn many high offices, and is credited with the the people, an, 
principal share in the Atabeg's downfall in 1897. authority is not 
Others whom the Atabeg deemed it prudent to have authority as in 
removed from the vicinity of the  Court were the of the Persian . 
Kawam-ed-Dowleh, banished to Meshed, for many they are i n d e e c  
years member of the Council of State, and conilected vices of t h e  
by marriage with the S h a h ;  the Nassir-el-Mullr, in any independ,  
honourable exile as  Goverl~or of Kurdistan, who was fluential m i d d l  
a fellow-student a t  Balliol both of Lord Curzon and of some m e a s u r e  
the present British Minister at Teheran, S i r  Arthur 
Hardinge, and was sent  on a special mission to London 
to announce the accession of Muzaffer-ed-Din ; and the ministers h a t r e  
Ala-el-Mulk, now Governor of Kerman, a Seyyid or to conciliate th 
descendant of the Prophet, who comes of an influential A ta beg-Azam 
family, and has occupied important diplomatic posts a t  them, But tht 
St. Petersburg and Constantinople. T h e  last-named the foreigner ?h 
especially has the reputation of being a strong man, cry that natur-, 
with independent and progressive views. Other enemies of the IMz~lZafi~- 
the Atabeg still had nearer to Court, and though he ful a m i n i s t e r  
again lately procured the removal of a good many 
suspects," amongst others of the Haltim-el-Mulk, 
the illost inasterfr~l Minister could never hope to ear of the sovc 
eliminate all his would-be rivals. apt to be u g l y  
But though, like most: Oriental courts, that of Teheran who would s t a  
is a hot-bed of ceaseless intrigue, the Atabeg had per- to himself. H 
haps less to fear in that directioil than from the  growth as the S h a h  di( 
of popular discontent outside. Public opinion, in the 1 some of h i s  fz 
sense in which we understand it, can llardly be said to credited w i t h  i 
- ~~ . - . - ,  
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~ r d l y  be said to 
exist in Persia, but there is an  influential class \vhose 
voice, though no longer so powerful as in the past, 
may still sway the masses a t  a critical moment. In no 
Mussulman couiltry is scepticism so prevalent and 
even fashionable as in Persia, but the religious teachers 
of the Faith have not yet entirely lost their hold upon 
the people, and in a Shia country the ecclesiastical 
authority is not so closely bound up with the secular 
authority as in Sunni countries. T h e  moral standard 
of the Persian Mullnlzs may not be of the highest, and 
they are indeed by no means free from the prevailing 
vices of the official classes ; but in the absence of 
any independent aristocracy of birth, or of any in- 
fluential middle class, it is they alone who can in 
some measure stand, and have a t  times stood, be- 
tween the people and its rulers. Wi th  few masterful 
exceptions, such as Nadir Shah, most sovereigns and 
ministers have come to the conclusion that it is politic 
to conciliate them, and both Muzaffer-ed-Din and the 
Atabeg-Azam have been careful to  deal kindly with 
them. But the cry that the country is being sold to 
the foreigner is one which, if once raised-and it is a 
cry that naturally appeals to the more fanatical section 
of the Mz~llnl~s-it is very clifficult, even for so resource- 
ful a minister as was the Atabeg, to quell. At first 
it may not g o  beyond a whisper or a muttering, but 
even a whisper or a muttering ultimately reaches the 
ear of the sovereigil, and then the consequences are 
apt  to be ugly;  for Muzaffer-ed-Din is not the man 
who would stand by a favourite Minister a t  any risk 
to himself. His eldest son, now the Veli Ahd, lives, 
as the Shall did until his accession, a t  Tabriz. Lacking 
some of his father's more amiable weaknesses, he is 
credited with imperious and impatient ambitions, and 
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he courts with equal assiduity the goodwill both of the 
Mzsllahs and of the Russians. 
Seldom, even in the annals of an Oriental court, lzas an 
apparently all-powerful minister fallen in more dramatic 
circumstances than those which attended the Atabeg's 
recent dismissal. At the beginning of September, 1903, 
the news of the death of the Hakim-el-Mullc at Resht 
produced a profound sensatioil in Teheran. The  Ilakim- 
el-Mulk had long been one of the most confidential 
servants and advisers of' the prescnt Shah. A pupil 
of Dr. Tholozan, the distinguished French physician 
of the late Shah, the Halrim-el-1VIullr was appointed in 
the same capacity to the Court of the present Shah, 
whilst the latter was still Heir-Apparent and resided at 
Tabriz. He accompanied Muzaffer-ed-Din lo Teheran 
after Nasr-ed-Din's death, and at the beginning of 1900 
he was promoted to the position of Wazir-i-Durbar, 
or First Chamberlain of the Court-.a position which 
gave him a rank second only to that of the Atabcg- 
Azam himself. A few months later he travelled with 
the Shah to Europe, a n d  until the spring of this year 
remained constalltly in personal attendance upoil the 
Sovereign. H e  had great wealth and many friends, 
and though he was himself a prudent man, and was 
careful to Iceep cliscreetly in the background, some of 
his clients were less cautious, and are said to have 
used his name and influence rather too freely in opposi- 
tion to the Atabeg. In May the I-Ialcinl-el-Mulk was 
banished to Resht, nominally as Governor, and this 
was regarded as  f ~ ~ r t h e r  viclcnce of the Atabeg's omni- 
potence. But Kesht is, after all, not very far from 
Teheran. At any rate, it was not far enough to disarm 
the apprehensions of the Atabeg or of those who were 




















spite of a 
he  had f; 






tition of ; 
o r  some 4 
Atabeg's 
T h a t  the 
from the 
J PERSIA 
odwill both of t h e  
iental court, has a n  
I in  more d ramat ic  
nded the Atabeg 's  
f September, 1903, 
1-el-Mulk at  Rcsbt 
~ e r a n .  The H a k i m -  
; most co i l f ide~~t ia l  
n t  Shah .  A p u p i l  
French p h y s i c i a ~ ~  
E w a s  appointed in 
t h e  present Shah, 
rent  and res ided  at 
-ed-Din to T e h e r a n  
: beginning of r g o o  
)f Wazir-i-Durbar,  
-a position w h i c h  
hat  of the A t a b e g -  
r h e  travelled wi th  
s p r i n g  of t h i s  year 
;tendance u p o n  thc 
a n d  many f r iends ,  
den t  man, a n d  was 
ackground, some of 
tl a r e  said to have 
too freely in opposi -  
Hakim-el-Mulk was 
Governor, and this 
t h e  Ataheg's omni- 
no t  very far from 
ar  enough t o  disarm 
r of those w h o  wcre 
ves for in terpre t ing 
T H E  FALL OF THE ATABEG I I I 
his secret thoughts. Early in September the Hakim- 
el-Mulk and his confidential servant died suddenly 
within a few hours in very suspicious circumstances. 
Within a fortnight the Atabeg-Azam himself was 
dismissed from all his offices and banished, not merely 
from the capital, but from the Shah's dominion. In 
what precise relation his fall stands to the mysterious 
death of the I-Iakim-el-Mulk we shall probably never 
ltnow. I t  may be that the tragic end of so old and 
long-trusted a servant a s  the Hakim aroused the Shah's 
wrath or awakened other suspicions. The  Atabeg- 
Azam was, no doubt, "a man 
Of a n  unbounded stomach, ever r a ~ ~ l c i n g  
Ilimsclf with princes," 
and there are some shrewd observers who long a g o  
suspected that he might not always remain content 
merely to ranlc himself with princes, but would some 
day aspire to ranlc himself above them. T h e  wide- 
spread disturbances which broke out in so  many 
different parts of Persia during the first half of 1903 
had doubtless tended to weaken his position, and in 
spite of all he had done to earn the support of Russia, 
he had failed in some points to carry out her wishes, 
as, for instance, with regard to the Seistan Boundary 
Commission, over which she had hoped to exercise 
directly 01- indirectly a larger control, and also with 
regard to the Anglo-Persian Commercial Convention, 
which indeed ratified the fnit accom$Zz' in favour of 
Russian diplomacy, but a t  any rate prevented the repe- 
tition of another such coup in the future. The causes, 
or some of the causes, which have brought about the 
Atabeg's downfall can a t  present be merely surmised. 
That  the crisis was no ordinary one may be gathered 
from the fact, almost, if not absolutely, unprecedented 
i 
! 
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in the history of the present dynasty, that a inember 
I 
of the Kajar family has now been appointed Prime 
I Minister. The Ain-ed-Dowleh, hitherto Governor of ! 
Teheran, is a grandson of Fath Ali Shah, the great- 
grandfather of Muzaffer-ed-Din, and besides being 
thus a distant cousin of the reigning Shah, he is 
married to one of Muzaffer-ed-Din's sisters, and one 
of his own sisters was married to the late Shah. H e  
is ambitious and masterful, and has long been lr~iown 
to resent the ascendency of the ex-Grand Vizier. 
But if one may judge him by his record as Governor 
of Teheran, he is hardly lil~ely to lift the government 
of Persia ou,t of the slough of despond into which it 
has sunlr, whilst, as a member of the Kajar family, he 
might easily add most seriously -to the discredit into 
which the dynasty has already &lien. In the meantime 
the usual clznssez-croises is going on at Teheran. Many 
of those who had incurred the Atabeg's special dis- 
pleasure, like the Nassir-el-Mullr, the Kawam -ed- 
Do~vleh, etc., have been recalled to the capital, whilst 
his chief supporters and favourites have been involved 
in his disgrace. The  ex-Grand Vizier himself has Lilte the Hi 
departed into exile, avowedly on a prolonged pilgrimage times been cli 
to Mecca. This is a time-honoured expedient which 
helps to keep the luckless traveller's head on his I 
shoulders until he has passed the frontier. dialectical gy 
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CHAPTER XI 
TI-IE REVIVAL OF BABIISM 
T H A T  the lnovelnent which bears the apostolic name of the religious martyr who was put to  
death a t  Tabriz more than half a century ago is  still 
a living force in Persia is almost universally recog- 
nised. But to  what extent and in what shape that force 
is lilcely to make itself decisively felt opinions differ 
very largely. Any survey, however brief, of the  
general condition of Persia would, however, be incom- 
plete without some attempt to define the present position 
of Babiism, as  its origin and evolution appear to be 
exceptionally characteristic of a n  important phase of 
Persian life. 
Like the Hindu Aryans, Persian thinkers have at  all 
times been distinguished for their passion .., for meta- 
physical inquiry coupled with inordinate imagination. 
They delight in abstract subtleties of.. thought a n d  
dialectical gymnastics, for the sake, it would seem, 
rather of the intellectual enjoyment which such exer- 
cises in theinselves afford than in the hope of reaching 
any definite goal. Hence the impatience they have 
always shown of the restraints of cut -and-dr ied  
theology. Under the later kings of the Sassanide 
dynasty the priestly caste, though supported by the 
secular arm of the State, had been unable to maintain 
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already completely undermined before the tide of Arab its spiri 
conquest swept over the country. The Semitic form of lapse in 
Islam imposed by the conquerors was only tolerated I 
I towards for a very short time. It succumbed to the Shia  schism I combina 
which represented a national reaction, intellectual and philosol: 
political as well as  religious, though it llominally 
I 
I material 
turned only on the superiority of Ali's claims to the May it 
Khalifate as  against those of the three first succes- 
I conditic 
sors of Mahornet. To  preserve even the outward 
I are but appearances of Shia uiliformity it has been necessary of mate 
to create in Persia, on lines not dissimilar to those 
i and ind of the old Zoroastrian priesthood, a11 ecclesiastical whole  ( 
, organisation which presents a closer analogy to an I be l a r g  established church than is to be found elsewhere in the t o  d e d ~  
world of Islam. Even so, it is only an outward uni- 
I tudes  v formity that has been ~reselved.  I t  has  indeed been own liv 
asserted that in the whole of Persia there is not a single 
Mussulman who believes in all the tenets of Shiitic 
Islam without any admixture of exti-aneous doctrines. 
Amongst the masses Islam is overlaid with gross 
processl 
blood tj 
s a m e  br 
each in 
superstitions, largely compouilded of native hagiology internal 
quite alien to its original spirit of rigid monotheism. evitable 
Amongst the bullr of the more educated classes it has apt mer 
been rcfined away into intellectual agnosticism, or has ch ro  nicl 
merged into materialistic pantheism. Islam survives as 1 ( such el 
the badge of a conservative institution for the protec- 
tion of the vested interests of the ruling classes, a s  a 
war-cry for enlisting in their service the passions of 
popular superslitions, and also as a customary common 
denominator of heterogeneous schools of thought that 
accept ils inherited forms and ceremonies, just as many 
Europeatls continue to conform to the traclitional 
practices of a Christian c l ~ u r c l ~  long after thcy have 
rejected its clogmas, or ceased even to be irlflucnced by 
I 
.e of Arab 
:ic form of 
tolerated 
iia schism 
xtual  and 
nominally 
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. its spirit. The result has been, on the one hand, a 
lapse into mere sensualism, on the other, a tendency 
towards extreme asceticism, and sometimes a curious 
combination of both - an intellectual delight in the 
philosophic conceptions that underlie the latter and a 
material delight in the pleasures that satisfy the former. 
May it not be that what appear to us the anarchical 
conditions of spiritual life in such a country as Persia 
are but the natural reflex of the anarchical conditions 
of material existence? May not the spirit of scepticism 
and indifferentism which permeates the writings of the 
whole Sufi school off Persian poets and philosophers 
be largely due to the utter hopelessness of attempting 
to deduce any moral laws from the continuous vicissi- 
tudes which they experienced and witnessed in their 
own lives and in the lives of those around them? The 
procession of dynasties and rulers wading through 
blood to power only to be hurled back again by the 
same brutal process into the obscurity from which had 
each in turn emerged, the interminable recurrence of 
internal strife and external invasion, with their in- 
evitable accompaniments of pestilence and famine, are 
apt  merely to daze the European reader of Oriental 
chronicles. But what must have been the effect of 
such events upon those for whom they meant the 
ruin of their homes, the dispersion of their families, 
the loss of fortune, honours, possessions? Among 
Persian poets, none has preached the vanity of life 
in a form more attractive tharr- SBdi, both to those 
who would seek compensation for it in the fullest 
measure of sensual enjoyment, and to those who, 
reading into his verses a symbolical meaning, would 
fain find in them an exhortation to the pursuit of 
spiritual emancipation from the thraldom of the senses. 
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As one of the shrewdest students of the spiritual life 
of Persia, M. de Gobineau, has observed, when one has 
witnessed two or three times in his life the progress of 
a Tartar Prince on his way to the execution of a prede- 
cessor-Mongol, Turlr, or Arab-who had done the 
same by someone else before him, and when one 
has himself suffered numberless vicissitudes in conse- 
quence of such events; when one has been like SAdi 
a great personage, and then a common soldier, and 
then the prisoner of a Christian feudal chief; when 
one has svorlted as a navvy on the fortifications of the 
Count of Antioch, and wandered back afoot to Shiraz 
after infinite pain and  labour, he may well be disposed 
to think that nothing that exists is real or, at least, has 
any substantial reality worth clinging to. To-day the 
public peace of Persia is no longer subject to such 
violent perturbations. At least, as far as we are con- 
cerned, the appearances of peace prevail, and few of us 
care or have occasion to loolr beyond the appearances. 
But for the Persians themselves, have the conditions 
very much changed? Do they not witness one day the 
sudden rise of this or that favourite of fortune and the 
next day his equally sudden fa11 3 Have they not seen 
the Atabeg-Azam twice hold sway as the Shah's all- 
powerful Viziery and twice hurled down from that 
pinnacle by a bolt from the blue? How many other 
ministers and governors have sat for a time in the 
seats of the mighty and been swept away by some in- 
trigue as  sordid a s  that to which they owed their own 
exaltation? And how many in humbler stations have 
been in the meantime the recipients of their unworthy 
favours or the victims of their arbitrary oppression? 
A village which but yesterday was fairly prosperous 
is beggared to-day by some neighbouring landlord 
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higher up the valley, who, having duly propitiated 
those in authority, diverts for the benefit of his olvn 
estates the'whole of its slender supply of water. The 
, progress of a governor or royal prince, with all his 
I customary retinue of ravenous hangers-on, eats out the 
I countryside through which it passes more effectually 
I than a flight of locusts. The visitation is as ruinous 
and as unaccountable. Is  it not the absence of all 
visible moral correlation of cause and effect in these 
phenomena of daily life that has gone far to produce 
the stolid fatalism of the masses, the scoffing scepticism 
of the more educated classes, and from time to time the 
revolt of some nobler minds? Of such the most recent 
and perhaps the noblest of all became the founder of 
Babiisin. 
The story of Mirza Ali Muhammed, better 1- known as 
the Bab, or gate through whom the new knowledge of a 
better life was to be attained, scarcely requires repeti- 
tion. H e  was born in 1819 or 1820 at Shiraz, and 
acquired at an early age a great reputation for his 
learning in metaphysics and theology and for the purity 
and austerity of his life. A pilgrimage to Mecca and 
to the Shia shrines of Kerbela only served to complete 
his estrangement from Persian orthodoxy. On his 
return to Persia he began to preach openly against the 
corruption and vices of the clergy, and still professing 
the greatest veneration for the Prophet, used his Koran 
chiefly to justify his denunciati-ons of the degenerate 
professors of the sacred book. Gradually, and in more 
secret conferences, he began to expound a new gospel, 
which was an implied, if not an explicit, negation 
of Islam. At the date of his "Manifestation," when he 
proclaimed himself to be " the Bab," in IS#, he was 
barely twenty-five years of age. Yet not only in his 
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own native town of Shiraz, but all over the South 
of Persia, he had recruited disciples amongst men 
of every age and rank and class. Some-and not the 
least influential-were ready to carry his message into 
the North, and it was through their agency that the 
new movement assumed the political character which 
precipitated the catastrophe. He  himself remained 
throughout, both in his speeches and in his writings, 
essentially a religious agitator, though his claims to 
divine revelation and even to be regarded a s  an incarna- 
tion of the deity grew more and more outspolren and 
imperious. At Court and in the official bureaucracy, 
at any rate until the death of Muhammed Shah in 
1848, there were many whose intellectual curiosity of 
metaphysical novelties inclined them to disregard the 
denunciations which poured in from the clergy of the 
revolutionary tendencies of the Bab's teachings, and a t  
one moment the eccentric Grand Vizier, Hajji Mirza 
Aghassy, who had a mania for theological disputations, 
had nearly induced his master to invite the Bab to 
Teheran to meet in public conference the chief pundits 
of orthodoxy. But in the northern provinces, especially 
in Khorasan, in Mazenderan, and in Azerbaijan, the 
Babiist movement was destined rapidly to assume a 
character which could not but alarm the ruling classes. 
Perhaps it was the different temperament of the disciples 
who had undertaken to spread the new doctrine, or 
of the people to whom they preached ; perhaps it was 
a chapter of accidents more difficult to account for. 
Anyhow, in the North the message of peace was soon 
converted into a message of war ; and when Nasr-ed-Din 
Shah came to the throne he found the provinces nearest 
to his capital torn by sectarian strife. The military 
forces of the State were called into requisition, and 
despite pr 
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despite prodigies of individual valour, and many brilliant 
feats of arms, the Babis were overwhelmed successively 
in their two chief strongholds, a cold-blooded massacre 
in defiance of the plighted word of royal princes com- 
pleting in both cases after the surrender of the survivors 
the restoration of the Shah's authority. But though 
the militant forces of Babiism had been crushed, the 
spirit which informed it was still unconquered. The  
fervour .of its neophytes in the large cities had not 
broken out into deeds of violence, but by the light 
of what had already happened elsewhere, the teachings 
of the Bab, though not in themselves actually seditious, 
could no longer be regarded merely a s  an interesting 
subject of metaphysical speculation. The Bab, who 
had at first been placed under arrest in Shiraz and then 
conveyed in safe custody into the Caspian province 
of Ghilan, was now sent in chains to Tabriz, where, 
after being treated with every refinement of ignominy 
and cruelty, he was finally put to  death on July gth, 
1850, together with one chosen companion who was 
faithful unto him to the end. When  it was at last 
decided to take his life, he was led out t o  be shot in the 
public square outside the citadel, and  the first volley 
left him unhurt. Had  he immediately talcen advantage 
of the impression made upon the crowd of spectators, 
who had assembled with mingled feelings to witness his 
execution and were probably just as ready to acclaim him 
as  a prophet in whose favour Gpd Himself had wrought 
a miracle as  to jeer a t  his ignoble death, the whole 
course of Persian history might have been changed. 
But he was dazed and exhausted by his sufferings, and 
he fled blindly back into the citadel, where, in a guard- 
house in which he had sought refuge, the soldiers 
promptly despatched him. 
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The Bab was dead, b%t not Babiism. H e  was not the 
first, and still less the last, of a long line of martyrs 
who have testified that, even in a country gangrened 
with corruption and atrophied with indifferentism like 
Persia, the soul of a nation survives, inarticulate, 
perhaps, and in a way helpless, but still capable of 
sudden spaslns of vitality. Was  the Bab himself the 
creator of the movement which bears his name, or was 
he merely the exponent of ideas and sentiments which 
would have ripened even without him into maturity? 
It  is the old question as  to whether great men are only 
the fated product of an age in travail, or whetller their 
genius fashions into a new shape the world in which 
they live and move and have their being. Certainly as 
far as the Bab is concerned, his personal activity harclly 
seems to account for the evolution of Babiism either 
during his own lifetime or since his death. Still less 
does the personal activity of his successors account for 
it. The execution of the Bab was followed by a ~e r iod  
of wholesale persecution for his disciples throughout 
Persia, which culminated, in 1852, after a Babi attempt 
on the Shah's life, in an orgy of torture and bloodshed 
at Teheran when the Seven Martyrs and many others, 
including women and children, met their terrible fate 
with heroic fortitude. By this time allnost all the 
leading adepts of the new religion had been destroyed, 
and the Bab's successor was cornpelled to seek refuge 
in exile at Baghdad.. Mirza Yahya, upon whom the 
Bab's mantle was held to have descended, was a. mere 
youth, only sixteen years of agc, the son of a great 
personage who had been Gover~lor of %'chcran, but 
brought up, after his mother's death when he was still 
an infant, by the wife of one of the chief apostles of the 
Bab. Some say that a secret message from the Bab, 
deliverel 
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delivered after his execution, designated Mirza Yahya 
as his successor, others that he was chosen by a con- 
clave of clisciples on the strength of certain mysterious 
indications of peculiar moral fitness. Though he bore 
the title of Subh-i-Ezel, or Dawn of Eternity, in analogy 
to the title of Hazret-i-Ala or Supreme Highness, 
which the Bab had taken during the last years of his 
life, the part he played in the subsequent history of 
Babiism seems to have been inconspicuous. A half- 
brother of Mirza Yahya, Mirza Hussein Ali, thirteen 
years his senior, who had been imprisoned at Teheran 
on suspicion of complicity in the attempted assassina- 
tion of the Shah, rejoined him at Baghdad, and soon 
practically usurped his authority, though nominally 
yielding him religious allegiance. Dissensions were 
rife at this period amongst tlie Babis, and the Persian 
pilgrims of Babi proclivity, who on their wayto Kerbela 
used to visit the two brothers at Baghdad, were apt to 
fight over their respective claims to spiritual supremacy. 
T11e Persian Government ultimately urged the Porte to 
remove tbem both to some part of the Turkish Empire 
less frequented by Persians. In 1864 they were trans- 
ferred to Constantinople and then to Adrianople. Here 
Mirza I-Iussein Ali, who had taken the title of Beha'- 
ullah, or " Splendour of God," openly claimed to be 
( (  I-Ie who was to be made manifest," whose advent the 
Uab llimself had foretold. This claim, of course, 
involvcd the supe~session of the Sabh-i-Ezel, who had 
never Ilccll regarded as more than the successor or 
vicegerent of the Bab, Most of the Babis who had 
acco~llpanicd the two brothers in their exile went over 
to J3el1a'ullah's sidc, but those who still came on 
pilgrimage from Persia did not so readily acquiesce in 
llis claims, and serious disturbances from time to time 
122 THE REVIVAL OF BARIISM 
occurred between the two factions. Finally the Porte 
decided to separate the two brothers. In 1868 Subh-i- 
Ezel and his few remaining adherents were sent to 
Cyprus, where they still reside, and Bcha'ullah with his 
party was sent to Acre. From this inomcnt Sub11-i- 
Ezells influence, such as it had been, ceased altogether. 
Beha'ullah not only became the recogniscd head of 
Babiism, but he composed voluminous scriptures, which 
gradually superseded the writings of t l ~ c  Bab himself, 
and he claimed even more emphatically than the Bab to 
be revered as a divine incarnation. Pilgrims from Persia 
floclred a t  one time to the modest court he held in Acre, 
and he used occasionally to receive a few privileged 
European visitors, such as Professor Browne, ol Oxford, 
the chief English authority on Babiism, and tke late 
Laurence Oliphant, who, from his latter-day retreat on 
Mount Carmel, used to keep up friendly relations with 
the leaders of a movement in which, as in all religious 
speculations, he was deeply interested. I t  was as 
Oliphant's guest that in 1885 I enjoyed the favour of 
Beha'ullah's hospitality, and under the salne auspices 
were entertained by him a party of Americans in search 
of new spiritual truths, from whose visit, and more 
directly from the preachings of a Babi missionary, 
Ibrahim Khairullah, who lectured in America, there 
has sprung up a n  American branch of the I3abi Church, 
which counts, it is said, some 4,000 adherents, chicfly 
in Chicago. 
Beha'ullah died in 1892, and llis eldest son, Abbas 
Effendi, maintains the s~~ccession at Ac;re, thotigh liis 
authority has been disputed by a younger brother. 
1-IOW far the influence of Acre continues to make ilsclf 
felt amongst the Babis generally, it is l~a rd  to say. 
Regular communication is ltept u p  bet\ectl I'ersia and 
I Acre, b01 
and the s 
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~ c r e ,  both by pilgrimages and confidential messengers ; 
and the sacred boolrs of Beha'ullah and Abbas Effendi 
are widely read by the Babi communities. That the , 
latter are still very numerous and spread throughout 
the length and breadth of Persia there can be no 
doubt. In all the large cities, in Shiraz and Yezd, in 
Isfahan and Tabriz, and even in the capital, their 
adherents are to be found amongst all classes of the 
population, amongst officials and soldiers, amongst 
merchants and artisans, as  well as amongst the 
humbIest of the people. Amongst the rural popula- 
tion also, and especially in the villages around Isfahan, 
Kum, and Kashan, and throughout Khorasan, they 
have a large following. Their total strength is esti- 
mated by competent authorities at nearly one and a 
half millions, or about 20 per cent. of the total popula- 
tion of Persia. But all such estiinates must be largely 
guesswork, as  the most convinced Babis cannot make 
any open profession of their faith ; and it is difficult to 
distinguish between those who have f ~ ~ l l y  accepted the 
religious teachings of Babiism and those who merely 
sympathise with its reforming tendepcies. Though 
there has been no general proscription of Babis by the 
State since 1852, the hostility of the orthodox clergy 
towards them has never relented, and they have been 
constantly liable, not only to savage outbreaks of 
popular fanaticism, as in Yezd in 1891, and again this 
year in many places, but to the fitful vindictiveness of 
the authorities as in Isfahan, where in 1878, and again 
in 1888, fresh names were added to their long roll of 
martyrs. The aggravated misrule of the last few years, 
with its pretnonitions of impending national disintegra- 
tion, has unquestionably brought vast numbers of 
recruits to their ranks. They maintain, indeed, that 
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their objects are not in any way political,, and quote the 
warning issued by the Subh-i-Ezel after the Bab's death, 
tllat the fight must be fought with spiritual and not with 
material weapons, as well as  Beha'ullah's injunction 
that it is better to be killed than to kill. The pre- 
dominant tendency at the present day is in fact to give 
prominence to the ethical rather than to the theological 
aspect of Babiism, and from the latter point of view, to 
dwell upon the essential truths which underlie all 
"manifestations" of divine origin rather than on tile 
outward forms which differentiate them. T h e  new dis- 
pensation should therefore, it is claimed, be regarded 
chiefly as  the continuation and fulfilment of the earlier 
Mosaic, Christian, and Muhammedan dispensations. 
Does not the Jew still wait for the promised Messiah, 
the Christian for the second advent of Christ, the 
Mussulman for the appearance of a Mahdi? Babiisin 
is but the I '  manifestation " they are all equally expect- 
ing, and the evolution it has undergone, even within 
the short period since the Bab gave 1lis first message 
to the world, precludes any claim to rigid doctrinal 
finality. The Babis certainly profess, and within the 
measure of their lim'ited opportunities, have practised 
tolerance and good will towards all, Christians and Jews, 
Sufis and Zoroastrians, and they talk with enthusiasm 
of the universal brotl~erhood of man and a millennium 
in which wars and civil strife shall cease. 
Socially one of the most interesting features of 
Babiism is the raising of women to a much higher 
plane than she is usually admitted to in the East. The 
Bab himself had no Inore devoted a disciple than the 
beautiful ancl gifted lady, lrnown as Kurrat-el-Ain, the 
" Consolation of the Eyes, " who, having shared all 
the dangers of the first apostolic missions in the north, 
challenged 
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challenged and suffered death with virile fortitude, 
as one of the Seven Martyrs of Teheran. No memory 
is more deeply venerated or kindles greater enthusiasm 
than hers, and the influence which she wielded in her 
lifetime still enures to her sex. That women, whom 
orthodox Islam barely credits with the possession of a 
soul, are freely admitted to the meetings of Babis, gives 
their enemies, the Mz~llalzs, ample occasion to blas- 
pheme. But they have never produced a tittle of . 
evidence in support of the vague charges of immorality 
they are wont to  bring against the followers of the new 
creed. Communism and socialism are also often im- 
puted to them, and some of them appear to have 
borrowed from the West the termino\logy of advanced 
democracy. Probably Babiism is still in  a state of flux, - 
and represents, apart from its doctrinal aspects, an 
association of many heterogeneous elements loosely 
bound together by a common spirit of revolt against 
the scandalous depravity of the Court, the corruption 
of the ruling classes, and the intolerance and greed of 
the orthodox clergy. 
Perhaps the best proof of the widespread influence of 
Babiism is the attention which the Russians have paid 
to it. One of their ablest agents, Captain Toumanky, 
has made careful studies of the Babi movement in all 
its bearings, and translated the most important of its 
scriptures into Russian. Throughout Persia they keep 
in close touch with its leaders, thus acquiring valuable 
sources of information amongst all classes, and on 
Russian territory outside the Persian frontier they 
treat the Babis with marked favour, as, for instance, 
a t  Ashkabad, where they have been given land by the 
Russian authorities for the erection of a conventicle. 
It is, however, difficult even for the Russians always to 
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hunt with the hounds and run with the hare, and during 
the recent riots at  Isfahan the Babis who tried to seek 
refuge at  the Russian Consulate found it closed against 
them, and were massacred a t  its very gales. Even 
amongst the Persian official classes Babiism is supposed 
to have found protectors in high places, the Atabeg-Azam 
himself having been credited with a desire to stand well 
with the Babis, though l ~ e  is the last man to whom their 
moral aspirations would appeal. H e  was, however, a 
strong believer in the policy of malting friends unto 
himself in every camp, and whilst cultivating the good- 
will of the Mz~llalzs, he no doubt sought to impress 
upon the Babis that they might have worse enemies 
than him. But the outbreaks which have talten place 
this year (May-June, 1903) a t  so many and far-distant 
centres as Yezd and Isfahan, Tabriz and Shiraz, show 
that if the Babis really imagined they could put  their 
trust in him they were leaning on a broken reed. 
Earlier in the year, in February, there had been some 
anti-Babi riots in Teheran in connection with the burial 
of a reputed Babi, but the authorities put  them down, 
the initiative, it is worth noting, having been talren by 
a party of Cossaclrs, belonging to General Kosa- 
gowsky's brigade, amongst whom were several Babis, 
who at once intervened vigorously for the protection of 
their co-religionists. In  the provinces, however, the 
word was apparefitly passed round to give the lMuZZaAs a 
free hand. Ever since the Shah's return from Europe in 
the autuliltl of 1go2,the attitude of the orthodox clergy 
had caused some apprehension a t  Teheran. The  ex- 
travagance of the Court, the Russian loans, the 
appreciation of the cost of living, and the general 
distress and misery of the country, had intensified 
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fanatical MuZZahs m i g h t  give voice to it by raising a 
dangerous cry that  t h e  country was being sold to the 
Infidels. At  such t imes it is no small advantage to 
have ready to h a n d  an inoffensive and unprotected 
community upon w h o m  the passions of the mob can be ' 
deflected. The savage  massacres of Babis enacted at 
different points of t h e  kingdom have been the worst 
that have talcen place  since 1852, but the Mudlaits were 
for the time being appeased, and the Atabeg-Azarn 
could boast of h a v i n g  once more restored peace to the 
realm of the  enlightened and humane Sovereign, upon 
whom the most noble  Order of the Garter had just bee ? conferred. Babiism, however, has lived through worse 
days than these, and under Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah, as 
under his father, Nasr-ed-Din, the blood of martyrs 
, may have served b u t  to quiclren the seeds of a new 
harvest. , 
Though unconnected with Babiism, there are two 
other recent developments in  the religious domain 
which may as well be  noted here. The  survival of a 
faithful remnant of the ancient fire-worshippers of 
Persia has  begun t o  attract the attention and sympathy 
of the wealthy a n d  influential Parsee communities 
lof India. These Zoroastrians, or Ghebrs as  they are 
more commonly called, only number about 10,000 alto- 
gether, and most of them inhabit Yezd and Kerman. 
But as small traders,  and even more a s  gardeners, 
in which capacity they enjoy considerable reputation, 
they are to be found  scattered all-over Persia. The 
Bombay Parsees have  of late taken a very ~ractical 
interest in the fa te  of their Persian co-religionists. 
They have not on ly  given them local support in matters 
of worship and  education, but they now maintain a 
regular agent for their  benefit at  Teheran. He has, 
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of course, no official status, but his friendly representa- 
tions carry some weight with the Central Government. 
The  Parsees are both wealthy and generous, and they 
know how to approach the ruling classes of Persia. 
The Nestorians, or as  they prefer to call themselves, 
the Syrians of the highlands of Kurdistan, are one of 
the most ancient and interesting of the Cllristian corn- 
munities of Asia. On both sides of the froaties-under 
Turkish and under Persian rule-they have succeeded 
in maintaining an  ecclesiastical organisation, differing 
probably but little from that of the early ages of 
Christianity, though they have had their own sectarian 
quarrels amongst themselves, and those on the Turkish 
side of the frontier entered into communion with Rome 
in the seventeenth century under a separate Patriarch 
lrnown as  the Patriarch of Babylon. The Persian Nes- 
torians preserved complete religious autonomy coupled 
with certain political rights of self-government until 
quite recently. But as they saw the latter gradually 
whittled down by their Persian rulers, a considerable 
section threw itself a few years ago into the arms 
of Russia. More than half of the Persian Nestorians, 
including three bishops, were received into the bosom 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a party of 
Russian priests under an Archimandrite were sent down 
to take charge of the new flock. The  political results 
have not, it appears, so far quite fillfilled the expecta- 
tions of the converts, a s  Russian diplomacy, busy with 
other things, has failed to fight their battles at Teheran 
with the energy which had been hoped for. But Russia, 
who knows the uses of spiritual patronage in Eastern 
countries, will, no doubt, set inattcrs right as soon 
as the moment comes for turning the ecclesiastical 
allegiance of the Nestorians to practical account. 
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CHAPTER XI1 
FROM TEHERAN TO ISFAHAN 
ORD SALISBURY recommended the use of I-, large scale maps to students of Asiatic politics. 
Still more useful, as far as Persia is concerned, would 
be a map showing the proportion of cultivated to un- 
cultivated land as it is to-day, as it has been in the 
past, and as it might be in the future under an intelli- 
gent and honest administration. Our maps show clearly 
enough the well-known desert plains which extend over 
a large belt of Eastern Persia, but they give no 
iildication whatever of the infinitesimal proportion 
in which cultivated lands stand to arid wastes in the 
rest of Persia. S o  trifling and inconspicuous are the 
scattered patches of cultivation when compared with 
the vast tracts of sterile wilderness that Persia has been 
not inaptly described as "a series of small deserts in 
a big  desert." Yet with the exception of the salt deserts 
and the bare rock of the great mountain ranges hardly 
any land in Persia should be barren. Wherever a 
perennial flow of water can be brought to it the soil 
is abuildailtly fertile. Nothing is more striking than 
the suddenness with which, 
" A l o t ~ g  some strip of herbage strown 
T h a t  just divides the desert from the sown," 
one passes again and again in the course of a day's 
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journey ou t  of the bare sun-scorched wilderness into 
a n  oasis of verdant fields and shady groves. There is 
nothing to differentiate the soil of the oasis from that of 
the wilderness except that the one is parched, the other 
is blessed with water. In no country, therefore, is  the 
question of irrigation of more paramount ilnportance 
than in Persia, yet in none is it more criminally 
neglected by its rulers. 
T h e  Persian peasant does his best to eke out with 
the limited resources at  his disposal the scanty stoclr 
of water which nature, unassisted, supplies, and the 
elaborate system of Knnfit~, or uilderground aqueducts, 
d u g  out of the hard soil in order to distribute over the 
largest possible area the meagre output of some slender 
spring o r  mountain stream, testifies to his indefatigable 
industry. The  mounds of earth, Iilce exaggerated 
mole-hills, thrown up from the shafts which have been 
sunk a t  frequent iiltervals to dig these kailants, or, sub- 
sequently, to keep them free from obstruction, are a 
conspicuous feature in the Persian landscape, and a 
grateful one to t h e  traveller, a s  they always indicate 
the vicinity of a village, and with it a brealr in the 
monotony of the great drab-coloured wastes-unless 
indeed, as is too often the case, they are merely aban- 
doned KanrZk bearing witness to past prosperity and 
present decay. Though sometimes they are carried for 
two or three miles across the plain from the foot-hills of 
the mountain range to some specially fertile patch 
of land, and represent a vast expenditure of human 
labour, the k n n ~ t  system is after all only a prin~itivc 
malresl~ift. Persia wants water-storage on a much 
larger and  more adequate scale. T h e  winter snows 
and rains, though of short duration, a re  abundant 
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WATER-STORAGE '3' 
Pouring with torrential violence down the precipitous 
flanks of the denuded mountain ranges, they plough 
deep furrows at random across the plains until, in the 
great majority of cases, they lose themselves in a salt 
marsh o r  disappear by the mere process of evaporation 
under the fierce Persian sun. Yet this waste might be 
easily prevented, or at least mitigated, at no great 
outlay of money or engineering skill. The network 
of mountains which spreads over the greater part of 
Persia offers incomparable facilities for storing water 
in a number of local reservoirs by damming up the 
narrow gorges through which the winter rains stream 
down into the plains. A t  Isfahan, for instance, at the 
time of my visit in October, 1902, the broad bed of 
the Zendeh Rud  had been absolutely dry for two 
months, to the serious injury of one of the most 
fertile plains in Persia. T h e  water famine in the city 
and its immediate vicinity was partly due to the 
action of large and influential landowners, who had 
recently diverted an  excessive volume of water higher 
up the river in order to irrigate their own properties 
at the expense of the villages of the plain ; but a buttd 
could be easily constructed to hold up  during flood time 
the waters of the Zendeh Rud,  which now run to waste 
in a salt marsh some fifty or sixty miles east of the 
city, and  there would then be a constant water supply, 
abundant enough to allow cultivation to be developed 
at every available point, without robbing Peter to pay 
Paul. Something also might probably be done in 
Persia with artesian wells, though on this point expert 
opinion differs, owing to the peculiarities of the geo- 
logical formations. Experiments of a very promising 
character were made some years ago by an Englishman 
i n  a waterIess district in the neighbourhood of Karma% 
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but before their success could be definitely established 
the Persian authorities tried to defraud him of his 
rights, and before any redress could be obtained the 
unfortunate pioneer died of fever. 
Irrigation unquestionably offers a large field for 
remunerative enterprise, but from the Persians them- 
selves little or  nothing can be hoped for. There is no 
public spirit to take the initiative of such enterprise. 
Works  of public utility do not enter into the scheme of 
Persian government, and the large landowners, who 
mostly belong to  the oflicial classes, are content to 
amass a fortune by squeezing the wretched tiller of the 
soil. The  dearth of water is, in fact, a powerful instru- 
ment in the hands of the rulillg class for putting 
pressure on the people. By arbitrary interference with 
the slender water supply, which is life or death to him, 
the small landowner can be made to sell on the great 
man's terms, and  the tenant-labourer's share in the 
produce of the soil he tills can be ground down to a 
minimum to swell the profits of the landlord. The 
system works admirably for the 6uzz~rghnlz, or "the 
great men." T h e  capital they invest in the purchase 
of a village usually returns 40-60 per cent. per annum, 
and if the screw has been judiciously applied it may 
return as much as  zoo per cent. per annum-until the 
whirligig of fortune brings the great man under the 
heel of a greater man, who promptly annexes a large 
share of his ill-gotten gains. 
In times like the present, wl~en cupidity and extrava- 
gance are more than ever rampant in the highest 
places, and a vague sense of impending national 
disaster is creeping over the whole country, all the 
evils inseparable from the social system of Persia are 
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from Teheran to Isfahan last autumn inte~lsif i~d the 1 
impression of universal neglect and decay ~ v h i ~ h  nly 
visit to  Persia eighteen years ago had already left on 
my mind. Wi th  the single exception of the carriage- 
road built, and until then maintained at a considerable 
loss, by  the Imperial Banlr of Persia, there was not a 
single sign of progress to be noted anywhere. The 
villages are few and far between, and across the inter- 
vening tracts of barren wilderness the only signs of 
human life are the long files of mules and camels, whose 
constant footfall has trodden out the only roads that 
the Persian knows of. Kum, second of the holy cities 
of Persia, still contrives to live on the devotion of the 
pilgrims who flock from all parts of thc Shia world 
to worship at the shrine of Fatima-el-Masuma, the 
sister of Imam Reza, and the grcat golden dome of the 
mosque in which she is buried, flashing in the evening 
sun against a baclrground of purple hills, shed, as I 
approached it, a glamour of ancient grandeur over the 
maze of ruinous alleys and dilapidated bazaars into 
which the town resolves itself on closer inspection. Of 
the stone quays which once lined the river banks, of 
the stately caravailserais and the "mel-built, sweet, and 
wel-furnished " houses of which Le Brun, as quoted by 
Lord Curzon, tells us a couple of centuries ago, scarcely 
a trace remains. Kashan, which was still, not many 
years ago, a n  important industrial centre, famous for its 
silk and  satin fabrics, as well as  for its pottery and 
copper wares, has fallen into even greater decay. Its 
industries languish, its population diminishes, and the 
inhabited quarters of the town are almost lost amidst 
the ruins of its former self. Everywhere on this great 
highway between the modern and the ancient capitals 
of Persia the squaloriof decrepitude and poverty seems 
'34 FROM TEHERAN TO ISFAI-IAN 
to have increased ; deserted villages, abandoned cara- 
vanserais, exhausted Kanrits, broken-down bridges, mark 
the steady progress of decay. The  picture which the 
country itself presents would be intolerably depressing 
were it not for the perpetual enchantmeilt of sunny 
days and starlit nights, and an invigorating atmosphere 
of incomparable purity, whilst every morning and every 
evening the "false dawn " and the afterglow, flooding 
the whole landscape of plain and mountain with their 
luminous glory, seem in very truth to "shed love on all 
that lives and peace on lifeIess things." 
Isfahan itself is to-day merely 77zabw7zi norninis unzbra. 
The same circle of delicately scarped hills overloolrs a 
fertile plain of green fields and leafy orchards, studded 
with stately plane trees, as in the time of the great Shah 
Abbas, but of the splendid city which excited the 
wonder and admiration of European travellers in the 
days when Elizabeth reigned in England and Alcbar at 
Delhi only enough has survived to inarlr the contrast 
between the Persia of the past and the Persia of to-day. 
Whole quarters of the city are deserted and in ruins; 
of the bazaars, which were once the finest and most 
thriving marts of Western Asia, many are entirely 
abandoned, and but few more than partially tenanted, 
though the busy scenes of Eastern life which may still 
be seen in some of them can hardly be surpassed for 
diversity and picturesqueness; the Chehar Bagh still 
exists, but its avenues of giant plane trees have long 
since been ruthlessly thinned ; water no longer flosvs 
down them through a succession of marble channels 
and ornamental basins ; the palaces and mansions 
which overlooked the terraced gardens have sunlr into 
shapeless mud heaps ; and even the splendid Madresseh 
of Shah Hussein, which twenty years ago  was still one 
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of the noblest sights of Isfahan, has been robbed of 
most of its beautiful tiles, and is fast falling into rui~lous 
decay. The same fate is overtalriilg the pillared gal- 
leries of the monumental bridge of Ali Verdi Khan, by 
far the most magnificent of the five great bridges which 
span the broad and shallow bed of the Zendeh Rud. 
No trace whatever remains of the Hazar Jerib, the great 
royal pleasaunce of " a  thousand acres." In spite of 
the neglect with which the Kajar dynasty seems 
deliberately to treat every reminder of the greatness 
of their Sefavi predecessors, the superb mosque 
erected by Shah Abbas on the Meidan still remains 
unique, but not unscathed, in the glory of its green- 
and-blue tiled dome and minarets ; but in the ancient 
palace of the Sefavi princes, where the Zill-cs-Sultan 
now resides as Governor, the few clumsy attempts 
that have been made at  restoration have done more 
to mar the artistic beauty of the buildings than 
the ravages of deliberate vandalism. In the loggia 
of the Chehil Sitoon, or Hall of Forty Columns, the 
graceful mirror-work ornamentation of the walls and 
pillars has been torn down to make room for daubs of 
garish paint, and the hall itself, once the throne-room 
of the greatest of Persian monarchs, is now used as a 
godown for the storage of the Zill-es-Sultan's travelling 
tents and carpets ; the blue and gold arabesques of the 
gorgeous vaulted ceilings are cracked and crumbling 
away in places, and the six immense oil paintings, in 
which the martial prowess of t h i  Sefavi kings and the 
magnificence of their courtly pageants were blazoned 
forth with no mean artistic skill, are growing grimy 
with the dust of years. The entire population of the 
city, with the villages of the surrounding plain, is not 
estimated to-day at more than a quarter of a million, 
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20,000 men, whose training, equipment, and discipline 
were, at any rate, itlcomparably superior to anything 
that the rest of Persia could show. But his influence 
and the leaning towards England with which he was 
whereas two-and-half centuries ago the estimates for the 
city alone varied between 6oo,oo0 and I ,  roo,ooo, and 
within ten leagues of its walls Chardin counted 1,500 
villages. The days are indeed past when it was the 
proud boast of its people that Isfahan was half the 
world-Isfaahan ~zusfielyehnn. 
Yet Isfahan has had the advantage of being governed 
credited gave umbrage to Russia, and her agents 
worked hand in hand with the many enemies, whom 
he owed as much to his good qualities a s  to his faults, 
to secure his downfall. Surnrnoned suddenly to Teheran, 
in 1888, he obeyed the summons, relying upon the 
special favour and affection which his father had always 
displayed towards him. But Nasr-ed-Din's mind had 
been effectually poisoned against him, and when he 
I 
for the last twenty-eight years by a Prince who enjoys 
the reputation of being in many respects the strongest 
P 
and ablest man in Persia, and certainly in the Royal 
Family of Persia. The Zill-es-Sultan is the eldest living 
son of the late Shah, though, as his mother was not of 
royal birth, he was not entitled to the succession. 
Ilis power and prestige were a t  one time immense, for 
he was not only Governor of Isfahan, but of all the 
southern provinces of Persia-Fars, Arabistan, Luri- 
stan, Kurdistan, Yezd, and half a dozen others. He 
ruled almost as an independent Prince over two-thirds 
of the whole lringdom, and he ruled with undisputed 
vigour and energy, maintaining order and security with 
an iron hand. He  had even reinforced his authority I I 
by creating an army under his own control of over I 
x i s  authority 
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THE ZILL-ES-SULTAN '3'7 
came back to Isfahan, he returned merely as Governor 
of the one  province. All his other provinces had beell 
taken away from him, and his army had been disbanded 
or drafted away. H e  is believed to have accepted his 
disgrace with Oriental fatalism, and in a spirit of 
dutiful resignation to his father's will. Whatever may 
have been his earlier ambitions, he would seem to have 
been equally mindful of his father's wishes after the 
latter's death, for as soon as  the news of Nasr-ed-Din's 
assassination reached him he hastened to telegraph to 
his brother, the Vali Ahd at  Tabriz, assuring him of 
his own loyalty, and holding himself personally re- 
sponsible for that of his province. There are, never- 
theless, many who hold that it would have been far 
better for Persia if he had succeeded to the throne 
instead of Muzaffer-ed-Din. Though he was now fifty- 
two years old, the  two decades which had nearly elapsed 
since I was first received by the Zill-es-Sultan did not 
appear to have impaired either his vigour of mind or 
I his alertness of manner. Of his qualities a s  a firm, if 
1 
masterful, ruler, I can only speak from hearsay; but 
in the course of the long conversation with which I was 
honoured by his Highness, I had ample opportunity of 
appreciating his perspicacity and astuteness, as well as  
I 
I 
his ready wit and humour. 
1 Isfahan, like the rest of Persia, was suffering from the 
I severe depression of trade, due in part to unfavourable 
economic conditions-and especially the relentless de- 
preciation of the  kran, the unit of silver currency-and 
I in part to growing anxiety with regard to political developments in Teheran. Popular discontent aP- 
peared in Central Persia to be more profound or more 
freely expressed than in the North, and people asked 
with undisguised bitterness what was to be the end of 
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t h e  profligate course of extravagance upon which 
Teheran  has entered. I n  spite of the establishment of 
a Russian Consulate in a city where there are not, I 
believe, a dozen Russian subjects to be protected, and 
of the  iirnportation of a guard of Russian Cossaclts- 
whose appearance, however, hardly compared favour- 
ably with that of the smart Indian sOzU(l?'.r who act as 
escort to the British consul-General-liussian influence 
h a d  so far acquired little direct hold over this part of 
Persia,  and those who tooli the most despondent view 
of the  future of their country still turned with almost 
pathetic confidence for help to England, nncl to Eng- 
l and  alone. Amongst the more thoughtful, l ~~wcvc r ,  
that: coniidence seemed to be rapidly waning. "Eng- 
land," they said, ' ( i s  lavish enough of her assurances 
of friendship, and we do not distrust her intentions; 
but what we want are dceds, not words, and the deeds 
are not forthcoming. To-day she still has many friends 
i n  the  South of Persia, but thc tirne is  coining when it 
will be too dangerous to be counted amongst her friends, 
if s he  will not raise a finger to help them. If we are 
to be left to the tender mercies of new masters from 
the North, we must ultimately malrc terms with thctn, 
and England will learn too late what those terms may 
mean to her." I am quite aware that rhc value of such 
language from Oriental lips must be largely discounted, 
but it is none the less significant and worth noting 
that ,  whereas fornlerly England was the on ly  iorcign 
Power  whose existence seemed to be in any way rccog- 
nised at Isfahan, to-day she is already being wcighed 
in the scale against Russia, and thu balsnc:~ is little 
more than even. What  was, ~~cl-llaps, cvr:n rnurc 
s i gn i f i c a~~ t  was that just bcforc my arrival a, large 
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for the first time been placed in the Isfahall market. 
Hitherto, though the activity of the Russian Banlr at 1 
Teheran had already made itself adversely felt, Russia11 
trade had only made experimental incursions on a 
small scale into this field, but the operation I have just 1 
mentioned was evidently intended as the prelude to a 
'i 
campaign of bounty-fed competition with British trade 
in Central a s  well as in Northern Persia. 
CHAPTER XI11 . i  
THROUGH T H E  BAICHTIARI MOUNTAINS TO T H E  I i 
PERSIAN GULF 
F ROM Isfahan to the Persian Gulf the most fre- quented route is that which leads past the ruins 
of Persepolis to Shiraz and thence descends the great 
mountain ladder of Fars to Bushirc. But I had travelled 
by it during my former visit to Persia, and, within the 
last few years, British enterprise has opened up  a new 
route to the Persian Gulf, which, if adequate support is 
forthcoming, shouId prove of both cominercial and 
political importance, while it certainly is what our 
American cousins would call '' the great sccnic route " 
of Southern Persia. I decided therefore to travel 
through the Bakhtiari Mountains and down the Karun 
to  Muhammerah. 
It is difficult to explain the physical charm of Persian 
travel. I have done my share of travelling in the  high- 
ways and byways of the East from the Syrian Desert 
to  the Great Wall  of China, but Persia has a mysterious 
attraction of which I have nowhere found the like. 
Not the Persia of the towns, even such as Isfahan, still 
clothed with some majestic remnants of a magniiicent 
past, or Shiraz, where the scent of'old-time roses still 
hangs about the gardens where I-1a'fiz and Shdi used to 
walk, and the shadow of ancient cypresses still QIls 1 
athwart their tombs, but the Persia of far-spread desert 
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and lofty mountain, with its rare oases and hidden 
valleys ; the Persia of immense spaces and infinite 
solitude broken only by "the footfall mute of the slow 
camel, which strikes and malres no sound," or by the 
tinkling bells of a more bustling caravan of paclr- 
mules ; the Persia of brilliant sun-bathed days and 
of solemn starlit nights, and of those yet Inore precious 
hours of morn and eve when by the Great Magician's 
wand the whole earth and the heavens above are turned 
to glory. At daybreak the camp is astir, and before 
the sun has scaled the purple crest of the furthermost 
mountains the tents are struck, the baggage animals 
are being packed for the march, and one starts off on 
his pony for the morning's ride, which should cover the 
best part of the day's journey. Pretty well the whole 
of Persia, after the first steep climb from the lowlands, 
whether of the Caspian or of the Persian Gulf, is a lofty 
plateau varying between three and five thousand feet 
above the level of the sea, broken by successive ranges 
of mountains mostly ten to twelve thousand feet high, 
and rising in parts to much greater altitudes. The 
morning air, even in the early autumn, is always crisp, 
sometimes frosty, but long before one has reached 
the midday halting-ground, the sun pours down with 
conquering force. In the course of the five or six 
hours' ride, which makes a fair forenoon stage, de- 
licious canters across small and fairly level plateaus 
have alternated with steep climbs up and down the 
precipitous slopes of intervening hills, where your 
pony casts many an appealing glance at You as, 
leading him by the reins, you try to ~ ~ 1 1 1  him down 
some particularly bad drop until, uttering his sad 
grunt, he at  last makes up his mind to step down 
on all four feet at  once. By the time the sun has 
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reached the zenith, both man and beast are ready to 
welcome the sudden shade of trees, with a noise of 
rushing waters, which invites repose after a refreshing 
plunge in a clear pool and a frugal meal. Presently 
one's caravan, which toils at  a slower pace, unresting 
throughout the day, passes on its way to the next 
camping-ground with a jingling of many bells and a 
hum of urgent voices. I t  will be time enough to 
follo~v it up in another hour. Then, when the shadows 
are beginning to lengthen, we shall come up to our 
camp as it is being pitched for the night on the edge 
of some other strip of herbage, "whose tender green 
fledges the river's lip.'' Whilst the evening meal is 
being prepared the sun sinks, as  it sank yesterday and 
will sink again to-morrow, out of the golden slry behind 
long-drawn ranges of delicately chiselled mountains, 
which reflect in turn every tint of the painted heavens. 
But has it sunlr'r' Suddenly the sky, which had already 
faded from a pale sea-green into a n  ashen grey, flashes 
up once more into crimson and gold, and every hill- 
top is flushed with a responsive glow. But it is only a 
transient moment of infinite beauty, the brief spell of 
the "after-glow," and long before sleep, though seldom 
slow to come, has descended upon our camp the stars 
have peeped out, first one by one, and then in  their 
millions, until the whole firrnameilt throbs with the 
eternal flame of their quivering lamps. Save the 
occasional bark of a jaclral wandering hungrily around, 
and  the steady crunching of the int~les and ponies as 
they feed, tethered a few yards off from our tcnts, there 
is not n sound to break the deep sileilce of the night, 
until once more :- 
"morr~ing  in the bowl of night 
Has flung the d o n e  that puls Ihc stars to flight. 
And,  lo! tile hunter  of t h e  East has caughi 
T h e  Sultan's iurrel in a noose of lighl." / 
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A GRACIOUS LANDSCAPE I43 
T o  those in whom some inherited instincts of nomadic 
life still linger I would above all recommend a spring 
or an  autumn journey through the Bakhtiari mountains 
from Isfahan to the Persian Gulf. Geographically, and 
within certain limitations politically, the country of 
the Bakhtiaris belongs to Persia, but, though in Persia, 
it is in most respects not of Persia-at least, not of 
modern Persia. Sturdy oak trees cling to the AanIrs 
of the rugged mountain gorges, through which the 
Karun and its tributaries have carved a way for their 
turquoise blue waters, unsullied as the snows that feed 
them; oalc and beech and plane tree cluster round 
every mountain spring ; the spacious groves which 
clothe the greater part of the undulating uplands laclr 
only a carpet of green grass to complete their re- 
semblance to an English park ;  after the first autumn 
rains, yellow and mauve crocuses spread a network of 
colour over the brown soil before the tribesman's primi- 
tive plough prepares it to receive the seed for the winter 
harvest. Stern as the face of nature often is amidst 
the towering crags and deep ravines of the Bakhtiari 
mountains, it seldom wears that forbidding aspect of 
utter desolation peculiar to the waterless, sun-scorched 
regions between Teheran and Isfahan, and between 
Isfahan and Shiraz, which, though not devoid of a 
certain grim picturesqueness, is apt to grow depressing 
in its weird monotony. I t  is an easy march of about 
eighteen days from Isfahan to Ahwaz on the Karun, 
whence a steamer runs down to Muhammerah in a 
couple of days. The interest of the journey is perhaps 
more diversified than that of any other expedition 
which can be as easily compassed in Persia. For it 
takes the traveller out of what may still be called the 
heart of Persia proper, namely, the plain of Isfahan, 
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through the mountain fastnesses of semi-independent 
tribesmen, down into the great alluvial plains washed 
by the Persian Gulf, where the population, though 
owning allegiance to the Shah, is mainly Arab by race 
and language. Our caravan was itself a microcosm of 
this strange medley of tongues and peoples. Some of 
our muleteers were pure Persians, whilst others were 
Arabs from the Karun valley; our cook was a Chris- 
tian Arab from the Tigris, and one of our servants 
was a Persian Turk from the northern provinces. 
Bakhtiari tribesmen from time to time swelled our 
retinue, and to add to its picturesque variety an Indian 
fakir, who had been on pilgrimage to the Shia shrines 
of Meshed and Kum, and was proceeding to the yet 
holier shrines of Kerbela and Karsimein, under a vow 
to recite during the middle watch of every night certain 
chapters of the Koran, tacked himself on to us as  we 
entered the Bakhtiari country, always ready to fag for 
our servants, collecting firewood and carrying water, in 
return for protection and a daily bowl of rice. The 
Bakhtiari country is, like the rest of Persia, but sparsely 
populated, and when one has left the villages of the 
Zendeh Rud and Bistagoon valleys behind him-a 
slender thread of verdure winding across a broad 
yellow belt of desert between the hills encircling 
Isfahan thirty miles away and the first buttresses of 
the Bakhtiari mountains proper-hardly another sub- 
stantial village, except one or two that have clustered 
round the summer residences of the great Bakhtiari 
chiefs, is to be met with until the Karun is reached. 
But the trade route which has been opened up of recent 
years through this region has familiarised the people 
with the wants of travellers, and so  long as  the latter 
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are content with very siinple fare, they need have 110 
anxiety about supplies in the shape of lnllk and eggs 
and fowls and an occasional sheep. 
The possibility of developing a new trade route, or 
rather of reviving a very ancient one, froin the Persian 
Gulf to Isfahan by the Karun river and across the 
Bakhtiari mountains, had suggested itself in the first 
half of the last century to the eager young explorer 
who afterwards, as  Sir  Henry Layard, became a 
prominent figure in the diplomacy of the Near East. 
In fact, but for the sudden downfall of Muhammed Taki 
Khan, the idea might then and there have taken 
practical shape, for Layard had established strong 
claims to the friendship and gratitude of the great 
Bakhtiari chieftain, and the latter had been ready and 
anxious to  forward the scheme. 13ut that opportunity 
passed away, as did another and still more propitious 
one, when an Anglo-Indian force actually occupied the 
Karun valley from Muhaminerah to Ahwaz during the 
Persian expedition of 1857. Twenty years later Mr. 
(now Sir) George Mackenzie, an active partner in the 
firm of Gray, Paul and Co. at Bushire, one of the 
numerous firms affiliated to the British India Steain 
Navigation Coinpany, ~roceeded to Teheran with 
fresh offers of co-operation from another powerful 
Ilkhani of the Bakhtiaris, but the negotiations proved 
abortive, and it was not until 1888 that Sir Henry 
Drummond Wolff, then British Minister to Persia, 
inserted the thin end of the wedge by inducing the 
Shah to issue a special Firman throwing the Karun 
river open to foreign navigation. Such, kt least, 
was the purport of the Firman, though the Persian 
authorities lost no time, as I shall have occasion to 
L 
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show later on, in trying to withdraw with the left hand, 
by local obstruction, what they had given at Teheran 
with the right. 
Immensely exaggerated as were the expectations 
based a t  the time upon the paper promises of the 
Shah's Firman, the first step had been made, and 
the enterprising firm which had undertalren, on the 
invitation of the British Government, to act as the 
pioneers of navigation on the Karun was quick to 
realise the urgency of the second step. Im~nediately 
upon the issue of the Firman Messrs. Lyncll Brothers, 
who had been connected for half a century with the 
navigation of the Tigris, placed one of their stea~liers 
on the Karun, and Mr. H. B. Lynch proceeded to 
investigate on the spot the question of road communi- 
cations between that river ancl Isfallan by t ravel l i~~g 
through the Balthtiari country and renewing relations 
with the chiefs. A valuable report of his journey 
appeared in September, 1890, in the same number of 
the P~oceedi7zgs of the Koynl Geog~a$l~ical Socikbl as 
Lord Curzon's address on the Icarun river and the 
geography of South-Western Persia. The  rnills of 
diplomacy, however, grind slowly, and another eight 
a Ions wcre years elapsed before the  protracted negoti t' 
brought to a conclusion. In 1898 a n  agreement was 
arrived a t  under the auspices of the British Legation 
and with the sanctioil and ultimate guarantee of the 
Persian Government, under which Messrs. 1,yncli 
undertook to build, on behalf of the Uakhtiari chiefs, 
a caravan road available for mule trafic from Ah~vaz 
on the ICarun to Isfahan. In 1900 the tivo important 
bridges which hacl to be thrown across the upper 
waters of the Karun a t  Goclar-i-Balultat ancl across 
its tributary, the Ab-i-Dazuft, at Pul  Amarat.'-the only 
two suspensit 
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two suspension bridges in Persia-were completed, 
and the new road ready for traffic. 
The "Lynch road," as  it is commonly called, would 
probably receive but scant praise from Western travel- 
lers unaccustomed to the break-neck tracks over which 
the traffic of the East has been carried for centuries in 
all mountainous regions; but, given the conditions 
under which it was constructed, and the nature of the 
country it traverses, it is certainly no mean achieve- 
ment, and it compares, at any rate, very favourably 
with its chief rival, the caravan road from Shiraz to 
Bushire. Between Isfahan, which lies at an altitude of 
5,200 feet above sea-level, and Ahwaz, which is barely 
300 feet above the sea, it has to scale four distinct chains 
of mountains, of which the highest-the Mungasht- 
rises to over 12,000 feet, besides the many lesser ranges 
which form their buttresses. This great mountain 
t 
! system, which runs roughly north-west and so~ith-east 
4 . e .  at right angles to the Lynch road-has been 
si~ccessfully negotiated, and though for six or seven out 
of an eighteen days' march we had daily ascents and 
descents of 2,000 feet and more, the highest level which 
the road reached was 7,800 feet. Persian muleteers are, 
in fact, so accustomed to the roughest mountain tracks 
that there are few slopes, however precipitous, up and 
down which a track cannot be engineered to meet their 
modest requirements. One of the most difficult bits of 
work in laying out the new caravan route was to find 
some way of turning the lofty Zirrah range, which 
forms the second of the four mountain barriers I have 
alludecl to, and in the winter, after heavy snows, is 
quite impassable. A way was ultimately discovered 
by following the deep gorge of a stream which seems to 
have cleft the range in two as  wit11 a giant's knife. Along 
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this gorge, to which the muleteers have given a pictur- 
esque name which may be reildered as  the Gorge of the 
Pulling up and Letting down of Skirts,-in allusion to 
their practice of pulling their baggy trousers up at the 
waist when there is a steep ascent and letting them down 
when there is a sharp descent,-the track, often blasted I 
out of the solid roclr, now rises and falls in a series of 
bold zigzags, sometimes climbing roulld tlle edge of a 1 blank wall of roclr several l~undrecl feet high, son~etimes 
plunging down to the very bed of the foaming, 
thundering torrent. On either side the cliffs rise in 
serried masses and jagged teeth to a towering crest line 
of embattled peaks more than ro,ooo feet above the 
level of the sea. S o  sheer are these tremendous battle- 
ments that the sun only reaches for a few lhours at 
high noon the deep ravine they mount guard over. 
Nevertheless the track is so sltilfully laid out, and on 
the whole so well kept up, that there are few points which 
offer any sekious difficulty even for heavily loaded 
mules. But it is a long dCtour, which substantially 
increases the day's mileage, the gorge itself extending 1 over five miles. So, except during the worst moilths of 
the year, when the snow lies deep on tlle mountain 1 ! tops, the muleteers, having no eyes for the incomparable 
grandeur of the new route, prefer to take a sllort cut, 
1 infinitely more arduous, straight over the Zirrab range, i 
up and down its precipitous slopes, of which no attempt ! 
has been made to mitigate the ilatural steepness by any 
scientific road building. Another bad place along this 
route is immediately beyond the bridge over the Ab-i- 
Bazuft, as one coines from the North. I had surveyed 
it at my leisure as we descencled the opposite range to 
our camping ground 011 the pscvious evening, and 
tllere seemed to be no break of any lcind in the slieer 
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wall over 2,000 feet high, which I was told we should 
have  to climb. But a traclr had been cut in one 
almost continuous zigzag straight up its face, and, 
t h e  next day, within little more than an hour after we 
began to climb, we found ourselves upon the crest, with 
t h e  river we had crossed at the start gleaming like a 
thread of silver in the valley below. 
As far as my memory of the old caravan route beyond 
Shiraz to the Persian Gulf serves me, not a single point 
of  the Lynch road could compare for difficulty with the 
great  kotals,. .over which the toughest mules groan and 
stumble down to Bushire, whilst in addition to greater 
immunity from accidents, the Lynch road has the further 
advantage of shortness. The land carriage from Ahwaz 
to Isfahan is only 277 miles, as  against 530 miles from 
Bushire to Isfahan. Hence, in spite of the intense con- 
servatism of the Persian muleteer, who, it must be re- 
membered, practically controls the carrying trade of the 
country, the ~neri ts  of the Lynch road are obtaining 
gradual recognition, and last year especially marked 
very distinct progress. The Indian Government is send- 
i n g  forward over the Lynch road a large portion of the 
materials for the construction of the new direct telegraph 
line from Kashan through Yezd and Kerman to Balu- 
chistan, and the results have so  far been most satis- 
factory, as  besides a saving of over 30 per cent. on the 
cost of freight from the Persian Gulf to Isfahan as 
coinpared with the Bushire route, there has been a still 
greater saving of time. Consign~nents have been 
landed by the same steamer a t  Bushire and at Muham- 
merah respectively for conveyance to Isfahan, and the 
goods sent up the Karun and over the Bakhtiari road 
have been delivered at Isfahan before those sent up 
direct from Bushire have even reached Shiraz, which is 
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barely half-way t o  Isfahan. The native merchants of 
Isfahan are also beginning to appreciate these ad- 
vantages for their most valuable exports, such as opium, 
and for 1902 the traffic over the Lynch road amounted 
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CHAPTER XIV 
T H E  HIGHLAND TRIBESMEN OF PERSIA 
F for the ordinary traveller the chief attraction of the 
Bakhtiari route lies in the natural grandeur of the 
country, it offers to the political student the additional 
advantage of bringing him into contact with one of the 
most interesting races that inhabit Persia. The warlike 
and hardy nomads who dwell in these mountain fast- 
nesses have indeed little in common with the degenerate 
townsman or down-trodden villager of Persia proper. 
Not much is lc~lown as  to the origin of the Bakhtiaris, 
I 1
but the opinion first, I believe, expressed by Layard, that 1 "they are of pure Iranian blood, the descendants of the 
d tribes which inhabited the mountains they still occupy 
I from the remotest antiquity," is now generally accepted. 
1 Their virtues and their vices, their manners and their 
customs, are, a t  any rate, those of free men. A fierce 
1 light plays in their jet-black eyes, and constant exposure 
to sun and wind has tanned their skin almost as black 
as the raven ringlets that curl over their ears. Muscular 
and active lilce all highlanders, they are also, unlike 
most highlanders, splendid horsemen, for though 
essentially m n  of the hills, they are also men of the 
plains. They have ceased to be merely pastoral nomads, 
and though they still derive their chief means of liveli- 
hood from their herds and flocks, they no longer disdain 
Is= 
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to  till the soil, whether on the upland slopes, where 
they spend the summer months, or on the fertile plains 
of Arabistatl, to which they descend on the approach of 
winter. 
W h e n  I travelled through the Balrhtiari country, it 
was the seasot1 for their annual migration from the 
highlands to the lowlands, and from time to time we 
would overtake a long stream of men and women and 
children with their flocks and droves winding slowly 
u p  and down the narrow mountain track, lambs and 
kids and babies and chickens and hens tied promis- 
cuously, with the rest of the tribal goods a n d  chattels, 
on to the backs of the nimble little donkeys and  diminu- 
tive cows, which serve as beasts of burden. Many of 
the men, and a few of the women, rode horses or mules, 
but the majority were on foot. Grimy and sunburnt, 
and often ragged, their proud bearing and elastic step 
stamped them as the lords of the soil they trod, and the 
rifle or  musket, which even the goat-herd tending his 
flock down the mountain side wore jauntily slung across 
his back, was only the outward and visible emblem of 
the martial spirit transmitted fkom father to son through 
generations of fighting ancestors. Nominally Mussul- 
mans as  they are nominally Persian subjects, their 
allegiance to both the Koran and the Shah sits lightly 
upon them. "No true Bakhtiari," it used to  be said, 
"dies in his bed," and in defiance of all Mussulman 
prejudice and usage, a rough-hewn lion of a convcn- 
tionally uncouth type, adorned with a sabre and a 
pistol, marks in every ancient graveyard the resting- 
place of the warrior. As for temporal authority, the 
ordinary Bakhtiari, at any rate, loolrs no further than 
the head of his tribe. Courteous and hospitable to 
strangers in So far as they enjoy the protection of his 
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chiefs, his powers  of discrimination between ,?Zeune and 
tuuflz appea r  to be rudimentary, and the predatory in- 
stinct is s t i l l  strong within him. Yet to his own code 
of honour, even  in the matter of property, he is faith- 
ful enough. Every autumn, before leaving the high- 
land valleys in which he spends the summer, he scatters 
the  seed w h i c h  the winter rains and snows will fertilise, 
a n d  marks t h e  extent of his temporary holding with a 
pattern of s tones  which no other tribesman will venture 
t o  disturb before the sower returns in the spring to 
ga ther  in his harvest. Light-hearted and cheerful in 
spite of the severe struggle which he is constantly 
wag ing  fo r  sheer existence, the Bakhtiari is, however, 
prompt to wra th ,  and out of some hasty and insignificant 
quarrel b lood  feuds arise which involve whole families 
and  clans in destructive enmity. 
I t  i s  ma in ly  owing to the frequency and bitterness of 
such feuds, especially amongst the leading members 
of t he  ru l ing  clans, that the Persian Government is 
able t o  maintain some semblance of authority over the 
Bakhtiaris. At  times their independence has been well- 
n igh  absolute;  they have even more than once threatened 
to over throw the power of the Shah;  on one occasion 
they ac tua l ly  placed a puppet of their own on the throne 
at Isfahan. But, in the long run, the superior diplomacy 
of the ru l e r s  of Persia, coupled with unparalleled 
treachery, has always asserted itself, and it has always, 
i t  must  b e  confessed, found willing and efficient tools 
amongst  t h e  Bakhtiaris themselves. As  one of the 
chiefs remarked sixty years ago to Layard, after Mu- 
hammed T a k i  Khan had been betrayed into the cruel 
hands  of the Motemed-ed-Dowleh, " I will tell you the 
truth, S a h i b .  W e  Bakhtiaris are all fools. S o  long 
as we are  powerful and strong, and do not fear the 
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Persians, we must needs be at enmity amongst our- 
selves and seek each others' lives. Were we but united, 
these mountains would never be trodden by those dogs 
of Turksv-the ruling dynasty in Persia is of Turlcestan 
origin-" for they are women, not men.'" Some of the 
ablest Persian rulers of the past have realised that a 
great warlike tribe, such as the Balrhtiaris, if properly 
handled, might be a bulwark of strength for their 
Empire. The present dynasty is incapable of such states- 
manlike conceptions, and none lias practised greater 
perfidy and cruelty i n  its dealings with the tribes, or 
played with greater skill upon their internal jealousies 
and dissensions. At Kahv-i-Rukh, his summer resi- 
dence, on  a well-watered plateau high up in the moun- 
tains, I was the guest of the Serdar Isfendiar Khan, 
the head of the Haft Lang clan and supreme chief or 
llkhani of the Bakhtiari tribes, a grave and rather sad- 
looking man of fifty-two, whose father was treacherously 
murdered by the Zill-es-Sultan under orders from Te- 
heran. Isfendiar himself was spared, but for six years 
afterwards he remained a state prisoner. When tbe Zill 
fell into disgrace with the late Shah ill 1888 it suited 
Teheran to affect disapproval of his policy towards 
the Bakhtiaris, and Isfendiar Khan was a t  least out- 
wardly restored to favour, first as Ilbegi and then as 
Ilkhani of the tribes. The Balrhtiaris who owned 
allegiance to him numbered, according to his estimate, 
upwards of 250,000 souls, capable of placing 70,000 
fighting men in the field, and, as the Arab tribes of 
the lowlands were subject to his influence, and Sheikh 
Khazzal of Muhammerah, who controls the great Kaab 
clan in the estuary of the Shatt-el-Arab, was his very 
good friend, his authority could be said to extend from 
the western borders of the provinces of Isfahan and 
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people his word was law, and nothing perhaps afforcled 
a better illustration of the implicit obedience he corn- 
manded than the acquiescence of the tribes in the pro- 
hibition he had recently enacted of the use of tea 
and sugar, the excessive consumption of these Persian 
luxuries being in his opinion a needless extravagance 
and tending towards Persian effeminacy. Yet, great 
as  his power was over the tribesmen, the history of his 
family, as well as his own experience, was there to 
teach him how manifold are the dangers that beset such 
as  him, both from the wiles of the Persians and from 
the jealousy of his own kinsmen. A few days after my 
visit to ICahv-i-Rukh I passed through Kalaat Tul, 
where the great grandson of Muhammed Taki Khan still 
lives in the castle which his great ancestor built when 
he raised the Chahr Lang clan to the premiership of 
the Bakhtiari tribes, but the stronghold in which he 
entertained Layard is dismantled and ruinous, and his 
descendants can barely eke out a penurious existence 
from the remnants of his great estates. Though the 
fortunes of the Haft Lang were built up on the ruins 
of the Chahr Lang, the llkhani could not but realise 
that the power of the Bakhtiaris had never recovered 
from the blow dealt to it when Muhamlned Taki was 
carried off a prisoner to Teheran ; and that even in his 
own branch of the clan the dissensions which brought 
about the downfall of so many of his predecessors 
are only slumbering, and inay be quickened at any 
moment under the sinister influence of Persian in- 
trigues. Isfendiar Khan was ill when I saw him, and 
he died in June, 1903. What will be the consequences 
of his death to his own people it is yet too early to 
say, but it cannot fail to increase the apprehensions 
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which already existed amongst them of troublous times 
to come. 
Almost from the first days when our  influence begail 
to make itself felt in Persia the Balrhtiaris have looked 
instinctively to England for protection, and we have 
generally sought to cultivate friendly relations with 
them, so far as  we could do so without arousing the 
susceptibilities of the Central Government. It was 
mainly to secure our goodwill that the  Balrhtiari chiefs 
agreed to construct and protect a caravan route through 
their mountains. .. They are in many respects more open 
to progressive ideas than the average Persian ofiicial, 
and they value not only the direct' profit they them- 
selves derive from the road in the shape of tolls, but 
also the indirect benefits it has conferred upon their 
people. For with the growth of traffic cultivation has 
extended along the road in a very remarkable degree, 
* and the tribesmen are beginning to find a ready market 
for produce which they had never before dreamt of 
raising. I t  is much to be regretted that in these cir- 
cumstances a misunderstanding should have arisen 
between the chiefs and Messrs. Lynch a s  to payment 
for the construction of the road. The  expenditure in- 
curred by Messrs. Lynch-and it must be remembered 
that they agreed to construct the road merely as agents 
for the chiefs without making a farthing of profit for 
themselves-has unfortunately considerably exceeded 
the original estimates, chiefly owing to the unexpected 
cost of the two suspension bridges ; but the chiefs refuse 
to consider themselves bound to anything beyond the 
estimates, and, so far, though they have levied the tolls, 
they have paid neither capital nor interest, as  Messrs. 
Lynch naturally decline to give them a full discharge 
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have actually incurred. Yet the tolls represent a hand- 
some income on the small cost of the road, which 
amounted only to about A8,500. I11 1902 the toils 
levied by the chiefs on the through traffic amounted to 
nearly Lsoo, and the tolls they levy upon local traffic 
from their ow11 tribesmen must have amounted to a 
much more considerable sum, as in 1901 they were 
farmed out for over h'1,5oo. But the Bakhtiari chiefs 
would probably have been less reluctant to discharge 
their obligations if the primary object for which they 
agreed to open up the mountains they had hitherto 
so  jealously guarded against all comers had not been 
disappointed. Rightly or wrongly, they imagine that, 
far from having secured thereby the goodwill of the 
British Legation to whose urgency they yielded, they 
can no longer rely upon its friendly offices even to the 
same limited extent as in the past. It is not only that 
from recent personal incidents, of which they perhaps 
exaggerate the importance, they have gathered the 
impression that they are looked upon now as somewhat 
, compromising clients to whom we can no longer afford 
I 
to lend our patronage. Being shrewd observers, they 
note and draw their own conclusions from the singular 
phenomenon that in proportion as the Teheran Govern- 
ment is becoming a mere tool in the hands of Russia, 
our readiness to strengthen it by favouring its centralis- 
ing policy at home seems to increase. At any time 
during the last century we might have paralysed the 
power of the Central Government in Southern Persia 
by encouraging the various elements of disaffection 
which have ever yielded reluctant allegiance to Teheran. 
W e  preferred to adopt an opposite policy, and on more 
than one occasion we actually encouraged, not only the 
consolidation, but the extension of Persian rule, in the 
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belief that a strong Persia would also be a friendly 
Persia. Even the significant developments of the last 
few years do not appear to have cured us of that 
delusion, and we still seem disposed to countenance 
the policy of centralisation by which her rulers look to 
regain at home some of the prestige they have lost 
abroad. That Russia should encourage such a policy 
is natural enough, and she is only doing in Persia 
what she does in China and in Turkey. So long as the 
Central Government is sufficiently subservient to her 
purpose she is quite willing to let it have a free hand 
in all non-essentials, especially in matters of internal 
administration. 
That Russia is herself beginning to take an active 
interest in the affairs of the Bakhtiaris is by no means 
calculated to reassure them. There have been mys- 
terious coinings and goings of Russian Consuls and 
Russian officers in the Bakhtiari mountains, and not 
only have the demands of Teheran for " benevolences " 
from the Bakhtiari chiefs grown more exacting, but 
already last year rurnour was rife that the Persian 
Government meant to take an early opportunity of 
removing the Ilkhani, who had always opeilly professed 
himself a friend of the English, and  who built roads 
for the benefit of their trade. That Russian influence 
should become a factor in the tribal politics of the 
Bakhtiaris is a n  entirely novel feature in the situation. 
In  their traditional detestation of Persian rule, the 
Bakhtiaris have been accusto~ned hitherto to place their 
hopes in the ultimate support of England, because 
Englishmen are the only foreigners who have cultivated 
friendly relations wit11 them. But  they would very 
soon learn to turn their eyes towards Russia if her 
ascendency were once brought bomc to them; and 
though it m: 
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though it may suit Russia to pose for the time being as 
the champion of the Shah's authority, she is much too 
shrewd to identify her influence permanently with such 
a hateful formula, or to allow such a splendid material 
as  the Balrhtiari tribesmen to be wasted and debased by 
Persian methods. Early in the last century, during 
the great Napoleonic wars, Persia was induced to com- 
mit for a time to British oficers the thanlrless task 
of reorganising her army. Of the force which they 
created none was more efficient and loyal to its British 
commanders than a body of 3,000 Balrhtiaris raised with 
the consent of the chieftains. In the hands of a born 
leader of men like General Kosagowsky the Balrhtiaris 
would furnish an army which would soon secure to 
Russia all over Southern Persia down to the Gulf the 
same, and more than the same, ascendency she already 
enjoys in the North. That a body of roo Balrhtiari 
tribesmen under one of their own chiefs has lately been 
attached to the  Cossack Brigade at  Teheran is, to say 
the least, a noteworthy symptom, 
1 From the ridge of the Mungasht, the most southerly 
of the lofty ranges that enclose the summer haunts of 
the Bakhtiaris, the mountains fall away in a successioil 
of spacious upland terraces leading down in turn by a 
series of steep descents to the great alluvial lowlands. 
From the edge of the last of these terraces, supported 
by serried buttresses which form a natural retaining 
wall Goo or 700 feet high, the eye ranges over an 
apparently boundless plain, stretching away for a hun- 
dred miles due south to the head of the Persian Gulf, 
and south-east across the Karun to the great Mesopo- 
tamian delta. In November there is little to break the 
yellow-and-brown monotony of this vast expanse, save 
the dark tents of Arab nomads and the wattle huts of 
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occasional villages clustered round a few wells of more 
or less brackish water. For in the rare patches of 
cultivation the summer crops have long since been 
garnered, and the grass bas everywhere been eaten 
down to the ground by the roaming herds and flocks. 
Yet it only requires a few days' beneficent. rain to con- 
vert this plain into a great succulent pasture land, and 
as the first autumnal storins had just swept up from the 
Gulf, we found, before we reached Ahwaz, tender 
shoots of green already bursting fort11 froin the sodden 
soil under the compelling force of the fierce sunshine, 
and we met troops of Arabs-men, women, and chil- 
dren-sallying forth from the villages on the banks of 
the Karun to sow their winter crops and pick out fresh 
pasturages in their accustomed haunts. A little later 
in the year the Bakhtiaris descend from their lnountains 
to share the plain with the Arabs, but they had not yet 
reached the lowlands, and we seemed to have dropped 
suddenly into a purely Arab country. The harsh 
guttural tongue, always voluble and strident, the strong 1 
Semitic type, even the coif of yellow sillr, bound round I 
the head with a twist of black camel-hair wool, showed 
that, though still nominally in Persia, we had already 
passed into the land of the Arab, where the untutored 
son of Ishmael still roams at  large, yielding, outside 
thc towns, but scant allegiance to any master, Turk or 
Persian, from the shores of the Persian Gulf to the out- 
slrirts of Damascus and Aleppo. 
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CHAPTER XV 
T H E  KARUN TRADE ROUTE 
N 0 one who remembers the flourish of trumpets with which the opening of the Karun river to 
navigation was announced in 1888 can well repress a 
smile at  the exiguous results which have hitherto 
attended that effort of British diplomacy. I t  is not 
that anything has happened to diminish the value of 
the Karun, or that those who undertook to act as the 
pioneers of navigation on its waters have laclied enter- 
prise or perseverance. The fiercer the competition to 
which British trade is being subjected in Northern 
Persia under the politico-economic pressure of Russia, 
the more important it becomes for us to develop the 
easiest and cheapest means of access to the Persian 
markets of the interior from the South. The recent 
formation of a new British company which is to take 
over the road rights of the Imperial Bank of Persia 
may be taken as an indication that we are beginning to 
appreciate the fact that the Karun must be our chief 
base of operations from the South. I t  may be hoped 
that before long a carriage-road from Isfahan to Kashan 
and Kum, connecting with the Kum-Teheran road 
which the Imperial Bank constructed a few years ago, 
will materially facilitate traffic between the Karun and 
the capital. The material difficulties to be overcome 
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are certainly not formidable. The  " Persian Trading 
and Transport Company" has also acquired the right 
to open up a new road froin Shuster on the upper 
Karuil through the Dizful valley to Khorumabad 
and Burujird, conllecting tl-lence through Sultanabad 
with the carriage-road for which the Imperial Banlr 
had also acquired a concession from the Persian 
Government. O n  this route the difficulties are likely 
to be greater, as it will have to be carried through the 
turbulent country of the Lurs, but there is no reason 
why the methods wl-lich have proved successful with 
the Bakhtiaris, who are themselves an offshoot of the 
Lur tribes, shoulcl not be equally successful with the 
nomads of Luristan proper. In any case, the navigation 
of the Karun mill have to receive a little more attention 
at the hands of British diplomacy than it has had during 
the greater part of the last fifteen years. S o  far we seem 
never to have quite realised that it is one thing to obtain 
the promulgation of a Persian Firman and another to 
secure its execution. A brief summary of the difliculties 
with which British enterprise on the Karun has l-lad to 
contend possesses from this point of view nlbre than a 
merely retrospective interest. 
Even the most unprogressive of Chinese Mandarins 
might learn something from Persian Mandarins in the 
matter of obstruction and bad faith. Within a few 
weeks of the promulgation of the Firman the Persian 
Government elaborated a series of regulations concern- 
ing the navigation of the I<arun, which were obviously 
intended to defeat as  far a s  possible the objects of the 
concession. It was ruled that no foreigner could 
purchase, holcl, or mortgage property on the Karun, al- 
though the Treaty of Turkman Chai, of which we share 













of the Sh( 
Turkman 
the erectio 
were met i 
Persian a1 
('Karun r( 
by the Bri 
learnt fron 
friendly cc 


















.I  Ilan k 
i'i!rsian 
t* likely 
u g h  the 
1 reason 
ful with 
it, of the 
wit11 the 







1s 11ad to 
rc tl~an a 
iandarins 
nu in the 




:ES of the 
rbr wuld 
: B T M ~ ,  81- 
we share 
4 c."~;Bu%, 
PERSIAN OBSTRUCTION 163 
gives foreign merchants the right to purchase property 
sufficient for a dwelling-house, with warehouses and 
business premises. The Persian Government, on the 
other hand, declared that it would itself undertalre the 
construction of such buildings, and lease them to 
foreigners trading on the Karun. I t  was further 
enacted that the banks and course of the river were 
not to be interfered with in any way. These regulations 
were blandly accepted by the British Minister. The 
result was that when Messrs. Lynch Brothers, who had 
already placed their steamers on the river at the 
invitation of the Bri~ish Government and on the faith 
of the Shah's Firman, claimed their right under the 
Turkman Chai Treaty to purchase land at  Ahwaz for 
the erection of the necessary business premises, they 
were met with a categorical refusal on the part of the 
Persian authorities, who took their stand on the 
" Karun regulations " ; and their refusal was upheld 
by the British Legation. At the same time, having 
learnt from Messrs. Lynch's agent, under cover of a 
friendly consultation, what that firm proposed to do 
in order to promote navigation on the river, the Persian 
Governor-General of Arabistan hastened to secure from 
Teheran an exclusive concession in favour of one of his 
creatures, the Moyun-i-Tujar of Bushire, for the whole of 
the scheme, which embraced the construction of a wharf 
and business premises at Ahwaz, the establishment of a 
portage tramway round the rapids above Ahwaz, and 
the placing of a special steamer on the upper reach of 
the river between Ahwaz and Shuster. Thus when 
Messrs. Lynch, finding themselves deprived of their 
treaty rights to buy land at Ahwag fell back upon 
the Persian Government's own undertaking to provide 
the necessary premises, the tatter entrenched themselves 
behind the concession they had granted to the Moyun. 
For nearly three years Messrs. Lynch, failing to obtain 
any redress, tried to  negotiate with that individual, 
whose terms were, however, so exorbitant that an 
agreement proved impossible, and in the meantime 
their agent at Ahwaz was charged 500 lrrans a month 
(at the then rate of exchange about A150 per annum) 
for the rent of an old mat-shed which the Persian 
authorities had graciously assigned to him as his 
residence and business premises. I t  was not until 
1894 that the Persian Government were induced to 
appoint an  agent empowered to carry out their engage- 
ments, alld a lease signed for the premises which 
Messrs. Lynch now occupy. Even this lease, however, 
can hardly be said to give them either fixity of tenure or 
immunity from vexation, for already the Persians, who 
drafted i t  themselves, have endeavoured to place upon 
it their own arbitrary interpretation. As  for the tram- 
way round the rapids between the lower and upper 
reaches of the river, the Moyun has made good his 
monopoly, and the only safeguard against absolutely 
prohibitive charges for the portage of goods is the 
competition of mule carriage, which the Persian authori- 
ties have tried, hitherto unsuccessfully, to defeat by in- 
timidating the muleteers. The navigation of the Upper 
Karun between Ahwaz and Shuster is carried on 
under conditions even more characteristically Persian. 
Messrs. Lynch had to present the Shah with a steamer 
and then to run it on his account. One might: imagine 
that, navigation having been placed under such exalted 
auspices, there would have been less obstruction. On 
the contrary. U p  to the present day Messrs. Lynch 
have failed to secure any kind of premises for storing 
cargo a t  Shuster, 01- even the l~lost elementary facilities 
for loading 
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for loading and unloading. Trading under such con- 
ditions is bound to be unprofitable, but the Shah's 
Government t e a r s  the loss stoically, for the simple 
reason that it leaves Messrs. Lynch to meet the deficit. 
So  far it has not paid a single penny towards balancing 
its acco~tnt, and has, apparently, no intention of doing 
so. Anything in the shape of a river conservancy is, 
of course, unIrnown it1 Persia, and the clause of the 
" Karun regulations " providing against interference 
with the shores or the course of the river serves no 
other purpose than to prevent the removal, however 
urgent, of natural obstructions to navigation. In fact, 
the only clause of the " Kar~un regulations " which the 
Persians have honestly observed is that which authorises 
them to raise a due of one kratl on every ton of cargo 
carried. 
But mere obstruction for obstruction's salre, though it 
may have its fascination, is not the game which appeals 
most to the Persian official. There are other forms 
which possess the more substantial attraction of bring- 
ing grist to his own mill. The plains watered by the 
Kal-un are capable of becoming one of the granaries 
of the world. Even under their present rulers they 
yield a bountif~ll harvest whenever there is an abundant 
rainfall, and the export of wheat in good seasons was 
an important feature in the estimates of future traffic on 
the river. These estimates tlie Persian authorities have 
clone their best to upset by  the simple process of enact- 
ing arbitrary prohibitions against the exportation of 
foodstuffs. Persian officials are adepts i n  the art of 
engineering corners in grain for their own persolla1 
benefit, and, by stopping the export, they practicaily 
compel the producer to sell his produce to them on 
their own terms. It is a lucrative business, in which 
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the Shah's Ministers in Teheran do not scruple to 
take a hand, and there is always a famine in solne 
part of the empire which can serve a s  a colourable 
pretext for the prohibition, though, in the present state 
of communications and with the present cost of trans- 
port, an embargo on the exportation of grain from 
Muhammerah can no more relieve a famine in Khora- 
san, or even in Isfahan, than in Tiinbulrtu. 
The followillg incident may serve as  a n  illustration. 
In June, 1900, there came a s  a pleasant surprise to the 
British merchants a t  Muhammerah, who had grown 
weary of makillg fruitless representations, a n  official 
notificatioil from the British Legation at Teheran that 
the Persian Government had removed the embargo on 
the exportation of wheat from the ports of Southern 
Persia. They thereupon proceeded to purchase grain 
from the natives up the Karun, who were immediately 
thrashed for their pains by the local authorities at 
Ahwaz. This was reported to Teheran, and inquiry 
made as to the apparent exclusion of Muhammerah 
from the removal of the embargo. The answer promptly 
came that Muhammerah was not excluded, and that 
within ten days categorical orders would be received 
by all the local officials which would avert further 
difficulties. On  the faith of this definite statement 
purchases of grain were executed on a larger scale, 
and heavy payments made on account. But week after 
week elapsed, no orders were received, and the local 
officials refused to allow the grain purchased from the 
peasantry to be removed. At the end of August the 
Legation had to admit that a hitch had occurred, and 
intimated that the best way to secure a settlement would 
probably be for the interested parties to negotiate 
direct with the Governor-General of Arabistan, who 
was the chi1 
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was the chief obstructionist, and, in the absence of 
the Shah then in Europe, refused, it was alleged, to 
coinply with the orders sent to him from Teheran. 
This suggestion was utterly impracticable, for the 
Governor-General of Arabistan resided at Burujird, 
about a fortnight's journey from Shuster, and com- 
munications in that part of the country are always 
notoriously precarious and unsafe. Meanwhile the 
local authorities, who refused to allow the British 
purchaser to remove the grain, were actually pressing 
him on behalf of tlle producer to complete payment of 
the purchase-money. In these circulnstances the only 
course left to the purchaser was to try and get rid of 
his grain as best he could in the local market, Be- 
sides this, he had to cancel all arrangements made 
for transport, freight, etc. When this was done, and 
the Governor-General of Arabistan and his friends i n  
Teheran had been in due course apprised by their local 
agents of the successful termination of the squeeze," 
the comedy was completed by an official communica- 
tion from the Persian Government to H.M. Legation, 
stating that as  far as  purchases had been already made 
by British merchants, imperative orders had now been 
sent to allow the produce to be exported, and tbe 
Legation was able to announce with no little self- 
coinplacency that its untiring efforts had at  last been 
rewarded. The  unconscious llurnour of this announce- 
rnent was doubtless not lost upon the interested parties 
in Muhammerah, who had had to write off their losses 
before thc atlnouncement reached them. 
It says a good deal for British pluck that it should 
have hcld out on the Karun for so many years in the 
face of such discouragillg conditions, for the small 
annual compensation for loss which was granted by 
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the British and Indian Governments to encourage 
Messrs. Lynch to continue their pioneer work has 
failed, I understand, to cover even the deficit on the 
navigation of the river between Muhalnmerah and 
Ahwaz, not to speak of the debt contracted towards 
them by the Shah's Government in connection with the 
navigation of the upper reach between Ahwaz and 
Shuster. Though a t  an entirely disproportionate cost of 
both money and energy, steady progress has, neverthe- 
less, been made. T h e  foreign trade of the ICarun, which 
was estimated a t  barely L16,ooo in 1891, represented in 
1902 a total value of £271,732, in spite of severe 
temporary depression due to bad harvests and other 
adverse influences ; and the foreign sllipping of the 
port of Muhalnmerah has increased within the same 
period from 13~,ooo  to over 240,000 tons, whereof 95 
per cent. is British. The population of Muhammerah 
has grown from about 2,500 to over 7,000, and  at 
Ahwaz an  entirely new settletnent has sprung up called 
Bunder Nasri, just below the rapids, a t  the terminus of 
river navigation on  the lower reach. These are, no 
doubt, small beginnings, but if one takes into account 
the enormous difficulties to  be contended with, they are 
far from discouraging. Yet, at the very moment when 
a fresh impetus was being given to the ICarun trade by 
the prospect of improved ineans of communication with 
the inland markets, the Persian Government threatened 
to deal it a fresh and  very serious blow. 
By a stroke of the pen and without a word of warning 
the new Belgian adn~inistmtion of the Persian Custolns 
attempted in the autulnn of 1902 to revolutionise the 
wholc Cus to~ns  system of the I<arun district. After 
the river was opened to navigation in 1888 the collec- 
tion of Customs dues was consolidated a t  three different 
stations-1 
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Stations-Muhammerah, Ahwaz, and Shuster. Goods 
could t h u s  be despatched on through bills of lading to 
or f r o m  any one of these three ports, where the import 
or e x p o r t  dues, a s  the case might be, were respectively 
paid. Native merchants at Shuster and Ahxvaz attach 
special  value to  this arrangement, which was almost 
the o n l y  practical concession ever made by the Persian 
authori t ies to the trading interests of the Karun. In 
1890, when Messrs. Lynch came to an agreement with 
the S h a h ' s  Government for running the steamer, which 
they presented to  his Majesty, on the upper reach of 
the r iver ,  they were careful to include the maintenance 
of the three Customs stations as one of the condi- 
tions of that agreement, and the pledge then given 
by the Amin-es-Sultaneh, now the Atabeg-Azam, 
who was  then Prime Minister, was embodied in 
a n  official memorandum drawn up by Sir  Henry 
Dru lnmond  Wolff, under date of February 14th, 1890. 
I T h e  action of the new Belgian administration of 
Cus toms ,  therefore, not only interfered abruptly with 
established usage, but was a deliberate violation of 
specific engagements contracted by the Persian Govern- 
ment. No official intimation of any kind was given 
that  such action was contemplated. The Customs 
s ta t ions  at  Shuster and Ahwaz were closed, and goods 
consigned to those ports were detained arbitrarily in 
Muhammerah pending payment of import duties at 
that por t ,  where the carriers had, of course, no authority 
to  p a y  them, and where neither the shippers nor the 
collsignees had in most cases any agents. In  the same 
way goods despatched from those ports on through 
bills of  lading were detained at Muhammerah because 
there  was no longer anyone qualified to receive pay- 
m e n t  of the export dues tendered to the Persian authori- 
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ties a t  the place of origin, and there was no one who 
could pay them at  Muhammerah. For more than a 
month a complete deadloclr ensued, and though a ~?todus 
uivendz'was established with regard to the goods actually 
detained in transit, very strong pressure had to be 
hpplied to secure the material interests of the Karun - - 
trade permanently against the arbitrary action of the 
new Customs administration. 
But the issue was not merely a commercial one. For 
at  Muhammerah, as in all the Persian ports of the Gulf, 
the establishment of the new Customs administration 
is regarded as forming part of a comprehensive policy 
of centralisation upon which Teheran has entered at 
the instigation of Russia. Hitherto the Customs 
administration had been left practically in  the hands of 
the local authorities, who levied them or farmed them 
out on their own account, often making merely such 
periodical remittances to the Shah's Treasury as  were I 
necessary to avoid acute trouble with the central 
Government. This system led, no doubt, to grave I 
abuses, the tax-farmer of one port not infrequently 
competing with his neighbours at  the expense of the 
Treasury by offering importers a largely reduced tariff. 
The looser the administrative ties which bound the 
local authorities to the central Government the larger 
was the liberty or licence they enjoyed with regard to 
the Customs. In Muhammerah especially the authority 
'I'F.1 li I< I<  
wielded by Sheikh Khazzal, who controls the great 
Kaab tribes of the Karun and the Shatt-el-Arab, has 
been rather that of a semi-independent vassal than of 
a mere governor appointed by the Shah. T h e  intro- 
duction of a highly centralised administration directly ! 
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his eyes, and in the eyes of the natives generally, a 
serious inroad upon his authority ; and, indeed, he 
seemed a t  first by no means inclined to submit to it 
tamely. The Arabs of South-Western Persia, lilre tllc 
Bakhtiaris, have always looked to British illfluence as 
a counterpoise to the centralising tendencies of Teheran, 
and no one, perhaps, has courted British friendship 
more assiduously than Sheikh Khazzal, who is just 
about old enough to have seen with his own eyes 
British gunboats steaming up the  Karun and Indian 
sepoys in occupation of Muhammerah and Ahwaz 
during the Persian expedition of 1857. Had  he received 
the slightest encouragement from us, the new Belgian 
administration would assuredly have had some difficulty 
in securing recognition at his hands, as the coercion of 
an Arab chief who controls powerful tribes in a country 
prone to lawlessness is a task upon which Teheran 
would not have been likely to  enter lightly, especially 
when that chief, having wedded a Persian princess, has 
made friends unto himself at Court. If, moreover, he 
was aware that the establishment of a Belgian adminis- 
tration of the Customs, not only at  Muhammerah, but 
at all the Gulf ports, might well be regarded as a viola- 
tion of the engagement into which the Persian Govern- 
ment had entered not to place the Customs of Southern 
Persian under foreign superintendence, he was, perhaps, 
entitled to  expect our support. Our only reply, how- 
ever, was that he had better come to an amicable 
arrangement with the Belgians. This he has done, 
and the arrangement is not pecuniarily disadvantageous 
to him ; but whether our advice was palatable is another 
question, The conclusions he has drawn from it are 
certainly not flattering to those who gave it. Whereas 
formerly no foreign influence of any kind except that 
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of Engla~ld  was visible in Southern Persia, the adminis- 
tration which most directly aflects even our commercial 
illterests has been delivered up to be controlled by a 
foreign influence which not only is not English, but 
is practically, if not avowedly, anti-English. That 
England should have tolerated such an innovation if 
she were able to prevent it is inconceivable to the 
llative mind. That the reorganisation of the Custorns 
is an internal reform within the rights of the Persian 
Government, and that the choice of Belgian officials to 
carry it out has been protnpted by the desire to avoid 
provoking international jealousies, are official arguments 
which equally fail to impress the native. IIe talces 
stock only of what are to him the bed-rock facts, that 
Persia has pledged her Custotlls revenues to Russia 
and that the Belgians are merely acting as  revenue 
collectors on behalf of Russia. If he is told that the 
Customs revenues of the Persian Gulf have been 
specially excluded from the bond he is apt to smile, or 
to inquire pointedly why Russia insisted that Persia 
should at  once repay out of the liussian loans the debt 
which a few years ago assigned thc custo~ns of the 
Persian Gulf as security to England (i.c. to the Imperial 
Bank of Persia). I-Ie knows, too, that such a vigorous 
measure of centralisation as l l ~c  reorganisation of the 
Customs under the direct control of Telleran is one 
from which the nerveless hands of his rulers would 
have flinched had they not been braced u p  to it by 
strong pressure from outside. Fccit cu i  ~ ~ Y o L ~ c . ~ J ' ;  SO the
establish~ncnt of a new aclministratio~~ as antago~listic 
as the Belgian Customs have sllvw~l tl~emselves to bc, 
at least in the South, to the interests of IJritisll trade is, 
not perhaps unreasonably, Ioolccd upon as one of the 
many signs of the ti~lles ; like tllc creation of Russian 
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Consulates - including a new Russian Consulate- 
General at Ahwaz, where Russian interests are at 
present absolutely ni2- the journeyillgs of Russian 
agents, the cruises of Russian men-of-war, the ventures 
of Russian trading vessels, which, in the Persian Gulf 
as elsewhere, all point to the new star of ascendency 
rising in the North. 
CHAPTER XVI 
TURICISH ARABISTAN 
N spite of the frontiers which politically divide 
Persian from Turkish Arabistan-frontiers of which 
Turkey, at  any rate, does her best to bring home the 
reality to all concerned by the most absurd and onerous 
q~arantine regulations-the great alluvial plains which 
stretch from the Bakhtiari mountains across the Karun, 
the Tigris, and the Euphrates towards the Arabian 
peninsula form physically and ethnically so homo- 
ge'neous a whole that the present artificial lines of 
severance cannot be expected to outlive the precarious 
tenure upon which their titular owners still hold them. 
The disappearance of the two decadent Oriental 
Monarchies that have so long misgoverned one of the 
most fertile tracts of land in the whole world must be 
but a question of time. The Turk and the Persian are 
both aliens in the land, equally hated by the Arab 
population, and both have proved equally unworthy 
and incompetent stewards of a splendid estate, though 
Turkish administration in these distant provinces, far 
removed, on t h ~  one hand, from the blighting in- 
fluence of Constantinople and fairly accessible, on 
the other, to the restraining influence of British gun- 
boats, compares in many ways favourably with Persian 
administration. f here is little or no probability of the 
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Arabs developing any of the qualities which entitle 
or enable a people to govern themselves, and, with the 
pressure which is IIOW driving civilised nations to grasp 
in every direction at  new opportunities of remullerative 
expansion, it i s  equally improbable that one of the 
historic granaries of the world, which, moreover, lies 
athwart a main artery of communication betweell 
Europe and the East, will be allowed indefinitely to 
lie all but fallow in the hands of its present thriftless 
possessors. 
More than half a century ago  there was a time when 
we seemed ready to realise the importance of this 
region. Wi th  no ilatural boundaries to landward, 
until one reaches the great mountain system which 
stretches across Southern Persia from the borders of 
Afghanistan to the highlands of Kurdistan, and easily 
accessible from the sea by extensive inland waterways, 
the basin of tlie Tigris and the Euphrates offered every 
i~lducement o the enterprise of a nation commanding 
the seas and already holding a dominant position in 
Southern Asia. The  British Resident at  Baghdad 
in the days of Taylor and Rawlinson was the most 
powerful personage in the country, and a determined 
and  consistent effort on our part might have restored 
the ancient prosperity of Mesopotamia for the benefit 
of our Indian Empire and of ourselves as well as of 
Turlrey. But the national interest which was then 
taken in such enterprises a s  the Chesney expedition 
on the Euphrates was excited mainly by the prospect 
of opening up a tl~rougli route to India for which the 
time was perhaps not yet ripe, and relatively little 
account was talren of the value of these regions i* 
themselves, either as an outlet for our COmmerce or as 
a field of emigration for the surplus millions of our 
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Indian population. Yet though we lacked the foresight 
to seize at  the flood the tide which has  long since 
ebbed, the interests we still possess are much too im- 
portant to be allowed to drift helplessly a t  the mercy 
of impending changes which it probably 110 longer 
lies with us to avert. 
In 1878 the British Resident at  Baghdad wrote :- 
" I feel I cannot too strongly urge the subject on the 
attention of the Government, as  I am sure in my own 
mind that there are influences at  work which will some 
day lose us the privilege'we may honestly and fairly 
claim a t  the hands of the Turkish Government for the 
fostering care we have taken of its trade by our having 
been for iifty-eight years the conservators of the public 
peace in the Persian Gulf, by our surveys of its shores, 
a work accomplished by the officers of the late Indian 
Navy at  great trouble, expense, and sacrifice of life, 
and the general relations we have had with all the 
Arab tribes on the Persian Gulf littoral." 
The warning then given might be repeated to-day with 
added emphasis. Not only is Russian influence moving 
steadily down from the North, but a new world-power 
has appeared on the scene in the shape of Germany, 
who has taken it1 hand, with characteristic vigour and 
tenacity, the great railway scheme from which we 
flinched when we had exclusive command of the field. 
Whatever the relative value of railways and waterways 
for comtnercial purposes, it is too late for us to aspire 
to any exclusive command of railway enterprise in 
these regions, for we have now to reckon in any case 
with Germany. Had we simply built a railway years ago 
from Basra to Baghdad, instead of talking for decades 
about a trunk line from the Mediterranean to the Persian 
Gulf, we should have been in a position to impose our 
own terms u 
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own terms upon her, and our com~nercial interests 
would not have been dependent upon the advantages 
which, as a pre-eminently maritime nation, we derive, 
or might derive, from water c o m r n ~ ~ i ~ i c a t i o ~ ~ s .  But we 
did not do so, and, what is more, we have done little or 
nothing to develop or improve even the water communi- 
cations. Yet, as  things are at present, if we are to hold 
our ow11 against the competition of land-borne trade 
whenever the German railway is completed to Baghdad 
and the Persian Gulf, utlIess we can still secure the 
control of the latter section, our main hope lies in 
increasing, as far as possible, the facilities for our 
water-borne traffic. 
I t  is easy enough, no doubt, to talk at large about 
the cheapness of water-borne traffic all the world over 
as compared with land-borne traffic. But these general- 
isations do not apply to water-borne traffic carried on 
under the diffictrlties and restrictions it has to contend 
with in this part of the Turlcish dominions. The navi- 
gation of such tortuous and wayward rivers as the 
Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris is not in itself easy, and 
the Turks, of course, do nothing to make it easier. 
River conservancy is as  unknown in Turltey as in 
Persia. The course of these streams is not only 
shallow ancl winding, but subject to heavy rises and 
falls, and constantly changing with the formation and 
disappearance of rapidly shifting sand shoals. The 
river journey from Basra to Baghc1ad is about 500 miles, 
and talres four to five days by steamer ullcler favourable 
conditions. T h e  distance by land is only 300 miles. 
Moreover, Basra lies 60 miles up the Shatt-el-Arab, 
and a t  its mouth there is a bar with barely 10 feet 
of water a t  low tide, ancl even at high water vessels 
drawing more than 16 to 18 feet of water have to dis- 
N 
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charge a portioil of their cargo in lighters-always an 
expensive operation-before attempting to enter the 
river. The approaches to the river from the gulf are 
complicated and treacherous; not a single light or 
beacon has Turkey placed at  any point of the coast, 
and the only buoys that Inark the channels are those 
laid down by the British India Steam Navigation Com- 
pany, just as the only surveys are those made by the 
British Navy and the Indian Marine. On the other 
hand, Turkey has erected forts at  Fao, on the Shatt-el- 
Arab, about half-way between the bar and the con- 
fluence of the Karun, in direct violation of her treaty 
engagements with Persia, and if she has not yet arined 
them, this is solely due to the vigorous protests which 
the British Government has froin time to time entered 
at Constantinople and which, as the Turlrs know, could 
be easily enforced on the spot. 
But great as  are the natural dificulties with which 
water-borne traflic is handicapped, they do  not for111 so 
serious an obstacle to trade as the arbitrary restrictions 
placed up011 it by the shortsightedi~ess or wilful ob- 
structioil of the Turkish authorities. The Euphrates is 
practically closed over its whole course to foreign 
vessels, as  is also the Tigris above Baghdad. Messrs. 
Lynch Brothers, who have navigated the Lower Tigris 
for half a century, are oilly allowed to employ two 
steamers in the trade between Basra and Baghdad, and 
to keep a third one laid up at  Basra in reserve against 
accidents. A Turkish company also runs four steamers 
on the same line, and two more, which were orclered in 
Eilglai~d in 1902 011 behalf of influential personages 
at Vildiz who elljoy the favour of thc Sultan, have 
recently begun to ply for traffic. After much solicita- 
tion the Turlrisl~ Gover~unent now allows the Lynch 
steamers to ta] 
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steamers to take lighters in tow for the conveyance of 
surplus cargo, but  this paltry concession entirely fails 
to meet the requirements of the trade, and is actually 
granted only as a temporary favour to relieve the present 
congestion. Local shipments have often to be refused 
altogether and t h e  shipments from India and Great 
Britain strictly limited. Nevertheless the accumulations 
of cargo on through shipments for forward delivery are 
so great that it would take nearly three months to clear 
off the stock piled up 011 the wharves at Basra, even if 
there were no f resh arrivals in the meantime. Freight 
in these circumstances is naturally very high, and it 
actually costs much more to forward goods from Basra 
to Baghdad than t o  bring them out from London to 
Basra. The heavy disabilities under which trade is 
thus do no t  affect our commercial interests only 
locally. A consiclerable portion of our trade with 
Persia-to an annua l  amount estimated a t  nearly three- 
quarters of a million sterling-is done through,Basra 
and Baghdad by the caravan route to Kermanshah, 
Hamadan, and Teheran. This route is indeed con- 
sidered by many t o  be the most promising route for 
British trade into  Northern Persia, but what prospect 
is there of developing traffic which is thus strangled at 
the neck? Exploring operations were commenced last 
year near Khanikin,  just over the Turko-Persian fron- 
tier, under the D'Arcy concession for opening up the 
naphtha wells of Southern Persia, and one of the great 
difficulties with which the work had to contend was the 
artificial congestion of traffic, under this system af ob- 
struction, on the  route over which all the machinery, 
etc., had to be imported. In these circumstances it 
is not surprising that, as the boring to a level of 2,000 
feet below the surface did not show very satisfactory 
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results, and doubts had arisen as to the actual owner- 
ship of the soil, the boundaries of Turltey and Persia 
at that point never having been definitely delimitated, 
the concessionnaires have preferred to remove the seat 
of their operations to the Karun valley. 
The restrictions placed by the stupidity and ill-.will 
of the Turkish authorities upon international trade are 
so glaring and so obviously directed against British 
trade that it should not be beyond the power of the 
British Government to insist upon their removal. The 
Forte is so little amenable to arguments based even 
on the economic interests of Turkey herself that it is 
not liltely, I admit, to grant, of its own accord, corn- 
plete freedom of navigation on these waters ; but when 
the Turks call upon us to cotlseilt to a revision of 
our commercial treaties, and an increase of duties on 
British imports, we are surely entitled to demand, i n  
this direction also, some compensatory concession for 
the benefit of our own trade. I t  is even doubtful 
whether the restrictions which Turlrey at present 
places upon the navigation of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates are'not at variance with her existing engage- 
ments. Though the British Government never appear 
to have pressed that point, it is worth noting that one 
of the ablest representatives they have had at Baghdad, 
who had made a special study of the question, con- 
tended only twenty-five years ago that the Capitulations 
of 1661 might be successfully invoked, as Article I., 
which has been coniirmed by successive treaties to the 
present day, lays down "that the English nation and 
merchants and all other merchants sailing under the 
English flag, with their ships and vessels and merchan- 
dise of all descriptions, shall and may pass safely by 
sea, and go  and come into our dominions without any 
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fore, that it was in conformity with the above principle 
that, in 1834, the Sultan's Firman was issued, authoris- 
ing four British steamers to navigate the Euphrates, 
and it is under this Firman, originally granted for the 
Euphrates, that by a series of diplomatic evolutions 
the Indian Marine retains a gunboat, the Comet, at  
Baghdad, and Messrs. Lynch ply their steamers on the 
Lower Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab. 
Since the last of our .Euphrates steamers was with- 
drawn in 1843 for service on the Indus little definite 
information has been available with regard to the possi- 
bilities of navigating the Euphrates. Large swamps 
have formed above its confluence with the Tigris, and 
they absorb now a considerable portion of its waters. 
But as the Turlrs are known to have run a small steamer 
up a s  far as Meslrene, there is no reason to believe 
that the task of restoring a regular channel for naviga- 
tion by light-draught steamers would prove either 
very arduous or  costly. On the Upper Tigris a 
small Turkish steamer has plied occasionally between 
Baghdad and Mosul, and the natural obstacles to navi- 
gation might probably be removed up to Diarbekir. 
If these two great rivers were thrown open without any 
arbitrary restrictions to the mercantile enterprise of the 
world-for we need not seek here, any more than we 
have done on the Karun, for any exclusive privileges- 
we should be in a much better position to meet the 
competition of any future railways from Asia Minor 
into Mesopotamia, not only in Basra and Baghdad, 
but in  many other markets accessible from their upper 
reaches. I t  is hopeless to expect that the Turkish 
Government will ever undertake the irrigation works 
which alone are necessary to  give a fresh meaning 
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to the tradition that the Garden of Eden was located 
between the Tigris and the Euphrates, but S i r  William 
Willcoclts, of Egyptian , irrigation fame, has lately 
drawn attention to the field which lies before us there 
within easy reach of India with its superabundant 
and its great experience of similar under- 
taltings. British capital and British guidance would 
give a new stimulus and n.ew opportunities to the 
industry of the people-at present quite as effectually 
discouraged by the diffic~~lty of disposing of surplus 
produce as by the exactions of the tax-collector-and 
our water-borne trade with adequate facilities for ex: 
pansion would take its 'legitimate share of the returning 
prosperity of the country. 
Surely, at the present day, when ~ r i t i sh ' i ~ ldus t ry  is 
clamouring for new marltets under the growing pressure ' 
of universal competition, it behoves the British Govern- 
ment to make an effort to retain and develop the lnarliets 
which we have already opened up and where our pre- 
dominance is still intact. The trade of Basra and 
Baghdad, artificially cribbed and'confi ned as  it is, is by 
no means insignificant. I t  is unnecessary to  procluce 
detailed statistics of which even the compilers are 
unable to guarantee the accuracy. But the value of 
the foreign imports as set forth in the latest Consular 
reports amouilted to over one and a quarter million 
sterling in 1902, or about the same figure a s  in1 1901, 
though the exports, in consequence of exceptionally 
bad harvests, had fallen to iGg50,ooo from L'I,I~O,OOO 
in 1901, and ~ 1 , ~ 6 0 , 0 0 6  in 1900. In one respect the 
foreign trade of the Tigris is on a sounder basis than 
the foreign trade of the Persian ports of the Gulf, for . 
the exports bear a much more favourable proportion to 
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s o  picturesque a feature in the landscape along t,otll 
banks of the Shatt-el-Arab, contribute, with cr:r~fil~, 
the  most important item of exportation, the total value 
of  the date crop having reached upwards of &350,000 
i n  a good year ; and, shortsighted a s  is the ccorlon~ic 
policy of Turlrey, her officials are not free like their 
Persian colleagues to interfere with the export trade by 
arbitrary embargoes and to engineer rings for their own 
private benefit. Curiously enough the foreign merchants 
of Basra confine themselves almost entirely to the export 
trade, leaving the import trade to native firms, mostly 
Jewish. Both the imports and the exports are, how- 
ever, mainly British or British Indian, and I3ritish ship- 
p ing  is equally predominant, the net tonnage of British 
steamers cleared a t  the port of Basra in r p ,  a~llount- 
i n g  to 164,341 tons out of a total of 201,513 tons. 
Satisfactory a s  these results doubtless are, they fall 
deplorably short of what they might have been had 
British diplomacy shown a little more foresight in the 
past, or of what they might be now, if it displayed n 
little more energy in the present ; and the enterprise of 
a British cominunity which braves the terrors of rcsi- 
dence in this fiery furnace, where the thermometer 
registers over rooo in the shade on I 16 days during the 
year, and the mean temperature night and day for 
upwards of four months is about gsn, certainly deserves 
rather more recognition than it has generally met with 
a t  the hands of those to whom its interests have been 
committed. One of the most acute, though not the 
most serious, grievances of Basra is the arbitrary and 
futile imposition of quarantine under orders from Con- 
stantinople, which is rigorously enforced against all 
foreigners, though any native can evade it with im- 
punity. Because there is plague in India or cholera in 
~ g y p t ,  every foreigner who has been called on business, 
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say, to Bushire or  some other port on the Persian Gulf, 
has to perform quarantine either on board ship or  in a 
miserable lazaretto on the opposite bank of the river 
when he returns to Basra. The native, on the other 
hand, leaves the ship a t  Muhammerah, and,  subject 
to a carefully graduated scale of bribery, is allowed 
almost openly to come across the river in a native boat 
and land unmolested under the nose of the quarantine 
authorities. I t  is humiliating to thinlr that even the 
British men-of-war engaged in policing the Gulf were 
fain to submit patiently to the same treatment, until 
one day a Russian man-of-war came up to Basra, when 
an emphatic protest from its commander, properly sup- 
ported by the Embassy at Constantinople, a t  once 
secured a substailtial reduction of the term. Then 
and then only did we bestir ourselves, and ultimately 
succeeded in obtaining a further reduction. 
Political and cominercial interests, here as  elsewhere 
in the East, are indissolubly bound up together, and 
the Koweyt question, with which I must deal separately, 
may serve to illustrate the impossibility of dividing 
British interests, as  some of our political mentors 
would apparently do, into different water-tight coin- 
partments, which can be retained or jettisoned without 
mutual injury. Basra is the capital of the vilayet 
specially created to direct and promote the extension 
of Turkish influence along the shores of the Persian 
Gulf, and there can be little doubt that, if we had 
adopted a more determined attitude in defence of our 
conlmercial interests against the policy of obstruction 
steadily pursued by the Porte, Turlrey would never 
have ventured to einbarlt upon the political intrigues 
by which she is now seelting to undermine our in- 
fluence in a region where half a century ago our 
ascendency was unchallenged. 
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CHAPTER XVII 
THE GERMAN RAILWAY INVASION OF ASIATIC 
TURICEY 
G ERMANY cannot yet be said to have acquired any positive status in the Middle East. In 
Persia she has, lilte other Powers, diplomatic and con- 
sular representatives, and in the Persian Gulf her con- 
suls have been displaying of late years a good deal of 
somewhat ostentatious activity. Her  commercial rela- 
tions with Persia are unimportant, and so far she has 
had few opportuilities of cultivating political relations 
with the Shah's Government. It may, however, be 
well to note that in the Treaty of Commerce concluded 
between Persia and Germany in 1873, which is stiIl in 
force, it is stated, under Article 19, that 'L in  the event 
of Persia, being involved in differences with another 
power, the German Imperial Government declares 
itself ready to employ its good oflices, at the invita- 
tion of the Shall's Government, with a view to promot- 
ing  a settlement of such clifferences." The  German 
Government, we may be sure, reckons among its 
political assets a provision which opens up such 
possibilities of 4'11011est brolrerage." It is not, how- 
ever, through Persia, for the present, but through 
Turkey that Germany is seeking to project her influence 
into the Middle East. Like all her other schemes of 
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militant world-policy, this one laclrs neither thorough- 
ness nor boldness,.and as it must very largely affect our 
interests and especially those of India, and our  co- 
operation has actually been invited to promote its 
achievement, it is a matter which it behoves us to 
examine with much care. Let us, in'the first place, con- 
sider the circumstances which have enabled' Germany 
to compass with no mean prospect of success such great 
ambitions. 
The growth of German influence a t  C o n s t a n t i n ~ ~ l e  
is one of the most remarkable political phenomena of 
the closing years of the nineteenth century. Never has a 
great European Power acquired so rapidly and with so  
little apparent effort a position of authority and privilege , 
in a decadent Oriental state with which its previous 
connections and actual community of interests seemed 
so slender. Germany stepped, as it were, overnight into 
the position left vacant on the Bosphorus when, after the 
fall of the Beaconsfield Government, in 1880, England 
abruptly changed the course which she had hitherto 
steered in the Near East. The new German Empire had 
then entered upon a period of commercial and industrial 
expansion at home, of which the conquest of new 
markets abroad was the necessary corollary, and 
German statesmen mere quiclr to recognise the oppor- 
tunities which lay before German enterprise in a country 
where so much goes by favour, and political influence 
can be so effectually exerted for the furtherance of com- 
mercial interests. The first appearance of the Germans 
on the field was ostensibly in a military capacity, a s  
became tlie leading military power on the Continent. 
English and French and other foreign officers had been 
from time to time employed in Turlrey with a view to the 
reorganisation of the Turkish army and gendarmerie. 
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But for various reasons, neitl~er they nor their Turlrish 
employers had ever taken their work very seriously, 
and though some of them, like Valentine Balrer and 
Hobart, had rendered conspicuous services during 
the Russo-Turkish War ,  their influence was quite in- 
adequate to overcome the normal apathy and jealousy 
of the Turk. The  German oflicers who accompanied 
General von der Goltz, himself an exceptionally dis- 
tinguished soldier, a t  once took up a very different 
position, in which they received the full and unvarying 
support of their own Government. That  they have 
served the Turkish Government well the event showed 
when the Turlrish army took the field against Greece 
in 1897. But they have none the less beell able to do 
excellent service to their own country, which has, per- 
haps, been an even greater gainer by the bargain than 
Turlrey. Armaments, ammunition, stores, equipment, 
everything that Turlrey had to buy abroad, was bought 
from Germany. And their influence has not been con- 
fined to the W a r  Office. The German military in- 
structors have, no doubt, been excellent officers, 
but they have been even better commercial agents. 
Their credit at  the Palace and with the public depart- 
ments has been employed, in and out of season, in 
pushing German trade and promoting German under- 
takings. T h e  powerful influence of William 11,. has 
been exerted with admirable intelligence and persever- 
ance to co-ordinate all the forces that could promote the 
expansion of German enterprise in Turkey, and the 
results from the commercial point of view alone, not to 
spealr of the political aspect of the question, have been 
sufficiently remarkable to deserve attention, The fol- 
lowing figures showing the growth of import and export 
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trade between Germany and  Turkey during the last two 
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One OF the chief factors in the development of 
German trade with Turkey has been unquestionably the 
promotion of railway enterprise in the Ottoman domin- 
ions under the auspices of Germany, a s  the sudden leap 
in 1889, shown in the above table, clearly indicates. 
The completior~ in 1885 of the system lrnolvn as  the 
"Oriental Railways," commenced by the late Baron 
Hirsch, placed Germany in direct railway comtnunic'a- 
tion through Hungary, Servia, and Bulgaria, with 
Constantinople. On the opposite shores of thc Bos- 
phorus lay a co~lsiderable fielcl of undoubted natural 
resources, still 
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communica- 
ilgaria, with 
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resources, still practically untouched by European 
enterprise. The only two railway lines of ally import- 
ance in Asia Minor were the Smyrna-fidin Railway, 
for which a concession had been granted as  far back as 
1856 to an English company, and the Smyrna-Kassaba 
Railway, which was then still in the hands of another 
English company, that had obtained the concessioll in 
1863. No serious attempt had ever been made to open 
up Asia Minor from the Constantinople base, though a 
short line of some fifty-six miles had been built by the 
Turkish Government in 1871, from Haidar Pasha, just 
beyond Scutari on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, 
to Ismid at the head of the bay of the same name in the 
Sea  of Marmora. It had been leased in 1880 for a term 
of twenty years to an English company, the Turkish 
Government, however, reserving the right of deter- 
mining the lease at any moment, subject to compensa- 
tion. It was to the acquisition of this short line as the 
base of further operations that the Germans first applied 
themselves. In 1888 German diplomacy obtained two 
Imperial IradCs, conveying to the nominee of the 
Deutsche Bank, the leading financial institution at 
Berlin, the right of working the Haidar Pasha-Ismidt 
Railway, and a ninety-nine years concession for an 
extension of the line to Angora with a kilometric 
guarantee of 10,300 francs for the original line, and of 
15,000 francs for the line yet to be constructed. The 
capital was raised in Germany for the creation of the 
"Ottoman Company of Anatolian  ailw ways," the 
works were pushed on with great energy under a skilled 
German staff, the materials being, of course, all Pur- 
chased in Germany, and within four years the line was 
completed. The  German position was now so Strong 
that the real aim of German ambitions could be safely 
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disclosed. In 1893 another Imperial Iradti granted to 
the German company two further concessions, one for 
the construction of a brailch line from Eslti S l~ch i r  to 
Konia, and another for the extension c ~ f  the Angora 
line to Kaisariyel~, with the right to prolong it 
eventually through Sivas to Diarbeliir and down the 
valley of the Tigris to Baghdad. This second con- 
cession was before long abaildoned. The ostcnbible 
reason was that a careful survey of the coul~try between 
Angora and Kaisariyeh had shown tlle cliificultics and 
cost of construction to be prohibitive; the rcnl reason was 
that the Germans were alarn~cd at the jealousy already 
displayed in Russia 01 their intrusion into the no~.tl~ern 
part of Asia Minor. The important rights wliich this 
concession carried with it, for the extension to 13nghclacl, 
appear, however, to have been carefully safeguardecl. 
The Eski Shehir-Kotlia sectioll was completed in 11496. 
The German system had secured a strong footllold in 
Asia Minor, and tapped so111c of its ricllcst provinces. 
The next step was to acquire the control, or to  circum- 
scribe permanently the development of the other ritilway 
interests in Asiatic Turkey. The Ottoman Government 
had exercised in 1893 its right to buy back tlio Smyrna- 
Kassaba Railway, which had been extended under its 
English management to Ala Sl~chir ,  and it was trans- 
ferred to a French group which undertook to construcl 
a prolongation to Afium I h r a  Hissar. At this poirtl: it 
met the A~lritolian Railway which pnsses through Afiutn 
ICara Hissar on the way from Eslzi Slialiir to Konia, :ind 
if it could only have eflectcd a junction there with llle 
German line, it would unquestionably Irnvc dcflct:tcd 
much of the latter's traflilic ikon1 tllc interior dowtl to 
Smyrna inste:id of Constantinoplc. 'I'lle German 
Company refused to allow ~ h c  jul~etion, and tliot~gli 
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such obstruction, however intelligible from the point 
o l  view o f  its own interests, was clearly detrime~ltal to 
the general inlerests o f  trndc, tlie Turltisl~ Govern- 
ment turned a dcaf car to tlic remonstrances of the 
French Co~np:~ny, and the two lines ren~aincd cut off 
from e;ich otlicr I y r  :L f i : ~  hundred y:~rds of unrnetalled 
roadway, until l l ~ c  wcaker was driven to give in to tlie 
stronger. 'l'lie I~rcncli Company had to accept Lhe 
German tcrms, iintl tllough it preserved its nominal 
identity, it pnssitd [)riletically under the control of tlie 
Anatolian Company. 'Thcroupon tlie Porte immediately 
reversed its fortner c1cc:isit)n rind allowed tlie junction of 
the two lincs, whicli it had previously prohibited, to be 
effected a t  Afiutn Knrn IIissar. Tlie English Smyrna- 
Ai'din Company has alona l~itherto retained its incle- 
pi:ndcnt:e, hut Gerrnzin influence at Cunstantinople 
has successfully defeatccl all its efforts to penetrate 
Curtlier into the intcrioc of Asia hiinor, tliougli it has 
never asked fur any kind of kilometric guarantee from 
the Turkish Government, whilst the Anatolian Com- 
pany dsas not build a mile ctf railway without ample 
cover.{The Smyrna-AYdin IXail~vay with its intelligent 
system of small lateral feeders may possibly succeed 
in resisting the  pressure of its German neighbours, 
but the oldest and most business-like railway enterprise 
in Asia Minor, which with :L little rnore support from 
the nritisli Govt:rnment might have been the instru- 
ment for opcni11g up tlic wliolc cot~ntry to British trade, 
is doolnccl, ii not to al)sorl)tion IJY its potverful rival, at 
any rate, to pc!rmancnt exclusion from any wider field 
than IlIilt upon whit:h it has already conferred an amount 
of proslxrity rare irzdccd in 'l'urkcy. Mention should 
al..;tj bc? rnade 01 the srtlafl Mersina-Adana line origi- 
n;illy ~ ~ 1 s t ~  Britislr, which has been absorbed by the 
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Anatolian Railway, under an agreement concluded in 
1901 with its French proprietors who had talcen it 
over from their English predecessors. At  the same 
time, whilst by a bold and consistent policy' the field 
was being cleared of all competitors in Asia Minor, 
the Deutsche Bank and its satellites in South Germany, 
Austria, and Switzerland, were busily engaged in 
securing a large, if not a preponderating, financial in- 
terest in the & '  Oriental Railways " which control the 
European traffic between Germany and C ~ n s t a n t i n o ~ l e ,  
and in cementing close relations with the Turkish Ex- 
chequer by doling out to it from time to time some of 
those advances of which it stands in chronic need. 
Meanwhile quite a volulninous literature had sprung 
up in the Fatherland discussing from every point of 
view, commercial and economic, strategic and political, 
the advantages that were to accrue to Gerlnany from 
the conquest by railway of the Sultan's Asiatic 
dominions. T h e  professors foretold the revival of the 
ancient glories of Nineveh and Babylon under German 
auspices. The  Pan-Germans preached the mobilisation 
of the German tribes of Switzerland and of Austria," 
as well as of the actual German Empire, with a view to 
the Germanisation of Asia Minor by colonies of German 
immigrants, some of them even advocating opeilly the 
establishment of a formal German protectorate, which 
should guarantee to the Sultan the preservation of his 
Asiatic possessions. Military writers expatiated on the 
strategic value of the proposed railway system, for the 
protection of which it has been even suggested that 
Germany should talre a leaf ovt of Russia's book in 
Manchuria, and establish military posts to secure the 
works of construction against the ~rnfriendly interfer- 
ence of Kurds and Beduins. The German Emperor, 
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with his lreen imagination and boundless patriotic 
ambitions, had from the beginning talcen the liveliest 
personal interest in the development of German enter- 
prise in Asia Minor, and in Dr. Siemens, the eminent 
Director of the Deutsche Bank, he had found an in- 
valuable coadjutor who combined with remarkable 
business capacity the fervour of an enthusiast. I shall 
refer later on to the political activity of German diplo- 
macy at  Constailtinople under the Emperor's direct 
impulse, and to the visit which his Majesty himself 
paid to the Sultan in 1898, not disdaining to play for 
the nonce, if one may use the term without disrespect, 
the part of an Imperial carpet-bagger. In the year 
after that memorable visit a Convention was signed 
between Dr. Siemens and the Porte, which formally 
conceded in principle to the Gerrnan Anatolian Com- 
pany the right to extend from Konia to the Persian 
Gulf, A commission of German engineers, with the 
German Consul-General Stemrich at its head, proceeded 
to survey the ground for the great trunk line, the 
German Military Attach6 at Constailtinople was sent to 
report upon the strategic aspects of the question, and a 
German cruiser visited the Persian Gulf to discover the 
most suitable point for a terminus in its waters, whilst 
Turltey was at the same time prompted to talte imme- 
diate steps to revive or establish her sovereignty along 
the littoral. On January 16 th~  1902, an Imperial Iradt 
was issued approving the. final Convention, of which 
the details had been negotiated with the Porte by Dr. 
Zander, the Director of the Anatolian Railways after 
the death of Dr. Siemens in 1901, It is unnecessary 
to enter into the particulars of this Convention, since it 
served in its turn only as the basis for the elabora- 
tion of the definitive scheme with which we are chiefly 
0 
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concer~led. Sufice it to say that the terms were extra- 
ordinarily favourable to the German Company, whose 
concession for the Anatolian railway system already 
constructed was extended for the full term of the  new 
concession, i.e. for ninety-nine years, whilst there were 
indefinite possibilities of further exteilsion in the  very 
elastic provisions allowitlg for interruption of the  
worlrs in case of certain contingencies. In  addition t o  
branch lines actually specified, the Convention granted 
to the German Company a ~ r i o r i t y  of rights with 
regard to future extensions which practically secured 
to it the control of all railway enterprise in Asiatic 
Turkey. The financial conditions, of which t h e  main 
feature was a kilometric guarantee to be specially 
secured on certain revenues of the State, were equally 
favourable to the German Company. They were, a t  
any rate, as satisfactory as  any financial arrangements 
based upon Turlrisll credit can be. 
Thus Germany held in her hand the long-coveted 
prize. She had acquired the virtual monopoly of rail- 
way power in Asiatic Turkey from the Bosphorus to  
the Persian Gulf, and what railway power in a decadent 
Oriental state means nowadays, when directed by a 
strong hand, the Manchurian Railway is there to  show, 
not to speak of Germany's own manipulation of railway 
power in Shantung. The  German Company in  whom 
that power was vested was, it is true, officially termed the  
" Ottoman " Anatolian Company, but t h e  formula was  
a s  empty as that  under which the Manchurian Railway 
is officially designated as the " Eastern Chinese. " T h e  
process of "peaceful penetration" might not be s o  
easy ; but German, like Russian, statesmanship works 
tc langue e'c12&0nce, and  from the Elbe to the Euphrates 
may not be such a far cry in the future as  it seems a t  
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present. Putting aside as the dreams of exuberant 
patriotism the visions of a Germaliised Mesopotamia, 
in which not a few ardent spirits indulged, there was 
enough to justify very sanguine anticipations of com- 
mercial and eco~lomic ascendency. How comes it, there- 
fore, that instead of preserving and working for hcr 
own exclusive benefit the valuable concession acquircd 
under the Convention uf SS)OZ, Germany should have 
seemed anxious to transform it into an international 
undertalting to be shared with her 011 a footing of more 
or less rcal equality by other powers? The usual 
explanation is that her financial resources were not 
suficiellt to bear the undivided strain of so heavy an ' 
outlay, and that she had no option but to seek the co- 
opuratiorl of foreign capital. This explanation contains 
part, but, I am inclined to think, only part, of the truth. 
It was not only her financial, but also her political, 
credit which she fclt to be slill inadequate for such a 
venture on her own account. She owed the concession 
itself to the extraordinary influence she had acquired 
over the present ruler of Turkey through an excep- 
tionally fortunate combination of circumstal~ces coupled 
with consummate diplomacy. Could she ieel assured 
of retaining the same in fluencc throughout the period 
required for completing the grcat work of which the 
concession after a11 merely conveyed the promise? 
What  were the real foundations of that influence? 
Wha t  guarantee did it: afford of permanency? To 
these queries a n  answer must be sought in a sl~ort  re- 
trospective survey of German policy at Constantinople, 
Though as late as at the Congress of 13erlin in 1878 
Bismarck had not yct thought i t  wort11 while to go  one 
inch out of his way to conciliate Turkey, the old 
Chancellor was quick to seizc the opportunity which 
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Turkish resentment of the new policy inaugurated by  
Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet in 1880 offered to German 
diplomacy. From that moment, without ever com- 
mitting herself too deeply, Germany began t o  play 
the part of "the friend of Turkey " in the European 
concert. I n  the negotiations connected with the rectifi- 
cation of the Turlcish frontiers for the benefit of Greece 
and Montenegro in 1880, and during the complications 
which follorved the Philippoli Kevolution in 1885, 
Bismarck, without ever getting off the international 
fence, always leant over to the Turkish side, as far a s  
he could prudently do  so without compromising the  
equilibrium of Germany's policy. William 11. has 
merely trodden the same path, with perhaps less dis- 
cretion. The complimentary missions, the congratu- 
latory telegrams, the presents, the decorations with 
which he continuously courted the favour of the Sultan; 
the indifference to the Arineniail horrors, of which he 
set the tone throughout Germany, the sympathy with 
which he ostentatiously followed the victories of Turkish 
arms in Greece, were but the preliminaries of a much 
more significant demonstration. Abdul Hamid was 
still practically boycotted by public opinion throughout 
the civilised world when the German Emperor pro- 
ceeded, with all the pomp in which he revels, t o  
Constantinople and Syria in the autumn of 1898. A 
potentate who had handed over thousands of his 
Christian subjects-men, women, and children-in the  
very streets of his capital to the fury of his  Mussulman 
soldiery could hardly be expected to resist the blandish- 
ments of a powerful Christian ruler, who not only 
consented to accept his hospitality, but proclaimed 
ur6i e t  orbi that "H i s  Majesty the Sultan and the  
300,000,000 Mohmnedans  who, scattered over all 
parts of 
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I t  is true that neither in connection with Egypt, nor 
after the Greek war, nor during the crisis in Crete, 
nor a t  the time of the French naval demonstration 
at Mitylene, nor during the recent troubles in the 
Balkans, has Germany ever ~ n a d c  any real stand or 
risked any  unpleasant consequences for the benefit 
of Turlrey. T h e  most she ever ventured to do was 
to " lay down her flute " when the other powers refused 
to dance to thc Turltish tune she had piped for them 
in vain in thc waters of Crete. But herein lies pre- 
cisely the  Emperor William's diplomatic genius. He  
realised that even Abdul Hainid's shrewdness is not 
proof against personal flattery, and without sacrificing 
a single German interest, and, least of all, without im- 
perilling the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, 
he has persuaded .that astute ' potentate of the value 
and sincerity of a platonic friendship froin which 
Turkey has not yet on a single occasion derived any 
substantial benefit. 
At  the  same time William 11. is doubtless much 
too intelligent not to realise how precarious are the 
foundations up011 which Germany's position at  Con- 
stantinople-must in these circumstances rest. At any 
moment there may arise in South-Eastern Europe 
a situation of such extreme peril for Turkey that 
the Sultan will be compelled to put Germany's friend- 
ship to a crucial test. W h a t  the result would have 
to be if it meant for Germany the slightest de- 
parture from her policy ol: traditional subserviency to 
her Eastern neighbour, Williatn 11. is perfectly well 
aware. He can only cultivate the friendship of the 
Sultan s o  long a s  it does not seriously impair Germany's 
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relations with Russia. Of the vigilance and jealousy 
with which Russia watches the development of German 
.enterprise in Asia Minor a significant indication was 
given at the beginning of 1900, when, after the con- 
clusion of the preliminary convention for the Baghdad 
Railway, Russian diplon~acy immediately pressed a t  
Constantinople for priority of rights in respect of thc 
constructioil of railways in the northern part of Asia 
Minor, and obtained from the Porte an  undertalring, 
known a s  the  "Blaclr Sea  basin agreement," that 
Russia shall enjoy such priority of rights throughout 
the Asiatic provinces of Turlrey that drain into the Blaclr 
Sea. In the Near East, a s  in the Far East, Germany 
can malre a brave show so long as  she does not cross 
Russia's path, but, in view of the continental situation 
in Europe, she cannot afford in the long run to weigh 
her interests or her ambitions either in Turlrey or in 
China against the danger of a conflict with Russia. 
Tried by the fiery ordeal of a grave international crisis, 
Germany's influence at Constantinople could hardly 
emerge unscathed. But a domestic crisis at Yildiz 
Kiosk might affect it a t  least equally prejudicially. So  
long as Abdul Hamid lives and retains power his will 
is law, and if he is Germany's friend she can dispense 
with any other friends in Turkey. It is well for her that 
this is so, for outside the Palace her friends in Turlrcy 
are few indeed. Even in the arnly, except amongst 
those who have studied or scrvcd in Germany and owe 
their advancement to German iniluencc, the Gcrrnans 
have inspired more jealousy tban lovc. Atnongst thc 
official classes generallyand amongst thc people, as far as 
the people count in Turlcey, they are hatccl nlilce for the 
good and the bad qualities of the German cllaracter, for 
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Not t h e  least of the causes which have made theln 
detested by many Turlss is that the German Emperor 
is the Sultan's friend, for though the Turks tremble 
before their master there are  few of them who do not 
regard him a s  the worst enemy of his country. When- 
ever t h e  EIainidian regime comes to a n  end the inlluence 
of t h e  one European power which is most closely 
associated with it in thc minds of every Turk will be 
involved in its fall. I t  is therefore of the utmost 
importance to  Germany, merely from the point of view 
of t h e  internal situatioil at C ~ n s t a n t i n o ~ l e ,  apart from 
all financial or interilatio~lal considerations, to enlist 
with a view to future developments, which may not be 
very remote, as many loreign interests as possible in 
support  of thc greatest undertaking she has entered 
upon in  Turlsey. She cannot hope to complete the 
Baghdad Railway within Abdul Hamid1s lifetime, even 
if h i s  life were a better one  than it would for various 
reasons appear to be, and what will happen when 
Abdul  Hamid clisappears the most intelligent states- 
manship cannot foresee. But it can foresee the 
expediency of being forearmed against possible con- 
tingencies, If, without sacrificing the substantial 
control she has acquired over the  Baghdad Railway, 
she can engineer a combination which would secure 
to her in all circumstances the co-operation of Great 
Britain, France, and others-but above all of Great 
Britain-she will be in a vastly better position to 
await events that will necessarily to some$ extent 
jeopardise, and may even suddenly bring down with 




THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY CONVENTION O F  1903 1 
F, as I have shown, it was Germany's interest to I 
try and enlist the co-operation of foreign capital 
and the political support of other powers-and more 
especially of England-for the Baghdad Railway, it ~ 
was clearly necessary that the Anatolian Company, of /I 
which the essentially German character was too patent 
to all, should retire discreetly into the background and 
make room for an a t  least outwardly more coslnopolitan 
arrangement. Whilst the Deutsche Banlr was preparing 
j 
the ground in London and Paris, fresh negotiations 
were being conducted all through 1902 at Constanti- 
nople, which resulted in the creation of a new Company 
to be styled the Imperial Ottonlan Baghdad Railway 1 
Company," and the conclusion of a Convention between 
the founders of that company and the Ottoman Govern- 
ment, embodying with certain amendments and addi- 
tions the provisions contained in the Convention of 
January 16th, 1902. The definitive Convention was 
signed at Constantinople on March 5th, 1903, by 
Zihni Pasha, the Minister of Commerce and Public 
Works, on behalf of the Turlrish Government, and by 
I-Ierr Arthur Gwinner, Presiclei~t of the Deutsche Banlr 1 
of Berlin, and Dr. Zander, Director - General, and 
M. Huguenin, Assistant Director - General of the 
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On the same date the Cahier des Charges, accornpany- 
ing the Convention, and the Statutes of the new Corn- 
pany, received the sanction of the Turlrish Government. 
The French text of the Convention will be found in 
the Appendix. But as it forms the charter of an under- 
taking which may be destined to play quite as  important 
a part in Western Asia as the Eastern Chinese or 
Manchurian Railway has played in Eastern Asia, it 
deserves to be carefully examined, and to this end 
some explanatory coinments may not be out of place. 
Under Article I. the Ottoman Government grants a 
concession to the Auatolian Railway Company for the 
construction and ~vorlring of a prolongation of the 
Konia line (Anatolian Railway) to Baghdad and Basra, 
passing through, or as near as possible to, the towns 
of Keraman, Eregli, Kardash-Beli, Adana, Hamidieh, 
Osmanieh, Bagtcheh, Kazanali, Killis, Tell-Habesh, 
I Harran, Ras-ul-Ain, Nussibin, Avniat, Mosul, Tekrit, Sadijeh, Baghdad, Kerbela, Nedjef, Zubeir, and Basra ; 
-!  as well as of branch lines (I) fro111 Tell-Habesh to 
i Aleppo, (2) from a point to be hereafter determined to 
I Urfa, (3) from Sadijeh to Khanikin, and (4) from Zubeir to a point on the Persian Gulf to be settled by com- mon accord between the  Ottoman Government and the , 
I concessionnaire. 
I The original plan had been to carry on the trans- 
continental line, not from Konia, but from Angora, 
the northern extension of the Anatolian Railway 
system, through Sivas and Diarbekir to the Tigris. 
I 
I The  Sultan had from the first strongly favoured that 
I plan, as it presented great strategical advantages from the Turkish point of view, enabling troops to be 
moved up rapidly in case of need all along the line 
from Baghdad towards the Russian frontier beyond 
i 
I 
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Erzeroum. But the Germans, who had doubtless 
received some intimation of the views held in St. 
Petersburg, which subsequeiltly found diplomatic ex, 
pression in the '' Black Sea Basin " agreement of 
March, 1900, decided to reject the northern route in 
favour of the southern one. From Konia the first 
section of the new railway as far as  Eregli presents 
no serious difliculties. It continues to run SO far over 
the Anatolian plateau at  an altitude of about 3,000 
feet. But, after reaching Eregli, it is i~nn~edia te ly  con- 
fronted by the great mountain barrier which separates 
the Anatolian plateau from the plains of Mesopotamia. 
The  difficulties it will have to surmount are picturesquely 
described by Mr. Whighain in one of the chapters he 
devotes to the Baghdad Railway in his instructive boolr 
on The Persian Pro6Ze1?z. Advantage is to be taken 
iirst of the wild caiion of the Chakit Su ,  which cleaves 
the Taurus range in twain, and then of the historic 
pass known as the Cilician Gates, through which the 
path of conquest has been trod in turn by many an 
invading army, 'from the days of Xerxes and Darius 
down to those of the great Egyptian, Ibrahim Pasha. 
Thence the railway will cross the small and fertile 
plain of Adana, before scaling the second but less 
formidable rampart which falls away in easier slopes 
towarcls the basin of the Euphrates and the Tigris. 
The two sections from Eregli to Aclana, and from 
Adana to Tell-Ilabesh, where the branch line will 
diverge to Aleppo and Northern Syria, will certainly 
prove the most difficult ancl costly of 311, as they will 
necessitate altogether nearly a hundred miles of blast- 
ing and tunnelling. After cinerging froin the Taurus 
mountains the line, instead of sweeping rotiiid the foot- 
hills through the fairly populous and fertile clistricts of 
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Urfa and Diarbelcir into the upper valley of the Tigris 
and down to Mosul, is to be carried in a straight line 
across the desert between the twin rivers of Meso- 
potamia to Mosul, and thence down the clesolate right 
bank of the Tigris to Baghdad. It is true that a feeder 
is to be thro~vn out to Urfa, and others are contem- 
plated later on to Marash, flitltab, Bircjilr, Mardin, 
Erbil, and to Tuzlrur~natli and Salahiell in the Kerkuk 
district. But the proposed route for the main line 
w o ~ ~ l d  harclly llavc bccn adopted by the Company had 
not the kilonletric guarantee rendered it fina~lcially 
independent of the immediate resources of the country 
to bc traversed between the Taurils and Baghdad. 
From Baghdad a very important branch is to g o  off 
to the Persian frontier at Khnuikin, rvl~ence one of the 
chief trade routes into Persia lies througll ICertnanshah 
and Hamadan to Teheran. 'The annual value of the 
British trade carried on with Persia by this route 
is estimated at  ;E7go,ooo-a fact which serves inci- 
dentally to illustrate the many-sided bearings of the 
Baghdad Iiailxvay upon Britisli interests. From Bagll- 
dad the main line is to trend back to the Euphrates and 
cross it again in order to touch at the two sacred cities 
of the Shin11 Mussullnans, Kerbela and Nedjef, ~vhere 
the rnere pilgrim trafic from Persia and from India 
must prvvc a considernble source of revenue, 011 the 
way down to Rasrah, the chief port of the Shatt-el- 
Arab, and to its appointed terminus, wllerever it lnay 
ultimately be, on the Persian Gulf. The barest pre- 
liminary surveys have, however, yet been made of the 
Mesopotamian sections of the railway, which will 
certainly Iirescnt s o ~ n c  rathc?r serious difliculties, owing 
to the intricate networlc of swamps and marshes that 
cover so large a portion OF the great fluvial delta. 
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The total length of the new railway, including the 
branches, for the construction of which immediate 
provision is made, is not set down anywhere in the 
Convention, even approximately, though in view of the 
kilometric guarantee to which the Turkish Government 
is pledged, it would seem to be a very material point. 
It may be estimated roughly at 1,750 miles, and if we 
add for the existing Anatolian railways 625 miles, and 
for the Smyrna-Kassaba and Mersina-Adana railways, 
which have already passed under German control, 
another 400 miles, the entire system will amount to an 
aggregate of nearly 2,800 miles, independently of the 
further extensions already contenlplated, and of the 
ultimate absorption of Syrian and Arabian railways. 
The concession is granted (Article 11.) for ninety-nine 
years, but in reality it will extend over a slightly longer 
period. For the ninety-nine years' term will run for 
each of the sections into which the line is to be divided 
from the date when the State bonds to be issued by the 
Ottoman Government are handed over in respect of 
it. The Anatolian railways' concession, which was 
originally for a similar term of ninety-nine years, 
whereof fifteen have already expired, is at the same 
time extended so as to cover the full period of the new 
Company's concession. 
The new line is to be divided up for purposes of 
construction into sections, each of approxilnately 200 
lcilometres (Article 111.). These sections are not 
specified, but it is understood that starting from Kollia 
the maill line to the Persian Gulf will comprise twelve 
sections, viz. Konia-Eregli, Eregli-Adana, Adana-Tcll 
Habesh (whence the branch line to Aleppo), Tell- 
Habesh-I-Iarran (whence the branch line to Urfa), 
Harran - Nussibin, Nussibill- Mosul, Mosul - Tekrit, 
~ekrit-Baghdad 
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Tekrit-Baghdad (with a branch line from Sadijeh to 
Khaniliin on the Persian frontier), Baghdad-Nedjef, 
Nedjef-Zubeir and Basra (two sections), and finally 
Zubeir to the Persian Gulf. 
Article IV. binds the concessionnaire to begin work 
on the first section within three nlonths from approval 
of the plans, ancl to complete it within two years. At 
the same time it is provided that the whole line and its 
branches shall be completed within eight years, a 
curiously short allowance for the colnpletion of the 
other sections when compared with the two years 
i allowed for completion of the first section alone. But this article contains another still inore curious pro- 
vision. The term fixed for the colnpletion of the whole 
line is subject not only to the punctual fulfilment by the 
Ottoman Government of its financial obligations to- 
wards the concessionnaire, which is a very natural 
stipulation, but also to delays arising from force 
nznjeure; and  jbrce ntnjeu~,e includes, as well as war 
between European powers, ally radical change in the 
financial situation of Germany, England, or France. 
As  there is  nothing to indicate svhat shall be deemed to 
constitute such a radical change, nor who shall deter- 
mine when such a radical change shall be held to have 
talien place, this provisioil appears liable to very elastic 
construction. 
The  railsvay is to be built (Article VII.) in the first 
instance for a single line, but a second line is to be 
laid ~vhcn the gross kilometric receipts shall have 
reached 30,000 i r a ~ ~ c s  per annum. 
Article VIII .  provides for the creation of an Ottoman 
Joint Stoclc Company under the name of "Imperial 
Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, " which shall 
talce the place of the Anatolian Railway Company in 
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all that concerns the new line from Konia to the 
Persian Gulf with its branches. The Anatolian Rail- 
way Company engages not to transfer its lines to any 
other than the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad l i a i l w a ~  
Company, and the latter binds itself not to part with 
its property in any shape or form. 
Article IX. allows the Coinpany during construction 
to acquire and use steam and sailing vessels and other 
craf on the Shatt-el-Arab, the Tigris, and the Euphrntes, 
for the transport of materials and other requircn~ents. 
Considering how jealous the Turkish Government is of 
all navigation rights on those waterwa~ys, this clause, 
even with the restrictions attached to the permission, 
is of considerable significance, for when the Company 
has once acquired the plant necessary for navigating 
those waters and established the wharves and ware- 
houses it is entitled to construct at  Baghclad and Basra 
under another article of the concession, it is, at least, 
improbable that it will conse~lt o relinquisl~ the advan- 
tages of navigation. 
Article XII. opens up the way for an almost indefinite 
extension of the new Company's control over the rail- 
ways, not merely of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, but 
of Syria and Northern Arabia. Whilst professing to 
safeguard the rights of the Damascus-I-Inmall Railway 
Company, a Frencll company at  present, it secures 
to the Baghdad Railway Company prior rights for the 
construction of any branch connecting it wit11 the 
Medic;erranean between Mersina and 'Tripoli i n  Syria. 
The Haghdad Railway Company is thus lorought intu 
contact with tlle Syrian railway system, wllicll is made 
"17 at present of several s~nall  1int:s that WIILIICI t l~crc- 
fore seem bound to pass ultilnately untlur tile contrtrl 
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line which the Sultan is engaged in building from 
Damascus v i i  Mezarib to Mecca. Already in 1901 
the Allatolian Company was approached by A b d ~ ~ l  
I-Iamid with the request that it should take up a 
contract for coinl~leting the Hedjaz Railway, of which 
the small section that had then beell built was proving 
a severe drain upon his Majesty's purse. One of the 
collsideratio~ls for which the Sul ta i~ granted the 
Baghdad Railway concessioil is believed to have been 
a promise of assistance in carrying out this pet project 
which would ultimately link up by rail the seats of his 
te~llporal and  spiritual sovereignty. 
Article XXIII. gives the Company the right to 
establish ports on the Tigris at Baghdad, on the Shatt- 
el-Arab a t  Basra, and at the terminal point on the 
Persian Gulf. With the powers conferred upon it, the 
Cumpany as  the owner of the wharves, quays, ware- 
houses, etc., which it is authorised to construct, must 
inevitably acquire coinplete control of the traffic by 
water as well as by land. Mention may also be made 
in this co~lilectio~l of Article XXIX., which forbids the 
working of ally section of the line between Baghdad 
and Basra that may have been built before completion 
of the main line from Konia to Baghdad. The new 
Company clearly has no wish to see that district opened 
up from the Persian Gulf before it has obtained access 
to it from the North. 
The fillancia1 obligations of the Ottoman Govern- 
ineilt are set forth in Article XXXV. I t  guarantees 
a two-folcl lcilo~lletric annuity, one of r 1,000 francs per 
kilometre, built and openecl to traffic, and one of 4,500 
francs per lrilomctre towards worlring expenses, and 
provides for t l ~e  inode of payment of these annuities. 
An ottolnan State loan a t  4 per cent., with a sinking 
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fund of '087538 per cent., to be guaranteed by special 
appropriations which shall be settled before the con- 
struction of each successive section is commenced, is 
to represent the kilometric annuity of 11,000 francs, 
the Company receiving bonds of a face value of 
269, I 10.65 francs per kilometre, built and opened to 
traffic. For the first section beyond Konia, bonds to 
the nominal value of 54,000,ooo francs are to be issued 
in the first instance. The annuity of 4,500 francs per 
kilometre towards working expenses, which is  to be 
gradually reduced as the gross lrilo~lletric receipts reach 
given amounts, is guaranteed on the surplus of the 
guarantees already appropriated to the Anatolian 
Railway. The Baghdad Railway Company, moreover, 
pledges to the holders of the state bonds the whole 
line from Konia to the Persian Gulf and its branches, 
and all its rolling stock, etc., and its share of the 
net receipts. The bondholders, however, will have no 
right to interfere in the administration of the Company. 
The' liabilities of the Ottoman Government under this 
clause are heavy. I t  is true that in respect of the 
Anatoliail Railway a lriloinetric guarantee only very 
slightly inferior in amount was given by the Porte, 
that the revenue of both the Konia and Angora lines 
has shown remarkable expansion, and that as  a set 
off to the proportionately diminishing burden on the 
Treasury, Turkey has materially benefited by the in- 
creased prosperity of the provinces thus opened up to 
trade and agriculture. But the Anatoliari Railway, 
like the two railways from Smyrna, has tapped the 
richest parts of Asia Minor, and if the first two sections 
of the Baghdad RaiIway beyond Konia may also be 
expected to earn a fair revenue, the same can certainly 
not be predicated of the further sections, and especially 
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not of those which cross the arid xvastes of the upper 
Euphrates and Tigris basin. There, eve11 according 
to Germall estimates, many years and even decades 
must elapse before there can be any results to show 
for the heavy allllual payments which the Turliish 
Exchequer will have to meet. Even in what were of 
old the Illost fertile tracts of Mesopotamia, extensive 
and costly worlrs of both irrigation and drainage will 
be required in  addition to the railway, if anything Iilre 
its ancient prosperity is to be restored. Many different 
calculations have been made as to the amount which 
the lrilometric guarantee on the whole Baghdad line 
is likely to reach, and a very moderate estimate places 
it at over f;r,ooo,ooo per annum after allowing for 
 roba able revenue. How is the Turlrish Exchequer, in 
its condition of chronic penury, to provide such a large 
sum? T h e  Convention itself leaves this question un- 
answered. But just after the conclusion of the 1902 
Convention the Anatolian Company is stated to have 
intimated to the Porte that it would accept as security 
for the lrilometric guarantee appropriations from an 
increase of the Turkish Customs dues, from the creation 
of certain monopolies, or from the unification of the 
Ottoman debt. 
Nor does Article XXXV. represent the whole of 
Turkey's iinancial obligations. Under Article XXXVII. 
the Turkish Government is to provide two further a11- 
nuities of 350,000 francs each, one for a ~ e r i o d  of thirty 
years to cover the cost of betterment works to the 
extent of 8,000,ooo francs on the Anatolian Company's 
lines, and  another, to commence as soon as the new 
line reaches Aleppo, for the purpose of covering the 
cost of express train services. 
Under various other articles a number of minor but 
P 
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valuable rights are conferred upon the Coml3any ; ex- 
elnption from Customs dues for all ~nnlerials, mnchiner~r, 
rolling-stoclr, iron, wood, coal im1)orted from abro~ld 
during the period of constructio11 and e~lellshln, 
exemption from all taxation of the COmpally'~ (?ntire 
property and revenue during tbe ~vllole tcr111 Of the 
concession; mining and quarrying and forest rigllts 
within a zone of twenty lti1ometres o n  t?iLlll!r SitlL! of 
the line; the right to establish ~vnrellousc.~, cIev;lt(?r~, 
etc. ; to manufacture bricks and tiles, and to ~ilakct frtlc 
use of ally natural water power in tlle vicinity c ~ f  the 
line for traction and lighting l~url>oscs ; 311 o f  which 
tend to smooth the way for a monopoly o f  the tlconomic 
exploitation of the country, 
T h e  usual provisioil is made to ennhle Lllc Ottomai~ 
Government to resume possession of thc milw:~y at any 
moment, but on conditions so onerous as to rc*~~dcr tllc 
provision practically illusory. Tlie annuity to he p:lid 
to the Company in such evctit until tllc csl~iry of t l ~ e  
concession is to l,e calculated on the basis of so per 
cent. of the averagc gross revcnue during the* last iivc 
years preceding resumplion of pos.s;i~ssio~l, and is, in 
no circumstances, to amount to less t h a n  1 2 , m  fr:\ncs 
per kilometre. Nor can the 0ttott1:~n (;c~\rurnrncnt 
resume possession in order to leas(! thc  milway to any 
other company. 
On  the other hand, the Company undr~rt:~lit*s to  ~ n a k e  
provision for postal and tclegrnpllir: .c;cr\riccbs r lnc labr  the 
control of the Otlotllan Gavcrnrnc~nt for tl~ad ~r; l~~.c;l) t~rt  
ol' troops in time a l  war and of I)c1;\r:c, srltl for t l i ~  
establishment, at its own expcnsc!, of the military prrsts 
rccluired by the Ministry of War arp to zr total rxlbt.ntli- 
ture of q.,ooo,ooo fr;lncs, llic C;ovl*rnnri;nt, mclr.cvtvr1r, 
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deem necessary. The  Company also undertakes that 
within five years from the opening of each section the 
personnel elnployed upon it, with the exception of the 
superior officials, shall be composed exclusively of 
Ottoman subjects. All the officials are to wear the fez 
and a uniform to be chosen by the Ottoman Govern- 
ment. And finally, during the duration of the con- 
cession, the Compaily is to contribute annually LT.500 
to the Asile des Pnuures! The caution money to be 
deposited on this gigantic concession was fixed at the 
modest sum of LT.go,ooo. 
T h e  Cnhier des Clzarges accoinpanying the conces- 
sion contains detailed provisions with regard to the 
construction of the line, of which the gauge is to be 
I in. 435-1 m. 455 inside the rails, and with regard to 
rates for passengers and freight. It also provides for a 
daily service of ordinary trains in both directions, and 
for a n  express service, weelrly, between Haidar Pasha 
and Aleppo, and fortnightly to the Persian Gulf, with an 
average speed of 45 kilometres an hour for the first five 
years after the line is opened to traffic, and afterwards 
of Go kilometres an  hour. This would work out to 
about 72 hours in the first instance for the journey 
from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, and 54 hours 
only if the counsels of perfection contemplated in the 
second instance are ever fulfilled. 
Another clause of the Cnhierdes Charges is of peculiar 
significance. The  specifications for metallic bridges 
arc to be drawn up in accordance with the last 
circular of either the Prussian or the French Ministry 
of Public Worlrs, and the rails, sleepers, etc., are to be 
of the type aclopted by the Prussian State railways- 
The  Statutes regulate the coilstitution of the "Im- 
perial Ottonlail Baghdad Railway Company" to be 
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created under Article VIII. of the Convention. Though 
primarily formed to carry out the concession conveyed 
by that Convention, the new Company explicitly re- 
serves power to acquire interests in any other railways 
already built or to be built in the whole of the Ottolila~l 
Empire. It is to have its seat in Constantinople. 
Whilst the Anatolian Railway Company undertaltes 
to transfer to the new Company under Article 5 the 
coilcession granted to it under the above Convention, 
it nevertheless preserves for its ow11 exclusive benefit 
all rights and obligations concerning the old railway 
lines, as well as those which it derives from Articles II . ,  
XXXIII.,  and XXXVII. of the above Convention. 
Under Article 6 the initial share capital of the  
Company is fixed at 15,000,ooo francs. The  Ailatolian 
Railway Company shall subscribe 10 per cent. of the 
share capital, and shall not alienate its holding without 
the consent of the Ottoman Government. T h e  Otto- 
man Government shall also have the right to subscribe 
up to 10 per cent. of the share capital. 
Article 12 states that the Compa~ly will be ad- 
ministered by a council of administration consisting 
of eleveil members, three of whom shall be nominated 
by the Anatoliail Railway Coinl~any. T h e  others will 
be appointed by the general assembly. Three mcmbers 
shall be Ottoman subjects. 
The most important article, ho~vever, is Article zo, 
under which the council is invested with the widest 
powers for administering the property and affairs of the 
Company, " ct $ezd nz&~ze tmnsfg-cr ct co~l~jronzeltre." 
For it is in virtue of these powers that thc Germans, 
being so farain sole control, were ablc to ncgotinte 
abroad and to inake thc proposals for Uritisli co- 
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had under their consideration. These proposals cer- 
tainly involved considerable modifications of the ar- 
rangements set forth in the document signed at 
Constantinople, and the British Government was, no 
doubt, justified in declaring that the latter had not 
come within their purview. Nevertheless, the bear@ 
of the whole questioll can hardly be correctly appre- 
ciated unless those proposals are studied in the light 
of the original arrangements they were intended to 
modify. 
CHAPTER XIX 
THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY AND BRITISH 
INTERESTS 
S one of the maill arguments put forward in sup- A port of British co-operation was the international 
character which had already been imparted to the 
undertalriag by the promise of French co-operation, it 
may be well to examine in the first place the nature 
and extent of such French co-operation. In France 
powerful stoclc exchange influences were induced at 
an  early date to favour participation in the German 
scheme. It  was closely connected with a project for 
the unification of the Ottoman Debt promoted mainly 
by the French bondholders, who now hold the bulk of 
Turkish Government securities, and as the unification 
promises to create a surplus revenue which might 
be appropriated to the kilometric guarantee on the 
Baghdad Railway, Germany had undertaken to lend 
diplomatic support to that project in Constantinople, 
Moreover, since the two French railway companies in 
Asia Minor, the Smyrna-Kassaba and the Adana- 
Mersina, had been compelled to throw in their lot 
with the Anatolian Company, a certain community of 
material interests had been established in that respect 
between the French and the Germans. Before the signa- 
ture of the preliminary Convention, December 23rd, 
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to reserve participation for French capital, and it was 
fillally arranged in February last before the signature of 
the new Convelltioll that its participation sllould be 
equal to that of Germail capital. The French Govern- 
ment, on the other hand, always a~lxious to avoid 
offence to Russia, who had repeatedly given more or 
less open expression to her hostility to the Baghdad 
Railway scheme, had been careful not to depart from a 
prudent attitude of official neutrality. Nothing indeed 
could be more categorical than the statement made by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Chamber on 
March ~ 4 t h ~  1892, that French diplomacy had never 
interfered officially or semi-officially in the matter. The 
action of the French Ambassador at Con~tantino~le,  and 
M. DelcassC's own language, betrayed, however, a dis- 
position to give as benevolent a character as possible 
to the  neutrality of France. That was all the Germans 
could expect, and all they required, from the French 
Government, at  whose hands they had no special 
favours to ask. They wanted only the co-operation of 
French capital, and so long as no official pressure was 
brought to bear against it, they had every reason to 
anticipate success. 
I n  England the situation was quite different, and 
much less promising. Yet except, perhaps, from the 
purely financial point of view British co-operation was 
far more important to Germany than French co-oper- 
ation. It was not, in fact, financial co-operation so 
much as political co-operation the Germans had to seek 
for in England, Some years ago, when the German 
sclleme was still in its embryonic stage and Anglo- 
German relations were more friendly than they have 
been recently, British statesmen had been informally 
approached from Berlin and had, very properly, ex- 
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pressed their appreciation of Germany's apparent desire 
to secure British sympathy and support on terms of 
mutual benefit to both countries. In the meantime, 
however, the attitude of Germany during the South 
African war, the virulence of the German Press, and 
the more guarded, but scarcely less hostile, utterances 
of German statesmen, had given deep offence in this 
country. This was, however, no reason for either 
British ministers or British capitalists to refuse to 
consider any proposals, merely because they happened 
to be " made in Germany," which could be shown to be 
really beneficial to British interests. But it was a 
reason for the utmost caution and circumspection. To 
satisfy British public opinion a very strong case had to 
be made out. 
The Germans very adroitly professed themselves 
anxious to place the ilegotiations on a purely business 
basis. I t  was primarily a matter of finance to be dealt 
with on its merits by financiers with financiers. The 
Deutsche Banlr of Berlin, whilst the final convention 
was under negotiation At Constantinople, approached 
certain influential houses established in London with a 
view to the formation of a British group of capitalists 
who should co-operate with the German and other 
groups. This was, however, a polite fiction which it 
ultimately proved iinpossible to keep up. T h e  London 
houses were not prepared to undertake so large a 
financial operation, of which the political bearings 
were obvious, unless they were assured of the approval 
and support of the British Government. 'The British 
Government naturally were unable to promise their 
approval and support unless adequate provision was 
made for safeguarding what they conceived to be the 
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Ckrmans again were not prepared to make sucll pro- 
vision unless the British Government pledged thenl- 
selves to certain conditions which would have directly 
committed the State to considerable responsibilities. 
Thus, by the  very force of inherent circumstances, the 
negotiations from being nominally financial became 
essentially political, and had to be directed willy-nilly 
by the Government, though they continued to be con- 
ducted through financial intermediaries instead of 
through t h e  customary diplomatic channels. 
T h e  main point ostensibly at issue in these negotia- 
tions was the share which British capital was to acquire 
in the control of the railway. The Constantinople 
Convention and the statutes of the new Company gave 
the Germans an absolutely overwhelmiilg control. The 
Anatolian Company was to preserve its independent 
entity, and be represented by three directors out of a 
total of eleven on the new Company's Board, whilst 
three other directors were to be Ottoman subjects, who 
would presumably be little more than clay under the 
German potter's hand. Thus there only remained five 
seats to be  divided between the Deutsche Reichsbanlr 
and the British, French and other groups that might 
co-operate with it. This was, of course, an impossible 
arrangement, and the Germans readily admitted it in 
London, as they had already admitted it in Paris. 
They declared themselves willing to enlarge the 
board, a n d  to provide for the equitable representation 
of the British element upon it. The precise nature of 
the proposals for giving effect to that purpose has not 
been officially disclosed, though it has been stated on 
good authority that the German, French, and British 
groups were each to provide 30 per cent. of the 
capital, the balance of 10 per cent. being made up from 
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other quarters. Whether, even if the British element 
had been nominally placed on a footing of con1plete 
equality with the specifically German element, equality 
of control would have been really secured, seems very 
doubtful, as in addition to the specificaIly German 
element, other elements under German control, s u c h  as 
Austrian and Swiss, would have remained available to 
turn the scales in favour of Germany unIess the French 
had been constantly ready to ict  solid with the British 
-an unlilrely contingency in view of the, at least 
partial, co~nmunity of financial interests between the 
French and the Germans. Still the concessions which 
the Germans were ready to make in this and also in other 
directions were considerable. British industry was to 
be assured of a proportionate share in the construction 
and equipment of the railway. Exception was naturally 
taken in London to the retention by the Anatolian Rail- 
way Company of its exclusive rights over the existing 
lines from Constantinople, by which alone the Germans 
would have been able permanently to control access to 
the new railway, and thus to exercise a paramount in- 
fluence over the entire system. Here, aga in ,  the 
Germans, without definitely binding themselves, held 
out the prospect of an eventual fusion of t h e  two 
Companies, the Anatolian Company surrendering to 
the new Company all the rights which it at  present 
still reserved to itself. But if all these German pro- 
posals and assurances were not, as far as t h e y  went, 
unsatisfactory, they were always coupled w i t h  con- 
ditions of which the significance was unmistakable. 
These conditions, a s  set ,forth by Mr. Balfour in the 
House of Commons, were. threefold. Assurances were 
to be obtained from the  British Government, firstly, that 
they would not object to a reasonable increase of the 
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1, Assurances were 
ernment, firstly, tha t  
,able increase of the  
Turkish Customs duties, of which a part should be 
used in guaranteeing the Baghdad Railway ; secondly, 
that if the Baghdacl Railway should prove to be a 
substantially better route for conveying the mails to 
India, it should be used for their conveyance on terms 
to be agreed upon hereafter ; and, thirdly, that Great 
Britain should lend her good offices in providing a 
proper termillus on the Persian Gulf at or near Koweyt, 
To two, at least, of these conditions there were strong 
pri?~zG Jacie objections from the British point of view 
apart from the general merits of the scheme. With 
regard to the Turlrish import dues, we had been the 
first to recognise that it might be to our advantage as well 
as to that of Turkey that we should agree to an increase, 
if we could obtain in return some mitigation of the evils 
from which trade suffers all over Turkey under adminis- 
trative corruption and misgovernment. The British 
Government actually agreed some years ago to a, specific 
tariff on a higher scale than the present advnlore~n tariff, 
on condition that the Turkish internal and export dues 
should be abolished, that bonded warehouses should be 
established, and other custom-house facilities granted 
for the benefit of foreign trade generally. But all 
these conditions have remained unf~~liilled, and there 
would be less chance than ever of securing their ulti- 
mate fulfilment if we were to surrender for another 
purpose, such as the creation of revenue to meet the 
charges of the Baghdad Railway, the one lever we 
shall sooner or later have an  opportunity of using for 
the protection of our commercial interests. Moreover, 
until a new financial scheme was agreed to for the 
reorganisation of the ~ u r k i s h  debt, any increase of the 
import dues was already pledged to the bondholders 
under the Decree of Muharrem. 
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With regard to a British postal subsidy for the 
transmission of mails to India by Baghdad Rail- 
way, the assurance asked for was e i ther  supererogatory 
or designed to commit the British Governmellt to an 
altogether premature obligation. W h e n  the Baghdad 
or any other line of railway opening u p  a new route for 
our Illdian mails is completed the British Post office 
will naturally use it if it presents sufficient advantages 
over the present route, and pay a proper  price for the 
use of it. But as far as can be judged by any estimates 
yet put forward, it is extremely doubtful whether the 
Baghdad Railway, assuming it to be  made, will present 
any sufficient advantages. According to the most 
favourable estimate, it might enable the British mails 
to be landed at Karachi three days and sixteen hours 
ahead of present schedule time at Bombay. Except 
for the north-west provinces, twenty-four hours must 
be deducted from that estimate f o r  the extra land 
journey to destination in India from Karachi as  com- 
pared with Bombay. Another twenty-four hours at 
least may be deducted for the difference between the 
present schedule time and real t ime,  as the mails are 
constantly landed at Bombay a full day ahead of 
schedule time. The maximum ga in  that can be shown 
in favour of the Baghdad route would therefore amount 
only to one day sixteen hours, a gain which might very 
easily be reduced to the vanishing point by a reason- 
able acceleration of the steamship service between 
Europe and Bombay, But, at bes t ,  the question of 
time is not the only one to be considered. W h o  will 
guarantee the same regularity a n d  safety with which 
our Indian nlails are delivered tomday, when they are 
carried by rail across inhospitable regions inhabited by 
semi-civilised and often turbulent rases, and perpetually 
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liable t o  those chronic outbreaks of disorder which are 
the inevitable outcome of Turlrish misrule? Nor is 
this all. W e  can hardly afford to subsidise two mail 
! routes to  India, and, if we give a subsidy to the Bagll- 
dad Railway, we shall have to diminish or  to withdraw 1 altogether the  subsidies at  present granted to British 
shipping companies. Now we are essentially a sea- 
power, and before we undertake to transfer so importailt 
a mail service as that between bhe Mother Country and 
India from the ocean highways which we can hope to 
I control in time of war as well a s  of peace to a land 
route across two continents, neither of which we can 
control, the  advantages in favour of the latter should 
not merely be estimated on paper, but tested by ex- 
perience and  placed beyond all shadow of doubt. 
I T o  the third condition put by the Germans-namely, 
i facilities for establishing the Persian Gulf terminus of 
the line a t  koweyt, no objection could be taken on its 
own merits. Indeed, if a great trunk line is to be 
built from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf, it is in 
many respects desirable that its terminus should be 
located within the territory of a chief who has placed 
himself under our protection. On the other hand, the 
Baghdad Railway probably needs Koweyt far more 
than we need the Baghdad Railway. In  that part of 
the  Persian Gulf there is no point better fitted by nature I 
to become the terminus of a great railway system. 
T h e r e  may be other points available, for instance, 
U m m  Kllasa, at  the head of the Khor Abdallah, which 
lies, i t  is alleged, outside the actual territory of the 
Slleikh of Koweyt. But Umm Khasa is certainly not 
more suitable than ICoweyt itself, and Koweyt might, 
in certain circumstances, prove inconveniently close to 
it. Therefore it would unquestionably be a great boon 
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for the Baghdad Railway to have the assurance of 
friendly access to Koweyt. Whether it was expedient 
for the British Government to pledge themselves t o  
the granting of such a boon depends entirely upon t h e  
view taken of the scheme as a whole from the ~ o i n t  of 
vietv of British Imperial interests, political as well as 
commercial. 
The chief arguments advanced by the two members  
of the British Cabinet who appeared to favour the 
scheme were, firstly, that this was a great undertaking, 
destined to confer upon a vast and interesting reg ion  
the blessings of civilisation, and that England owed i t  
to herself not to stand aloof, and, secondly, that it would  
open up a new route from Europe to India, and t h a t  
this country, instead of repeating the blunder it  com-  
mitted forty years ago when it left the Suez Canal t o  be 
built exclusively by foreign enterprise, should lend a 
helpful hand from the beginning, so  as to make sure of 
a share in its ultimate control. The railway, it w a s  
asserted, would be built sooner or later, with or without 
us, and if without us, we could not depend upon a 
recurrence of the same good fortune which had enabled 
us to repair our original mistake in connection with t h e  
Suez Canal by acquirii~g the Khedive's interest in it. 
The  first argument is merely an appeal to sentiment, 
' 
and however commendable the sentiment, it may b e  
pointed out  that there are many other undertakings 
equally conducive to the spread of civilisation w h i c h  
this country might promote-some of them perhaps  
more pertinent to  our national interest-and that w i t h  
the best will in the world our resources are not i n -  
exhaustible. The second argument is more practical 
and more'plausible, but it is by no means convincing. 
T o  begin with, there is this fundamental difference 
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UI' t t l r o ~ g h  ~ominunication by the shortest sea-route 
1)clwcen United Kingdom and India, whereas the 
I3Wlldnd ]<ailway proposes to open up  a land route. 
Our  illterests in any highway of the seas must always 
1 1 ~  greater than our interest in any trans- 
(2onLincntal highway. The former are of vital collcern 
to us  ; the 1:~ttcr dircctly affect only our convenience, 
thotlgh illdireclly and as an  instrument that may be 
used against  us, a transcontinental highway towards 
lorlia 111ust ahvays be a potential danger. I t  might 
indeccl l ~ c  argued will1 some force that in facilitating 
the construction of a railway, which we could never 
malerially control, from the shores of the Bosphorus, 
wtlich rrlny a t  any day pass out of the hands of the 
Turl; illto the lcceping of some great European power, 
to :L ternlintis \v l~ic l~  may only be temporarily located in 
so rerllote a corner of the Persian Gulf as Koweyt, we 
shoulcl b e  committing the precise counterpart of our 
former blunder, when we sought to prevent t l ~ e  removal 
of such a n  obstruction to our communications with 
Inclia~ hy sea as the unpiercecl isthmus of Suez formerly 
c~mstitutccl. I t  is certainly singular that in the course 
o f  the several parliamentary debates on a questioil 
wllich concerns India very closely no representative of 
tho  India  Office ever spoke, nor was ally statement 
rrlade of  the views of the Illdiail Government. I t  
ivuuld be interesti~lg to know why. 
I3ut it is unnecessary to press those arguments. W e  
necd not regard the Baghdad Railway as any menace 
to Indin, tlor look with jealousy upon its construction, 
arid y ! r  il rnay be undesirable for 11s to lend it a help- 
ing hanrl in tllc shape it has assumed under German 
:~usl,iccs, or, a t  any rate, to do so except on much more 
f i~voura l~ lc  terms than have yet l~een  ofrered to 11s. 
\lvi~lltruL giving to national prejuctices, which 
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would rule out Germany from anlong the powers  
with whom this country should in any circumstances 
co-operate, one may be allowed to ask whether o u r  ex- 
perience of co-operation with Germany in China, e i t h e r  
politically, under the Anglo-German agreeme~lt of 1900, 
or economically, under different railway agreements  
between English and German groups of capitalists, h a s  
proved so  satisfactory that we should wish to r e p e a t  it 
in Asiatic Turltey. Or, if we confine our purview to 
Turltey, has Gerinan influence been exercised at Con- 
stantinople with so much consideration for Br i t i sh  
interests, either political or economic, that we s h o u l d  
tie ourselves up with it indefinitely? Wha t  assurance  
have we, in the present condition of the T u r k i s h  
Empire, that Asia Minor and Mesopotamia m a y  not 
become the scene of the same sort of racial a n a r c h y  
which is now chronic in European Turkey? A n d  can 
we contemplate with equanimity the prospect of h a v i n g  
in such a n  emergency to intervene with Germany for 
the protection of our joint railway interests amidst war- 
ring Kurds and Arabs, Turlrs and Armenians? H a s  
Germany ever shown any disposition to  deviate, how- 
ever slightly, out of consideration for us, from her po l i cy  
of constant subserviency to her Eastern ileighbour in 
every phase and every branch of the Eastern ques t ion  ? 
And if not, why should we cheerfully share wi th  her, 
and perhaps give her an opportunity of un load ing  
altogether upon our shoulders, the burden of potent ia l  
complications with Russia in which she sees c l ea r ly  
and anxiously enough that this scheme may s o o n e r  
or  later involve her? Are there not causes e n o u g h  of 
friction, if not of conflict, between Russia and ourselves 
in other parts of Asia, where we have much m o r e  vital 
interests to defend, without wilf~dly creating a fresh 
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one where our interests are not vitally engaged, in 
association with a dubious partner who might at any 
moment leave US in the lurch, not necessarily from bad 
faith, but under the inexorable pressure of threatening 
events in Europe? I t  has, I know, been urged that 
with French co-operation in addition to our own there 
would be little danger, either of Russian jealousy, or 
of overwhelming German preponderancy. But even if 
the permanency of French co-operation were assured, 
i t  would be a very different sort of co-operation from that 
which is  expected of this country. It would amount to 
nothing more than iinallcial co-operation based upon the 
community of certain financial interests in France and 
in Germany which I have already explained. It will 
be t ime to place French co-operation on the same level 
of political significance as British co-operation when 
the  French Government has been asked and has agreed 
to  give official assurances ever so remotely analogous 
t o  those required from the British Government. 
Financially and commercially the scheme is equally 
open to very grave objections. Twenty million pounds 
is a low estimate of its cost. That it will pay as a 
business venture, except possibly in a remote future, 
very few, even amongst German enthusiasts, are bold 
enough to assert. For many years it must be largely 
dependent upon the kilometric guarantees which it is 
t o  receive from the  Turkish Government. It is there- 
fore based in the main upon Turkish credit. 1s that 
a satisfactory security upon which to encourage the 
investmellt of British capital? The great financial 
llouses that are in the  habit of promoting similar under- 
takings  may see their way to a remunerative operation- 
But  how about the  British public, out of whose poclcets 
the  money will evelltually have to come? IXfficulties 
(2 
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may, and  probably will, not arise at  first. The next 
two or three sections of the line beyond Konia, like the 
existing Anatolian lines, may yield sufficient revenue 
lo enable Turkey to bear the financial burclen she 11a.s 
taken on to her shoulders. The crzss will COInc ivhcn, 
after the costly work of crossing tllc Taur11s m~i l f lk i . in~ ,  
the descends into the arid wastes of the Upper 
Euphrates and Tigris. Then if the Turlrisll G0vcl.n- 
merit should happen to default, we should have to face 
the alternative of taking some action, either in concert 
with others, or  alone, for the protection of the British 
investor, or of leaving him to his fate, even thougl~  
he had invested his money on the faith of ofiicial 
assurances that  the collstruction of tlie railway was a 
matter of tlatiollal interest. 
The  crux, moreover, will come just when the railway 
passes out of what must be regarded as the spacial 
sphere of Germany's commercial interests. Asia h'linor 
proper is the field to which the Germans chiefly loolr 
for the expansion of their trade. I t  is thcre that 
commercially they will reap the chief bellelit from the 
railway. W e  shall doubtless also to some cstent sllare 
in  it there. But if the proposed railway is destined to 
serve British commercial interests on any scale that 
would compensate us, for instance, for a n  increase of 
the Turkish import duties, that will be not in Asia 
Minor, but at the other end of the line, when it rcnches 
the Mesopotamian delta and the Persian Gulf. Thcrc 
unquestionably British trade, as  I Iiavc: pointecl out in 
a preceding chapter, has long felt the need of a r a i l l v ; ~ ~ ,  
and to  secure it we might well run sclme rislcs atrd 
make some sacrifices. But, as if to filr~lisll 3 comI,lptc 
yedz~ctio ad 0hfzl?'dzl712 of the vaunted parity ( ~ f  trc*r~t. 
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Railway scheme, it is formally stipulated in the con- 
stantinople convention between the Porte and the new 
Company that the sections of the great trunlE line in 
which we are specially interested, viz. between Baghdad 
and the Persia11 Gulf, are not to be opened to traffic 
until every other section from Constantinople down to 
Baghdad has been completed. This was palpably a 
s t ip~~lat ion i restraint of British trade. Had we be- 
come a party to it, we should have been helping 
Germany to open up Asia Minor, where she would be 
the chief gainer, and to carry the railway through a 
great tract of unremunerative country, before we were 
allowed to tap the fertile regions of Mesopotamia from 
our own base on the Persian Gulf. Such a self-denying 
ordinance would have been no less prejudicial to our 
political than to our commercial interests. 
Fortunately the British Government ultilnatelydecided 
to reject the German proposals, and on April 23rd Mr. 
Balfour announced that he and his colleagues had come 
to the conclusion that those proposals did not give this 
country sufficient security for equal powers of control, 
constructions, and management, and that the assur- 
ances asked for could not therefore be given. It does 
not, however, appear from the Prime Minister's state- 
ment, or from any other ministerial utterances, that the 
Government had even then realised the broader aspects 
of the  question upon which I have ventured to lay 
special stress. No doubt, apart from all other con- 
siderations, the object which the Government had had 
in view was a very proper one, namely, as Mr. Balfour 
himself explained it, ' ( to  place the railway, including 
the existing Anatolian Railway, throughout its whole 
length from sea to sea, under international control, and 
to prevellt the possibility of preferential treatment for 
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the goods or subjects of any conntry." B ~ l t  even if 
this object could have been achieved, the political, 
financial, and commercial objections which g o  to the  
root of the question would n o t  have been at  all  
adequately met. 
It  call only be hoped that t h e y  will be more fully 
appreciated in responsible qua r t e r s  whenever the  
British Government are again approached on the  sub- 
ject. That they will be again approached may be taken 
for granted. The  same reasons  which induced the  
Germans to solicit British co-operation this year will 
liold good in the future. F o r  those reasons are not  
merely financial, though even f r o m  the financial point 
of view, German assertions tha t  al l  arrangements have 
been made and will be carried o u t  with or without u s  
cannot be accepted quite so unreservedly as Mr. Balfour 
ivould have had us accept them.  The change which 
has already come over the F r e n c h  attitude towards the  
scheme since the British Government rejected the  
German proposals is in itself significant enough. T h e  
Germans are tenacious people, a n d  they will be careful . . 
not to betray their disappointment. Their cue is, of 
course, to proceed with the construction of the railway 
without displaying any concern a b o u t  the f~lture. T h e y  
are, in  fact, doing so, and we m a y  be prepared to see 
the next two or three sections beyond  Konia built with- 
out a hitch. But sooner or la ter  they will have to face 
the difficulties to overcome w h i c h  they wanted, a n d  
will still continue to want, o u r  help. 
When that day comes, must o u r  reply be an uncon- 
ditional ?zonpossz~mzu? By n o  means, if our interests 
are properly safeguarded-not merely our interests in  
the railway itself as a business undertaking, but ou r  
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affects. For  that  purllose it may be suggested that 
instead of seeking to secure a theoretical equality of 
rights over a great  trans-continental railway along 
wliicl~ the interests of the different parties must neces- 
sarily be distr i l~ntcd unequally, we should try to secure 
parity Of trcatmcilt by the mutual recognition of pre- 
po~lder:iting intcrcsts in the various regions which it 
traverses. Germany's interests, aild such French fillan- 
cia1 interests iIS are  bound tip with hers, centre in Asia 
hiinor. Ours  ccntre in the Mesopotamian delta. Let 
us have the construction, management, and control of 
tlie rni11v:ly 011 conditions to be mutually agreed upon, 
fro111 thc 1'orsi:~n Gulf up to Baghdad, including the 
I~rnnc:h line to tIic Persian Gontier at  Khanilcin. Let 
tlic i~ thers  linvc: the salne rights on similar terms with 
r c p r ~ l  to  tltc rest of  the line from Constantinople 
dc)wn~vards. W e  c;ould push on from our base, whilst 
the otlicrs pushed on fro111 tlleirs, and when the junction 
was once effct:ted, the whole line could be svorked on 
t l ~ c  basis of a joint traffic agreement, and for the 
common financial and commercial benefit of all the 
partners. Such a schemc ~vould largely diminish the 
danger of international friction, and while there would 
be a completc fusion of conlmon interests, such as the 
crention of a grcal: i~~ternational highway demands, the 
special illtercsts of each partner would be localised 
within tliu area which afforded the greatest facility for 
their prt)~ec:tior~. 'I'herc may be other solutions, but 
this is at lcasr :i 1)1':u:tic111 soliitic~n ~vhich, without doing 
ally prcjudict: t o  tlic legitimate interests of others, 
tvould scrvc, i l o t  to c:xtcnd our responsibilities indefi- 
niteIy, but to consolirlatc our own legitinlate interests 
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CHAPTER X X  
T HE name of Koweyt was almost unlrnown to the  present generation outside the Persian Gulf until 
it sprang into notoriety as the coveted terminus of the  
proposed German railway from Constantiilople to 
Baghdad. Our own dreams of a British-built railway 
down the  Euphrates valley vanished so long ago  
that few Englishmen probably recollect that, under the 
alternative name of Grane, from the resemblance t o  a 
pair of horns -in Arabic Kamzein --which the curve 
of the bay presents, it was recommended in General 
Chesney's scheme as the best terminus for a railway 
to the Gulf. Even in the Gulf it was known but to  
few Europeans, as, although the best, though not, 
perhaps, as was at first believed, the only natural 
harbour in those waters, it offered little attraction to 
foreign traders, and lay outside the beaten track of 
steamers. The opportunities of visiting it are still 
few and far between, and I was fortunate to  find a t  
Basra a steamer that was to call in  there on her way 
I 
I 
down the Gulf. 
About eighty miles by land, as the crow flies, from 
Basra, and sixty-five miles by sea from the outer ba r  of 
the Shatt-el-Arab, Koweyt lies on the south side of a t" t 
bay nearly twenty miles deep and about five miles C 
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broad, which is well sheltered against all but westerly 
winds. T h e  mouth of the bay is partially protected by 
two low islands, and  the approach between shoals and 
low-lying sandbanks is not easy, a s  there are neither 
buoys nor lights a t  present to indicate the channels. 
Bu t  once inside, there is good and ample anchorage for 
all the fleets of the world in from four to nine fathorns of 
water, and, in spite of shelving shores, it would require 
no  excessive expenditure of money or of engineering 
skill to make it a really commodious port. The town 
itself looks north and fronts the sea on a long ridge 
well above the water, whilst at the back it opens straight 
out  into the spacious desert. The  population amounts 
now to 15,000 or, a t  the outside, zo,ooo souls, and con- 
sists almost exclusively of Arabs, whose tribal ancestors 
settled a t  Koweyt about three centuries ago. Many of 
t h e  houses have stone foundations, and though sun- 
dried mud is the chief material, and few buildings have 
a n y  architectural pretensions, the  town presents al- 
together an  appearance of solidity and prosperity, and 
especially of cleanliness, which i s  in pleasant contrast 
t o  the  tumble-down squalor of the Persian towns of the 
G u l t  The  bazaars are of considerable extent, and 
though to European eyes poorly stocked, tiiey do a 
reillunerative business with the caravans which come 
in from the clesert to exchange the produce of the 
interior for the few imported luxuries of Beduin life. 
W i t h  the exception of a few date palms at Jehara, 
where the Sheilrh has an inland residence, and one 
solitary tree that serves as  a landmark for mariners 
approaching Koweyt from the Gulf, the land produces 
nothing, and' is  absolutely flat, bare, and desolate- So  
t h e  maill business of Koweyt is, and has always been, 
o n  the sea, for the men of Koweyt have been for 
generations a hardy seafaring race, and their dhows,  
built in their own primitive yards, ply for t rade ,  not 
only all over the Gulf, but into the Indian Ocean  and 
far up  into the Red Sea. 
The  question of Turkish sovereignty on the Pe r s i an  
Gulf in its broader aspects can be more conveniently 
dealt xvith when I take a general survey of the Situation 
in the Gulf. Over Koweyt, a t  a n y  rate, the Sul tan  
]lever attempted to give practical effect to his shadowy 
authority until the German railway schemes drew atten- 
tion to the importance it might acquire in the f u t u r e  a s  
the terminus of a trans-continental railway t h r o u g h  his 
Asiatic dominions. The  Sl~eilrh had the r a n k  of a 
Turkish Icaimakam or local governor, but the t i t l e  was 
regarded a s  purely honorific, and he was defucto, if not 4 
de g'ure, a n  independent ruler. When,  in 1898, the 






Koweyt within the sphere of direct Turkish adrninistra- 
C. 
tion, the ruling chief, Sheikh Mubarak, on the advice, t 
it is believed, of his friend, the Sheikh of Bahre in ,  1 
appealed to Great Britain a s  the traditional gua rd ian  1 
of the public peace in the Gulf;  and, taking o u r  stand a 
on the maintenance of the status quo, we not only '1 
entered a formal protest against any attempt o n  the t 
part of Turkey to curtail the Sheikh's authority, and v 
showed our determination to defend him a g a i n s t  any a 
forcible interference, but concluded, early in 1899, a 
! 
I 
I 1 definite agreement with him by which his interests  r 
have been permanently placed under our special  pro- t ' 
tection. At first the Turks seemed, nevertheless, in- fc 
dined to try and carry matters with a h i g h  hand, a 
Troops were from time to time reported to be on the r 
march overland to occupy ICoweyt, and on one occasioIl 1 0 
a force was sent down by sea from Basra, wllich pro- s 
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ceeded to another destination when it found three 
British men-of-war lying ready for business in the bay. 
A nzodus viven.di has now been arrived at, and, so long 
as British ships are there to enforce it, the Turks will 
probably refrain from any overt act of aggression 
against Koweyt itself. But they are evidently bent 
upon confining Sheikh Mubarak's authority within 
the narrowest limits possible. On the other side of the 
sandy promontory which forms the northern shore of 
the bay of ICoweyt, there is another deep indenture in 
the coast of the mainland. The greater part of this 
indenture is occupied by the large, low-lying, and 
swampy island of Bubyan ; but to the north-east of this 
I island, a long and narrow channel runs up inland from i near the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab to Umm I<hasa, 
\ where, in former times, a brancl~ of the Shatt poured 
itself out into the sea. The Khor Abdallah shows, 
according to  the charts, four fathoms of water at low 
tide, and there is believed to be good anchorage off 
Umm Khasa, which is absolutely sheltered. Failing 
Koweyt, it might therefore be converted into a harbour, 
and serve as  a terminus for the Baghdad Railway. 
The Turks  evidently received a hint to this effect, for 
they sent troops in 1902 to garrison Sefivan, about half- 
way between Basra and the head of the Khor Abdallah, 
and they have established military posts both at Umm 
Khasa and on Bubyan Island. They claimed even the 
right to occupy Subeya, on the sand-spit to the north of 
the bay of Koweyt, but they were not allowed to en- 
force their claim. W h y  the same reasons and the same 
arguments to which the Sultan has had to yield with 
regard to Koweyt should not have applied equally to 
other points of the coast, over which his rights of 
sovereignty are just a s  shadowy, it is difficult to see. 
no money. But I have made many true friends ; 
grapple them : while other states havc fallen off around 
the Gulf froin injustice or ill-government, mine has i 
W e  may yet have cause to regret the conseqi~ences of 
f 
this seemingly inexplicable inconsistency. 
The position is, in other respects also, not altogether 
satisfactory. Sheikh Mubarak is the third son of the 
I 
1 
gone on increasing. Hold to m y  policy; and thoGgh I 4 
late Sheikh Mullamnled es-Sebah, and he only succeeded 
in 1896 upon the  death of his two elder brothers, who 
were murdered in one of those feuds which are gener- 
ally of common occurrence in the families of petty Arab 
you are surrounded by a desert and pressed on by a 
once hostile and still wandering set of tribes, you will 
still flourish.' " The present Sheikh has broken with 
the traditions of his family in the methods he adopted to 
secure for himself the possession of power, and he has 
had to reap in this respect what he sowed. The three 
, , sons of the two murdered men are naturally a t  deadly 
feud with their uncle, and he has another powerful 
enemy in one Jusef el Ibrahim, who is  connected with 
him by marriage and acted as  treasurer to his pre- 
decessor, with results which Mubarak, when he rose 
, 1  
.. 
chieftains, but from which the  records of the ruling 
farnily at Koweyt had hitherto been creditably free. T h e  
rulers of Icoweyt appear indeed to have been an ex- i 
ceptionally long-lived race, and the present Sheikh's 
grandfather was certainly something inore than a 
centenarian. Colonel Pelly, who was Resident in the 
Gulf in the sixties and twice visited Koweyt, reports a 
conversation, in the course of which t he  then Sheikh 
I 
said to him : "When my father was nearly a hundred 
! 
and twenty years old he called me and said, ' I shall 
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j 
to  Power, found SO little to his liking that the l~lljust ' 
I s teward  thought  it advisable to take refuge i n  fligllt. 
Jusef el Ibrahim and the three nephews sougllt protec- 
tion wi th  the  Turks ;  and, though Mubarak was at 
first in excellent odour with the authorities of the 
vilayet and received from them the honorific title of 
Kaimakam, they rapidly transferred their favours to 
his r ivals  when he began to resist their encroach- 
! ments  and courted British support. Thus, while the 
T u r k s  were pushing their military posts forward i n  
the direction of Koweyt, the pretenders carried on their 
plots of revenge against Mubaral: with the full cogni- 
sance, if not with the active assistance, of the Ottoman 
authorities. Jusef el Ibrahim was recognised by them 
as S h e i k h  of Dorah, on the Tul-lrish banlr of the Tigris 
just a b o v e  Fao, and it was from Dorah that, early in 
September,  1902, he boldly equipped a raiding cspcdi- 
tion f o r  the capture of Koweyt by sea. 
Two armed dhows with some hundred and fifty uncn, 
a m o n g s t  them one of Mubaralr's nephews, Hamud Ibrl 
J e rah ,  were to make a descent in the deacl of night 
upon  Koweyt by water, whilst another body of partisans 
with one  of the other nephews, Khalid Ibn Muhamnlcd, 
w e r e  to co-operate by land. Mubaralr received timely 
warning,  and  though the two dhows actually slipped 
into the  harbour and landed two spies, they got wind of 
the preparations made for their reception and beat a 
has ty  retreat. H.M.S. Lcyjzui7zg also arrivcd during 
the night, and  though the warning she had come to 
convey had  already reached the Sheik11 from native 
sources, she  was able on the following morning to dis- 
cover  the raiding dhows off one of the sandbanks out- 
s ide  Koweyt, and cut off their retreat up the river. On 
s igh t ing  them Captain Armstrong Sent off a cutter to 
challenge them. As they hoisted no C O ~ O U ~ S ,  and threat- 
ened to open fire if the man-of-war's boat drew nearer- 
thus committing an overt act of piracy on the high seas 
--the commander of the Lnpwilzg manned his other boats 
and gave chase to them, he himself leading the IVay in 
tile gig. Cut off from the river, the raiders made for 
the Persian coast, and, being hard pressed, they aban- I 
doned their dhows and fled across a mud-banlc into 
some long grass, whence they opened a murderous fire 
upon the gig's crew as Captain Armstrong came u p  in 
hot pursuit to seize the derelict craft. One bluejacket 
was lcilled and twd were wounded, and the commander 
himself had a narrow escape. Indeed, the consequences 
might well have been more serious had the Arabs, who 
were firing at very short range, made better practice. B u t  
our men replied vigorously, and as  the Lapwifzg's other 
boats were drawing up in support, the Arabs soon dis- 
I 
persed on to the mainland and the Lnpwirzg returned to 
Basra with her prizes. The details of this story deserve 
to be noted not so much because it is one of the many 
little adventures of ready pluck which too often pass un- 
recorded in the workaday life of the British Navy, but 
because it illustrates the peculiar difficulties of the situa- 
tion in regard to Koweyt. 
Ample evidence was produced that the expedition 
had been organised in Turlrish territory, and there 
were trustworthy witnesses to spealr to the ilames of 
those principally responsible for it. In  fact, all t h e  
details were the subject of common gossip in  the 
bazaars of Basra. Yet the Turlrish authorities con- 
tinued for a long time to affect scepticism and in- 
difference, and they took no steps either to bring the 
offenders to book or to prevent a recurrence of silnilar 
undertakings, though the raid was organised under 
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their very eyes against a native chief who was known 
to enjoy the protection of Great Britain, and, in the 
repression of a n  audacious act of piracy, there had 
been loss of life to a British man-of-war. The Vali 
of Basra certainly did not take upon himself the 
responsibility of adopting an unfriendly attitude in 
so serious a matter, a ~ l d  he was evidently acting upon 
instructions from Constantinople, where the support 
of Germany with regard to anything connected with 
Koweyt seems to be taken, it must be hoped too 
confidently, as a foregone conclusion. T h e  necessary 
pressure was, however, ultimately applied to the Porte, 
for, neither in connection with our police worlr in the 
Gulf could we allow the  killing of a bluejacket to be 
condoned, nor with regard to the security of Koweyt 
could we allow conspiracies of such a nature to be 
hatched with impunity. The  authorities a t  Basra sent 
up the papers i n  the case to the Court of Appeal at  
Baghdad, and, what is more important than that purely 
formal satisfaction, Jlnsef el Ibrahim and the Sheikh's 
recalcitrant nephews received a hint that they had better 
make themselves scarce. One story is that they went 
on pilgrimage to Mecca, another that they joined Ibn 
Raslzid in the Jebel Shammar. At any rate, they 
disappeared. 
Sheikh Mubaralc is a mail advancing in years, though 
if, as he told me, he is  really seventy, he loolcs, I must 
say, very young and robust for his age. H e  was loud 
it1 his protestations of confidence in Great Britain, and 
he pointed with pride to the portraits of the King and 
Queen and of her late Majesty, which adorn the walls 
of his favourite chamber, high up above the sea, 
whence he can watch the goings and comings of 
his seafaring people, and sometimes, perhaps, descry 
238 KOWEYT 
with a sense of relief the welcome smoke 
of a British gunboat entering the bay. H e  is a shrewd 
old Arab, and he 110 doubt quite realises t h a t  he has 
compromised himself hopelessly with the T u r l ~ s .  S o  
long as he lives we can probably rely on h i s  fidelity 
to the ellgagements he has contracted towards us, and 
we can, of course, upl~old his authority, as  pal-f and 
parcel of the sinfr~s quo on which we take our  stand. 
But if he i n  turn falls a sudden victim to one of those 
feuds which cause so much mortality amongst Arab 
chieftains, or even if be is allowed to die peacefully 
in his bed, what is to happen should his successor 
prefer to accept all the consequences of the  Sultan's 
sovereignty which Mubaralr himself has, it must be re- 
membered, repudiated only on second thoughts?  In 
a few hours the Turks might be installed i n  Koweyt, 
and what would then be our position, w i th  a new 
Sheikh who declined our " special protection," and 
with the Porte, which bas never formally recognised 
i t? Even in Mubarak's lifetime our present anlorphous 
relations to Koweyt may place us at any moment in an 
awkward predicament. In accordance with their  usual 
practice, the Turks, when Mubarak fell out w i t h  them, 
sought to mobilise the Emir of Nejd, Abdul  Aziz 
Ibn Rashid, against him, and Mubarak replied by 
taking u p  the cause of the Wahabis, whose power 
has revived since the death of the present Emir 's  uncle, 
Muhammed Ibn Rashid, the well-known Sheikh of the 
Jebel Shammar. After some preliminary successes 
Mubarak and his allies were severely defeated (March 
17th' 1901) by the Emir of Nejd near Aneyza, and one 
of Mubarak's younger brothers, Hamud, fell in battle, 
together with several other leading men of Koweyt. 
In 1902, however, the fortunes of war were more pro- 
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:f the welcome smoke pitious~ and Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdur Rallman, a grand- 
: bay. H e  is a shrewd son of the blind old Emir Feysal Ibn Saud, whom 
;e realises that he has M ~ h a n ~ m e d  Ibn Rashid treacherously dispossessed, 
with the Turks.  SQ ' , took revenge upon the usur~er ' s  S U C C ~ S S O ~  by 
,ly rely on his fidelity seizing the  stronghold of Riad, which he has held ever 
ratted towards us, and since. Ilnmediately after this success large numbers 
authority, as part and of tribesmen flocked to his standards, and though Ibn 
;h we take o u r  stand. Rashid moved out against him again in the spring of 
victim to one of those ' 1903, he had to retire without venturillg any serious 
.o r t a l i t~  amongst  Arab a t t ac l~  Both the Turks and ourselves have undertaken 
3wed to die peacefully : to discourage this intertribal warfare ; and though they 
n should his s~ccessor  lllay not carl'y out their undertalring very scrupulously, 
luences of t h e  Sultan's they will certainly protest vehemently if their prot&g& 
nself has, it must be re- get  seriously worsted. But in the present state of 
second t h o u g h t s ?  I n  / 
!, 
thiilgs it is difficult to exercise ally effective control 
be installed i n  KoweJ't, ' over Mubaralr's action in that direction, for he knows, 
: position, w i t h  a new or believes, that we are bound to support him in 
;pecial protection," and Koweyt whatever happens in the interior, where the 
ver formally recognised I rights and xvrongs of the case can never he established 
e our present amorphous i on really trustworthy evidence. 
at any m o m e n t  in an Is  it, moreover, Iilrely, that apart from any difficulties 
:ordance with t h e i r  usual which the  Turks may raise, the status of a place which 
bar& fell out with them, has already acquired a certain measure of international 
, of Nejd, Abdul importance will be allowed to remain as undefined as it 
,nd Mubarak replied by is at present? International law has shown itself of 
Wahahis, whose polver late years so adaptable to novel situations that it should 
the  present Emir's uncle, not be in~possible to discover some formula which 
well-known Sheikh of the would effectually cover our relations with Koweyt. 
ne successes : But no time should be lost in discovering it. Otherwise 
severely defeated (March we may find ourselves compelled to define the stnius 
Jejd near Aneyza,  and one of Koweyt in circumstances less favourable to our 
:rs, &mud, fe l l  in  battle, present contention that we are merely maintaining the 
leading men of ICoweyt, status pz~o. Sheikh Mubarak has been visited in turn 
,, of war were  mare pro. by the Russian consuls at Baghdad and at Bushire, and 
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he told me that they were both very anxious to impress 
upon him the  advantages of Russian friendship and 
protection. These visits of Russian C O I ~ S U ~ S  and 
Russian men-of-war ce.rtainly do not talfe plat:e in our 
interest, nor, if one may judge from the view generally 
taken in Russia of German railway scllcmes in Asia, 
in the interest of Germany; and though it would be 
foolish to overrate their significance, they show that the 
situation at Koweyt is being watched pretty closely by 
European diplomacy. It is being xvatched equally 
closely by all the other independent or  cluasi-indepcn- 
dent rulers on the littoral of these waters, who, like 
Mubarak, have thrown in their lot with Great Britain, 
One of the first questions put to m e  by the Sultan 
of Muscat when I saw him a few days after I llacl l~een  
with Sheikh Mubarak was about the situation at 
Koweyt. T h e  posi t io~~ we occupy all over the Persian 
Gulf is a very peculiar one, and it closely affects the 
credit and the interests of our Indian Empire. It is 
possibly-perhaps not improbably-in connectior~ with 
Koweyt that  it will for the first time be seriously 
challenged, and it behoves us to make up our minds 
in good time how we should meet such a cl~allcnge. 
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CHAPTER XXI 
OUR RECORD IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
N a very remarlcable article published in the 
Nationnd Review of September, 1902, Captain 
Mallan summed up his views of British policy with 
regard to the Persian Gulf in the followillg sentellce: 
"Concession in the Persian Gulf, whether by formal 
arrangement [with other powers], or by neglect of the 
local commercial inLerests which now underlie political 
and  military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval 
situation in the Farther East, her political position in 
India, her commercial interests in both, and the Im- 
perial tie between herself and Australasia." So definite 
a pronouncement by perhaps the greatest authority on 
sea-power, writing, moreover, on this question with the 
complete impartiality of an  American, could not be 
dismissed as  Inere idle panic-mongering, even by the 
staunchest advocates in this country of a policy of self- 
effacement. The  English critics who demurred to his 
main conc~usions took refuge, for the most part, in 
the contention that, as the Persian Gulf is an open 
sea to whose shores we hold no territorial title, we 
could not oppose the occupation of any part of it by 
another power acting in agreement with the titular 
owners, without the assuln~t ion on our part of a 
privileged position in, and of special rights over, its 
R 24.1 
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waters for which tllere would be neither precedent nor 
justification. 
Such a claim might, indeed, be ullprecedented ; 
but so also are the circun~stances of the case. Any- 
one ~vho has visited the Persian Gulf and studied 
the peculiar positioll we occupy there to-day, together 
with the events which have led up to it, would, I 
thinl<, be puzzled to find even a distant parallel to it. 
In what other sea has a power with no territorial 
title to its shores discharged for a whole century 
all the duties which accompany territorial ownership, 
alld which, had we not undertaken to discharge 
thern, would have remained undischarged? Or  what 
other power xvould have so discharged them without 
seelring a single exclusive advantage for itself in return 
for the sacrifices of life and treasure which it had thus 
incurred? If the Persian Gulf is to-day in the fullest 
sense an open sea to which the commerce and shipping 
of all nations have liberty and security of access on any 
errand of peace, it is so solely as the result of a century 
of British effort. 
In the seveilteenth and eighteenth centuries the 
Persian Gulf was the arena of successive conflicts 
between the early pioneers of East Indian adventure- 
Portuguese, Dutch, French, British; but at the begin- 
ning of the nineteenth century the European factories 
which they had in turn established a t  different points 
of the coast had disappeared, and a long pel-iod of 
internal turmoil in Persia had reduced to a mere 
shadow the authority of the only Oriental monarchy 
which had ever exercised effective power on its shores. 
The whole littoral north and south from the mouth of 
the Tigris to the Indian Ocean was in the hands of 
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Almost all these Arab tribes, settled from more or less 
remote periods along the Gulf, had imported on to its 
waters the predatory habits of the desert. Their armed 
dhows scoured the Gulf and its approaches, and had 
grown almost as formidable to peaceful mariners as 
were ever the Barbary corsairs. Of the magnitude of 
the task upon which Great Britain entered when she 
undertook to restore peace and order in those lawless 
waters some idea may be gathered from the fact that 
within little more than one decade, between 1810 
and 182 I,  besides the naval forces constantly main- 
tained in active service, three large military expeditions, 
one of them of 3,500 men, had to be despatched from 
India before the Jowasmi corsairs were subdued, and 
a decisive blow dealt to the prestige and popularity 
of piracy. Several decades more elapsed before the 
Arabs were taught to prefer the peaceful ventures 
of trade and of pearl fishing to the more exciting 
pursuits of slave-raiding ancl buccaneering. 
Even now it requires the vigilance of the ubiquitous 
British gunboat to prevent sporadic outbreaks of the 
old predatory instinct, for though both Persia and 
Turkey have been prompt enough to take advantage 
of the work of pacification done by British hands along 
the coast, and to demand recognition of their authority 
from the tribes whose powers of armed resistance we 
had already broken, neither of them has been able or 
willing to afford the slightest effectual co-operation in 
securing the  peace of the sea. To  the present day not 
only is every merchantman that plies for trade, what- 
ever his flag may be, indebted to the police work 
patiently accomplished by generations of British ships 
for that peaceful access to  peaceful markets which he 
\ 
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now enjoys as a matter of course, but he owes equally 
to their labours everything that has been done to 
diminish the natural perils and dificulties of naviga- 
I 
I 
tion. The only surveys upon which the greater part 
of his charts have been compiled have been carried out 
by the British Navy or the Indian Marine. A British 
company, the British India Steam Navigation, has laid 
the only buoys which mark practicable channels and 
safe anchorages, and keeps up the only beacons which 
yet light the chief roadsteads. The Indian Government 
have laid and maintained the only cables by which tele- 
graphic communication can be had with the outer world. 
When a Kussian man-of-war visits Bunder Abbas to 
study the possibility of converting it into another Port 
Arthur, when a French squadron goes to Muscat to 
intimidate one of our oldest allies into the cession of 
a coaling station, or when German engineers come 
down to the Gulf to prospect for a terminus to the I 
Baghdad Railway, they are each and all drawing upon 
the accumulated work of British pioneers in these 
strange and inhospitable waters. It is, above all, the 
pax Britan7zz'ca we have laboriously established on land 
and on water up and down the whole coast which has 
restored, with the industries of peace, whatever measure 
of prosperity the native population now enjoys, and 
revi'ved the internal and external trade in which the 
enterprise of all nations is free to take a share. 
I t  is impossible to estimate the actual cost in money 
and in blood at which that pax Britannica has been 
established, but when one considers the naval ex- 
penditure it has annually involved for over a hundred 
years, the military expeditions it has from time to 
time necessitated, the political establishments, whose - 1 .  
work largely consists in  securing the observance of the 
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many covenants and treaties under whicll the tribes 
have beell bound over to us to keep the peace, or 
voluntarily refer their Iocal differences to us for arbitra- 
tion and  settlement, and last, but not least, the heavy 
and often unendurable strain to which the climate of 
one of the hottest regions in the world subjects the 
constitution of European residents, the cost must un- 
questionably have been very great. Yet, great as it 
has been, we have derived no material advantages for 
ourselves beyond those which British trade and British 
shipping can reap from the freedom and security of 
comrncrce and navigation in open competition mith 
the rest of the world ; we have claimed no direct com- 
pensation, no exclusive privileges; we have not only 
refrained from turning to account the absence of any 
effective authority along the coast in order to n~alre 
territorial acquisitions for ourselves, but, perhaps with 
more generosity than wisdom, we have tolerated, 
and even encouraged, the establishment of effective 
authority by both Turkey and Persia without any 
guarantee that it might not be eventually used to our 
detriment. 
We have acted in this matter solely under a self- 
denying ordinance, for the opportunities we have had 
in the course of the last hundred years for %ivin,a a 
territorial sanction to the authority we exercise in the 
waters of the Persian Gulf have been unlimited. In 
fact, all the  way down the Gulf one passes point 
after point which we have occupied at some time or 
other during the last century, but not one of them have 
we retained after the necessity for temporary occupation 
appeared to have passed away. Muhammerah and the 
lower of the Karun river were occupied during 
the expedition of 1857, as  was also Bushire. The 
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island of Khal-ak to  the north-west of Bushire was 
occupied from 1838 to 1842, and again in 1857 Further 
down the coast, before coming to Lingah, we pass the 
island of Kais, where we had a lnilitary station during 
the pil*ate wars early in  the last century. 011 the 
island of Kisl~m, facing Bunder Abbns, an irn1)ortant 
military and naval station was established in 1820, and 
a company of sepoys was maintained there until r879, 
we evacuated it, retaining only sm:lll coal depbt 
at Bassiduh. At the mouth of the Straits of Orn~ux, 
Jaslr, the telegraph station to which the Indo-European 
cable up the gulf was laid from Gwattur after it was 
shifted from Cape Musandirn on tllc opposite coast, 
was occupied from 1879 to 1886, but Persia then laid 
claim to it, though she had hitherto exercised no vestige 
of authority over it, and the garrison was withdrawn 
in deference to the policy by which we have helped 
to invest Persian rule along the whole coast fro111 the 
mouth of the Tigris to the frontiers of Baluchistan with 
an effective reality it would never have possessed 
without our intervention. Even those points on the 
northern littoral which we have never acttlally occupied 
were not so very long ago in the hands of native 
rulers, upon whose goodwill we could rely with much 
more coniidence than on that of the Shah's satraps, 
Lingah, for instance, was governed by an hereditary 
sheikh, whose tribe-a branch of tlie I<o\vasim Arabs 
-had come across from the :c~ppositc coast, until the 
Persians seized him by a sudden c'orq5 r~ruitt ill 1889, 
and having deported him to Tclleran, instnllcd in his 
place a deputy of the Governor of I3usliire. 113 tile 
same way the Government of Bundcr Abbas and the 
adjoining coast had been since the erld of the cigl.lteuntb 
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of the oldest allies of the British Power, but in 1868 
Persia, who hacl been steadily undermining his authority 
for many years, took advantage of his troubles in Oman 
to deal the last blow and instal a Persian governor with 
a Persian garrison. 
To  the east and south-east of Bunder Abbas, outside 
the Persian Gulf, the Shah's sovereignty extends 
nominally all along the shores of the Gulf of Oman, in- 
cluding the important Bay of Chahbar, which is already 
freely talked of in Russia as the future terminus of a 
Russian railway to connect the Trans-Caspian and 
Central Asian railways through Eastern Persia with 
the open sea. Inland it extends also, through Persian 
Mekran and Persian Baluchistan, to the frontiers of our 
$ 
Indian Empire, which march with Persia from Kuh 
Malelr-i-Siah, on  the watershed of the Helmund, to the 
Bay of Gwettur, in the Indian Ocean. But what the 
Shah's sovereignty amounts to in those regions, or would 
t amount to without our support, may be gathered from 
i 
the fact that within the last three years two expeditions 
have had to be sent from British Baluchistan to help 
him police the country. The story of these ttvo expedi- 
tions, which has passed almost unnoticed at home, is so 
significant and instructive that it deserves to be briefly 
recalled. A notorious outlaw and freebooter-Muham- 
med Umar Khan, a member of the powerful Nausher- 
wani tribe, of whom Serdar Sir  Nauroz Khan of Khoran 
is the head-fled a few years ago, in 1898, across the 
Persian border, after his grandfather, Mir Baluch Khan, 
whom he had joined in a rising against the Khan 
of Khelat, the ruling chief of the Baluchistan Protec- 
torate, had been defeated and Billed by a British force. 
Muliamn~ed Umar Khan made his submission in the 
following year, but in 1900 11c again fiecl to Persia, and 
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organised on Persian territory a series of raids into 
British Mekran, which culminated, in December, 1900, 
in a regular attack by a band of some 600 men on tlze 
village of Kantdar, which was taken and looted after 
a fight in which the villagers lost severely. Muham- 
med Umar and his men got back into Persia with 
plunder to the value of 80,000 rupees. Nearly the whole 
of his following on this occasion consisted of Persian 
subjects and refugees established on Persian territory 
between Irafshan and Sarhad, who were led by their 
own chiefs and received a share of the spoils. Alto- 
gether the damage done to our people by this raid was  
estimated at over one lakh and a quarter of rupees, and 
it became necessary to take some steps to bring home 
to the Persians their responsibility for allowing British 
territory to be harried with the aid of their own subjects 
from a secure base oh Persian soil. 
Major Showers, the Political Agent at Khelat, w a s  1 










some sowars to march up from Gwattur to the 
Persian border and subsequently to Dizak, in Persian 
Melrl-an, where he met, in February, 1901, the Persian 
Deputy- Governor of Bampur, the nearest Persian 
town of any importance. This official had been en- 
gaged for nearly a month and a half in trying to 
subdue three small forts held by Muhammed Umar's  
people. But though he had two small guns, his 
nondescript following of Persian soldiers had made n o  
impression upon them. Major Showers immediately 
made preparations to escalade them, but the rebels 
knew the difference between the Shah's soldiery and 
Anglo-Indian troops, and made haste to surrender. 
Unfortunately, the hot weather was already approach- 
ing. Major Showers and his men had a march of 480 
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miles before them back to Quetta, and the capture and 
punishment of Muhammed Umar and his chief ad- 
herents had to be postponed till the following year. 
Tlie Persian Government was in the meantime invited 
to send a responsible official with the necessary force to 
meet a British expedition on the border and settle all 
matters in dispute. Vigorous action was obviously 
necessary, a s  Muhamined Umar soon reappeared on 
the scene. Two of his brothers seized the fort of Nodiz, 
near Turbat-i-Kej in Mekran, and though they were in 
turn invested by the Nazim of Mekran, who administers 
the country on behalf of the Khan of Khelat, with 
about 1,000 Erahui tribesmen, they held out until, 
towards the end of December, 1901, the Agent-General 
for Baluchistan, Colonel C. E. Yate, with Major 
Showers and a small force of 300 infantry of the 27th 
Baluch Regiment, fifty men of the Sind Horse, and two 
mountain guns under Major Tighe, arrived on the spot. 
The  fort was at once stormed under Colonel Yate's 
orders, Muhammed Ali, one of Muharnmed Umar's 
brothers, and seventeen of his men being killed, and the 
rest captured. It was a pluclry feat of arms, and the 
effect was excellent. Melrran has remained quiet ever 
since. But there was still the source of all this trouble 
to  be dealt with on the Persian side of the frontier. 
Major Showers proceeded with his force to Megas, 
where he met the Governor-General of Kerman with a 
Persian force of 700 infantry, 300 cavalry, a camel 
corps, and two small guns. It was then decided to 
carry on combined operations for the recovery of com- 
pensation for damage done by Muhammed Umar's 
raids into British territory ; for the punishment of 
the chief leaders-certain Serdars of Megas, Sarhad, 
Sargo, and Irafshan ; and for the capture, if possible, 
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of Muhammed Umar himself. It was also agreed that 
the forts on the Persian side of the  border should 
be demolished, that certain important celltres should be 
garrisoned by Persian troops, that shelter should no 
longer be given on Persian soil to outlaws f l ~ i l l g  from 
Britisll territory, and that an annual meeting should 
take place between the Persian Deputy-Governor of 
Bampur and the Nazim of Mekran for the settlement 
of border cases and for concerted measures to restrict 
the importation of modern arms of precision. The 
cornbil~ed forces then proceeded against the strong fort 
of Megas, which Serdar Shah Jehan was still holding. 
He quickly made his submission, and  paid an indem- 
nity of 18,000 rupees, and his lort was levelled to the 
ground. Irafsban was surprised after a long night 
march, and as the fort which is the principal residence 
of Muhammed Umar Khan is in a very difficult and 
strong position, it was handed over to the Persians 
to be permanently garrisoned. Muhammed Umar him-, 
self, unfortunately, eluded pursuit, but  a move was made 
into the Damani country, further north in Sarhad, and 
several other chiefs submitted and paid, or engaged to 
pay, indemnities for the outstanding instalments af which 
the Persian authorities were to be responsible. By the 
end of April, 1g02, Major Showers's force had marched 
back successfully to Quetta out of Persian Baluchistall 
over the Seistan trade route. As soon, however, as our 
backs were turned, the Persians allowed Muhammed 
Umar to depart unmolested across the  Afghan border. 
They have now even withdrawn their garrison from 
Irafshan, and as the Persian authorities do nothing to 
check the importation of arms which are beillg regularly 
smuggled in on the coast of Melrran, especially from 
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doubt, before long become once more a hotbed of law- 
lessness, in which case the Indian Government will 
have to  despatch another expedition to restore order 
in the territories of our good friend and loyal neigh- 
bour, the  Shah, and to ( (  save his face" we sl~all 
I 
1 
probably again invite him to send some of his raga- 
muffin regiments to " co-operate '> with us. 
T h u s  while her Russian neighbour in the North has 
during the last century wrested from Persia her Cauca- 
sian provinces, and banished her flag from the Caspian, 
we have persistently favoured the extension of her 
authority in  the South, to the detriment, amongst other 
things, of our popularity wit11 the people of the Gulf, 
who abhor  her rule. The influence which Russia and 
Great Britain now respectively wield at ~ e h e r &  affords 
a truly cynical illustration of the relative value of a 
policy of masterful treatment as  against conciliatory 
forbearance in dealing with a corrupt and weak Oriental 
monarchy. T h e  latest achievement of the Persian 
policy of centralisation in which we have so readily 
acquiesced has been the introduction into the Persian 
Gulf of a new Customs administration under foreign 
control, which is meant to be, and is, openlyantagonistic 
to British interests. 
If Turkey  had emulated the example of Persia at  an 
earlier date, the extension of the Sultan's authority on 
the opposite shores of the Gulf would doubtless have 
encountered equally little opposition. For when Midhat 
Pasha dur ing  his tenure of office as Governor-General 
of Baghdad i n  the early seventies began tentatively to 
assert the  Sultan's sovereign rights along the littoral, 
we seem to  have treated the matter with some indiffer- 
ence, though we recorded a formal protest against the 
occupation of the promontory of El Katr by the Turks 
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in response to the invitation of a lawless local sheikh, 
who found the engagements he had already contracted 
tolvards us to be too severe a strain upon his bucca- 
neering At any rate, in the Same year the 
~~~k~ occupied ~1 Katif and all the  adjoining coastline 
to the north of Katar and, to consolidate their authority, 
founded a Sandjak, or sub-governorship, with 
headquarters at  El Hofuf, in the E l  Hasa district, under 
lr new valj at Basra. T h e  energies of the Porte 
were, however, soon afterwards absorbed by the crisis 
of the Russo-Turkish war, and it was not until 1884 that, 
for the second time, the erection of Basra into an  inde- 
pendent vilayet gave the signal for a revival of Ottoman 
pretensions in the Persian Gulf. Thoug l~  this measure 
coincides with the Pan-Islamic propaganda which the 
Sultan himself was directing against Great Britain from 
the palace at Constantinople, it attracted little attention 
a t  the time, but its effects were not slow to make them- 
selves felt. The  Turkish authorities, to say the least, 
winked at piracy and slave trading, and native dhows 
engaged in nefarious practices could always find a safe 
refuge in the small creeks and harbours where they were 
covered by the Ottoman flag. W i t h  the boldness bred 
of impunity a regular flotilla of pirate dhows was 
actually fitted out in 1895, on the  so-called Turkish 
coast, to seize the important islands of Bahrein, the t 
centre of the pearl fisheries of the  Gulf,/but a British t 
gullboat appeared opportunely on the scene, and broke 
j 
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treaty ~ ~ n c l ~ d e d  in 1861. How u~ltolvard were to be 
the consequences of the indifference .with which Turkish 
pretensions in the Gulf were originally treated, few 
people realised until the Koweyt question imported into 
our local differences with Turkey internatiol~al interests 
01 a much wider bearing. I have already dealt at length 
with the complications to which that question has opened 
the door. It may at present be only a cloud no bigger 
than a man's hand, but such clouds are often in these 
latitucks the presage of severe storms. 
T o  the south of the territory to which Turkey lays 
claim stretches the long line of coast which is still 
called the Pirate Coast, though now only in memory of 
the past. This was the scene of the severest struggles 
we fought as guardians of the peace of the Persian 
Gulf, and the loyalty to their engagements of the six 
Trucial chiefs who rule over the tribes we forcibly 
reclaimed from the wildest outlawry in the first half of 
the last century has borne testimony ever since to the 
efficiency of a beneficent but vigorous statesmanship. 
The whole series of engagements, beginning- with the 
treaty of 1820, which was merely an initial attempt to 
restrain the chiefs from overt acts of piracy, down to 
the treaty of 1853, which imposed upon them perpetual 
maritime peace, and that of 1873, by which they under- 
took to prohibit altogether the traffic in slaves, deserves 
to be studied. For it forms a wonderful record of the 
perseverance, sltill, and intelligence displayed by genera- 
tions of devoted Anglo-Indian 'officials, whose names 
may be already forgotten, but whose work still endures. 
Still more satisfactory are the relations of friendship 
we have maintained without any serious break. for up- 
wards of a century with the Sultans of Muscat, whose 
territory, facing Persian Melrran, commands the 
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western approach to the Gulf. The present Sultan is 
the most genial and intelligent of the Arab rulers I 
met in those regions, and he does not disguise the 
pleasure he takes in friendly intercourse with foreigners. 
He bad beer, evidently much flattered by the V i c e r o ~ ' s  
invitation to the Delhi Durbar, and though he could 
not himself accept it, as the patriarchal administration 
of s~lch states as his imposes upon the ruler a daily 
far more exacting than the government of more 
highly developed and far more powerful states, he did 
not l~esitate to send his son, a youth of about seventeen, 
under the care of the British Resident, Major Cox, 
who, during his three years' tenure of the post, has 
gained his complete confidence. 
The only other European power besides ourselves 
with whom the Sultan of Muscat has come i n t o  direct 
contact is France, who has had since 1862 a treaty under 
which she claims equality of treatment w i t h  Great 
Britain. But it was not until 1894 that, in response to 
pressure from the Colonial party in the Chamber, who 
openly urged the necessity of lending Russian influ- 
ence in the Persian Gulf the support of F rench  co- 
operation, a French Consul was appointed to reside a t  
Muscat. This was soon followed by an attempt to 
obtain the grant of a coaling-station, which might 
easily have developed into a navai base, on t h e  coast 
of Muscat, but the attempt failed, as it was bound to 
fail, since by a treaty concluded with us in 1892 the 
Sultan is pledged not Zo cede any part of his territory 
without our consent, and the lease of a small  of 
ground illside Muscat Bay for the erection of a coal- 
shed has not quite reconciled the French to their failure, 
A still more serious question, because it has been a 
source of constantly recurring friction, is that of French 
lcan is 
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I protection for native craft. In a spirit hardly worthy of 
b 
a great nation, the French have repeatedly insisted 
upon extending, even in Muscat waters, the protection 
a of the French Bag to a number of dhows fro111 one of 
the old pirates' nests on the coast of Muscat, which, 
in the course of a more or less suspicious trade, have 
1 obtained " irnmatriculation " from the  French authori- 
ties at Obok or Jibuti. These dhows are a thorn in the 
flesh to the Sultan, and he cannot understand how the 
British Government can tolerate, or the French Govern- 
! ment encourage, a nuisance so flagrantly at variance with the professions of all European states concerning slave trade on the high seas. The questioil became 
very acute a few moilths after my visit to Muscat, when 
in April, 1903, some Arab mariners of Sur, on the 
coast of Oman, were arrested by the Sultan's officials 
for a breach of quarantine regulations and other law- 
less acts, and a dhow flying, it was alleged, the 
French tricolour was fired at, These people at  once 
, claimed French protection, and appealed to the French 
Consulate at  Muscat. The French flagship Infer~zet 
. was at  once sent up to demand their release from 
j 
the Sultan, who naturally contended that the French 
flag, even if his subjects had acquired the right to 
hoist it on the high seas, could not confer upon them 
immunity from the laws of Muscat in his own territory 
or within his own territorial waters. Happily the 
question had already for some time past formed the 
subject of friendly discussion between the British and 
French Governments, and this unpleasant incident 
served chiefly to bring home to both sides the urgency 
oi  a permanent settlement. No agreement could, how- 
' 
ever, be arrived a t  as  to the principle which should 
govern such cases, and the matter has now bcen 
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referred to the Hague  Court of Arbitration. T h e  Sultan 
was, nevertheless, compelled in the meantime to release 
the prisoners before the expiration of their sentences, 
and they went back to Sur  with all the appearances of 
a triumph over the authority of Muscat. Tlle question 
is not one which n~erelyaffects the prestige of the Sultan. 
For these so-called French dhows, besides being often 
engaged in operations alrnost undistinguishable from 
slave trade, are continually smuggling arms of pre- 
cision in very large numbers all along the coast, for the 
benefit of the inland tribes always in a state of more or 
less open warfare against the Sultan, and of all the 
outlaws generally on either shore of the  Sea  of Oman 
and of the Persian Gulf. But when I was a t  Muscat 
it was not to any point connected with his own clifi- 
culties that the Sultan chiefly addressed himself in the 
course of our conversation. T h e  probing questions 
which he put to me with regard to Russian influence 
in Persia, German railway schernes, the situation at  
Koweyt, and the various recent manifestations of the 
growth of new foreign influences in the Persian Gulf, 
not only showcd him to be observant and  well informed, 
but they betrayed also the presence in his mind of the 
same anxieties with regard to the future.- I might 
almost say the same sense of grave impending changes 
-which prevails to a greater or less degree amongst 
the whole native population of that region, - 
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CHAPTER XXII 
THE GUARDIANSHIP O F  THE GULF 
H A T  the apprehensions with regard to the future T which were shared by natives and Ellglishmen 
alike in Southern Persia and in the Gulf are groulldless 
only the blindest optimism can maintain. There have, 
it is true, been as yet no such profound changes in the 
~o l i t i ca l  situation in the South as those svhich have 
placed the North of Persia under the exclusive ascend- 
ency of Russia, but the consequences of those changes 
in the North are extending all over the South of Persia, 
and they are already making themselves felt even in the 
Persian Gulf. When I was for the first time in the 
Gulf, not yet twenty years ago, there was no sign of any 
foreign influence but ours. British influence was not 
only paramount, but it was unchallenged. To-day it is 
still predominant, but it no longer stands alone, and 
it is being openly challenged in more quarters than 
one. T o  the legitimate competition of foreign trade in 
the Persian Gulf, as  elsewhere, no Englishman can, of 
course, take exception. But even if such no~ninally 
commercial ventures as the cruises of heavily subsidised 
Russian steamers can rank as  legitimate competition, it 
is not commercial enterprise that chiefly prompts the 
various nlanifestations of foreign influence which the 
last few years have witnessed in the Persian Gulf. 
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: 
French, German, and Russian Consuls have not been 
appointed to reside in Gulf ports, where they for the 
most part have practically neither nationals nor trade to 
protect, merely for the transaction of ordinary Consular 
business, nor is it for the prornotioll of commerce that 
their peripatetic activity is generally displayed on  board 
a man-of-war. It is not for cominercial purposes that 
the Russians have from time to time developed such 
abnormal interest in the sanitary condition of the  Gulf 
as to send medical missions, assisted by lllilitary and 
naval officers, to Bushire and Buncler Abbas, nor that a 
French subject, acting as correspondent of Russian 
newspapers, conducts from Muscat, under shelter of 
extra territorial rights-which the French Consul is 
there to uphold-a systematic propaganda amongst the 
Arabs of the coast, by means of Arabic leaflets in which 
the British and the Sultan of Oman are joiiltly and 
severally traduced and vilified. It is not merely in the 
interests of trade that foreign men-of-war have been 
sent to cruise ostentatiously in the waters of the Gulf, 
and to show their flag to native chiefs who were hitherto 
quite content to know only the white ensign of the 
British Navy, nor are the recesses of the coast being 
explored with a view to the creation of merely com- 
mercial harbours. Concurrently with these a n d  many 
other novel manifestations of the activity of the Con- 
tinental Powers in the Gulf itself, diplomacy-worlrs on 
parallel lines at Constantinople and at Teheran. W e  
could, perhaps, afford to treat with indifference the local 
influence of Turkey and of Persia on the littoral of the 
Gulf, so long as there was nothing more substantial 
than their own ambitions behind it, but now that 
Turkish policy in the Gulf is liable to be wire-pulled 
from Constantinople by Germany, and Persian policy 
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from Teheran by Russia, the action of the two states 
for whose assertion of territorial rights we have our- 
selves paved the way can no longer be regarded as a 
clz~afztite' ?zkgZigeable. I have already alluded to the two 
iirst results-011 the one hand, the aggressive attitude 
of the Turks in the neighbourhood of Koweyt, alld on 
the other, the transfer of the Persian Customs in the 
Gulf to a foreign administration antagonistic to British 
interests. Other and inore serious results can hardly 
fail to follow. Big raiIway schemes are being matured. 
The Germans still maintain that, in spite of our refusal 
to co-operate wit11 ' them on the terms they "so 
generously" oflered us, the Anatolian Railway will 
eveiltually be carried down to Baghdad and the Persian 
Gulf, and railways, a t  least in Asia, are, we know, 
supposed iiowadays to carry with them the right to an 
open door on to the sea. Russia has already taken in 
hand such a vast programme of railway construction in 
Asia that slie would prefer to postpone for the present any 
extension of her lines into Persia and down to the Gulf, 
and she has accordingly closcd Persia against all foreign 
enterprise for a term which does not expire until 1905, 
and will doubtless be then renewed once more if she is 
not yet ready for action. But Germany, if she persists 
in carrying out  her schemes of railway conquest from 
Asia Minor, may precipitate Russia's action there, as 
she did in the Far East by the seizure of Kiao-chau. 
Whether Russia has actually " ear-marked" Bunder 
Abbas or any other port in the Persian Gulf, or whether 
she has already come to the conclusion that Bunder 
Abbas would prove too hot, just as Vladivostok proved 
too cold, for her purpose, and that, upon the same 
principle upon which she claimed an ice-free port in the 
Pacific, she must insist here on having a port outside 
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the fiery furnace of the Gulf and open to the cool sea 
breezes of the Indian Ocean, there is  very little room 
for doubt that, if Germany secures a place for herself in 
the fierce sunshine of the Gulf, Russia will be iourld 
fully armed with the Shah's authority to occupy any  
point she may have selected on the Persian littoral. 
T h e  French, too, in such a contingency would certainly 
not be behindhand in discovering some eligible site for 
the naval station they failed to obtain four years ago on 
the coast of Muscat. 
To  the building of railways for genuine commercial 
purposes we need assuredly take no exception ; nor to 
the opening of commercial ports as  an outlet for such 
railways. But we have every reasoil to lrnow, from 
recent experience i n  other parts of the world, what these 
peaceful enterprises are apt to develop into, and it is to 
be hoped we shall not again commit ourselves to pre- 
mature acquiescence. When Mr. Balfour admitted the  
reasonableness of Russia's desire for a warm-water 
port as an  outlet for her great Siberian railway, he 
assuredly never contemplated the creation of a naval 
and  military stronghold at  Port  Arthur as  tllc terminus 
of an entirely new line of railway dominating Man- 
churia. Even those Englishmcl~ who still put their 
faith in Germany, and ~vould have us give tlic Sultan a 
free hand at  Koweyt for the benefit of his good friend 
and  brother the En~perar  William, would hardly wel- 
come the establishment of another Kiao-chnu ill the 
Persian Gulf. Yet the situation in the Persian Gulf 
when I visited it for the second time, to'ivards thc c~id of 
1902, bore a striking resemblance. to the situation in  
the Gulf of Pe-chi-li before Germany opened the ball by 
occupyiilg Kiao-chau. There wcrc, to ;L g r ~ a t  extent, 
the same factors, the sarnr! features, the samt: sym19turns 
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a 
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,r)d friend our c-ornnlercial suprcrnat:y urlly that wuuld be chal- d 
lrclly ~ ' t ~ i -  l e n g d  if  utlicr nations once gainecl a luotllold in thc P 
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seem quite as  futile a s  that Russia's policy of expansion 
in Asia can be  arrested by graceful concessions. India 
would for the  first time for upwards of a century be 
1 
exposed to attack: from a naval base within close 
proximity to her shores, and though that is a danger 
against which she could be protected so long a s  we 
preserve our command of the sea, it would mean a n  
additional task for our  Navy a n d  involve a substantial 
increase of the naval force permanently stationed in our 
Indian waters. Whatever the sequence in point of 
time, and whether the railway came before the  port or 
the port before the railway, a Russian Port Arthur  on 
the Persia11 G~llf  would inevitably mean another Man- 
churian Railway through Eastern Persia, with all the 
consequences which such a railway involves ; and  in the 
course of a given number of years the whole line of land 
defences behind which India has entrenched herself a t  
such enormous cost of treasure and labour would be 
turned, .and her resources would have to b e  strained 
afresh to meet a new military situation far more compli- 
cated and threatening than any she has yet had to  deal 
with. And I have suggested s o  far only t h e  material 
effects upon our position in India: Might not the 
moral effect be more serious still if our Indian Empire t 
C 
were subjected to the  immediate reaction of every inter- 
national cornplicatio~~ in which our world-wide interests , 
must a t  times involve us? 
It will be said, no doubt, that this is a highly-coloured 
picture. But  is it a n  improbable or an impossible one? 
Does it not merely fill-in, as i t  were, with some slight 
measure of topographical detail the rough slcetch already 
drawn in outline by Captain Mahan from a purely 
scientific survey of the situation ? H e  saw "the question 
of the Persian Gulf, and of South Persia in connection 
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with it . . . clearly visible on the horizon." He analysed 
it with his usual perspicacity, and as,  on the broader 
I 
issues it involves for an empire ~vhich rests as  our own 
does upon sen-power, llc writes with an autl~ori ty I 
I cannot venture to clztim, I may be allo!vecl to quote 
his own words :- 
"I3y established rule and justice the determination 
[of rights and responsiliilitics] beloligs primarily to 
those immetliatcly irn the spot, in actual possession. 
Unhappily tlie Powers th:~t border the Persian Gulf- 
Pcrsin ilself, Turlsey, and solne minor Arabian com- 
munities-are unable to give cithcr the commercial or  
military sccurity that the situation will require. Under 
their tutelage alone, withoul: stronger foundations under- 
lying, stability cannot be nlaintainecl either by equi- 
l i  brium or by predornin:lnce. In  such circumstances, 
and w l ~ e ~ l  occ;lsiun arises, the responsibility naturally 
devulves, a s  for other dereIicts of fortune, upon the 
nest-of-lii 11, thc ncarest in place or  interest. . . . Great 
nr i ta i~l ,  in the clear Eailul+o of  Turkey and Persia, is 
tht? nation first-"-that is, most-concerned, S h e  is not so 
only in llctr o\vn right, and that of her OIVII people, but 
in thc yet more binding uric: of Imperial obligation to 
a great rincl politically hctlplcss ward of the Empire-to 
India nncl its teeming p ~ p u t : ~ t i ~ n .  111 her awn right 
and duty she is, as regards the maintenance of order, 
i n  act~lnl  possession, h:~ving discharged this office to 
the Gulf for several generations. Doubtless, here a s  
in Egypt,  now that the t:onstructivc worlr has been 
done, she might find others wllo would willingly 
relic:.r.t: hc:r of tllt: burclcn o l  maitltcnencc ; but as 
regards sucli trrlnsfer, the d e c i s i u ~ ~  of acceptance wot~ld 
rest Ily ~ c n o r a l  cus to~n with ~~rt!sc:llt l)usscssor, and 
to her th[. cluestion is olic not nrr:rr:ly of co~ivenience 
but of duty, nr is i t~g from and closc*ly involvcd wit11 
esisting tt:ontli~itrns, whicl~ are lhc: rnorc irnpcrative 
l)ecnusc they :Ire pl:ints of maturt: gronrCI1, wit11 roots 
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deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil of a past 
history. These conditions are doubtless manifold, but 
in last analysis they are substantially three. First, her 
security in India, which would be materially affected 
by an adverse change in the political control of the 
Gulf; seco~ldly, the safety of the great sea route, com- 
lnercial and military, to India and the Farther East, on 
which British shipping is still actually the chief traveller, 
though with a notable diminution that demands national 
attention; an& thirdly, the economic and commercial 
welfare of India, which can act politically only through 
the Empire, a dependence which greatly enhances obli- 
gation. The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign 
state of considerable naval potentiality, a fleet in being 
there based upon a strong military port, would re- 
produce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta 
to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes 
to the Farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last 
two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a 
political system ; and although at preserlt Great Britain 
unquestionably would checls such a fleet, so placed, by 
a division of her own, it might well require a detachment 
large enough to affect seriously the general strength 
of her naval position." 
To this point, and on the lines thus laid down with 
so much authority by Captain Mahan, his Majesty's 
Government have addressed themselves, after perhaps 
an unnecessarily long period of hesitation, but with 
commendable determination. The declaration made 
by Lord Lansdowne on May 5th, 1903, marks an 
important stage in the question of the Gulf, In rcply 
to a series of inquiries from Lord Lamington, the 
Secretary of State announced that ''we [LC,  his 
I Majesty's Government] should ~*egrtrd the cstablishinent 
, of a naval base or of a fortified port in thc Persian 
Gulf by any other power a s  a very grave menace to 
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: soil of a past British intcrests \vllich we should certainly resist with 
rnnnifold, but all the means at our disposal." That Lord Lansdowne 
c1e. First, her 
I 
I 
sllould a t  the same time have intimated that he spoke 
:rinlly affected in no minatory spirit, and that he was not aware of any 
c:ontrol of the I I 
, I  on foot for the establishment of a foreign 
t1;i route, corn- \ ,  
]lava1 base in the Gulf werc, no doubt, merely oratorical ~rltler. I h t ,  on 
which did not, and were not ineallt to, c:hictf traveller, 
1n:inds national detract fro111 the emphatic warning his words conveyed 
to the world at large. The arguments by which he 
led up to his declaration of policy were equally sober 
and moderate. " It was owing to British enterprise, 
to the cxpcnditure of British lives and money, that 
the Persian Gulf is a t  this moment open to the navi- 
,c.,r.t, would re- 
,tar, u ~ i d  Malta gatiou of the world. I t  was our ships that cleared 
, id1 the routes those waters of pirates; it was we who put down the 
lstral in,  tlic last slave trade ; it was we who buoyed and beaconed those 
intricate waters." We had so far succeeded in pre- 
serving a liberal share of the commerce, and though 
:t, st I ~ ~ l n c u l ,  by we might feel vcry kcenly the competition of other 
powers, and could perhaps scarcely hope always to 
maintain there or elsewhere the position of superiority 
we had acquired as the pioncurs of cortlrnercial develop- 
ment tl~rougliout the world, and certainly could not ; I;&irl clown \b7ith 
11, Ilix 3l;ijcsty's aim a t  excluding the legitimate trade of other nations, 
.!;, ;~ftr.r perhaps he entirely agreed that "this country stands with 
I t i i l i r i l ~ r  htzt ~it.11 regard to the navigation of the Gulf in a position ' 
different from that of any other power," and that "our Ir.r'l;tr;itic~~l r~ade 
rtyiu;r rn;irks an policy should be dirccted to protect and promote 
British trade in those waters," 
As far a s  it wcilt it was an admirable exposition of 
our rights :~nd obligations, Grcat Britain still holds 
! ] b h #  t 7 : , ~ ; ~ l t I i ~ l ~ i ~ i c ~ ~ t  a position of cornpletc pre-cmincncc i n  the Persian 
t l ~ ~ :  t't!rsi;~n Gulf. S h e  holds it uricler the most lionourable of title 
deeds, for it i s  nonc: other than the reign of law and 
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order she has imposed, and for SO many decades upheld 
by her own unaided efforts; to her own benefit no 
doubt, but  equally to that of the discordant native 
races and tribes whom she has reclaimed from lawless- 
ness to peaceful pursuits, and of the friendly nations 
of the world to  whose peaceful enterprise she has 
throlvn open an unrestricted field. 111 this sense Great 
Britain has made the Persian Gulf an open Sea, and 
in this sense it will remain so under her guardianship. 
But her Imperial interests forbid her to leave it open 
to the territorial ambitions of other powers. The self- 
denying ordinance she has imposed up011 herself in 
this respect she has the right to impose upon others, 
dir warn- and the British Government have now given f' ' 
ing that we intend to impose it "with all the means a t  
our disposal. " 
Nevertheless, the value of this declaration of policy, 
pregnant a s  it may and should be with important de- 
velopments, is in itself negative rather than positive. 
I t  lays down what we shall not tolerate on the part of 
others. Even coupled with the explanations, satis- 
factory enough as far a s  they went, which Lord Lans- 
downe subsequently gave, of vario,~~s measures which 
are occupying the attention of the Government in 4 ,  
Southern Persia, it gives but an imperfect itldication 
of what we ourselves ought to do. T o  quote Captain I 
Mahan again, he tells us that for the Imperial purposes 
he has already enumerated as  those we should steadily 
keep in view, "navil  predominancc in the Gulf un- 
fettered by bases there belonging to possibly hostile 
foreign powers would be a factor of considcrablc in- 
fluence." But, he goes on, t i  naval control is a very 
imperfect instrument unless supported and reinforced 
by the shores on which it acts. Its corollary, there- 1 
fore, is ti 
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fore, is to attach the inhabitants to the same interests 
by the extension and consolidation of commercial re- 
lations, the promotion of which consequently should 
be the ainl of government. T h e  acquisition of territory 
is one thing wl?ich may properly be rejected as  prob- 
ably inexpedient, and certainly unjust when not im- 
perative. I t  is quite another matter to secure popular 
confidence and support by mutual usefulness. What- 
ever the merits of free trade as a system suited to these 
or those national circumstances, it probably carries wit11 
it a defect of its qualities in inducing too great apathy 
towards the exertion of governmental action in trade 
matters. Non-interference, Zaimca-faire, may easily de- 
generate from a conservative principle into an indolent 
attitude of mind, and then it is politically vicious." 
In an even broader sense than that in which Captain 
Mahan wrote, his language describes with a rare 
faculty of intuition the fundamental wealrness of our 
policy for many years past in and along the shores of 
the Gulf. W e  have tolerated the encroachments of the 
Porte and bolstered u p  the authority of Teheran 
without any guarantee that their authority would not 
be used to our detriment. We have produced among 
the native chicfs and tribes who regarded themselves 
as our clients the in~pression that their interests will in 
the long run always be sacrificed to the exigencies of 
some diplomatic bargain with the central government. 
With all our boasted wealth-wealth such as  no other 
nation has cvcr had at its command-we have suffered 
a much poorer rival to monopolise the formidable 
power which i l~~ancia t  indebtedness places in the hands 
of a masterful creditor, and to parade it in the shape 
of a foreign ndministratiotl openly antagonistic to all 
British interests. We forgot all about the instability 
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of the treaty foundations upon which our trade with 
Persia rested until we suddenly awolce to find them 
totally by the new RUSSO-Persian tariff. 
Whilst Russia was opening up new trade routes in 
the North, and creating and co-ordinating new forces 
towards the consolidation and extension of her political 
and commercial ascendency, the modest efforts of 
British private enterprise, and in some cases even the 
exhortations of British diplomacy on the spot, received 
but scant attention or encouragement at  home, and 
no serious attempt was ever made to organise and 
develop systematically even the claims we had already 
pegged out in the past. W e  allowed o~~rselves  to be 
hypnotised by the one comforting word statz4.r quo per- 
petually dinned into our ears, whilst it was rapidly 
coming to mean nothing more than a label on an 
empty bottle. Our action with regard to Koweyt and 
Lord Lansdowne's official declaration in the House of 
Lords, followed by the recent announcement that the 
Viceroy of India is about to visit the Persian Gulf, and 
will be met there by the British minister at Teheran, 
may, it must be hoped, be taken as indications that 
we are at length beginning to realise that the main- 
tenance of a nominal status quo does not sufIice to 
avert a radical and far-reaching transformation of the 
real status quo. TO drift is not to swim, and we still 
have a hard swim before us against adverse curreilts 
if we are to recover the ground we have lost during 
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CHAPTER XXII I  
THE FUTURE OF SEISTAN 
T 0 one who has just travelled through Persia there is a special piquancy in the contrast which Quetta 
presents. Nature has fashioned in much the same 
mould the whole of the great plateau, intersected by 
lofty mountains, which rises, as it were, in broken 
terraces from the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates to 
the Roof of the World, and embraces Afghanistan, 
Baluchistan, and the North-West Provinces of India, as 
well as Central and Southern Persia. The arid plain 
in which Quetta lies at an altitude of 5,515 feet above 
the sea, the belt of precious vegetation which surrounds 
the settlement, and the amphitheatre of bare and rugged 
mountains clothed. with deep snow throughout the 
winter, which frames the picture, present all the familiar 
features of a Persian landscape. But there the likeness 
ends. There is nothing Persian about the broad, well- 
kept roads bordered with leafy avenues, the trim bunga- 
lows, each standing in its own carefully tended garden, 
the spacious cantonments laid o i t  in symmetrical lines 
of camp and barraclxs, the busy railway station upon 
which two lines converge from the plains of Sind, both 
in their way a triumph of engineering skill and audacity, 
the one up the Bolan Pass with gradients of one in 
twenty-four, and the other through the Chappar Rift, 
269 
270 THE FUTURE OF SEISTAN 
as forbidding a defile, cleft through three miles of per- 
pendicular cliffs, a s  has ever echoed with the  shrill 
whistle of the locomotive. There is nothing Persian 
about the stalwart Baluch and Pathan tribesmen whom 
twenty years of strong and intelligent government by 
a handful of British administrators have gone  far to 
redeem from lawlessness without impairing their 
martial qualities. There is nothing Persian about the 
combined energy and patience which, within little more 
than twenty-five years, have converted this renlote and 
inhospitable corner of India into one of the chief bul- 
warks of our Empire. Quetta, with its northern out- 
post a t  Chaman projecting across the Khwaja A~nran  
range into the plain of Kandahar, is now one of the 
grkat strategical positions of the world, and nothing 
appears to  have been left unclone which modern military 
science could achieve to add to its natural strength. 
But there is no finality to  the problems of Empire. 
When, after a period of costly hesitation, i t  was decided 
to retain and fortify the Quetta position, the  policy 
which prompted this decision was based solely upon 
considerations connected with Afghanistan and the 
great military Power which was already pressing upon 
it from the North. Persia still preserved, a t  any rate, 
some outward semblance of power, and the Persian 
provinces of Khorasan and Seistan covered the  western 
flank of Afghanistan, while the Shah's authority in 
Persian Baluchistan was much too slender t o  hamper 
the consolidation of Biitish influence in the adjoining 
territories of British and British-protected Baluchistan, 
I t  is only within the  last decade that Russian activity 
in Eastern 'Persia, assisted by Russian ascendency at 
Teheran, has forcibly drawn attention to other possible 
avenues of hostile approach towards our  Indian Empire 
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1 than those which lie through the Afghan passes. The 
Russification of Khorasan may be said to have begun 
in earnest in 1889 with the appointment of a Russian 
I 
Consul-General at Meshed, and though it will probably 
not be completed until Russia has connected her Trans- 
1 
Caspian Railway from Ashkabad with Meshed, her 
influence was already in 1895 so firmly established in 
the province that she had no hesitation in revealing 
the ulterior objects of her policy by issuing a Custoins 
tariff which was intended to kill the considerable Indian 
and British trade which had hitherto been carried on 
with her Trans-Caspian provinces through Khorasan. 
The new tariff prohibited the importation of all British 
or Indian goods except a few articles which Russia her- 
self does not produce, such a s  tea and indigo, and even 
these were severely penalised. This was the preliminary 
step to the commercial as well as political conquest of 
Khorasan, and there were ample indications that 
Russia did not intend to confine her operations to 
Northern Khorasan, but was bent upon extending 
them to Seistan, which, for administrative purposes, 
forins the southern part of Khorasan, though it is geo- 
graphically a separate district. At  first only Russian 
agents of the approved "unofficial" type were employed 
in Seistan, and surveys of the country south of Meshed 
to our Baluch border were carried on by "scientific" 
n~issions. Later on these " unofficial " agencies were 
superseded, or rather supplemented, by recognised 
official agencies. A Russian Vice-Consulate under the 
orders of Meshed was established at Nasretabad, the ad- 
ministrative capital of Seistan, and "plague" missions, 
of which more anon, made their appearance escorted 
by Russian officers and Cossacks. "Complimentary " 
missions, like that of the Russian Consul-General at 
272 T H E  FUTURE OF S E E T A N  
Meshed in 1899 to Kain, with a cargo of valuable 
presents to the Khan, impressed in turn upon the 
different of the old ruling family the gener- 
osity as  well as  the might of Russia, whilst at  Teheran 
\ the Persian Governnlent was being encouraged to 
strengthen its aclmi~listrative grip of SeiStan. 
Anyone who takes the trouble to refer to a map can 
see for hilnself at a glance the importance of the 
position occupied by the Persian province of Seistan. 
~t lies about midway north and south between the 
point where the frontiers of liussia, Persia, and 
Afghanistan now meet a t  Zulfiltar a n d  that where 
the frontiers of Persia and of our Inclian Empire 
meet on the open sea a t  Gwattur--i.e. about zoo miles 
separate the northern border of Seistan from the 
Russian frontier, and about 300 miles again separate 
its southern border from the Indian Ocean. I t  marches 
on its eastern border with Afghanistan and with 
Baluchistan. I t  commands the valley of the I-Ielmund, 
and with it the road from Herat to Kandahar. It has 
an area estimated a t  950 square miles, with a mixed 
population-Persian, Afghan, and Baluch-of barely 
~oo,ooo souls;  and, unlilre the greater part of Eastern 
Persia, a very large proportion of this area consists 
of rich alluvial soil cleposited in the course of ceri t~~ries 
by the Helmund. I ts  immense resources as a wheat- 
producing region have been only partially devclopcd 
under Persian misrule, but with a n  extended system 
of irrigation, for which the Helmund afli~rcls an ample 
supply of water, it woulcl soon recover, i11 the hands of 
any civilised power, its ancient place as  olle the 
chief granaries of Central Asia. I t  is not, tllerefore, 
surprising that  the enterprising gionecrs of I<ussian 
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binatioll of strategic and economic advantages offered 
by Seistnrl in the present position of afairs  ol1 
the AsiaLic chess-board. Fortunately it had also 
not altogctller cscnped the attelllioll of Indian 
Guvernnlcnt ; for we have beell rnore or less closely 
associatc*cl wit11 the history of Seistan since the middle 
of thc Inst c:ci~lury. 
Tllc t ! ~ t n t ) t i ~ l l ~ e t l t  of Persian autllority in Seistan has 
followcd m u ~ h  tha same course as I have already had 
ot;casiam to c1csi:ril~c in connection with other outlying 
parts of tllc Sllah's dominions. A feud breaks out 
amongst t he  mernbcrs of the local ruling family, who 
have hitllcrto cnjoyed almost absolute independence. 
One uf t l~crn ,  hsrrl pressed in the struggle for power, 
a ~ ~ p w l s  t t ~  'Teheran for support,  and purchases the 
material tlssistzuncc required to turn the scales in his 
favour, i ~ n l c s s  or until a rival suitor outbids him. 
Once Pers ian  influence has thus gained a foothold, the 
resourcehll rliplomacy of Teheran, made up  in equal 
parts of treachery and  corruption, never fails to find 
Ercsh opportunities of playing upon tribal jealousies 
and family ctisscasions, until the power of the notninal 
chief 113s 1)een reducect to a mere shadow and the last 
rcmtlants of self-gu\:ernment surrendered in return for 
a cr~ntinuanctt of the Shall's favour. This process has 
alrcady r cac f~ed  a n  advarlccd s tage  in Seistan. It  is 
administratively a s u b d i v i s i o ~ ~  of the district: of Kain. 
Mir  i l l am ICllan, the  Ameer of Kain,  who died in 1891, 
was stilI a local cliicftain of r:onsiderable power, though 
the I'crsian Governrncnt had alrcady obtained a good 
price for its intervc:ntic~n against  thc Afghans, Upon 
his death h is  ellreti sons nn~ura l ly  cluarrulled over his 
inhr!ritanr:r, nllcl 'Tcllcn~n composed their clilferences by 
rccugrlising the  elrlcst so11 as Governor of Scistan 
'1' 
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ullder the title of ~ashmet-ul-Mullr, the second son as 
Governor of Birjalld under the title of S h a ~ k a L - ~ l - h ~ ~ l k ,  
and the third son as Sartip, or honorary Cominander- 
in-Cl1ief of I(ain. The I-Iashii~et-ul-M~lll<, however, 
preferred a t  first to delegate his aulliority LO his second 
~011,  Mjr Masum I(han, who was sent, a i11el.c lad, to 
reside a t  Nasretabad as  Depu ty -Gc )vc~~c )~  c)f Scistan 
under the tutelage of his mother, a Balucli lady of 
good family and considerable anli~ition. 13ut Mir 
Masum failed to retain the good graces of his father, 
who suspected him of intriguing with the Sliai~liat-ul- 
Mulk, and in 1898 his elder bl-other, Rlul~lrrnllled Kiza 
Khan, appeared 017 the scenc with a \varranL to supcr- 
secle him. Mir Masunl Ichan was for sollle time 
recalcitrant, but ultimately had to give may, and 
Muhammed Riza Khan ruled i n  his stead, until 
Hashmet-ul-Mulk came this year to take over tlie reins I 
of govern'ment himself, as far as the increasing pressure 
of Teheran, baclced by Russian influence, has left him 
ally of the substantial attributes of power. In Seistan, 
as at Muhammerah ancl other places in tlie Persian 
Gulf, the latest blow to tlie prestige and power of 
the local ruler has been the importation of tlic Uelgiarl 
Customs Administration, which has takcn over control 
of one of the chief sources of revenue. 
Persian Seista~l comprises only half of the region 
commonly designated as  Seistan. T h c  otlicr half lies 
to the east of the H e l m u ~ ~ d ,  ancl fornls part &IF the 
dominions of tlie Ameer of Afghanistan, r J ' l l ~  posses- 
sion of Seistan-the land of the Scythinlis, Lllc Cnvourite I 
haunt of Nimrcld tlie mighty liuotar, t l ~ c  legendary 
13irtl1placc of the Ileroic lit~stum-llns I.)i:e~l at various 
periods :I 11o11c of  s angu i~~nry  ~:ontctition I~ctwcjcn 
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Shah, who had :ltldccl it to his many conquests, it Ivas 
a~~sorhl:d i n  tlic 1)ur:lni Kmpire, wllicll Ahmed Shall 
Abclnli fouritled in Afghanistan, and upon tlle dis- 
ruI)tiori of tlie IS~rilrii do~niniotl it continued through- 
out tlie lirst lialf of tlic nineteenth century to own 
a1leginnc:c to AFgl ia~~  rulers, sornctimes a t  Kandahar, 
alld sonir!tirncs i ~ t  II(!riLl. It 1v:is not till tile middle 
of the I:~st ci:~ltiiry tliat E'ersi:~, taking advarltage of 
internal cli!isensio~ls i l l  Afglianistan, attempted to revive 
her clilirns to St:ist:~n. I t  is difficult to rcalise to-day 
that less than tifty yctars ago Persia I V ~ S  still capable 
of sul:cessful aggression in any direction, and especially 
against so \v:11.lil;c a race as tlic Afglians. Rut it was, 
it will bt: remen~l~crc!cl, x lJersian expedition against 
Hcrar wliicll brvuglit n1,out n rupture between Great 
Britain ancl Pr:rsia : ~ t  t h e  encl of 1 8 ~ 0 ,  and though, as 
the result of o u r  occtlpation of  Busliirc and the Iiarun 
valley, the l'orsixn Covcrnrncr-lt ~~~lclertoolr, Isy the 
treaty of peace ~vhicll w i s  signed in Paris in the follow- 
ing spring, tu rt:frain from all future interference in 
thc affairs of Afghanistiin, Wcstorn Soistan was before 
long reaccupicd by I'crsian troclps. Years of diplo- 
matic wmnglitlg ensuctl, and tlic 13ritisll Government 
of tlie day, Ellough invitctl in turn Ily both parties to 
disclzargc? its crl,ligations under thc Paris treaty and 
lend its fricnclly ofiic:c!s for thc adjustment of the differ- 
ence, prcft:rrcari to s h i r k  its rc~sponsibilities, and i t  was 
only tlict irnminc~ncv: t r f  :ic.:t~lal liostilitics l~ctwecn Persia 
ancl Afgllsnistan wl~ic*l~ at lsist iriilucc:cl S,srd Clnrendol~ 
to undcrtnkr ;rrilitratir~n, irr i t l  itppoint S i r  1;. Goldsmid 
to proc:ccd i n  18i.r) to t l ~ t :  spot for tliu dcmart:ation of 
a dciirlitu 11ot1 nd;~ry. " l ' l l t b  Goltlsmid R<lissiot~, clespntched 
urlder t l ~ c  dirwt trr.rlr~rs t j f  Lhc! 13rilis11 I;o~.c!ign Office, 
was, it 111ust be cur~fesscrJ, I,ut w r y  irnperfcclly organised 
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for its work. The staff was smal l ;  its escort con- 
sisted only of a couple of glzolams from the British 
Legation at Teheran and a few ragged Persian soldiers, 
and worst of all, its technical equipment was altogether 
inadequate. The late Sir Murdoch Smith, Director- 
General of the Indian Telegraphs in Persia, had, a t  
the last moment, to lend one of his officers as surveyor, 
no provision having been made in London for topo- 
graphical work, although the country to be dealt with 
was still practicallyunmapped. But Captain Lovett, K.E.,  
who was-detached for this duty, had to proceed in such 
haste to join Sir  Frederic Goldsmid that there was 
no time to secure assistance froin the Survey Depart- 
ment of India, and he actually started with nothing 
more than a sextant and a prismatic compass. S u c h  
was at that time the confidence we reposed in the 
I friendship of Persia that it is  impossible to say  what 
the consequences would have been had not Lord Mayo 
insisted upon sending a high official from India to join 
Sir Frederic Goldsmid and t h e  Persian Commissioners 
on the Helmund and back up t h e  Afghan Commis- 
sioners. The Persiails professed deep resentment a t  
this interference of the Indian Government, a n d  it was 
no doubt in order to appease them that, in the iinal 
settlement, the course of the  Helinund was adopted 
for a considerable distance as t h e  boundary between 
Persia and Afghanistan, without any provision for 
the contingency of future changes in the main channel 
of that erratic river: though t h e  surveyor to the F 
Mission pointed out that it had already shifted its I 
bed in the past, and might therefore clo s o  again 
in the future. On the other hand, to  satisfy the  
Afghans, the southern boundary of Afghan Seistan 
was ultimately drawn without any regard for tllc future 
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interests of Baluchistan. No doubt at that time our 
position in Baluchistan was not what it is to-day, 
and the triangular str ip of territory between the Kuh 
Malik-i-Siah and the Helmund, which was awarded 
to Afghanistan, was then regarded as a no-man's-land 
of little actual value or  prospective importance. But 
even at that  tinlc it might perhaps have beell foreseen 
that upon thc possession of the big bend of the 
I-Ielmund with Bund-i - Ichemal-Icha must depend 
the restoration of Seistan to its former prosperity, as 
though the old irrigation worlrs were chiefly situated 
in what was rccognised to be Persian Seistan, the 
control of the upper course of the river would always 
be of vital importance for regulating the flow of its 
waters, and  averting the  danger of floocls by escape 
channels, and of drought by judicious storage. After 
nearly two ycars of weary wrangling Sir  Frecleric 
Goldsnlid rctircd to Teheran, and tllere gave his arbitl-a1 
award by which the Pcrso-Afghan frontier was drawn 
from the north-eastern boundary of the Persian district 
of Nchbandan along the  southern fringe of the Naizar 
to the left bank of the I-Iclmund, thence up the river 
to a poitlt a mile above the great br~fzd or dam at 
Kohak, and  finally i n  a straight line south-west from 
that point on the rivcr to  the ' ~ ~ 1 1  Malik-i-Siah. T h e  
result, which even the  Shah  was very reluctant to 
ratify, gave satisfaction to neither party, and the 
Afghans especially resented, not without sorne reason, 
that Persia should have l ~ e c n  held by the 13ritish Com- 
missioner to hnvc acquired a prescriptive title to tlze 
wester11 and w~!al~liit!r 11:~If of Scistall in virtue, as they 
believed, only of n 1c)1ig twin e)f u~llawf~ul occupation 
against which they had constantry protcsted,ancl wl~ich 
was in itself a breacli of Persia's treaty c~igagements 
towards Grciit 13ritai n, 
THE FUTURE OF SEISTAN 
If Sir Frederic Goidsmid's award had or~ly produced I 
I some heart-burning at the time the mischief would 
have been slight. But, unfortunately, it contained also 




rnund, like most rivers in that: part of the world, 
frequently shifts its bed, and has stubbornly refused 
to acquiesce in the decision of the I3ritish Com- 
missioner that the old becl which he had assigned as  
the boundary between Persia and Afghanistan was its 
L .ii !. 
, i, .I 
\ $, true bed. In such a country the  existence of the 
I ? $ t  
t t l !  people depends upon water, and as the I-Ieln~und 
ij!l: 
:i :I . ; 
, I t .  ,. 
shifted over towards Persian territory, the Afgllans no 
:i, 
8 ,  .. , doubt clung to its right bank without much regard for 
boundary lines drawn on paper in defiarlce of n:lture. 
At any rate the Persians have rcpea1;edly complained 
\ o f  Afghan encroachments, and in IF?, wllicll was a I j year of quite exceptional drought, t1it.y charged the 
\Afghans with having deliberately tampered witli the 
$:upper waters of the river to the prejudicc c.)f Persian 
fseistan, and again invvkcd tlie arbitration of Great ! 
' !~ r i t a in  under Article VI. of the Anglo-13crsi:lt~ Treaty 
.of 1856. The Ameer of Afghanistan acquiosccd, and I 
' a t  the end of December, I ~ Z ,  the Indian Government 
despatched a commission under Major McMahon to 
investigate the disputes on the spot and effect :I fresh 
1 ' settlement. This Commission was orgatiised on a very 
i t 
{'different scale from that of Sir Iirederic. C o l c l ~ ~ y ~ i d ' ~ ,  
8, ,) 
:Captain McMahon took with him, in additir.,n to a 1 
'carefully selected staff of R u r o ~ e n r ~  ofliccrs and native 
iofiicials with special local knnwlcdpc, an escort con- 
i 'sisting of a squadron of Sind EIcrrsrt, :L tlctnchmcnt 
of the 24th 13aluch Iiegirncnt, ancl a blnxiru gun. 
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sence than the (>oltlsmicl hlission had been able to 
Itlal<e would he ncc:t!ssary to overcome the improved 
Ine thud~  of Persian obstruc:tion combined with other 
and morc po\v(!rf~llly hostiln inflt~ences in the baclc- 
g r o u ~ ~ d .  On  t l~e  other hand, noL only had the cx- 
tension of l$ritisli a~~ t l io r i ty  over Ual~ichistatl bruugllt 
holne to tllc Indian Government during the thirty 
years which inturvenc!d bctween the Goldsmid and the 
McMahon 1VIission.s tht! grb)wing importance of Seistan, 
but very el'fcctuc~l s t c l~s  had recently I~een taken to 
create the nccessnry facilities of access to it. 
It was i n  1896 that, in c.,r$cr to mctt the growing corn- 
ptition of Iiussin in North-Eastern Persia, and to parry 
to snrne estc:nt the blow dealt at  our Inclian tracle by the 
proIlil~itivt: character of thc new Trans-Caspian tariff, 
the Indian Govt:rnment dccidcd to open up a clirect 
trade route bctweun C,)uc!tta and Seistnn d u n g  the Baluch 
sicle of the Afg11a11 bortlcr. Colonel C. E. Yatc, the 
present agcnL to thc! Gtwcrnor-General in  I3aluchistar1, 
and Captain Welsh LVarc! had in turn visited Seistan 
on official missions, and reported very strongly in 
favour of that  route. Some! preliminary diffic~llties 
had already been cleared away hy the assignment of 
tllc Chazai district tc~ the I3ritish sphere under the 
Durarld Agrecmcnt of IH~JI ;  with the Amecr of Afghan- 
istan and thc subsequent dnlimitation of tht? Baluch- 
Afghan boundary by Majtjr Mci\Iahon, while in 1896 
Sir  T. EIaldich carried out, as far ;is a hasty survey of 
the country could allow, the dclirnitation of tllc Pcrso- 
Baluch frontier from Kiit~ilk nortl~wards to thc M:llek 
Siah Kuh, \vllc?rr? it joins tlte Afghan bou~~clary. 
Captain Wcbi) Wi~rt!, ;rn oilici*r of Australian I~irth, 
whose ability ancl indtrmitahlc ctnergy arc a credit Lo 
thc yoting Commnnwc~~lth,  was placcd i n  charge uf thc 
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new route, and thesuccess which i t  has already achieved 
has fully justified his most sanguine estimates against 
the pessimism of adverse critics, who croaked about the  
waterless deserts to be traversed, the intolerable heat 
of the summer, and the bitter cold of the winter, 
which no caravans would dare to face. 
The distance from Quetta to the  Seistan border at  
KilIa Robat along the route which has now been 
adopted is 465 miles, divided into twenty-one stages. 
The first five stages out of Quetta down to Nushlti, 
a distance of ninety-three miles, are through a moun- 
tainous country, but after this first descent of 2,000 feet 
from the plateau of Quetta on to the great tableland 
which stretches away into Seistan at the  same altitude 
throughout of about 3,000 feet, the road is a dead 
level and admirably adapted, at least, for camel traffic. 
Fortified posts, with dn̂ R bungalows and clla@ar 
Khanehs suitably equipped for the  accomn~oclation of 
travellers and merchants of all classes accompanying 
the caravans, have been erected a t  the different stages. 
Wells have been sunk a t  sufficient intervals to over- 
come the main difficulties with regard t o  water supply, 
and between Nushki and Killa Robat a kz~tclza road, 
varying in breadth from ten feet to twenty feet, has 
been laid out, which enables a bi-weelrly d6h to be 
run through in six and a half days from Quetta to 
Nasretabad, the capital of Seistan, roo m3es beyond 
the Perso-Baluc11 frontier. I n  the first year the 
trade only amounted $0 one lakh and a half of rupees, 
In the second year, 1897-8 (the year is reckoned 
from April I), it rose .to nearly six lalchs, and then in 
successive years to seven, twelve, and  fifteen Iakhs, 
and for the year which ended on April r ,  1902, for 
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INDIAN TRADERS 
lished, a further considerable increase was anticipated. 
Since then there has been a set-back owing to the 
terrible drought, u~lprecedellted within the memory of 
living man,  which has prevailed throughout Balu- 
chistan, Afghanistan, and Eastern Persia, but the 
depression can be merely temporary, as the route has 
already made its reputation amongst native merchants, 
and several Indian firms have definitely established 
themselves in Seistan. Many Indian M~~hammedans of 
the Shiah  persuasion now travel by this route on 
pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Reza at Meshed. 
Even the Afghan merchants of Herat have begun to 
use it largely for their Indian trade, whilst the export 
of tea to Persia by this overland route, which does not 
aflect its aroma a s  does the journey in the inoist heat of 
the Persian Gulf, has sllown such profits that several im- 
portant tea associations have despatched representatives 
from India to study the requirements of the new markets 
thus thrown open to them. Wool, almonds, and other 
driecl fruits, asafcetida, and ghee (clarified butter) in 
very large quantities, form the bullc of tlle export trade 
from Seistan, whilst English broadcloth, Indian sheet- 
ings, tea, indigo, and hardware are the chief exports on 
our side. But the trade whicli shows perhaps most con- 
clusively how exaggerated were the apprehensions en- 
tertained with regard to the climate and water supply is 
that which has sprung up in horses, mules, and even 
sheep. Persian horses have come into Quetta in 
excellent condition and realised hanclsome profits, 
whilst Baluch camels for breeding purposes have 
been in request on the Scistall side. 
T h e  prospects of the route are in fact so well assured 
that the Indian Governmetlt, which had already acquired 
in 18gg a lease of the Nuslllti district at a perpetual quit 
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rent of 9,000 rupees from the Khan of Khelat, who rules 
over the British Protectorate of Baluchistan, considered 
itself justified in rgoz in sanctioning the construction 
of a railway from Quetta to Nushki, and the work has 
already been talcell in hand. The difficulties it presents 
are not formidable, though it will have to cross three 
distinct ranges of hills, over the furthest of which there 
is a sharp drop of nearly 2,000 feet to the  level of 
Nushki. The line which branches off from the main 
line to Quetta above the Bolan Pass near Spezand 
Station, about sixteen miles short of Quetta, will, it 
is expected, be terminated in the course of two years a t  
a cost which should not exceed A5oo,ooo, and  its com- 
pletion cannot fail to  give a great impetus t o  the trade. 
For Nushlri, which is surrounded by good grazing land 
for camels, is a much better starting-point for caravans 
than Quetta, while the beasts of burden will be spared 
the trying march over the mountains at the beginning 
or at the end respectively of the long journey to and 
from Seistan. Whether the railway will be  ultimately 
carried further along the Baluch frontier or ever reach 
Seistan must depend upon a number of circumstances 
which it would be premature to  forecast. Should its 
prolongation be at any time deemed desirable, there will 
certainly be no physical difliculties in the way. From 
Nushki to the Persian frontier there is an unbroken 
plain, and carriages have already passed-over it with 
ease. 
Thus when Captain McMahon's missioil sallied forth 
froin Quetta in the last days of December, 1902, i t  
was able to march Mt11 all its iinpedimet~ta within a 
month and without any serious difficulties to the 
Persian frontier. In 1870 Sir Frederic Goldsinid had 
had to make his way as best he could, and  as it were 
- 
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,an of 1<hdat~ who rules incognito through Northern Persia to Seistan under 
Baludhistit'~ c o n s i d e r e d  convoy of a few Persian tufefikjzj.. In 1903, thanlrs to 
i o n i n g  the cOnstruction the foresight and energy of the .Indian Government, 
~shlri  , ,d the work has the M c M a h o n  Mission entered Seistan clirect from the 
difficulties i t  presents great military outpost of our Indian Empire with a 
will have cross three ; ~icked escort sufficient, at least, to secure respect for 
furthest of w h i c h  there : Great Britain's arbitral power in  a region of growing 
,,, feet to the level af , importance to our Imperial interests. 
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CHAPTER XXIV 
THE RUSSIAN POSITION IN EASTERN PERSIA 
T H E  McMahon Mission to Seistan came none too soon to uphold our interests in a region where 
Russia had specially applied herself t o  defeat them. 
Had we failed to vindicate our position as the arbitral 
power between Persia and Afghanistan on the banks of 
the Helmund, not only would Kabul and Teheran 
have each drawn its own inferences from such an 
avowal of impotency, but the new trade route we have 
opened up between Quetta and Eastern Persia would 
have been doomed at no distant date to practical ex- 
tinction. Its success up to the present has  been 
achieved in the face of very peculiar difficulties. I have 
spoken so far only of the physical I. difficulties, which 
have not, on the whole, proved so serious as was 
anticipated. But it has encountered in other respects 
difficulties which could hardly have been foreseen, in 
the shape of political opposition so bitGrly and de- 
liberately hostile as to be almost without precedent in 
the relations of two horninally friendly powers. 
Nowhere in Persia has Russian influence been so 
unscrupulously exertkd as in Seistan for the purpose of 
closing the country to the legitimate exercise of our 
trading rights. The Belgian Customs administration 
has been mobilised to organise on scientific lines the i 
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by no means despicable forces of Persian official ob- 
struction. Whereas one Belgian official is apparently 
to deal with the large Russo-Persian trade 
of Meshed, it has been considered necessary to send 
no fewer than three members of the Belgian staff 
to deal with the relatively small beginnings of Indo- 
Persian trade in Seistan. They have, it must be ad- 
mitted, found ample occupation for themselves in 
devising novel mcthods for the discouragement of 
trade. O n  the flimsiest pretexts the traders who accom- 
pany the Quetta caravans have been fined for the non- 
observance of arbitrary regulations carefully varied to  
provoke confusion ; the  camel-drivers have seen their 
animals seized ; they themselves were thrown into prison. 
High-handed action of this kind cannot be openly up- 
held. T h e  cases are referred to Teheran, and I have no 
doubt M. Naus in due course apologises profusely to  
Sir  Arthur Hardinge for the shortcomings of a new 
administration, for the excessive zeal of individual sub- 
ordinates, etc. But, in the meantime, the desired effect 
is produced on the spot. The caravans are scared, 
native confidence in our ability to protect our own 
people is shaken, and no little trouble has to be ex- 
pended in counteracting the effect of these unpleasant 
stories in the bazaars of Nushki and Quetta. But  
however resourceful the Belgian Customs and their 
Persian coadjutors have proved under the inspiration 
of M. Miller, the enterprising Russian Consul in 
Seistan, they have succeeded only in hampering, not 
in preventing, the expansion of Indian trade. To 
reinforce the Customs, which form, as it were, their 
first fighting line, the Russians have therefore estab- 
lished a second one coilsisting of plague officers. T h e  
excuse is that the importation of Indian goods might 
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introduce the plague into Khorasan and thence into 
the Russian dominions in Central Asia. I t  is true 
that the period of possible incubation has expired long 
before a caravan from Quetta can reach the borders of 
Seistan, and that the limits of time within which 
quarantine is permissible have been laid down by the 
decisions of the Venice Sanitary Congress to which 
Russia is a party, but it is a far cry from Venice to 
Khorasan. So in the rear of the Customs cordon the 
Russians have established a strong quarantine cordon 
between Seistan and Northern Khorasan. Its head- 
i quarters are at Turbat-i-Haidari and Karez, where on 
Persian soil Russian military doctors, supported by 
Russian officers and Russian Cossacks, and assisted 
by flying parties of Persian Cossaclrs, detached from 
Russian headquarters at  Teheran, administer their own 
laws against the importation of Indian plague and 
other Indian cominodities in utter disregard of all in- 
ternational usage. These measures appear to be 
directed more especially towards checking the develop- 
ment of our trade through Seistan b i t h  Northern 
Afghanistan, and driving the Herat  merchants into 
the Penjdeh market, which they have not hitherto 
patronised to the satisfaction of their Russian neigh- 
bours. The British Government appear, however, to 
have at last recognised the necessity of protecting our 
"\ 
traders against such systematic vexation. Lord Cran- 
borne admitted last July in the course of a debate in 
the House of Conlmbs that the Russian quarantine 
cordon was a matter, interfering as it did,with British 
trade from India, of *hich his Majesty's Government 
had every right to complain, and added that they had 
not neglected making representatioils in the proper 
quarter in order to have that grievance abated ; 
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I 
I 
it may be hoped that the presence of the McMahon 
Mission in Seistan may help our diplon~atic protests at  
Teheran and St. Petersburg to materialise Illore effect- 
ually on the spot than has hitherto been the case. 
It would be idle to pretend that thesc are questions 
I 
which affect merely Anglo-Indian trade with Eastern 
Persia. However keen the liussians have shown them- 
selves under the energetic impulse of M. Witte to 
prosecute the comirlercial conquest of Persia under 
cover of their political ascendency, it may be doubted 
I 
I whether political coilsiderations have not played a larger 
part than coillnlercial ones in stimulating their activity 
in Northern I(11orasan and Seistan. apathy with 
which British interests have been defended in other 
parts of Persia had, perhaps, left them unprepared for 
the energy which the Indian Governlne~lt has displayed 
in this direction, and they resent it all the more keenly. 
The unailinlous outburst of ill-humour to which the 
Russian Press @ve vent when it was ailnounced that 
the Indian Goverllment proposed to build arailway down 
to Nushlti, entirely within our own territory and some 
400 miles away Cram the Persian border, disclosed the 
nature of the aspirations entertained in other and 
much more responsible quarters in Russia. Even 
if the line were prolonged right up to the froiltiers 
of Seistan, Russia would have no more reasonable 
grouilds for ubjection than we had when she prolonged 
her Trans-Caspian line down to the frontiers of Afghan- 
istan a t  ICushk. In fact, if there were ally sincerity in 
the professions to which utterance is solnetinles given 
I in Russia of a clesire to see the Russian and Indian 
I railway systenls linlied up through Afgbanistan, she 
ought to welcome the construction of a line which 
might ultimately he connected through Kllornsan ~vith 
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her Trans-Caspian line without opening up the delicate 
political questions to which any interference with 
Afghanistan must always give rise. But Seistall lies 
across the easiest and shortest line of Russian advance 
to the Indian Ocean, and though, or because, she is 
probably not yet prepared for such an advance-the 
engagement she has compelled Persia to prolong until 
1905 that no railways are to be built upon Persian terri- 
tory till the expiry of that term is a proof of her own 
unpreparedness-she watches, with an apprehension she 
is unable to disguise, any indication that the important 
part which Seistan must play in the future develop- 
ments of Central Asian politics has been realised in 
other quarters besides St. Petersburg. 
In dealing with the Persian Gulf I have endeavoured 
to show how largely the interests of India are con- 
cerned in the maintenance of the undivided control 
we have exercised for upwards of a century over its 
waters, and in the exclusion from its shores of terri- 
torial ambitions, which would convert it into a cock-pit 
of international strife. The same considerations apply 
scarcely less forcibly to the question of the future of 
Seistan, for the chief value of Seistan to Russia, and 
the only one that can explain the'effort she is making 
to secure her ascendency there, is as a stepping-stone 
in her advance towards the Indian Ocean. Seistan 
alone, amidst the wildernesses of Eastern Persia, would 
afford her, in virtue of its natural resources and of 
its geographical position, a tempting field for economic 
and political expansion, as well as an admirable strategic 
base for future niilitary operations. Seistan lies mid- 
way athwart the track of the shortest line which could 
be built to connect the Trans-Caspian Railway with the 











to place he  
in which s 
mercial pol 
pursued t h ~  
especially tl 
is at presen 
entirely pre, 













is not too I 
a railway, 




~ u t  Se is tan  lies 
~ u s s i a ~  . 
r b e c a u s e l  she is 
all advance-the 
, to  prolong utl t i l  
,on pel-sian. terri-  
proof of her O X V ~  
a p p r e h e n s i o n  s l ~ c  
 at t h e  i m p o r t a n t  
2 f u t u r e  cleve~op- 
b e e n  r e a t i s e c t  i n  
:. 
lave e n d e a v o u r e d  
f I n d i a  are con-  
m d i v i d e c l  c o i ~ t r o l  
c e n t r l r y  O v e r  its 
; s h o r e s  of terri-  
i t  i n t o  a c ~ c l i - ~ i t  
s i d e r a t i o n s  apply 
of the future of 
n to Russia, a n d  
,rt s h e  i s  making 
a stepping--stone 
O c e a n .  S e i s t a n  1 
t 
ern Persia, w o u l d  , 
r e s o u r c e s  and of 
field for e c o n o m i c  
i m i r a b l e  strategic i 
S e i s t a n  lies 113 id- 
line which could 
R a i l w a y  with the 
: t h a t  the surveys 
A " MANCHURIAN " RAILWAY? 
have already been completed for the extension, at least 
into Seistan, of the railway Russia has determined to 
build from Ashkabad to Meshed, as soon as she has 
carried out the extensive programme of railway con- 
struction that at present absorbs her energies in other 
parts of Asia. Pending the expiry of thc unpre- 
cedented railway agreement by which she has in the 
meantime excludcd any possible rivals from the field 
of railway construction in Persia, she spares no effort 
to place her ascendency beyond dispute in the regions 
in which she is pegging out her claims. The com- 
mercial policy of absolute exclusion which Kussia has 
pursued throughout Central Asia towards British, and 
especially towards British-Indian, trade, and which she 
is a t  present pursuing with relentless energy in Persia, 
entirely precludes the idea that Russian railway schenles 
in this part of the world are conceived in the interests 
of international trade or for any purely mercantile 
purposes. Even more than in China, where the Man- 
churian Railway a t  least traverses rich and populous 
provinces, they would serve-in Eastern Persia above 
all-as an instrument of political domination. What  
the constructio~~ of another " Manchurian " railway 
into Seistan, with its ultimate extension to some new 
Port Arthur on the seas adjacent to our Indian Empire, 
would mean t o  India it seems incredible that so many 
politicians a t  home should still ignore, and, above all, 
those who habitually inveigh against the military 
burdens imposed upon the people of India. For it 
is not too much to say that the construction of such 
a railway, with all the political and military conse- 
quences it must involve, would revolutionise a t  once 
the conditions upon which our whole system of Indian 
defence has been built up. 
U 
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It  is right to recognise, as  all reasonable Englishmen 
are willing to do, that the gradual extension of Russia's 
power in Central Asia has been frequently determined 
quite a s  much by the irresistible forces which seem to 
compel every power representing a higher plane of 
civilisation to absorb the wealier or decaying com- 
munities of the East with which it comes into contact 
as  by any settled and comprehe~lsive scheme of con- 
quest. But it is necessarJr also to recognise that the 
extension of her power has already seriously affected 
the psition of our Indian Empire, and that its further 
extension might have still graver results. Without 
going back further than the last two decades, it is 
obviously the rapid growth of Russia's power in Asia 
which has alone compelled India to carry out a vast 
and costly scheme of defensive armaments on her 
north-west frontier. These armaments no more imply 
any undue suspicion of Russia than is displayed 
in ttie elaborate system of defences with which the 
frontiers of all the 'great Continental Powers bristle, 
more than ever to-day, in Europe. We have not yet 
reached the millennium, and however honestly desirous 
of peace all the most powerful rulers of the civilised 
world may be, none of them has yet ventured to dis- 
regard the possibility of war and the necessity of being 
prepared for i t ;  and the experience of the last few 
years should at least have taught us how futile it  is to 
rely upon the goodwill of other nations with whom we 
have far less numerous points of friction than with 
Russia. 
A further extension of Russia's power through Eastern 
Persia towards British Baluchistan and the Indian 
Ocean or Persian Gulf would not diminish the necessity 
of precautionary measures for preserving the security 
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of our Indian Empire, but on the contrary, it would 
enormously enhance it. For our present lines of land 
defence in India have been laid out on the assumption 
that, as the north-eastern section of the Indian frontier 
is ~rotected by a natural barrier of eternal snows, so 
the western section is covered by a friendly, or at least 
independent, Persia-herself incapable of aggressive 
military action. The vulnerable sectioil has therefore 
been considered to lie only in the north-west, where 
from times immemorial the tide of conquest from the 
North has flowed down through the Afghan passes into 
the plains of Hindustan. Since the close of the last 
Afghan war all the energies of our statesmen and all 
the skill of our strategists have been devoted to build- 
ing up in the rear of a friendly Afghanistan a series 
of impregnable positions which should guarantee at 
the same time the maintenance of the Afghan State aild 
the safety of India from invasion. With this sole end 
in view, our diplomacy has laboured ceaselessly to 
restore the confidence of Afghan rulers in the sincerity 
of our goodwill, and to subdue and convert into an 
element of strength the fighting qualities of the tur- 
bulent frontier tribes, whilst, on the other hand, millions 
have been poured out in strengthening the natural 
bulwarks of our mountain boundary with all the modern 
resources of military science. I t  would be difficult to 
compute exactly the amount that has been spent in the 
construction of fortifications and military posts, of 
strategic railways and roads, of barracks and canton- 
ments, in the creation of new tribal levies, in the 
maintenance of native and British garrisons, in the  
paciiication and political administration of the in- 
hospitable country which stretches in a succession of 
rugged valleys and precipitous ranges from Quetta to 
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Peshawar ; but it unquestionably runs into scores of 
millions sterling. 
Let Russia be established in Persia by the  methods 
with which she has made us familiar in Manchuria, thus 
impinging upon the western frontiers of Afghanistan 
and Baluchistaa, and the flank of the whole position 
upon which we now rely would be turned, and India 
exposed to attack along a wholly new line of frontier 
much more difficult of protection. The  creation of a 
new corresponding line of defence on a border possess- 
ing few of the initial advantages with which nature has 
endowed the north-west frontier would subject the 
military and financial resources of India to a strain 
which would probably prove intolerable, even if we 
were justified in imposing it. The  development of 
India is reaching a stage in which, if xve have the 
interests of her people a t  heart, as we profess to do, we 
shall have to sanction the application of a larger pro- 
' 
portioll of her financial resources than has hitherto 
been the case to the advancement of her agriculture, to 
the promotion of her inclustries, to improved methods 
of education, to administrative rcforms, in fact, to all 
the needs of a community which is rising i n  the scale 
of civilisation. Is  i t  just a t  this stage that British 
statesmen can contemplate with indifference the creation 
of a new and, a t  least potentially, dangerous situation 
outside her frontiers, which would cripple her ex- 
chequer and hamper all progress? Or, if they contend 
that the voice of India in this case must be overruled 
by still more imperious considcl.ations of general policy, 
are they prepared to accept on beIlali of the Imperial 
Exchequer a legitimate proportion of tllc increased 
financial burden thus thrust; upon India? 
No doubt, though the cost would bc ,caorll~ous, it 
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might not be beyond the resources of the British 
Empire to secure the safety of India even if the whole 
of Persia, from Khorasan to the southernmost limits of 
Persian Baluchistan, were to pass to-morrow into the 
hands of Russia. But the cost could not be computed 
in terms of money alone. The whole machinery of 
British rule in India rests upon a delicate adjustment 
of forces which, in the absence of any abnornlal outside 
pressure, has hitherto worked with marvellous efficiency. 
Take, for instance, one particular province-British 
Baluchistan, including the Protectorate. The whole 
of that province, with an area equal to that of France 
or Germany, is administered by a dozen European 
officials. I t  is the moral influence of this handful of 
Englishmen, backed, of course, by an element of 
physical force always in reserve, which keeps the peace 
amongst a scattered population of about ~,ooo,ooo 
hardy and warlike tribesmen as naturally prone to 
lawlessness as any primitive race must be that has 
been accustonled for centuries to fight out its blood 
feuds from father to son without let or hindrance. But 
would these people continue to bow passively to the 
authority of the British r j ,  whose hand, they know, 
can be heavy as well a s  just, if there were another 
foreign ray established over the border whose power 
seemed to rival our own and would inevitably be 
invoked as a possible counterpoise to i t?  Is there 
not some significance in the announcement solemnly 
made only the other day by the official Trans-Caspian 
Review that eight Baluch chiefs had arrived at Ash- 
labad to invoke the protection of Russia against the 
oppressive acts of the Indian Government? Doubtless 
these are some of the outlaws against whom Colonel 
Yate's expedition into Persian Mekran was directed 
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last year, and we can afford a t  present to laugh at  their 
appeal to the Russian authorities. But should we be 
able to laugh as easily if those same Russian authori- 
ties were located just beyond our own border? W e  
know that, however LLcorrect" the policy of the Russian 
Government may be, its agents in remote parts of the 
Empire are allowed not infrequently to adopt a line 
of their own, which is but little in accordance with 
the friendly assurances of St. Petersburg, whilst in 
the event of international friction elsewhere, from the 
Mediterranean to the Pacific, the Russian Government 
could hardly be expected to refrain from using to our 
detriment the opportunities of intrigue afforded by 
close proximity to our Indian Empire. Is such a con- 
tingency one that could be contemplated without alarm 
by those who are responsible for the maintenance 
of law and order even within the narrow limits of 
Baluchistan, let alone by those who are responsible 
for the maintenance of peace throughout the length 
and breadth of India, where, under a system of govern- 
ment such as ours, which, in the main, applies to alien 
races the principles of British freedom, the tares of un- 
satisfied ambition and disloyal restlesslless a re  bound 
to grow up along with a goodly harvest of progress? 
Yet these are the consequences we must be prepared 
to face in the more or less near future if the views 
of those prevail in England who contend that the fate 
of Persia is no concern of ours, and that, for aught we 
need care, Russia may be allowed to reduce her to- 
morrow to the level of Khiva or Bokhara. It is, I 
repeat, unnecessary to assume any greater antagonism 
between Russia and England than that which the 
rivalry of nations produces in many other quarters, or 
to take au pied de la lettre the writings of influential 
Russians, some of 
claim for Russia  a r 
to say the least, apy: 
of British rule  from 
ascendency in Persi 
ing to-day, means n 
elimination of one 
depends t h e  maintl 
of relative immuni 
contact wi th  a gre  
islands owe to the 
%ASTERN PERSIA 
esent to laugh a t  their 
!s. But should w e  be 
;ame Russian authori- 
ur own border? W e  
: policy of the Russian 
in remote parts of the 
lently to adopt a line 
le in accordance with 
Petersburg, whilst  in 
In elsewhere, from the 
? Russian Goverillnent 
-ain from using t o  our 
intrigue afforded by 
mpire. Is such a con- 
!mplated without alarm 
for the maintenance 
the narrow l imi ts  of 
e who are responsible 
throughout t h e  length 
3er a system of govern- - main, applies to alien 
eedoin, the tares of un- 
restlessness a r e  bound 
harvest of progress?  
5s we must be   re pared 
ear future if t h e  views 
lo contend that the fate 
, and that, for a u g h t  we 
 wed to reduce her  to- 
1 or  Bokhara. It is, I 
any  greater antagonism 
i than that which the 
many other quarters, or 
e writings of influential 
A FUTURE DANGER 295 
Russians, some of them in very high positions, who 
claim for Russia a mission of dominion in Asia, which, 
to say the least, appears to postulate the disappearance 
of British rule from India. The  extension of Russian 
ascendency in Persia, at the rate a t  which it is spread- 
ing to-day, means within no remote period the practical 
elimination of one of the chief factors upon which 
depends the maintenance of India in the same lrind 
of relative immunity from the dangers of immediate 
contact with a great military power which our own 
islands owe to the "silver streak." 
CHAPTER XXV 
CAN THE BALANCE OF POWER BE RESTORED 
IN PERSIA? 
HAVE passed in review the different steps by 
which Russia has gradually reduced the Shah's 
Government to a position of absolute dependency. She  
has complete military control of the Caspian and of 
the whole northern frontier of Persia, from Tabriz in 
the West to Meshed in the East. In the Persian capital 
and in the provinces she disposes a t  her discretion of 
the only serviceable body of Persian troops, who are 
under the command of Russian officers and whose pay 
she secures. I t  is largely to the personal action of 
their late commander, General Kosagowsky, that 
Muzaffer-ed-Din is indebted for his unchallenged 
succession to the throne, and the same power that 
made the present Shah can by the same means unmake 
him a t  any moment. The  men of the Cossaclc Brigade 
serve with the colours only long enough to be duly 
impressed with a sense of the allegiance they owe to 
their Russian officers and paymasters. They are then 
sent off to the provinces, where they act as guards to 
the governors, and as agents for the propagation of 
Russian influence and for the collection of information 
required by their Russian employers. To  the power of 
the sword Russia has added the power of the purse. 
The Shah is her pensioner; by nature a spendthrift 
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and addicted to every form of sensual self-indulgence, 
unchecked by his ministers, who for their own purposes 
pander to his reckless extravagance, he naturally clings 
to  the Power that is not only ready to provide for his 
financial necessities, but delicately refrains from asking 
any unpleasant questions as  to how the money is spent. 
By financing Persia a s  she has done during the last 
few years, Russia has secured a grip of the entire Persian 
administration, so far as  it is controlled from Teheran. 
In the meantime she is recouping herself by prosecuting. 
the commercial conquest of Persia. For this purpose 
she has not only at  her service a powerful institution 
like the Russian Banque d'Escompte at Teheran, which 
is merely a department of the Russian Ministry of 
Finance, but she has shown that she can inanipulate the 
whole commercial policy of Persia. She has succeeded 
in negotiating over our head a new tariff agreement 
with Persia for the benefit of her own trade which we 
have been compelled to accept as  the basis of our owl1 
commercial relations. Apart from these considerations 
she has got excellent security for her loans ; and when 
the inevitable hour of Persian bankruptcy arrives she 
is in an admirable position for exercising, forcibly or 
otherwise, her rights of foreclosure. As far as  the 
Customs, which constitute the formal security for the 
Russian loans, are concerned, she is already in posses- 
sion, through the Belgian administration, which, though 
nominally neutral, is, and must inevitably be, dominated 
by the Russian Ministry of Finance. 
T h e  people of Persia have a vague consciousness of 
impending ruin, but they have no leaders, and in any 
case they realise that the old remedies by which they 
used to  help themselves when dynastic misrule had 
overstepped the limits even of Oriental patience cannot 
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be applied to a dynasty backed by the material support 
of such a power as Russia. On the contrary, there are 
abundant indications that some of those who are most 
disaffected to the present regime are looking forward to 
the day when, the Shah and his ministers having played 
out the part for which they are a t  present cast, Russia 
will throw them overboard and assume direct control 
over the government of the country. Similar influences 
are at work even among the Balrhtiaris and in other 
remote parts of the Shah's dominions where his writ 
has hitherto seldom run without dispute. Behind the 
centralising activity of Teheran the hand of Russia is 
felt to be pressing heavily, and her hand may be pro- 
pitiated but cannot be resisted. 
In a word, Russia is reaping to-day the results of 
a careft~lly thought-out, consistent, and persevering 
policy, carried out by a staff of highly trained officials, 
specially equipped with a thorough lrnowledge of the 
language, the customs, and the people of the country. 
I t  may be aslred why, if Persia is already so completely 
in her grip, she prefers not to enter into actual posses- 
sion. The answer is an easy one to those who have 
followed Russian policy in other parts of the East. 
Russia prefers a feeble and bankrupt Oriental neigh- 
bour to an annexed dependency. She has learnt the 
secret of ruling an Eastern state through its nominal 
owners, if only they are weak, corrupt, and in her pay. 
I t  is a device which can be combined with all the ex- 
ternal forms of respect for existing treaties ; it does not 
conflict with the technical maintenance of the status quo; 
it spares the susceptibilities of other powers; it mini- 
~nises the danger of international complications; it 
gives a maximum of power with a minimum of respon- 
sibility. 
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T h e  only Power whose interests have been seriously 
affected by the profound change which Russia has 
wrought by a series of subtle and almost imperceptible 
transitions in the condition of Persia is Great Britain, 
and her interests are, it must be admitted, affected 
mainly in connectioil with India. I t  is perhaps for this 
reason that British statesmen have been so reluctailt 
to realise the magnitude and importance of the change, 
and preferred t o  take refuge in comfortable assurances 
with regard to the maintenance of the  status qz~o;  as 
if the nominal maintenance of a techilical independ- 
ence and territoi-ial integrity were likely to have, in 
the long run, any more meaning in Persia than it has, 
for instance, at the present day in Manchuria. I t  may 
indeed be doubted whether, until quite recently, they 
ever attempted to face the situation in Persia. England 
has been represented in turn at Teheran by men of very 
different idiosyncrasies-within the last fifteen years by 
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Si r  Frank Lascelles, S i r  
Mortimer Durand, and now by S i r  Arthur Hardinge, 
all men who have achieved distinction in other dipIo- 
matic fields. If they have all failed t o  arrest perma- 
nently the steady decline of British influence, there 
must be some common cause for their collective 
failure. . 
I t  may be partly due to the fact that, whilst in every 
other Eastern country our Government has recognised 
the necessity of creating a trained staff of Oriental 
secretaries and consuls, Englishineil of good repute 
equipped for the special work required of them, the 
British Legation at Teheran never has possessed, and  
does not possess to-day, any properly organised service 
of the kind. This is a subject up011 which it is 
difficult to touch without importing personal reflections 
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which may seem unduly invidious. But by those 
who know the East it certainly cannot be regarded as 
a satisfactory state of things that during the last few 
years a complete breakdown of the Oriental Secretariat 
at the Teheran Legation has been averted only by the 
accident that a gentleman appointed to be Vice-Consul, 
a post for which great linguistic attainments are not 
indispensable, happened to be a scholar who was able 
to discharge the duties of Oriental Secretary, whilst 
the gentleman appointed to the latter post did the Vice- 
Consular worlr. Nor can the employment on respon- 
sible work of a native gentleman, whose brother was 
one of the Atabeg's secretaries, be considered altogether 
satisfactory in the light of certain past experiences in 
connection with native inembers of the Legation staff. 
Without making any personal imputations, one may 
be allowed to suspect that the Atabeg-Azam knew 
more of what was going on at the British Legation 
than the British Minister was allowed to ltnow of 
what went on in the Grand Vizier's department. The 
way in  which, after a whole year's secrecy, the  Russo- 
Persian Commercial Convention was sprung upon us 
would seem to be a case in point. 
With the exception of the political officers appointed 
by the Indian Government to consular duties in the Gulf 
and inEastern Persia, we have had absolutely no specially 
trained consular service in the country, and we may 
consider ourselves fortunate to have found one or two 
very efficient members of the Indo-European Telegraph 
Department, who, like our present Consul-General at 
Isfahan and our Consul at Muhammerah, have been 
able to step into the  breach. Of late the Foreign Office 
has awakened to the importance of this subject. One . 
of the most promising members of the Levant cotisular 
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importance of t h i s  subject. One 
: members of the Levant corisular 
service has been appointed Consul-General at  Tabriz, 
and the Vice-Consul at Teheran, who has been dis- 
charging, with an  efficiency no one was entitled to 
expect from the incumbent of that post, the duties of 
Orielltal Secretary, has been promoted to Shiraz, where 
we have never yet had any regular consular representa- 
tion. New consulates are also to be created a t  Ker- 
maushah, a very important centre of trade in Western 
Persia, and at  Ahwaz on the Karun, where we ought 
to have had one years ago, as soon as that river was 
thrown open to navigation. Yezd, however, is another 
important point, especially in view of the new land 
telegraph line to India, for which no provision seems 
yet to have been made. The Indian Government, on 
the other hand, has appointed a Consul at Bunder 
Abbas in addition to the posts which it had already 
maintained at  Bushire and Kerman and in Khorasan 
and Seistan. The very marlred difference in the scale 
of pay and allowances granted respectively by the 
Indian Government and by the Foreign Office, whose 
own better judgment in such matters is too often over- 
ruled by the Treasury, places serious difficillties in the 
way of hon~ogeneous organisation. That with our vast 
interests in all parts of the East, this country should 
still be the only one amongst the chief countries of 
Europe that does not possess any national institution 
for the study of Oriental languages, such as the Ecole 
des Langues Orientales vivantes in  Paris, the Seminar 
fiir orientalische Sprachen in Berlin, and the Oriental 
School in St. Petersburg, is an  almost unaccountabie 
fact, which increases the difficulty of finding at a 
moment's notice suitable men even for the posts which 
are recognised to be most urgently needed. Not that 
a knowledge of the vernacular, though indispensable, 
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is the only qualification for such posts. Apart from own s ins  of omission. 111, 
a healthy and activeplqsiqz~e, capable of standing, not astuteness a n d  patience of 
only the climatic conditions of Persia, but long journeys has not pressed them furtl  
on horseback and a certain amount of hardship, a t r a r ~ ,  encouraged  the  Persi; 
Consul q u i r e s  tact as well as stability of character, 
and political acumen as  well as  a knowledge of com- 
mercial questions. T h e  Foreign Office appears to be 
hesitating between the creation of a separate consular Russ i an  s i d e  of the  balanc8 
service for Persia on the lines of the existing Levant o~timisnl of Downing  S t r t  
consular service (which in practice is now almost entirely Purposes can be equally n 
confined to the Turkish Empire), and an extcnsion of !\'ires of h e r  Persian puppel 
the latter to include Persia within its field. Persia have no interest and no des 
differs in many ways so  widely from Turkey that, i n  taking possess ion  of t h e  sta 
theory and in practice, every argument should tell in cessions to British d ip lor  
favour of separate services, were it not for the  one petrolcum ~ v e l l s  in  Southe 
serious fact which experience has already demonstrated struction of te legraph lines . 
in Turkey, that in a service specialised within too in- to the P e r s i a n  G o v e r ~ ~ n l e n t  
elastic an  area promotion becomes hopelessly blocked, turn away wra th ,  b u t  do tlot 
with the inevitable result of general discontent and a tion of R u s s i a n  power. T h  
gradual deterioration in the class of candidates for 
admission to a service that has lost its popularity. 
However this particular point may be decided, i t  is, a t  that he has, a l l  t h e  t i m e ,  hid 
least, satisfactory to know that the whole question is convention by which she h. 
being seriously considered. For the efficiency of our conditions u n d e r  which Brit 
diplomacy at Teheran must be largely dependent upon 
the efficiency of those who serve it in and outside the 
But far more than to the inefficiency of the  instruments need not look at them in a 
with which it has worked, the failure of our diplomacy surely as Russia's ascen 
in Persia has been, I venture to say, due to the  fact established i n  the North o 
that the British representatives at Teheran have never and w i t h  the increased m 
been provided by Ministers a t  home with any definite be established t h roughou t  
and comprehensive scheme of policy to  work upon. to the confines of India, i 
Russia cannot be blamed for taking advantage of our 
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own sins of omission. Indeed, it does credit to the 
astuteness and ~ a t i e n c e  of her statesmanship that she 
has not pressed them further, but has, on the con- 
trary, encouraged the Persian Government to keep up 
appearances and make a11 occasional pretence of main- 
taining its boasted " policy of equilibrium '' whenever 
the  scale took so sudden and visible a drop towards the 
Russian side of the balance as to disturb the official 
optimism of Downing Street. S o  long as her own 
purposes can be equally well served by pulling the 
wires of her Persian puppets from the wings, she can 
have no interest and no desire to precipitate a crisis by 
taking possession of the stage, and a few timely con- 
cessions to British diplomacy for the working of 
petroleum wells in Southern Persia, or for the con- 
struction of telegraph lines which will ultimately revert 
to the Persian Goverilment and its heirs or assignees, 
turn away wrath, but do not retard the steady consolida- 
tion of Russian power. The Shah comes to London in 
all the state of an independent and puissant Oriental 
monarch, but, none the less, he has, and Russia lrnows 
that he has, all the time, hidden away in his pocltet, the 
convention by which she has made him sign away the 
conditions under which British trade has prospered for 
three-quarters of a century in Persia, 
I t  is  high time to loolr at facts as they are, and not as 
we would all gladly imagine them to be, though we 
need not look a t  them in a spirit of narrowjealousy. As 
surely as Russia's ascendeilcy is to-day impregnably 
established in the North of Persia, so will it gradually, 
and with the increased momentum of acquired speed, 
be established througllout Persia down to the Gulf and 
to the confines of India, if it is given time to extend 
the sphere of its operations through all the different 
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agencies which it controls, either directly o r  through 
the nominal rulers of the country. T h e  official dictztnz 
has, I know, always been that the statz~s q u o  is to be 
maintained and the integrity and independence of 
Persia preserved. But to apply these diplomatic for- 
mulz  even to the present condition of things in Persia 
would be a mere juggling with words, scarcely less 
futile than to apply them to the present condition of 
things in Northern China, with Russia entrenched in 
Manchuria, Germany pushing forward from her naval 
base in Shan-tung, and ourselves in blissful possession 
of a potential health resort a t  Wei-hai-wei. If they 
have any meaning at all, they can only mean that we 
intend to preserve, or rather to restore, the balance of 
power which the statads quo, and the integrity and inde- 
pendence of Persia, had they continued to be realities, 
would have secured. 
To  restore the balance of power in Persia is a 
practical policy, and it is not yet too late t o  prosecute 
it with success. But it can be prosecuted with success 
only by concentrating our efforts within well-defined 
limits. It would be futile to try and ignore Russia's 
ascendency over the Central Government of Persia and 
the political interests she has in the North. They are 
the inevitable result of territorial proximity. W e  have 
similar interests in the South and East, and material 
interests even more important, and of far older date. 
W e  have an old-established trade of considerable value 
to our own industry and of still greater value to India. 
W e  have concessions for the construction of roads which 
should enable our commerce to compete even under the 
altered conditions of the new tariff with the  bounty-fed 
trade of Russia. Our commercial and political base 
is the Persian Gulf. Both politically and commercially 
i t  is of the utml 
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it is of the utmost urgency that we should open up 
roads from our  base into the interior. The new 
" Persian Transports Company " has acquired the 2 
concessions originally granted to the Imperial Bank 
of Persia. If it receives the support and encourage- 
ment it is entitled to expect from the British Govern- 
ment, the  Karun trade route should develop into 
an important artery for the extension of British com- 
merce into the central and wester11 markets of Persia, 
not only through the Bakhtiari mountains to Isfahari 
and Kashan and beyond, but also through Luristan 
to Sultanabad and Kum. It has been officially an- 
nounced that negotiations were in progress for the 
speedy construction of one of those two roads, which 
would ultimately place Teheran itself in communication 
with the Karun river. By the same token these roads 
should serve to  spread British influence alnollg the 
hardy tribesmen who, since the days of Layard, have 
never entirely lost confidence in the magic of the British 
name. Both amongst the inland tribes and the popula- 
tion of the coast we have clients who still look to us  for 
protection against the misgovernment of Teheran-an 
essential fact which the British Minister at Teheran, 
who has to live with the Central Government, finds 
it often more convenient to ignore. We have pledges 
from the Shah's Government which Lord Lansdowne 
has recently again assured us are still binding, wit11 
regard to the construction of railways in the South, 
and the British Government will have to insist that 
they are redeemed as soon as  the Russo-Persian Agree- 
ment expires, which at present closes against us this 
important field of enterprise. W e  have constructed 
through Persian territory, on terms much more favour- 
able to the Persians than those to which Russia has 
X 
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in analogous cases agreed, a telegraph system which 
forms, together with the Gulf cable, a n  indispensable 
section of our Indo-European communications. In 
1902 we undertook to construct a new line, which will 
join the Bushire-Teheran line at Kashan direct from 
the land frontier of British India by way of Kermall 
and Yezd, and 140 miles of it had already been con- 
structed in the first half of 1903. The line is to  be leased, 
like the present ones, to the Indo-European Telegraphs 
Department, and will be maintained by a British staff 
under a British director. The Imperial Bank of Persia 
is a British institution, founded under a Royal Charter, 
and with adequate support it should still be in a position 
to play a considerable part, even in competition with 
its directly state-aided and state-controlled rival, the 
Russian Banque d'Escompte de  Perse. I t  has already 
once secured a lien on the revenues of the  southern 
Custom-houses of Persia, which it lost, however, as 
the first result of the original Russo-Persian loan of 
1900. But those revenues are still, it is believed, un- 
pledged to Russia, though they are already collected 
by the Belgian administration she controls, and every 
effort should be made to  prevent their passing irre- 
vocably into her hands. Lord Cranborne has intimated 
in the House of Commons that there was no  noed to 
assume so confidently as some members had done "that 
the Persian Government were rigidly bound in the matter 
of their finance not to borrow from any other country 
than Russia. " T h e  Shah's Government is  doubtless 
debarred from accepting a loan from any foreign state 
without the consent of Russia, but it is not debarred 
from malring arrangements of a financial character in 
other quarters on a busiiless basis. T o  the strategic 
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nised by our Indian military authorities, has been 
added the commercial importance of a new trade route 
which promises results of increasing value. 
These are some of the most obvious considerations 
which should serve to determine the zone within which 
our influence might be made a living force, by a 
systematic co-ordination and coilcentration of its con- 
stituent elements. I t  should certainly not be unduly 
expanded. From the strategetical point of view, as 
far as  the defence of India itself is concernecl, would 
a line drawn from Seistan to the Persian Gulf so as 
to include Kerman and Bunder Abbas constitute the 
irreducible minimum? Or would it be necessary, for 
the effective protection of our commercial and political 
interests and of our supremacy throughout the Gulf, 
that a broader line should be drawn, for instance, from 
Seistan across to the valley of the Karun river, to  the 
1 north of Yezd and Isfahan and over the Rakhtiari 
! mountains ? It would be rash to attempt to prejudge 
these points. They require the careful study of military 
! and naval experts, and we must be mindful to  cut our 
coat according to our cloth. At the same time we must 
not allow the difficulties and risks which clearly attach 
to any active policy to blind us to the still greater 
difficulties and risks which mere inaction must ultimately 
involve. Within the regions where we have no very 
important material interests to guard, and where the 
ascendency of a great military power need not im- 
mediately or appreciably react upon the safety of India, 
we are certainly not called upon to be more Persian 
than the Persians, o r  to adopt an attitude of gratuitous 
opposition to Russia. But in the East and the South 
of Persia there are regions in which the presence of 
\ Russia, or, for the matter of that, if it were conceivable, 
I 
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the presence of any other foreign military power, would 
inevitably cor~stitlite n gr:ive potential menace to the 
peace ant1 security of Inciia. l'he cluestion of wllere 
the l i n~ i t s  of sucli rvg io~ l s  should be placed is, I 
submit,  one tvllich calls i~rgently for sober examitla- 
tivn ; a n d  i n  frnniing the answer, thosc \\rho are re- 
sponsible for tlle government of India nliist be entitled 
t o  have no lncrc perfunctory sliare. TVhen the anslver 
has been framed it should riot be beyond the resources 
o f  cliplomacy to embody it i n  such a form a s  would 
leave room fur the satisfaction of Russia's legitimate 
ambitions in Persia, if they arc not directed to tlie 
ulterior objects w l ~ i c l ~  Iiussian states~nansllip has 
hi t l~erto officially disclaimed. At ally rate, we should 
then li110~ hen. wc stand. If Russia proved a s  reason- 
able as her cllarnpions anticipate, a big step \vould 
have been taken towards removing the atmosphere of 
suspicior~ wliich, on both sides, at present vitiates our  
r c l a t i c ~ ~ s  with her. If she  should i~nforlunately not 
p r o w  w, we slioulcl be \varnccl in  tirue to take whatever 
steps might  be considcrcd most expedient in relation 
to our Imperial interests and to our  Imperial resources 
for the  defence of our position. T h e  worst of all 
policies is the  policy of drift, for those who take refuge 
in it invariably end by being its dupes. In China it  
led us i11to a maze of embarrassments from which we 
have not  yet extricated ourselves, even with the help 
of the Japanese alliance. Where, as in Southern and  
Eastern Persia, the  security of India i s  concerned it  
might  nleli land us  in a national catastrophe. 
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CHAPTER XXVI 
THE BORDERLAND OF AFGHANISTAN 
F EW spots in the world can afford greater interest to the student of primitive social conditions than 
the rugged belt of territory intervening, on the north- 
west frontier, between the boundaries of direct British 
and of Afghan rule. Of the purely 
military problems connected with the defence of the 
rlorth-west frontier I shall not presume to discuss the 
intricacies, but it requires no expert knowledge to 
appreciate some of the difficulties which underlie them. 
In t h e  deep valleys and secluded glens which nature 
has fenced in with almost inaccessible mountains, wild 
tribes of mixed and mysterious origin, in whom Afghan 
and Tartar  and Turl~oman and Persian and Indian and 
Arab and  Jewish, and whatever other elements go to 
make u p  Pathan blood appear in some remote period to 
have commiagled, have lived their life for centuries, 
knowing naught of the outer world and caring less for 
it. Even amoilgst themselves there was but little inter- 
course except that of intertribal warfare, and the only 
bond that  ever could unite them in cornmoil action was 
the boild of Islam. T h e  little lrno~vledge we have 
of them to-day has been acquired but slowly and at  
great cost, and  amongst all the varied problems with 
which British statesmanship has been confronted in 
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India few have been more arduous than that of shaping 
our policy towards these unruly neighbours with whom 
the necessities of empire have driven US into closer 
and closer contact. Nearly a score of punitive expedi- 
tions during the course of the last half-century have 
only lifted the purdah " of this weird and inhospitable 
region, but gradually, in spite of many blunders on 
our own side and of deep-rooted suspicions and fitful 
outbursts of fanaticism on the other, a compromise has 
been come to, which holds forth, it is hoped, the 
prospect of a durable settlement on practical lines. 
The principle upon which this settlement is based is 
that, whilst we exercise over the tribes the political in- 
fluence requisite to secure our Imperial interests and pay 
them subsidies for the performance of specific services, 
we respect their tribal independence and leave them, as 
far as possible, free to govern theinselves according to 
their own traditions, and to follow their own inherited 
habits of life without let or hindrance. T o  this latitude 
we are, however, compelled, unfortunately, to  place 
certain limits, and the tribes are, just as unfortunately, 
almost compelled from time to time to overstep them. 
The resources of the country are in ordinary seasons 
barely sufficient for the tribesmen to maintain them- 
selves, and in bad seasons the temptation to supply 
deficiencies by raiding, dakoity, and robbery, either 
in British or Afghan territory, becomes almost irresist- 
ible. W e  are bound to defend our own borders, as we 
have disarmed the inhabitants in the districts we ad- 
minister and made ourselves responsible for their 
protection. W e  are equally bound to forbid raiding 
into Afghan territory, as we are ourselves responsible 
for the good behaviour of our frontier tribes uis-h-vis 
the Ameer. The only mode of punishment in serious 
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cases, where pecuniary fines are inadequate, is, and 
must remain, a punitive expedition, or a LLblocl:ade,v 
which is often a mere euphemism for a punitive ex- 
pedition, if it does not, in fact, develop into one. 
Of the tribes that inhabit this belt of so-called "in-  
dependent territory" none are more powerful and none 
cling more fiercely to their own savage ideals of free- 
dom than the  Afridis, six of whose eight clans dwell in 
the mountain fastnesses which command the Khaibar 
Pass. The  Khaibar is the best known, and perhaps 
the most important, of all the passes leading from 
Afghanistan into India. Through the Khaibar the tide 
of conquest from the North has flowed into the plains 
of Hindustan from the earliest times known to history. 
From Alexander the Great and Timur, down to Nadir 
Shah and Ahmed Shah in the eighteenth century, the 
Khaibar has  re-echoed to the tramp of armies and 
the tumult of invading hordes. But they passed and 
left the Afridis practically untouched in possession 
of their mountain strongholds. Three times within the 
last century our armies, reversing the course of his- 
tory, have marched up the Khaibar into Afghanistan, 
though with no purpose of permanent conqtest, and 
the Afridis have only bent to our power without bowing 
to the yoke. Liable as  they have from time to time 
shown themselves to sudden gusts of religious passion, 
they have no permanently fanatical hatred of the un- 
believer, and in the height of the Mutiny, Lawrence 
recruited some 1,500 Afridis, who served bravely and 
loyally on our side in Oudh. To-day several thousands 
of them are to be found in the ranks of our native army. 
Islam,'' nevertheless, remains a good battle-cry, and 
the Mz~llahs who know when to raise it are powerful 
leaders, inasmuch as they are generally wise enough to 
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lead the Afridis in the direction in which the popular 
temper wants to move. The Pan-Islamic revival of the 
last ten years, which was largely promoted by the Iate 
Arneer Abdurrahrnan for his own ends, has unquestion- 
ably produced a new solidarity of feeling between the 
tribes, which is compounded partly of religious feeling 
and partly of an inarticulate patriotism that would 
perhaps equally resent the intrusion of a Mussulman 
foreign power into their mountain homes. For  within 
their own native fastnesses they still preserve the savage 
independence of their tribal life, and if they have 
recognised the necessity of treating with the power that 
holds the plains into which many of their clans are 
from time to time driven to descend en nznsse, as, for 
instance, in the winter of 1902-3, by exceptional drought 
and the failure of the scanty harvest in their own high- 
land valleys, neither force nor diplomacy has yet suc- 
ceeded in disarming their fierce jealousy of alien 
domination. 
The boundary of direct British administration on the 
road to the Khaibar ceases about nine miles north of 
Peshawar, and from that point onward, right through 
the pass to the Afghan frontier, thirty-four miles to 
the north of Peshawar, the road lies through "inde- 
pendent territory." But the road itself is subject to 
British law, for on the road, a t  any rate, the pax 
B~itnlznica must prevail inviolate. From the fort of 
Jamrud, which guards the southern mouth of the 
Khaibar, the road winds in easy gradients up  to the 
narrow defile commanded by the fortified pinnacle of 
Ali Masjid, and then again down a broadening valley 
to the northern exit, where the fort of Lundi Kotal 
overlooks the final descent into Afghanistan. Through- 
out its entire length the road is flanked on either side 
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into Afghanistan. Through- 
)ad is Aanlred on either side 
by stark and desolate hills, rising sometimes in sheer 
~recipices to a height of several hundred feet, whilst 
other and loftier ranges fill in the background in 
deepening shades of distant purple against the azure 
sky. Besides the three chief positions which are per- 
manently garrisoned, small bloclthouses have been 
erected a t  numerous intermediate points, and on the 
days on which caravans pass through, to and from 
~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ,  the silhouette of a detached picket as he 
rises to salute a passing officer, whom the keen Afridi 
eye distinguishes at a thousand yards, stands out on 
the hilltops on every successive coign of vantage within 
probable rifle-shot of the road. For though the tribes 
as a whole may be resolved to discharge loyally their 
engagements to respect the peace of the road, it is well 
never to forget the native proverb, that "the Pathan 
is one moment a saint and the next a deviI." If the 
devil now but rarely brealcs loose in the Khaibar Afridi, 
it is probably due in no small measure to the fact that 
we have been able to enlist the Airidi to exorcise him. 
It  was a bold experiment to place the political system 
we have established in the "independent territory" under 
the protection of tribal levies recruited on the spot. 
The success which has attended these levies has not 
been altogether uniform, partly because the quality of 
the raw material varies considerably in the different 
tribes. I n  the Samana country, for instance, a levy 
has been raised called the Samana Rifles, and it was 
I intended that they should take the place of the regular forces. But so far it has not been considered advisable 
! to withdraw the latter, and it is doubtful whether from 
Fort Lockhart, a t  any rate, they will ever be withdrawn. 
In  Tochi and Wano minor posts are now held by the 
North and South Waziristan Militias, but the chief 
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points are still held by troops. Malalzand, Chakdara, 
and Chitral are also still entirely held by troops, and 
the tribal militia system in that region has only been 
carried so far as to raise some levies for the escort of 
mails. But in the Khaibar the success appears to have 
been complete. From end to end the pass is held by 
two battalions of Khaibar Rifles, under the commancl 
of Major Roos-ICeppel, the political officer for the 
Khaibar, who was the first to raise a similar force, and 
with equal success, in the ICuram valley, which is also 
now entirely held by the Kuram Militia. These tribal 
levies at  their best do not stand in any way on  the 
same footing as the native regiments of the  regular 
Indian Army, and their officers do not claim for them 
the same smartness on parade, nor enforce upon them 
in minor matters the same rigid discipline. But for 
the special worlr for which they are intended in a 
rugged mountain country of which they know every 
goat track and every denizen, their superiority is  un- 
clisputed. With the Afridis the service is growing so 
rapidly in popularity that there is plenty of room now 
to pick and choose recruits, whilst the attractions which 
it holds out to young British officers Ireen for work and 
not afraid of responsibility make the few appointments 
it offers a coveted distinction. It would certainly be 
clifficult to find a more serviceable and a t  the same 
time a more contented - loolring and, indeed, cheery 
body of men than the Khaibar Rifles. Though the 
new organisation has not yet been subjected to the 
critical strain of serious disturbances amongst the 
tribesmen, the confidence and almost childlike affection 
they display towards the half-dozen British officers who 
are the only European stiffening of the  two battalions, 
affords presumptive evidence that the strain would have 
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at least to be very severe and prolonged before their 
loyalty gave way to the pressure of tribal lutiship or of 
religious enthusiasm. 
One of the many riddles of the OrientaI character 
is the relative ease with which the individual Afridi 
who joins a corps like the Khaibar Rifles passes from 
his own native atmosphere of lawlessness into an 
atmosphere of orderly and methodical existence under 
military discipline, and then back aga i~ l  from the latter 
into the former. Curiously enough, this adaptability to 
new conditions appears to exist in  direct proportion to 
the " jungliness " of the recruit. For instance, Zalrlra 
Khel recruits are, according to the testimony of ex- 
~er ienced British officers, more easily brolren in than 
Kambu o r  Kulri Khel recruits, though the former clan 
has served but very littIe in our native army, while the 
two latter have furnished large contingents for half 
a century. Anyhow, and whatever his clan nlay be, 
the life which the Afridi recruit has been accustomed 
to lead until he dons his uniform is one which we can 
hardly realise, or which we are apt to connect only 
with a remote past when our civilisation was in its 
infancy. A s  soon as  the boundary of direct British 
administration is crossed one enters into another world 
of social conditions. The villages at once assume a 
different character. I t  is the Afridi country, and 
every Inan builds unto himself a stronghold as for- 
midable for offensive and defensive purposes as his 
resources enable him to make it. Here, in truth, a 
man's house is his castle. A stout mud wall caref~~lly 
loophoIed surrounds the endosure in which the tribes- 
man lives with his womenkind and such of his children 
and kinsmen a s  are not in a position to set up for thern- 
selves. Above the enclosure rises a square tower built 
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mainly of stone, though generally plastered over with 
mud. I t  serves in ordinary times a s  a look-out from 
which he can match the ~roceedings  of friend and foe 
(and the Afridi's best friend is always a potential foe). 
If there is actually a state of war between him and his 
neighbours it is from the curtained gallery which runs 
round thc upper storey that he directs his operations 
and keeps up a brisk or desultory fire, according to his . 
stock of ammunition, upon every hostile thing that 
lives and moves and has a being. Whcn the tide of 
war turns against him it is the last refuge to which 
he conveys his most cherished goods and chattels, 
animate or  inanimate ; and it is there that, after care- 
fully drawing up  the ladder by which access can alone 
be obtained to it, he and his iighting men make their 
last stand. If the tower has been well provisioned and 
there is an adequate supply of water, the  last stand 
may often be prolonged until assistance is forthcoming 
from without, or  the patience or ammunition of the 
besiegers is exhausted; for these solid towers are 
absolutely proof against mere rifle fire, and many of 
them would even stand a fair amount of shelling from 
field-guns. They can be, and are ltnown to  have been, 
pulled down stone by stone by their assailants, and 
sometimes their occupants have been smoked out by 
piling up a fire against the only aperture. But this 
can hardly be done unless the defenders have spent 
their last shot, for as the floor of the upper gallery 
is loopholed as well as the curtain, the assailants who 
venture up  to the base can be subjected to a direct 
vertical fire. 
Under these conditions regular hostilities are, fortu- 
nately, apt  to be more prolonged than sanguinary, 
but, perhaps for this very reason also, they are 
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a t  least, the  common 
tribesmen, in whom 
remained hitherto al: 
resolves itself into i 
of most quarrels in tl 
civilised W e s t ,  lurks 
In femrue is a precep 
mud fort of a n  Afrid 
salons of Paris .  01 
difficult to ass ign 1i1 
\Vhole vi l lages  talc1 
pitted a g a i n s t  the ot 
fined to t h e  origina 
tather to s o n .  Son 
common d a n g e r  o r  
conlmon advan tage ,  
last for years ,  a n d  
bourly re la t ions  are 
of m u t u a l  helpfuln~ 
existed. But f '  a I 
dung fire," a n d  at 
nounced, a n d  the  ' 
scorching flames. I 
own life, a n d  ready 
combat, he would tl. 
an u n n e c e s s a r y  ri: 
s tabbing him from 
a case occur red  in n 
and waged hithert 
b rought  to a close 
w a s  s a n g u i n a r y .  ( 
trived to dig a tunn 
the two warr ing 
r plastered over with 
- 3 as 1001~-out from 
~ g s  O F  fcjend and foe 
rays a potential foe). 
betwcc,l him and his 
3 gal Ic ry xvhich runs 
li r e d s  l l i S  operations 
fire, according to his 
y 110stilc thing that 
W lLen  the tide of 
Last rcftrge to which 
goods a ~ l d  chattels, 
here th~st ,  after care- 
hich access can alone 
t i  n g  ml e n malce their 
well ysl-uvisioned and 
rater, t h e  last stand 
tan cu i s  forthconling 
a ~ n n l u n i t i o n  of the 
s e  solid towcrs are 
be fire, ;and many of 
11 n t of sllclling from 
knowrl t o  have been, 
k t l  eir assai lants ,  and 
bcct-r s m o k e d  out by 
apcrttlre, But this 
cfe n d ~ r u  h:ivo spent 
>f t h c 2  rx ppcr gallery 
1 ,  tile cissailants who 
Ubj CCtcCL to :1 direct 
I x o s t i l  it  i ~ s  src,  fortu- 
d th;t n sanguinary, 
son aIsc i> ,  thcy are 
1 BLOOD-FEUDS 
317 
i regarded allnost as one of the normal conditions or, 
at least, the common incidents of life. Alnongst these 
tribesmen, in whom the fighting itlstinct of man has 
relnained hitherto absolutely uncurbed, every quarrel 
itself into a blood-feud, and at the bottom 
of most quarrels in  the primitive East, as in the highly 
civilised West, lurks "the eternal feminine," C/ie~.c~ez 
la femnze is a precept which llolds equally good in the 
fort of an Africli chieftain and in the fashionable 
salons of Paris. Once a blood-feud breaks out it is 
difficult to assign limits to its duration or extension. 
Whole villages take sides ; one-half of a valley is 
pitted against the other half; or the feud may be con- 
I fined to the original parties, but handed down from 
father to son. Sometimes, in presence of a greater 
common danger or in the pursuit of some greater 
common advantage, a truce will be called which may 
last for years, and  as long as the truce lasts neigh- 
bourly relations are often restored on the same footing 
of mutual helpfulness as if no blood-feud had ever 
I existed. But  " a  Pathan's enmity smoulders like a 
dung fire," and a t  any moment the truce may be de- 
nounced, and tlle " dung  fire" breaks out again into 
scorching flames. ReclrIess as the Ail-idi may be of his 
own life, and ready to face his foe, if need be, in open 
combat, he would think it mere foolishness to run such 
an unnecessary risk if he could find a chance of 
stabbing him from behind in the dark. Only last year 
a case occurred in which a blood-feud of long standing, 
and waged hithcrto with only desultory vigour, was 
brought to a close by a stratagem as successful as it 
was sanguinary. One of the parties to the feud con- 
trived to dig a tunnel under the fields which separated 
the two warring houses up  to the chamber which 
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did duty as a mosque where his enemy worshipped. for safety. Agi 
Through this tunnel he crept up with his own friends Lundi Kotal, w 
and shot his foe and all his foe's kinsmen from behind sunshine about 
whilst they were at prayer. chrysantf~emumr 
At the same time the Afridi has his code of honour, had laid out i r  
elastic as it may seem to us, and to that code he conforms, quite a brisk fu 
as a rule, rigidly. He observes equally strictly the two villages in 
limitations which the peace of the road has imposed / ever hits the for 
up011 him since the Khaibar Pass came under our con- I an accident, S o  1 
b trol - his self-restraint being presumably not a little considered to bc 
\ fortified by the lrnowledge that in this matter punish- cautions having i 
tnent, usually in the shape of a heavy fine or the Connaught  was T; burning of the ofiender's house, follows the offence both with t h e  Duche 
during his visi 
Delhi Durbar .  
It i s  froin sucl. 
that the Afridi- 




; I )  surely and speedily. On the road itself, and on a strip 
about IOO yards wide on either side, no feud can be 
I i 1 1  pleaded in justiiication of any deed of violence. Not 
i i  only has the Afridi learnt to respect the neutrality of the 2 '  i 1 1  
only a couple of hundred yards apart which had been rules a n d  regula 
for a long time at deadly feud. Each party had dug a dictory qualitie5 
shelter trench reaching from his tower to the road, by straightforwardr 
which he could pass to and fro without being exposed extent  will try t 
to his enemy's fire. .Once on the road both parties to their s t anda~  
could and were bound to meet only on a peace footing. 
A little further on a man with a rifle was squatting on a Even when he i: 
bank close to the road. He  was covering his family, a s o r t  of dual e 
who were at work tilling their fields. From that which h i s  sense 
neutral ground he could watch in absolute safety for refused leave tc 
any enemy who might be lurking to raid his people, village, where ; 
and though he could not fire a shot from where he had specially acute ! 
talren up his position, he had only to run forward a few tuni ty  of joinin] 
yards to do so in case of need, and then run back again fight appears to 
I I 
road, but he has been quick to turn it to account on 
i 
! occasion for his own relief. Going into the Khaibar we 
1 
passed two strollgholds at the southern mouth of the pass 
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for safety. Again, at the other end of the Pass at 
Lundi Kotal, whilst I was sauntering in the morning 
sunshine about the trim little garden, bright with 
chrysanthen~ums and marigolds, which our officers 
had laid out in the central quadrangle of the fort, 
quite a brisk fusillade was being carried on between 
two villages in the valley outside; but if a stray shot 
! ever hits the fort, it may be talren for granted that it is an accident. So thoroughly is the peace of the Khaibar 
i considered to be at present assured that, special pre- 
cautions having of course been duly taken, the Duke of 
Connaught was able to explore the Pass in company 
with the Duchess and spend a night at Lundi Kotal 
during his visit to the north-west frontier after the 
Delhi Durbar. 
It is from such surroundings as I have just described 
that the Afridi-cruel, turbulent, vindictive, reared to 
know no law but his own fierce will and revelling in 
his latvlessness-passes into the confinement of the 
barrack-room and the still closer confinement of its 
rules and regulations. A strange compound of contra- 
dictory qualities, he respects the spirit of justice and 
straightforwardness of his British masters, and to some 
extent will t ry  to conform his behaviour towards them 
to their standard, though he would never dreain of 
imitating them in his relations with his own people. 
Even when he is serving with the colours he is leading 
a sort of dual existence. One of the severest tests to 
which his sense of discipline can be put is when he is 
refused leave to go  back for a few days to his own 
viIlage, where a blood-feud has happelted to reach a 
specially acute stage. That he s h o ~ ~ l d  have an oppor- 
tunity of joining his people and taking a hand in the 
i fight appears to him the most excellent justification for 
I 
I 
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asking for leave. But when his petition is refused he 
malres no demur, though his whole being leaps to the 
fray. H e  accepts his officer's ruling docilely, nay, 
almost cheerfully, and will do so as long as  he is "in 
the regiment," just as he will wear its uniform with a 
certain air of jaunty smartness, however irlrsome it may 
be to his limbs. But the moment he is released from 
service, whether merely on furlough or permanently at 
the expiry of his term, he steps off proudly in his 
loose-flowing, ragged garments and carries back to his ' 1 1 walled village in the highlands not only the tall, well- 
b 
t knit frame of an essentially manly race, matured and + 
1 
P developed by a course of soldierly training, but sharper ~ wits and added knowledge-all, however, to be applied 5 
, I once more to the gratification of the same fierce instincts 
I 
which have been inbred in him and his forefathers for 
% 1 
I If thepz6rcZnh has to some extent been lifted from the 
weird borderlaild of Afghanistan, upon Afghanistan , i 
I itself it has fallen once more in almost impenetrable 
I folds. From the hills above Lundi Kotal the road may 
be seen winding down the valley to the point where the 
actual dominions of the Ameer begin. Beyond that point 
the eye ranges over the valley through which the Kabul 
river draws a thread of silver to the mountains which 
, , 
conceal the city of Kabul itself, and beyond them again 
to the perpetual snows of the I-Iindu Kush in the 
direction of Balkh, whilst on the extreme right the 
glistening pealrs of Kafiristan close the horizon. It 
is a wonderful panorama of browns and blues and 
purples, of sun-scorched plains and rare oases, of 
rugged ranges intersected by deep glens and gloomy 
valleys, of mountains piled upon mountains in the far 
distance up to the very roof of the world. And from 
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the  s t r ange  beauty of this grand and spacious lands- 
cape  one's thoughts  travel involuntarily to the human 
interests bound up with it and  the mystery in  which 
they  lie enveloped. Fo r  there are fern regions, so 
closely connected with us b y  political ties of the first 
importance, with which we are  so remotely in touch. 
For years  past  no European has crossed that frontier- 
only  a stone's-throw from the  outposts of our Empire 
-except t h e  few foreigners whom the Ameer has en- 
g a g e d  for special purposes, and  their opportunities of 
communicat ing freely with the  outer world are few and 
far between. Twice a week a British escort receives at 
the frontier from an Afghan escort the trading caravan 
which b r ings  down the  produce of Afghanistan into the 
marlrets of India, and hands over to its charge the return 
caravan which supplies the demands of Kabul upon the 
industries of t he  West.  The  caravans pass up and down 
the road th rough  the Khaibar  with undisturbed regu- 
larity - hundreds  of huge, ungainly, Central Asian 
camels, sure-footed a n d  powerful, bellowing and gur- 
g l i n g  under their heavy loads ; big, broad-shouldered, 
bearded Afghans,  shouting and blustering, but good- 
humoured  a n d  easy-going, though their bold, erect 
carr iage a n d  the  fierce gleam of their eyes show the 
mettle they  are  made of; and, every year at the approach 
of winter, hundreds of Pathan tribesmen-Mohmands, 
Hazaras-from the  other side of the frontier, who troop 
down  with their women a n d  children, some of them 
blue-eyed a n d  fair-haired like a northern race, with 
their herds  and their flocks, with their dogs and their 
cats  a n d  their hens, t o  seek work and to find pastures 
for a time in the  milder climate of the Peshawar plain. 
But  when the  caravans have passed the IChaibnr closes 
its gates a n d  all intercourse ceases as absolutely as if 
Y 
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there were a Great Wall of China between India and 
Afghanistan. News, of course, does filter through, 
and the Indian Government has its own channels of 
communication, official and unofficial, with the Ameer 
and his people. But though there is an abundance of 
bazaar gossip at Peshawar and the whole frontier yields 
a lively crop of rumours, the amount of trustworthy 
information which can be obtained with regard to what 
is going on in Afghanistan is singularly scanty. Yet 
in the recesses of this untamed country which has sur- 
vived in the heart of Asia as a relic of bygone ages, 
inaccessjble to telegraphs and railways, or, indeed, to 
any but the ~varlilre appliances of the modern world, I 
great changes have been taking place during the last 
twenty years, of which the consequences may affect us at 
any moment more closely than anything that has hap- 
pened during the same period in countries with which 
we are in  daily and  intimate contact. 
CHAPTER XXVII 
AFGHANISTAN AS A MILITARY STATE 
I T nlay still be too early to assume that Habibullah has finally overcome the dangers which beset the 
path of a new ruler in a country such as Afghanistan, 
and he has  yet to  show the stuff of which he is made. 
But the fact that  the internal peace of Afghanistan has 
remained unbrolten since his succession to the throne 
bears, at any  rate, very striking testimony to the 
constructive statesmanship of his father and to the 
solidity of the work he achieved. Two yyars have 
now elapsed since Abdurrahman died, and the autho- 
rity of Kabul  over the tribes remains in all appear- 
ances as unskaken as when the heavy hand of the old 
Ameer was still upon them. Abdurrahman's life 
work has survived, and unless his successor destroys 
it: by mistakes of his own making, its enduring effects 
must be such as to malru it worth while to recall briefly 
what that life work was. 
The  great  change which the late Ameer wrought 
during his twenty years' reign may be described 
roughly as  the transformation of Afghanistan from a 
feudal into a despotically-centralised military state. Ab- 
durrahman became in fact a s  well as in name the first 
Alneer of Afghanistan. Refore him there were ollly 
Amecrs of Kabul, and their position towards the great 
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tribal chieftains of Afghanistan was not unlike that of 
King John towards his barons, or of Runjeet Singh in , 
his early days towards the Sikh chiefs. An Ameer of 
Kabul was merely the head, sometimes merely the 
figure-head, of a confederacy of powerful clans. For 
twenty years Abdurrahman applied all the ruthless 
energies of his masterful nature t o  the task of curbing 
the power of the great Afghan tribes, who were a 
continual menace to the supremacy of Kabul, and 
consolidating his own authority so that it should pass 
undiminished to his successor. The chiefs of every 
rival clan were either obliterated or otherwise rendered 
harmless, until there remained not, i t  would seem, in 
the whole of Afghanistan, a single leader capable of 
heading a great rebellion. Within i ts  frontiers there 
was none left to challenge the Ameer. Ayub Khan and 
Ishak Khan were merely fugitives living in exile, the 
one on British and the other on Russian soil, and though 
either of them could no doubt always have rallied a 
number of malcontents to his standard, he would have 
been regarded with suspicion by the bulk of the people 
as the agent and tool of England or of Russia. The  
means by which the great Ameer achieved his purpose 
were not those which commend themselves to the 
humanitarian conceptions of Western civilisation, but 
they were those with which his own people had been 
familiar, and which his predecessors had practised with 
more or less thoroughness and success from times 
immemorial. 
I' The virtues of God a r e  pardon and pity ; they never were 11line ; 
They have never been ours, in a kingdom all stained with the blood of 
our kin, 
Where the brothers embrace in the war-field, and the reddest sword 
must witl." 
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A GREAT AMEER 325 
An autocrat by temperament, Abdurrahman Khan 
was also, unquestionably, a great Afghan patriot, and 
if he  sl~ranlr  at nothing to  tame the refractory spirit 
of his fierce tribesmen, it was not merely for the gratifi- 
cation of his own personal ambition, but, as he once 
admitted to one of the few Europeans whom he some- 
times admitted to his confidence, because he realised 
that the i~ldepeildcnce of Afghanistan could never 
survive in present circumstances such another period 
of internal strife and turmoil as  followed the death 
of Dost Mahornmed in 1863, the last Afghan ruler who 
had died in peaceful possession of his throne. The 
most potent instrument, besides llis own genius, by 
which this great tra~lsfornlation was effected was the 
standing army, which was during his reign for the first 
tirnc created, controlled, and paid directly by the Aincer, 
in substitutioil for the old feudal levies, which yielded 
to Rztbul only an indirect and uncertain allegiance 
conditioiled upon the loyalty of tho tribal chiefs to 
their overlord. T h e  whole of his policy tvas shaped 
to the  pursuit of this one end. He  struck down his 
rivals and chastised the tribes with iillplacable severity. 
H e  ruled his people with a rod of iron. He created 
huge trade monopolies to feed his Treasury and defray 
the expenses of his army. It was to provide his army 
with modern tveapons that practically the whole of 
the subsidies wcrt: devoted which he received from 
the Indian Govcrnment-at first ttvelve, and after the 
Durand Agreenlent of 1893 eightcen lalrhs per annum. 
It was to increase the mobility of his army that l ~ e  
built roads such as notv cross the I-Iindu Kush from 
K a l ~ u l  into North-Western Alghanistan and towards 
the Oxus, and from Jellalabad to Bndalcshan, in one 
direction, and in another into Kafiristan. Evcry other 
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question was subordinated to the one great purpose he 
had in view. That he was not indifferent to frontier 
questions per se he took care to show us when the 
Dursnd boundary between Afghan and British territory 
had to be traced out, not on paper, but on the spot. 
But the Penjdeh incident left him cold;  he  showed 
little enthusiasm for the strategic frontier we secured 
for him on the Parnirs; for he dreaded international 
complications which would have delayed and hampered 
his work of internal reconstruction. 
In short, a s  the result of twenty years' effort he was 
able to bequeath to his son a new Afghanistan widely 
different from the loose aggregate of unruly tribes 
which constituted his precarious kingdom when, after 
ten years' exile, he first set foot again in Kabul in 1880. 
Whatever difficulties Habibullah may still have to con- 
tend with, it may safely be said that they will be rather 
of his own creation than the outcome of organic con- 
ditions such a s  his predecessors had invariably to deal 
with on their accession to the Durani throne. H e  
founcl the whole machinery of government in working 
order, and his father, who during his last years had 
delegated to him an increasing share of his authority, 
had initiated him, at least, into the technical working 
of it. The weak point of the late Ameer's system is 
that he has made Afghanistan a "one man show." 
No one in the  country has any power whatever except 
the Arneer himself. Whether Abdurrahman succeeded 
in imparting also to his son something of the genius 
which, in Oriental countries especially, constitutes the 
indispensable driving power of so highly centralised 
a system of government yet remains to be seen. 
Abdurrahman was one of the  greatest men of his 
time, and he was able to run the machine he created 
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single-handed. Ijut wli:~t ~1~11:isty can show a sue- 
cession oC rt:ally g:.rcat men? Habibullah has not yet 
show11 tllat Iic is cast in tlic saInc rnould as  llis 
It  is doubtful wllethcr he has yct really shnlcen hinl- 
I self frce frnm the cxt:cssivc iixoriousness in wllicll 
he a t  first indulged. Ct:rtainly not all of the llulnerous 
marriages 111! 1 1 ; ~ ~  r:ontrnctcrl liavc bccn nznringej & 
~aiso~l ,  a n d  one, al least, ol  tl~osc in which he, pre- 
sumably, consulLcd liis lloart alone is reputed to have 
been very unpvpulal'. UuL if he has sl~oxvn himself 
more pr012cto self-jllrl ulgcncc a11c1 jndolcnce tllan the 
late Amccl-, tllc v igo~rr  hc has recently displayed in 
dealing wit11 the turl>ulcnt c1t:mcnts which 1n11st for a 
long time contillue to survive atnongst x population so 
naturally prone to Ia~vlessl~css a  the Afghans, proves 
r 
i 
that lie has nu rootccl objection to the methods which 
! 
I 
however repugnant they 111ny be to our Western ideas, 
j proved undeniably effective in Abclurrahman's hands. 
I t  is certainly worthy of note that, so far, the rumours 
which have from time to tirne circulated as to impend- 
ing  trouble at I I :~bul  llave been mainly concernecl with 
the gro\vth of dangerous rivalries within his own irn- 
mediate family rather than with ally synlptoms of 
disloyalty amongst thc tribes, I-Iis second brother, 
Nasrullal~, is reputed to be active and ambitious, and a 
faction of increasing inllucnce appcars to be attaching 
itself to thc fortunes of another and younger brother, 
Muhammed Urnar, wllo c~ljoys over his elders tlie 
advantage of royal descent rlirough his mother as 
well a s  t l~wugl i  his fatlior, and who, though still a 
mere lad, is being c;irel'ully trt~ined by 14s mother to 
1 
;i fulfil ~vortllily ~111: lofty aspiratiuns she ciltertains for 
his future. I'Itjw l:~r Filmily clisscl~sions, slloulcl they 
ever breali our. i11cu upt:n conflict, would revive the 
f 
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old intertribal strife, or  how far they might provoke Afghans who : 
new dangers by dividing the army into hostile factions, we11 a s  in  184: 
it is hard to say. Habibullah is admittedly the most ilI-armed and  
popular of all the late Arneer's sons, and in case of a n  c o ~ n r n o n  enmj 
outbrealr in Kabul and fighting amongst the brothers 
a large majority of the tribesmen, far and  near, would defences of Al 
probably stand by the present Arneer. This might behind t h e m  i 
not be the case with the troops, some of whose leaders 
are more or less closely conilected with one or other of 
his brothers. Ameer Muhammed Khan, who commands and  t ra ined  t 
the forces at Kabul, is a father-in-taw of HabibulIah, modern warfa 
and therefore presumably bound to  his cause. But Mir 
Ala Khan, who, though no longer actively employed, no authoritatir 
has still some influence with the army, and Bahawal and I believe 
Khan, who commands at Asmara, are believed to favour aware, h a v e  f 
Nasrultah Khan. O n  the other hand, men like below the ms 
Muharnmed Hussein Khan and some other high official gathered from 
and non-official Serdars of Kabul are suspected of 
leaning towards young Muhammed Umar. The  Uzbelr 
chiefs of Turlrestan, who are not Afghans, might 85,000 and  gc 
possibly try to set up Gholam AIi Khan as their ruler. regiments  of i 
But these are speculative contingencies, and for the  but numberin;  
present the important fact remains, that, for the first of cavalry a b  
time for a t  least a century, the succession to the  throne of artillery oi 
of Afghanistan has been peacefully effected. also a picked 
The great change wrought during Abdurrahinan's each I ,000 m e  
reign in the internal condition of Afghanistan has  men s t rong,  
naturally been accompanied by a proportionate change addit ion to tht 
in her positioil as a factor in the problem of Central men performi 
Asian politics. W e  have learnt more than once, at another force 
heavy cost to ourselves, the power of resistance which 20,000 a re  un 
such a brave and  warlike race as the  Afghans possesses 
in the inhospitable desert and mountain fastnesses that basis. But i 
form so large a part of their patrimony. Yet the tribal chiefs. 
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Afghans who faced us in battle in 1878 and in 1880, as 
well as in 1842, were but a heterogeneous colIection of 
ill-armed a n d  ill-trained tribesmen whom the bond of 
cornmon enmity to the infidel invader alone brought 
into temporary community of action. To-day the natural 
defences of Afghanistan are as formidable as ever, and 
behind them is arrayed a far more formidable fighting 
force, organised on a much larger scale and on sounder 
lines, equipped in great part with nlodern weapons, 
and trained to some extent, at least, in the art of 
I modern warfare. 
With regard to tbe constitution of the Ameer's army 
no authoritative information has ever been made public, 
and I believe that the estimates which, so far as I am 
1 aware, have hitherto been published are consiclerably 
I below the mark. The following details have been 
I gathered from sources which I have every reason to 
regard as trustworthy. The peace strength of the 
Ameer's regular army must be estimated at between 
85,000 and go,ooo men of all arms. I t  consists of 80 
regiments of infantry, varying a great deal in strength, 
but numbering on an average 700 men ; 40 regiments 
of cavalry about 400 men strong; and IOO batteries 
of artillery of 6 guns and 100. men each. There is 
also a picked force of four regiments of infantry, 
each 1,000 men strong, and three of cavalry, each 800 
men strong, which forms the Ameer's bodyguard. In 
addition to the regular forces there is a force of 30,000 
men performing gendarmerie and police duties, and 
another force of about the same strength, of whom 
20,000 are uilmounted and 10,000 mounted, belonging 
nomillally to  the Khans ancl organised on a tribal 
basis, But they are not actually controlled by the 
tribal chiefs. They resemble the Imperial Service 
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troops of the native rulers in India, with this difIerence, 
however, that they are permanently employed on the 
same duties as the Ameer's regular troops in distant 
parts of the country, generally far removed from their 
own districts of origin. 
In time of war every adult male Afghan, unless 
physically altogether incapacitated, is expected to join 
the Ameer's standards, and  as it is the natural pro- 
pensity of all Afghans to take u p  arms in case of a dis- 
turbance, few of them \vould fail to anscvet to the call. 
As a matter of fact every young Afghan has a rifle of 
his own, and knows more or less how to use it. More- 
over, the Arneer has, it is believed, a sufficient stock of 
arms and ammunition to supply the whole male popu- 
lation. The arms at  present in the hands of the tribes- 
men are not of a very modern type, but most of them 
are a t  any rate breechloaders. The Ameer's own 
factories are said to be able to turn out two guns and 
loo rifles with the necessary ammunition every week, 
and there can be no doubt that they have produced for 
many years past under the superintendence of skilled 
Europeans very large quantities, not only of rifles. and 
field-guns, but of heavy ordnance, whilst there has 
been at the same time a constant importation of all the 
newest types of armament from Europe and especially 
from Germany. But even if the Ameer is in a position 
to-day to arm in case of need the whole male population 
of Afghanistan, it does not follow that he  would consider 
it politic to do so. Even now he would probably not 
care to put the IoyaIty of all the tribes to the same test. 
The late Ameer raised a force of 400,000 Alijnris, or 
tribal levies, against the Hazaras, and though they 
actually started on the expedition only a portion of 





the latter i n  rr tt'g 
endurance, or  c"' 
lvarfare+ 
The c o m m i s ~ ~ a  
an army are  1 1 2 ~ ~  
of an army orgS1 
j is repor ted t o  11 
' the Afghans  arc  
that they call r1J 
nearly as fast a s  
I rifles, ammuniti  
their backs." 7 
. merely to the  1.r 
1 soldiers. I-It3 ctl 
1 horses and n a r t l ~  
stores of g r ; ~ i r ~  
Afghan a r m y  
{vould lack ttr-gl 
ing qualities uf 
"Je A ~ ~ h a n r  UII~CSS 
>cctcd to join _ i s  e+l  
rlatural pro. -' t!3L: r:ase of a dis. 
I s  ' 
t?t- to the call. Qns*Q 
' f g h z t  f 1 has a rifle of 
'* tc> . r ~ c  it. More. 
a su f i ic icnt  stock of 
" xvl-tc> 1 L: lllille popu. 
Elatlcl."; ~ ) f  the tribcs- 
2 ,  but 1110st of thcm 
? 
S h r -  bmccr's own 
n nut: t;>vo jlrl111s and 
U.11 <tic, rz i!VCry wCCk, 
y hawk:. produced for 
rite, c-c:rlt:u of skilled 
,t on of rilles and 
e, w l l i l ~ t  therc has 
~ p ~ ~ t ~ k t i ~ ~ ~  of all the 
I r O p C :  t z  nrl cspucially 
meer i s  i n  a yosition 
101 c 1x3 ;l l c  py~ulation 
.at I l c  xvr>ultl consider 
wu ~ x l c i  probably not 
bes t r a  t l l ~ :  snmetcst, 
400, cxxul (ijllris] or 
5 ,  ZLXI d t110~1g11 they 
1 only a portiu11 of 
to f i g l x t i ~ r ~ .  Some 
T H E  WAR-STRENGTH O F  T H E  ARMY 331 
competent authorities hold that Abdurrahman was not 
indulging in a mere idle boast when he tallred about 
placing I,OOO,OOO figllting men in the field in the event 
of a great war. But the view generally taken by those 
best acquainted with the situation in Afghanistan is that 
Habibullah ~vould not attempt to raise more than ~OO,OCIO 
Alijnris for a campaign against a foreign power. Of 
these 200,ooo might take the field in combination with 
roo,ooo regular and irregular troops, while 50,000 regu- 
lars and irregulars and 100,000 Alijaris would be left to 
maintain the Ameer's authority at Kabul and in the pro- 
vinccs. Thc  whole of both field and garrison forces 
could probably be armed with modern weapons, and 
though the tribal Levies have not had the same military 
training as the standing army, they are not inferior to 
the latter in rough fighting qualities, or in mobility and 
endurance, o r  even in the elementary tactics of mountain 
warfare. 
T h e  commissariat and transport requirements of such 
an army are naturally very simple compared with those 
of an army organised on Western lines. Abdurrahman 
is reported to have himself said : " Praise be to God, 
the Afghans are such a strong, healthy, hearty people 
J that they can run over the mountains of their country 
i nearly as fast a s  horses, carrying at the same time their 
rifles, ammunition, tents, and food for a few days on 
their backs." Nevertheless the old Atneer did not trust 
I merely to the broad shoulders and stout sinews of his soldiers. H e  always kept something like 50,000 pack- 
I horses and mules ready for transport service, and large 
stores of grain for the troops. The weak point of the 
I Afghan army is presulnably its oficers. Not that they 
would lack to-day any  inore than in the past the fighe- 
ing qualities of their race. But the larger the number 
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of troops they would have to handle, the more they 
would probably suffer in contact with the forces of a 
civilised power from the want of a n y  but the most 
elementary training in the modern science of war. 
The late Ameer set his face resolutely against either 
sending young Afghans abroad to be trained in the 
military schools of the West, or importing foreign 
officers into Afghanistan to act as military instructors. 
Habibullah shows no signs of departing from his 
father's policy in this respect. No doubt under the 
stress of war the Afghans will produce military leaders 
of great capacity as they have done before, but an 
efficient corps of regimental officers, especially for the 
scientific branches of the army, and, above all, a n  efficient 
staff cannot be extemporised nowadays on the battle- 
field against an enemy who starts with the initial ad- 
vantage of possessing them. 
The expenditure incurred in the creation, equipment, 
and maintenance of the new Afghan army, as it exists 
to-day, has unquestionably been very heavy, and 
Abdurral~man admitted a s  much. But the strain which 
it is supposed to have placed upon the Afghan Treasury 
would appear to have been exaggerated. I t  has 
certainly not proved so far intolerable. For  in con- 
sequence of certain differences with the  Indian Govern- 
ment, the Kabul Government, both under the late and 
under the present Arneer, has allowed considerable 
arrears of subsidy to accumulate untouched in the 
hands of the Indian Government, and  seems to be in 
no hurry to secure their release. Of late, and  in con- 
sequence, perhaps, of our experiences in the Transvaal, 
there has been a disposition on the part of the Indian 
authorities to exercise more control over the transit 
of war materials from Europe into Afghanistan. But, 
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in view of our treaty engagements with the Ameer, 
this is a very delicate matter, and even if all further 
importation ceased, Afghan armaments have already 
assumed such proportions that an invading army would 
find itself confronted to-day in Afghanistan with a task 
at least as formidable as  that which for nearly three 
years taxed the military resources of our Empire in 
South Africa. It would have to contend with natural 
difficulties as great, and with an  enemy as mobile and 
as well armed, and perhaps even more fiercely tenacious 
of his independence. 
T HE transformation of Afghanistan into the highly centralised and essentially military state, which 
Abdurrahman has bequeathed to the present Ameer, 
is a fact with which the neighbours of Afghanistan 
must reckon. For ourselves, so long as Ilabibullah 
abides by the engagements he has inherited from his 
father, it is a fact which in itself need cause us no 
apprehension. The maintenance of a strong and 
friendly Afghanistan as warden of the passes which 
have served from times immemorial as the highways 
of invasion from the North into the plains of Hindustan 
is now one of the fundamental principles of British- 
Indian statesmanship. Whether the Kabul-Kandahar 
line should or should not be still regarded as the real 
line of defence of our Indian Empire, so far a s  the 
north - west frontier is concerned, there is a general 
consensus that, even from the purely military point of 
view, we could wish for nothing better than that the 
Afghans should prove capable of holding it themselves, 
and should hold it themselves a t  least until they of their 
own free will invoke our co-operation. If a serious 
crisis were to occur to-morrow, involving a conflict 
between the two great European Empires in Asia, there 
is every reason to believe that the Afghans could 
and would offer a n  uncompromising resistance to any 
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attempt on  the  part of Russia to force her way tllrough 
Afghanistan. The  late Ameer never left room for any 
doubt as to what his decision would be if ever he were 
compelled to choose between Russia and England, alld 
not  only is there 110 reason to believe that the present 
Arneer's choice would be different, but even if there 
were, i t  would certainly be a very dangerous experi- 
ment for him to attempt to depart abruptly from the 
policy laid down by his father, and endorsed by the 
vast  majority of the chiefs and people of Afghanistan. 
But  the  issue is not likely to be raised in such a direct 
and  simple form. 
Russ ia  realises as fully as we do the change that has 
taken place during the last two decades in the forces 
of resistance which Afghailistan can oppose to any 
foreign invader. She  has herself, it is true, during 
the  same period materially strengthened her strategic 
position on the Afghan border. Her Trans-Caspian 
Railway, which now extends froin l<hrasnovodslr to 
Tashkend, has  been carried down to the very frontier 
of Afghanistan by a branch line to Kushk, and railway 
materials are stored there which would enable her at 
a n y  moment to push it on to 1-Ierat as quickly as we 
could push our own line on from Chaman to Kandahar. 
B u t  th is  no longer satisfies her. The Trans-Caspian 
line is not connected with the main system either in 
Europe  or in  Asia, and the passage across the Caspian 
involves transhipment at either end, She is engaged 
at present i n  repairing this lacuna by the construction 
of a new line, which will connect the eastern section 
of the TransCaspian Railway at Tashkend with the 
Siberian Railway. The new lille starts from Orenburg 
(which is already connectecl with Samara on the maill 
line from Moscow to Vladivostok and Port Arthur), 
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and runs through Orsk, Irghiz, Kazalinsk, Perovsk, 
and Turkestan .to Tashlrend. Its completion may be 
looked for within the next two years, and then the 
Russia l~s  will have two alternative routes by which 
from the east, a s  well as from the west, they can feed 
their strategic base at Kushlr, in the event of military 
operations against Afghanistan. I d o  not wish to 
convey that this new railway is being built solely or 
chiefly for strategic purposes. I t  forms, no doubt, part 
of M. Witte's scheme for the economic development 
of Asiatic Russia, and especially of the great cotton- 
producing region of Central Asia. But  the effect of 
its construction upon the strategic situation must not 
be overlooked. The natural advantages which Russia 
already enjoys are sufficiently great. While Southern 
Afghanistan is protected by a series of inountain 
barriers, Northern Afghanistan lies open to easy in- 
vasion along almost the whole length of the Russo- 
Afghan frontier. From the valleys of the Heri-Rud 
and the Murghab the province of Herat can be overrun 
at any moment by Russian troops, and from the banks 
of the Oxus Ballch and Badakshan are equally at 
their mercy. Ishak Khan, the great-grandson of Dost 
Muhammed, is  now merely a harmless refugee on 
Russian soil, but in the van of a conquering Russian 
army he might once more become a dangerous pre- 
tender, not without a following amongst the tribesmen 
of Northern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, though she 
could count upon easy successes in the North, it may 
be doubted whether Russia would feel inclined in any 
circumstances deliberately to challenge the defensive 
resources of Afghanistan. That she naturally wishes 
to be in a position to strike effectively in an emergency 
at  Afghanistan, and through Afghanistan at us, may 
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be taken for granted. But Russian expansion has 
wisely learnt to seek the line of least resistance, and 
that line is certainly not at present to be found in 
~ f ~ h a n i s t a n ,  but further west, in Persia, or further 
east, in the outlying provinces of the Chinese Empire. 
Patience, tenacity, and self-restraint have become the 
dominant characteristics of Russian policy, together 
with astonishing flexibility in  the adaptation of new 
and varying methods to the pursuit of unchanging 
aims. The last Kusso-Turlrish war seems to have 
permanently driven home upon her the lesson which 
the Crimean war had already taught her. Since then 
she has substituted for the old policy of overt conqrlest 
by force of arms that of subtle conquest by pacific 
absorption. The results which she has thus achieved 
are already a splendid monument to the wisdom of that 
statesmanlilre evolution, and one can well understand 
that she should seek for an opportunity of applying the 
same policy in Afghanistan, ~ ~ h i c h  has already borne 
such admirable fruits at Teheran and Peking. For 
that, it may safely be asserted, is the object which she 
has primarily in view in endeavouring to open LIP once 
more direct relations with the Government of Kabul. 
For this very reason also it behoves us to exercise the 
greatest cautiorl in  dealing with the overtures she may 
make to us in this direction. W e  stand on solid ground 
in refusing to release her from the assurances she has 
repeatedly given to us  that she considers Afghanistan 
entirely outside her sphere of action. 
Kabul in existing circulnstances is the very last place 
which we should willingly suffer to be transformed into 
a centre of diplomatic rivalry. We have ourselves 
refrained from maintaining any European representative 
at the Ameer's Court, because we have good grounds 
z 
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for believing that the obvious advantages of such repre- 
sentation would be outweighed by less obvious, but a t  
bottom far more serious, risks. A native Indian ofiicial 
may suffice for the ordinary purposes of commullication 
between the Indian Government and the Ameer, though 
his position is certainly not a very dignified one. H e  
is generally a very respectable regimental officer selected 
from the native army, but for that very reason he is 
seldom a man of any great political experience. H e  is 
treated at Kabul with all outward signs of deference, 
but the Ameer sees to it that his Afghans hold as little 
intercourse with him as possible. The Ameer, on the 
other hand, has a Kabuli representative at the seat 
of government in India, who moves about freely and is 
subjected to no restrictions whatever. Not content with 
this, Abdurrahman moved heaven and earth to have 
a representative of his own in London, who could com- 
municate direct with the Imperial Government over the 
Viceroy's head. Afghans of all classes travel and reside 
wherever they lilre in India, whilst if one of our 
officers is caught straying a mile or two over the 
Afghan boundary, he is immediately arrested and 
treated often with great indignity. Only last winter 
Colonel A. C. Yate, in command at Chaman, and 
brother to the Agent-General for Baluchistan, was 
made prisoner by a party of Afghans, whilst taking 
a morning ride, unarmed, across the plain, in the 
course of which he had trespassed into Afghan territory, 
and conveyed to the fort at Baldalr Spin, where he 
was detained for some weelrs within sight of his o v n  
lines, until the vigorous remonstrances of the Viceroy 
obtained orders from Kabul for his release. Such a 
state of things may be just tolerable in existing circum- 
stances, but it would be quite intolerable if a Russia11 
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representative were accredited at  Kabul, and Russians 
were allowed to g o  to and fro in Afghanistan. 
It is true that Russia avowedly limits her desire for 
direct intercourse with Kabul to commercial and frontier 
matters. But, without seeking to impugn the sincerity 
of that limitation, it implies a serious departure from 
the Russian pledge to desist even from the exchange 
of mere letters of ceremony with Kabul, and one may 
well aslr how the line is to be drawn nowadays be- 
tween comn~ercial and political relations when Russian 
policy more especially has shown in other quarters 
such conspicuous success in using the leverage of 
commercial enterprise for the promotion of political 
ascendency. In reply to a communication from the 
Russian Government proposing that direct relations 
should be established between Russia and Afghanis- 
tan with regard to  frontier matters, such relations, 
however, to have no political character, the British 
Government were compelled td intimate, as they did 
in very courteous terms, that they could not frame 
any proposals to be laid before the Ameer without 
some more precise explanation in regard to the method 
which the Russian Government desired to see adopted 
for the exchange of communications between the frontier 
officials on both sides. T o  this i'ntimation no answer 
appears to have been vouchsafed from St. Petersburg. 
The demand had been put forward at a time when 
Russia was perhaps inclined to exaggerate the signifi- 
cance of our military reverses in South Africa, and 
expected to find the British Government in a more 
yielding mood. But it must not be supposed that 
because Russia has not returned to the charge in 
London she has abandoned the purpose she had in 
view. The report which came down from Peshawar, 
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in September, 1902, that the Ameer had read in 
full Durbar a direct communication from the Russian 
Government, together with a message to the Governor 
of Afghan Turlrestan from the Russian Governor 
of the adjoining province expressing a desire for direct 
commercial relations across the Oxus, was never con- 
tradicted from Russia. On the contrary, a semi- 
official statement was not long afterwards issued at 
St. Petersburg to the effect that it had never been the 
intention of the Russian Government to make the es- 
tablishment of direct relations with Kabul a matter of 
negotiation with Great Britain, but merely to put on 
record that it was the desire and purpose of Russia to 
establish such relations a t  such time a s  she might think 
proper. Since then there have been further incidents 
to show that she is by no means disposed to relax her 
efforts in that direction. The latest of these incidents 
occurred in August, 1903, when the Governor of Russian 
Turkestan sent back some deserters from the Afghan 
army, who had escaped into Russian territory with a 
message of which the significance seems far to exceed 
the importance of the act that gave occasion to it. The 
Russian Goveri~or wrote : ' (AS the Tsar and the Ameer 
are amicably disposed the one to the other, his Imperial 
Majesty has given orders that every effort shall be made 
to continue the friendly relations existing between Russia 
and Afghanistan. As representative of the Tsar I am 
directed to send back all refugees and evil-doers who 
come to my territory from Afghanistan. This is the 
reason why I sent back to yo11 these eleven soldiers 
with their arms. Please be kind enougli to communi- 
cate this to the Ameer." One feels curious to Itnow 
what the Russian Government would say if the Viceroy 
of India were to send a message to the Ameer of 
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%khara expressing his desire for friendly relatiolls 
with that Potentate. Russia would rightly resent it as 
a demonstrative attempt on our part to interfere outside 
our sphere of influence. W e  have equally the right to 
resent any such attempt on her part to interfere outside 
her sphere of influence. Our relations with Afghanistan 
are far too delicate, and liable to far too many untoward 
accidents, for us to tolerate the gratuitous importation 
of a foreign ferment. No doubt the present system 
under which every little question that arises along the 
Russo-Afghan frontier has to be referred backwards 
and forwards through a long series of departmental 
channels from Central Asia to St. Petersburg, from 
St. Petersburg to London, from London to Calcutta, 
and from Calcutta to Kabul, is cumbrous and irksome. 
But there would be an end to all international arrange- 
ments if they could be determined as soon as any one 
of their incidental consequences proved inconvenient to 
either of the contractiilg parties. So  long, at any rate, 
as  the present uncertainty subsists with regard to the 
aims of Russian policy in Asia A it would be folly on our 
part to surrender one of the few advantages secured to 
us by that status quo, to which we cling in other 
quarters with pathetic fidelity, even when it has become 
a mere empty formula which serves only to disguise 
a serious disturbance of the balance of power to our 
own detriment. 
Though neither in this connection, nor with reference 
to other questions, is there any reason to doubt at the 
present moment the loyalty of the Ameer or of his 
people, our relations with them are, and always must be, 
of a very delicate character. To begin with, the en- 
gagements entered into on both sides are deplor- 
ably lacking in precision. Habibullah has at least 
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hinted that he does not regard the obligations person- pledged to  help the  A 
ally contracted by his father as necessal-ily binding bi~t  he will not allow 1 
upon him. Another curious circumstance is that, country where we ma; 
whereas he continues in his statement of accounts to and can have very litt 
debit the Indian Government regularly with the instal- the surveys and  rep0 
ments of mbsidy accruing to his credit, he, like his war, but  they hardl: 
father during the last years of his reign, has not Kandahar line. Of tl 
drawn a single rupee on the very respectable amount I including the Hindu. 
which these arrears now represent. On the other hand, pomisus mountains- 
he has shown no disposition to question the funda- it ever come t o  war- 
mental principle of his father's policy-namely, that he  there is  n o  Intelligl 
is bound to be guided by the Indian Government in all army which would 1 
matters of foreign relations, and that we in turn are the topographical i r  
bound to defend him against foreign aggression. But operations in t h e  fie1 
an indefinite undertalring of this k ind leaves room for I t  may b e  urged, i i  
plenty of difference of opinion as to the manner and does no t  trust us ,  he 
occasion of fulfilment, and, unfortunately, the forward he is proverbially ficl 
policy of British ministers between 1878 and 1881 and i?n& ('( t h e  Afghan i 
the backward policy of their successors immediately afier- 
warcls have equally contributed to shake the confidence It is impossible t o  reg 
of the Afghans in the sincerity of our determination both some apprehension t 
to respect their indepeGdence ourselves and to  protect of Russ ian  ascender 
it against others. S o  jealous are they of their inde- the l o n g  run produc 
pendence and so prone to suspicion that  .they might Whilst  t h e  consolids 
conceivably, even i n  a great emergency, resent the ceeds on lines of pea( 
appearance of a British force to co-operate with them competent to apprec 
quite as keenly as they might, on the other hand, resent value t h e  visible ex 
our non-intervention. Yet circumstances might arise in Asia f rom the Caspi 
which it would be absolutely impossible for our action to  essentially a fighting 
be determined solely by the caprice of Kabul. Even if, Abdurrahinan create 
in the event of Russian aggression, Kabul were to  invite peace b y  securing tl 
our military co-operation, the policy of rigid exclusion istan, eve11 t h e  old 
which it has hitherto maintained towards us must add part of h is  re ign not 


































r e  
pledged to help the Ameer in Afghanistan, if necessary, 
but he will not allow us in the meantime even to see the 
country where we may have to fight. As  it is, we have 
and can have very little information about it. W e  have 
tile surveys and rcporls ~ n a d e  during the last Afghan 
war, but they hardly g o  beyond the Kabul-Ghazni- 
Kanclahar line. Of the country which lies to the North, 
including the I-Iindu-I<~lsh, the Kuh-i-Baba, the Para- 
pornisus mountains-our future theatre of war, sliould 
it ever come to war-we know nest to nothing, and 
tllere is no Intelligence Dcparlnlent in the Afghan 
army which woulcl be able to supply us with even 
the topographical information needed for successf~~l 
operations in thr: field. 
It may be urged, rightly enough, that if the Afghan 
does not trust us, he distrusts Russia even more. But 
he is pl.overbially ficlcle-he says of himself A&llrin be 
i?nhz ('( tlle Afghan is without faith or honour ")-and, 
like all Orientals, he is prone t.0 worship material force. 
I t  is inlpossible to regard from this point of view without 
some apprehension the effect .. which the steady growth 
of Russian ascendency in o t l~er  parts of Asia must in 
the long run produce upon his fatalistic temperament. 
Whilst the consolidation of British rule in India pro- 
ceeds on lines of peaceful evolution which he is scarcely 
competent to appreciate, he can appraise at  its full 
value the visible expansion of Russia's power across 
Asia from tlie Caspian to the Pacific. The Afghan is 
essentially a fighting man, and, though t l ~ e  army which 
Abdurral~rnan creilttc has in the main so far made for 
peace by securing the internal tmncluillity of Afghan- 
istan, cvc:n thc old Amcer discovered in the latter 
part of his re ig t~  not only that i t  was necessary to keep 
it occupied, but that it was l ~ u t  easy to find suitable 
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occupation for it. The discipline of a standing army 
in such a country as Afghanistan is apt  to get lax in 
the idle times of peace. Under an Oriental military 
despotism. the army exists for active fighting, and all its 
instincts rebel against long periods of inaction. It 
wants the excitement and, above all, the opportunities 
of individual aggrandisement and enrichment which 
active service alone furnishes. For a long time Abdur- 
rahman kept his army fairly well occupied in putting 
down all his own rivals and subjugating the tribes 
whose loyalty he had cause to suspect. W h e n  that 
I 
was accomplishecl, Kafiristan, with its '' pagan " tribes, 
i offered another outlet for the martial energies of the 
i 
Afghan Mussulmans, But in proportion as the succes- 
sive clelimitations of boundaries and spheres of influence 
have diminished the area of doubtful ownership within 
which the military appetite of the Afghan commanders 
could be gratified without any serious risk of external 
complications, the task ctf providing occupation for the 
Afghan army has become more and more difficult, and 
with the maintenance of internal peace that difficulty 
must g o  on increasing. T h e  sops which Habibullah 
has from time to time thrown to his army, in the shape 
of increased pay and  improved rations, show that he 
himself is alive to the difliculty, but measures of that 
ltind can hardly be regarded as more than teinporary 
malceshifts. One is bound to bear in mind in this 
connection that the fighting instincts of the Afghan 
have always prompted him in the past to look towards 
the south rather than the north. The plains of India, 
which his fathers repeatedly ransackecl, are still to him 
the legenclary land of conquest and booty, and  if once 
he came to believe that we were po~vcrless to arrest the 
forces of Russian gravitation, he might well be tempted, 
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by the prospect of a share in such stakes as Russia would 
spread before him, to exchange a losing for a winning 
partner. 
These issues, it may be argued, are, however vital, 
still remote, and it is not remote issues, vital though 
they may be, that always govern the relations of civilised 
powers, let alone of an untutored people like the 
Afghans. Unfortunately, even our everyday relations 
with Afghanistan are not free from disturbing elements. 
In Abdurrahman's time questions arose concerning the 
frontier between British India and Afghanistan, and 
more especially questions concerning that wild beIt of 
tribal territory which separates British Indian territory 
under direct British administration from Afghan terri- 
tory. They sometimes became sufficiently acute to put 
a severe strain upoil Anglo-Afghan relations, though, 
thanks to the self-restraint of the Indian Government 
and the shrewdness of the old Ameer himself, the tension 
was never allowed to reach breaking-point. It is, per- 
haps, of no great importance that to the present day the 
Ameer maintains the practica1,protest which his father 
entered against our occupation of New Chaman, by for- 
bidding his people to use the railway from the terminus 
at  the northern foot-hills of the Khwaja Amran and 
compelling every caravan that trades between Kandahar 
and Quetta to journey laboriously over the mountain 
pass and unload its goods only a t  the first station on 
the south side of the great tunnel which pierces the 
range. There, at least, the frontier is definitely de- 
limitated ; but there is still a wide gap to the north of 
the Khaibar pass along the Moli~nand border towards 
the Hindu ICush which awaits demarcation, through no 
fault of ours. Delimitation is shortly to be resumed on 
this section, and as the Ameer has probably realised by 
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this time that procrastination is a game that does not 
always pay, it may be hoped that the task of the  Anglo- 
Afghan Commissioners will be completed without un- 
necessary delay. 
Amongst the wild hillsmen who inhabit the borderland 
for hundreds of miles along the Anglo-Afghan frontier, 
and especially in the eastern portion, explosive materials 
abound. Most of them are closely connected by racial 
as well as religious ties with the Afghans. Many of 
them dwell partly across the Afghan border, or migrate 
periodically backwards and forwards across the border. 
All of them turn naturally to Kabul whenever they get 
themselves into difficulties with the Indian Government 
or grow apprehensive of its intentions. On the other 
hand, they offer Kabul a perpetual field for the cultiva- 
tion of those arts of political intrigue which always 
thrive in an Oriental court. Abdurrahrnan was himself 
not proof against such temptations, though he was 
careful never to let t h e p  carry him out of his depth. 
Will Habibullah be able to exercise the same self- 
control? I t  is not given to everybody to discourse 
platonically upon the merits of a Jehad, to  pose a s  a 
leader of Islam before an admiring audience of bigoted 
Mz~lZalzs, to turn on and switch off the current of fanati- 
cism flowing amongst unruly tribes-in a word, to play 
with fire in a powder magazine, as  Abdurrahmall some- 
times did, without ever kindling a conflagration. I t  is 
certainly fortunate that Habibullah's first attempts at 
dalliance with the frontier tribes have failed on their 
own merits. It was not wise of him to challenge direct 
comparison by tryi'ng to raise frontier levies on the 
same lines and from t l ~ e  same tribes as ours. The 
~ o b e s  of honour and  other more substantial rewards he 
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who had distinguished themselves. in raiding British 
outposts and such-like deeds of frontier prowess no 
doubt flattered the vanity of the tribesmell. But when 
it came to  business they soon discovered the difference 
between the high-flown promises of Kabul and the 
solid advantages of regular pay and fair treatment all 
round which the  Khaibar Rifles and other tribal levies 
are assured of under the British i'lag. The Ameer's 
new recruits soon melted away, and even without the 
admonition transmitted to them through their elders by 
Colonel Deane, the Commissioner and Agent to the 
Governor-General a t  Peshawar, they would probably 
not have been in a hurry to repeat the experiment. The 
death of the Hadda Mullah at the end of 1902 doubtless 
also made for tranquillity, for, though there will cer- 
tainly be plenty of Mz~lla1z.s to claim his mantle, none 
can succeed a t  once to the prestige which that holy but 
turbulent person had acquired. One of our great diffi- 
culties in dealing with the tribes is that, whenever their 
turbulence compels us to chastise them and they find 
themselves hard pressed, they cgn always escape through 
the back-door into Afghanistan. Had we retained the 
Ningrahar valley up  to and including Jellalabad after 
the last Afghan war, we should have got permanently 
behind the Afridis, Orakzais, Mohmands, Swatis, 
Bunerwalis, etc., and  cut them off from Afghan terri- 
. tory. Their  complete and permanent subjugation 
would then have been only a question of a compara- 
tively short time. But we allowed that opportunity 
to slip by, a n d  there were doubtless strong arguments 
against taking advantage d it. Now, for the time being, 
we must make the best of things as  they are. W e  have 
set ourselves the perhaps more difficult task of winning 
over the tribes by consent. The policy laid d ~ w n  by 
I "  
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11 
Lord Curzon will, it may be hoped, fortify their confi- 
dence. If we can once convince them that we have no 
longer any wish to annex their territory and are quite 
ready to entrust to garrisons drawn from amollgst 
themselves the defence of their native valleys and hills, 
so long as they can be trusted to discharge those duties f 
loyally and efficiently, one of the chief opportunities 
of the mischief-maker, both on the borderland and at 
Kabul, will be gone. 
Of greater significance, one may hope, than his 
! 
i 
tentative flirtations with the fanatical elements in our 
frontier territory is the cordial reception which Habi- 
bullah has given to the Seistail Boundary Commission. , 
British policy in Persia has in the past very deeply 
affected the attitude of the Afghans towards us. Our 
reluctance to discharge the obligations we had con- 
tracted in this very matter of the Seistan boundary 
under the Anglo-Persian Treaty of Paris of 1857 was 
one of the chief causes which operated to incline Shere 
Ali towards Russia. We have been called in once 
more under the terms of that treaty to adjudicate upon 
the differences that have arisen between Persia and 
Afghanistan owing to the vagaries of the I-Ielmund 
river, which divides their territories along a consider- 
able portion of its course. Major McMahon's Com- 
mission has terminated this part of its labours, and 
whatever its award may be, it is to be hoped that we 
shall have satisfied the Afghans that it has been based 
this time strictly on the merits of the case, and not, as 
on a former occasioll the Afghans had some reason to 
believe, on considerations of political con~plaisance 
towards Persia. The Afghans are thoroughly alive to 
the present political situation in Seistan. Ilesat traders 
are amongst those who have suffered most from the 
measures adopted by the Persian authorities, at the 
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bidding of Russia, to obstruct the new trade route from 
Quetta into North-Eastern Persia through Seistan. 
At the same bidding, the Persian authorities began by 
taking up the same attitude towards the Boundary Com- 
mission. Russia at first put forward pretensions to talre 
a direct share in the proceedings of the Commission. 
But these were, on her own showing, inadmissible ; for 
in 1882 she had peremptorily rejected a proposal of the 
British Government to co-operate in settling the differ- 
ences between herself and Persia with regard to the 
boundary questions which had arisen out of the annex- 
ation of Merv and the Tekke Turkoman country to the 
Russian dominions. She has had, therefore, to keep her 
own oficials and Cossacks in the background, with the 
result also that she has on this occasion not found the 
indirect agency of Persian officials and Cossaclrs quite 
so effective a s  usual. In  this matter the Imperial 
Government was bound to keep a stiff upper lip. The 
fluctuations of British policy, largely due to, and 
perhaps inseparable from, ou; institutions and system 
of government, have repeatedly shaken the confidence 
of the Afghans both in the sincerity of our friendship 
and in our power to give ~ract ica l  effect to it. This is 
certainly not the moment when we can afford to raise 
doubts a s  to either. Afghanistan is still, and perhaps 
more than ever, a factor of the'utmost importance to 
our Indian Empire. Whatever the future may have in 
store, our immediate and imperative duty is to see that 
no pretext be given to the Afghans for suspecting us  
of lukewarmness or timidity in the discharge of our 
own obligations towards them, as their trustees in all 
international qtlestions affecting their interests. Then 
only shall we be entitled to insist upon their punctual 
discharge of the obligations they have contracted 
towards us. 
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of the Himalayas. But what we may, and probably 
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has moved down so .rapidly, during the last half-century, 
towards our north-west frontier. Russian ascendency 
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~ a n s i v e  energy which every power, possessed of a 
higher civilisation, develops almost automatically in 
contact with more primitive organisms is a pheno- 
menon which can be witnessed all over the world 
to-day. That the expansive energy of Russia tends 
to bring her constantly into closer proximity to the seat 
of British power in Asia is, no doubt, from the point 
of our own convenience very regrettable, but that is 
no reason for ignoring i t ;  and though it need not 
cause any exaggerated alarm it certainly calls for 
vigilance. In this connection the north-east frontier 
of India presents many points of interest and some 
of no slight potential importance, and without some 
reference to them any survey of the problems with 
which we are being confronted as an Asiatic Power 
would be incomplete. 
As on the north-west, British India is to a very 
great extent covered on the north-east by a fringe of 
territory not immediately subject to British administra- 
tion. From Chitral and Gilghit, which are now the 
northernmost outposts of the _ British r j ,  down to 
Assam, with the exception of one small brealr where, 
between Kashmir and Nepal, the British district of 
Icumaon stretches up into the heart of the Himalayas, 
the highland valleys which run down from the water- 
shed of that great mountain barrier to the plains of 
Hindustan form a continuous if often narrow belt of 
native territory over 1,500 miles in length, which under 
varying limitations has remained subject to its own 
ruling chiefs. 
Kashmir is the northernmost of the native states 
forming this belt. Its northern frontier marches with 
Chinese Turlrestan and its eastern frontier with Tibet, 
into which one of the chief trade routes from India 
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is that which passes through Ladalrh. Its history 
furnishes an excellent illustration of the ruinous vicissi- 
tudes through which so many native states passed until 
the final establishment of Pax B?'~~~?z?z~cu in India. It 
was once a centre of Buddhism, which prevailed up 
to the fifth century of our era. Under Hindu rulers 
of Rajput origin, from whom the present Maharajah 
1 claims descent, it was subjected to constant invasions by Tartar and Mongol hordes. Mahmud of Ghazni in 
I 
i the eleventh, and Shams-ud-Din in the fourteenth, 
century imported into it the conquering standards of 
Islam, and in 1586 it was finally incorporated by Altbar 
with the Mogul Empire of Delhi, In  1752 it was 
wrested from his degenerate descendants by Ahmed 
Shah Abdali, of Afghanistan, and for sixty-nine years 
was held by Afghan rulers more or Iess independent 
of Ksbul, until it was in turn wrested from them by 
t 8 L  Ranjit Singh and his Sikhs. It then remained subject 
: i l  4 " / to the lieutenants of the Sikh Government at Lahore 
I!$  
until after the battle of Sobraon, when Gulab Singh, 
i / 
I ; /  
having negotiated the terms of the Sikh surrender, 
I 
3 1 . 9  
obtained from the Indian Goverilment his own recogni- 
i; 
I I tion as Maharajah of Kashmir and Jammu. He lived 
i just long enough to give substantial proofs of his 
loyalty upon the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857, and 
both his son and his grandson, the present occupant 
of the Gaddi, have followed worthily in his footsteps. 
To-day Kashlnir is not only one of the natural bul- 
warks of our Indian Empire, but it contributes a very 
important contingent to the Imperial Service Troops 
placed at the disposal of the Government of India by 
the native chiefs of India. The Kashmir contingent 
consists of four regiments of infantry and two mountain 
batteries-the latter a unique distinction, as  no other 
native contingent is 
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native contingent is armed as  artillery. During the 
Hunza-Nagar Expedition in 1891-2, in the siege and 
relief of Chitral in 1895, and again during the Tirah 
Campaign in 1897, the Kashmir contingent, which is 
largely recruited from Rajput Dogras, who form the 
ruling caste, did excellent service, and the heroism 
displayed by a party of the 4th Kashmir Rifles under 
one of their own officers in bringing Captain Baird 
into the fort at Chitral after he had received his death- 
wound is one of the finest episodes of our recent 
frontier wars. 
Separated from Kashmir by the districts ceded to 
the Indian Government in 1816, Nepal continues the 
belt of native territory for another 500 miles along the 
slopes of the Himalayas. In some respects Nepal 
occupies a position entirely of its own amongst the 
various states which, without being subjected to British 
administration, have been brought under the direct in- 
fluence of the Indian Governineat. The Maharajah 
Adhiraj of Nepal cannot be classed amongst the ruling 
chiefs who are commonly, though not perhaps with 
strict accuracy, spolren of as the  feudatory princes of the 
Indian Empire. Like the Ameer of Afghanistan, he 
claims the position rather of an ally than of a vassal ; 
but the presence of a British resident at Khatmandu 
connotes a connection of somewhat closer dependence 
than that in which the Ameer stands towards the 
Indian Government. At  the same time the status of 
the British resident in Nepal differs materially from 
that of a British resident at other native courts. His 
actual right of residence is, for instance, restricted to 
the capital and its immediate vicinity, and he cannot 
travel in other parts of the State without special 
authorisation. For other EnglisIunen to obtain access 
2 A 
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to Nepal is only less difficult than to enter Afghanistan. 
The  paramount Power, moreover, has never attempted 
to exercise the control, or even the paternal right of 
criticism and remonstrance with regard to matters of 
internal administration, which it exercises more or less 
freely in other native states. The Nepalese form of 
government is peculiar, and the nearest analogy to it 
might perhaps be found in Japan before the great 
national transformation which ushered in the new era 
of Japanese progress. Just a s  the Milrado was then 
relegated to a position of dignified impotence, whilst 
the real power was vested exclusively in the  Shogun, 
I 
and the Shogunate itself had become hereditary in the 
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has long ceasecl to be anything more than a dignified 
figure-head, whilst, as  his Prime Minister, the leading 
representative of one of the great families of Nepal has 
enjoyed the complete monopoly of power, coupling with 
his official rank the exalted title of Maharajah. 
In  the hands of a strong and able man like the late 
Si r  Jang Bahadur, who. remained the virtual ruler of 
Nepal for upwards of thirty years, from 1846 until his 
death in 1877, this pecuIiar system worked on the whole 
satisfactorily; but since his death dissensions have 
been rife in the Sham Sher family, and there have been 
sudden changes of Prime Minister accompanied by 
murder and bloodshed, which in other countries would 
be, perhaps deservedly, called revolutions. Last 
winter the Prime Minister of Nepal, whilst stopping 
at Benares on his way back from the Durbar, was the 
object of a mysterious assault, which is believed to 
have been instigated by a rival faction a t  Khatmandu 
who had no wish to see him return to his country. 
But the standards which apply in more civilised corn- 
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munities are not applicable to such states as Nepal. 
Even Sir Jang Bal~adur, it must be remembered, only 
came into power after a massacre, in which thirty-one 
of the most influential men in Nepal disappeared ; and 
the personal rislrs to which the holders of the highest 
office in the State are exposed do not appear to affect 
the authority enjoyed by its incumbents. Possibly, as 
kinship with the noblest of Rajput chiefs. As a 
reigning dynasty the House of Nepal dates only from 
the first half of the eighteenth century, but its founder 
Ilinistt~r, the leading 1 is said to be descended from the Sesodia Rajputs, 
arnilivs of Nepal has who once held their court at Chitor, and still rule 
11 lwr.rdr, coupling with over Udaipur. Tradition has it that after the famous 
3l.illnrajah. sack of Chitor by Ala-ud-Dim, of Delhi, in 1305, 
t l lr*  m a n  like the late one of the scions of the Solar Ilouse, which alone 
tl!rh h u a l  ruler of refused ever to bend the knee-before the Mussulman 
conquerors, fled with some of his clansmen into the 
wcrrk(4el on the whole mountainous wilds of the Himalayas, where his de- 
In rliswnsions have scendants ultimately carved out for themselves a new 
;mnal there have been kingdom. No doubt the Gurkhas intermarried largely 
with the Buddhist and Chinese or Tibetan races 
whom they gradually subdued and converted to Hindu- 
ism, but if the Rajput blood in their veins has been 
much diluted with baser strains, the virile qualities 
they to-day possess are worthy of the lineage they 
claim. Our main concern with Nepal is, in fact, at 
present as a recruiting ground for our native army, and 
it is certainly noteworthy that a State with which our 
political relations are so circumscribed contributes one 
, 
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of the chief elements of strength to the armed forces formidable as i t  is, hi 
of our Indian Empire. The little Gurkha, so like the superable obstacle t o  
Japanese, not only physically, but in many of his eighteenth cen tury  a 1 
inbred qualities-except cleanliness, which has to be Hepal, and in the i r  tu 
drilled into him-has long since established his reputa- same century, Tibeta 
tion as a fighting man, and the fact that a t  the present the passes of Nepal 
moment the Indian Army List shows sixteen battalions of K h a t m a n d u ,  wherl 
composed wholly of Gurkhas speaks sufficiently to the sign a t r e a t y  of s u b m  
confidence reposed ill their unswerving loyalty. Bold, in the two smal l  s k  
franlr, and self-reliant, full of dlc~rz and equally full of follolv on to Nepal 
dogged tenacity, exception~llly keen of sight and hear- Himalayas, B u d d h i s  
ing, their good-natured temperament and cheerful Portant factor,  f o r  in 
powers of endurance have rendered them more popular the population is B. 
with the British Tommy than perhaps any other of our ruling chief is h i m  
native troops, and conversely they talire perhaps more descent. The V a l l e y  
heartily than any others to soldiering under the British like project ion of T i t  
flag. At any rate, the recruiting officers stationed along 
the Nepal border, under agreement with the Nepalese 
authorities, have never' yet had much difficulty in Though i t  w a s  the 
securing as many recruits as they want, and every Gurkhas of N e p a l  o 
season the young Gurkhas flock across the border to now Irnown as Sikl 
take the King's shilling with unfeigned alacrity. anew, to its h e r e d i t a  
Though the dynasty and the ruling race in Nepal campaign a g a i n s t  th 
claim to be of Hindu caste and creed, many of ' the  has g i v e n  so much t 
aboriginal tribes still adhere to Buddhism, and the .intrinsic i m p o r t a n c e  
Nepalese Government has a Resident a t  Lhasa ac- area of about 2,Soc 
credited to the Dalai Lama. Nepalese merchants and population of barel  
pilgrims keep up a constant intercourse between Nepal deep H i m a l a y a n  val 
and Tibet, and there is a quarter specially assigned The r e i g n i n g  fami l  
to them for residence at Lhasa. Nevertheless, there Tibetan ,Lamas, an1 
appears to have been little love lost in the past between been under t h e i r  inf 
Nepalese and Tibetans, and the Nepal Government of g r a t u i t o u s l y  ve: 
generally has a long list of unredressed grievances the Rajah was brc 
against Tibet. Even the great barrier of the Himalayas, port ion of the grar 
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l o s t i n a l a ti 11;lst hclwecn 
:be Kt=$,;r[ Guvcrnment 
LI n redrt: sr;rd grievances 
a r r i e r  o f  the IIimitlayas, 
formidable as  it is, has proved in former times no in- 
superable obstacle to invading armies. Twice in the 
eighteenth century a Gurlrha army invaded Tibet from 
Nepal, and in their turn, during the last decade of the 
same century, Tibetans and Chinese descended across 
the passes of Nepal and advanced almost to the gates 
of Khatmandu, where they coinpelled the Nepalese to 
sign a treaty of submission. 
In the two sinall states of Sikkim and Bhutan, which 
follow on to Nepal on the southern slopes of the 
Himalayas, Buddhisin has remained a still more im- 
portant factor, for in both states not only the bullr of 
the population is Buddhist and Mongolian, but the 
ruling chief is himself a Buddhist and of Tibetan 
descent. The Valley of Chumbi, which forms a wedge- 
like projection of Tibetan territory betweell Silrlrim and 
Bhutan, affords the most accessible route from Tibet 
into India. 
Though it was the Indian Government that drove the 
Gurkhas of Nepal out of a large part of the territory 
now known as Silrkim and restored it, or granted it 
anew, to its hereditary chief in 1816, after Ochterlony's 
campaign against the Nepalese, hardly any native state 
has given so much trouble in proportion to its size and 
intrinsic importance as  Silrkim, which has now only an 
area of about 2,800 square miles, with an estimated 
population of barely 30,000 souls scattered amongst 
deep Himalayan valleys or dotted about lofty plateaus. 
The reigning family owes its rise to the protection of 
Tibetan Lamas, and the Rajah of Silrlcim has always 
been under their influence. In 1835, after a long course 
of gratuitously vexatious and offensive proceedings, 
the Rajah was brought to book and deprived of a 
portion of the grant of territory made to him in 1816, 
358 THE NORTH-BAST FRONTIER OF INDIA .. . 
the Indian Government resuming possession of the 
plains and the outer hills, including Darjeelillg, now 
the seat of Government of British Siltlrirn, the centre 
of one of the firlest and most flourishing tea-growing 
districts in the world, and a valuable sanatorium 
situated, under the shadow of Kanchinjunga, in the 
grandest Alpine scenery that even the Himalayas can 
show. But even this chastisement only mended matters 
temporarily. For the Tibetans still had the ear of the 
Rajah, and our relations with Tibet have never yet 
! been placed on a satisfactory footing. Things  reached 
another climax in 1886-7. I t  had been arranged in r 1884 between the Chinese and  British Governments 
i I that an Anglo-Indian official should be allowed to enter 
Tibetfrom the Sikkim frontier and visit Lhasa on a com- 
mercial mission. Mr. Colman Macaulay was selected lo 
take charge of that mission, and was engaged in making 
preparations at Darjeeling when, owing to the British 
occupation of Upper Burmah, other questions came up 
for settlement between Great Britain and China in 
connection with the frontiers of our new province, 
which marched with those of Chinese Yun-nan. The 
Peking Government had acquiesced very reluctantly 
in the Macaulay Mission to Tibet, and it was finally 
dropped as a graceful concession to China in order 
to secure her recognition of the new rCgime in 
Burmah, where she  claimed certain shadowy rights of 
suzerainty. The abandonment of the Macaulay Mission 
was, however, co~lstrued by the Tibetans and their 
friends in Sikltim a s  an unmistakable sign of weakness. 
In collusion with the Rajah, who not only refused to 
carry out his engagements under the Treaty of 1861, 
but actually took up  his residence outside the borders 
of his own state on Tibetan territory, a Tibetan force 
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invaded Sikkim i n  1887 and proceeded to ercct a 
fort at Singtao, well within Siklrim territory and 
almost within sight of Darjeeling. After we had duly 
wasted some months in futile remonstrallce they were, 
it is true, ejected by a sinall expedition under General 
Graham in March of the following year, and the Peking 
Government ultimately sent down the Anzbarz, the repre- 
sentative of the Suzerain Court at Lhasa, to sign a con- 
vention at  Calcutta with the then Viceroy, the Marquis 
of Lansdowne, by which China recognised the British 
Protectorate of Silrlrim, and agreed both to a delimita- 
tion of the frontier and to the appointment of a com- 
mission to facilitate trade. A British political officer 
was appointed to reside henceforth in Sililrim, and a 
British garrison was maintained in the frontier fort of 
Guathong. T h e  expediency of fulfilling his obligations 
towards the paramount Power which had in former 
times saved his state from the Nepalese was thus 
definitely brought home to the ruler of Sikkim, who 
has been much less prone since then to coquetting with 
the Tibetan Lamas. 
Bhutan has a larger population and more consider- 
able area than Silrlrim. I t  covers nearly 17,000 square 
miles, and its population is estimated at 200,000. Lilre 
Sikkim, it is a country of lofty snow-clad mountains 
and highland plateaus, intersected by deep valleys, but 
very little is known of either its geography or its 
ethnography. W e  have never been drawn politically 
into such close contact with it as with Sikkim, though 
from time to time, as in 1873 when Captain Godwin 
Austen accolnpanied Sir  Ashley Eden to Punakha and 
made a survey of the route, missions are sent from 
India to the Court of the Deb Rajah, the temporal 
ruler of Bhutan, who appears to share the sovereign 
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authority with a spiritual ruler known as the Dharm Mrn G. Litton, t h e  Bri 
Rajah. The Deb Rajah is, like the Rajah of Sikkim, pel$ the new ‘ ' Treai 
a Buddhist and of Tibetan descent, and most of B h a m ~  on t he  Burma] 
his people are of Mongolian origin and follow the Yun-nan ,  he sa 
Lamaistic form of Buddhism. Qmges of the long 
In these four states-Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, and 
Bhutall-are focussed all the interests which directly 
connect British India with the Central Asian regions be exercised w i t h  reg; 
lying beyond the Himalayas, I shall have occasion to 'iders the agricultural  
return to these further on in dealing with the question been genera l ly  much 
of Tibet, but I cannot conclude this rapid survey of 
the north-east frontier of India without a few lines in VeIop in to  an imp( 
reference to its boundaries in the extreme East. Beyond auld find between 
Bhutan, travelling eastward, the British province of tQnlers. T r a d e  will, 
Assam stretches up the valley of the Brahmaputra to have to p a y  for the 1c 
the confines of Tibet, and to the east of Assam Upper route. It was not ti 
Burmah is now contiguous with the Chinese Empire after t h e  F r e n c h  had 
itself. Where the Burmese frontier marches with the town in S o u t h  YI 
Chinese province of Yun-nan it abuts on a wilderness mercial re la t ion to  
of mountains so inhospitable as to form, in the opinion Momein in w e s t  YI 
of the Indian Government, an insurlnountable obstacle Itramaddy, that we c 
to the establishment of railway communication with the a a " T r e a t y  Port." 
valley of the Yang-tsze, or at any rate an obstacle Still further east a 
which it would prove far too costly to attempt to over- vere declared to be 
come at present. Still there is no reason why British hve since t h e n  beer 
commercial enterprise should not find a useful field in project across  the Sal 
Yun-nan, where, as in Sze-chuan, the Chinese province ve have t h e  French  2 
lying to  the north of it in the upper valley of the had in a ~vealr mom€ 
Yang-Tze river, equality of treatment in respect of all a Convention signel 
privileges and concessions that may be granted to the "al l  the suzerain r 
French was specifically secured to the British under the Slunglem and I<ianj 
Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. Yun-nan has of late Kings of Ava con 
years had a bad name in England. But a very exhaustive China," on condition 
report just published by the Burtnah Government from cede any portion o$ t 
klar~n iiS the Dharh 
as dli' I{;ijoil of Sik t im,  
I ,  and most of 
~ ' " i ~ i n  a d fallow the 
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kir. N+.p:tI, Siktim, and 
Mr. G. Litton, the British Consul at Molnein or Peng- 
~ u e l r ,  the new " Treaty Port," nine stages distant froln 
Bhamo on the Burmall-Chinese frontier, tells a different 
tale. Yun-nan, he says, has at last recovered from the 
ravages of the long Muhamilledan revolt, which was 
brought to a close by the death of the Panthay Sultan 
in 1870, and though he admits that great caution must 
be exercised with regard to mining enterprise, he con- 
siders the agricultural resources of the province to have 
been generally much underrated, and as the peasantry 
arc now prospering, he believes Yun-nan may yet 
develop into an  important trade mart, where Burmah 
should find between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 of cus- 
torners. Trade will, however, he remarks significantly, 
have to pay for the long delay in opening up this new 
route. It was not till March, 1902, or thirteen years 
after the French had secured the opening of Meng-tsze, 
the town in South Yun-nan which bears the same com- 
mercial reIation to  Tonking and the Red river as 
Momein in West Yun-nan bears to Burlnah and the 
Irrawaddy, that we obtained the opening of the latter 
a s  a '' Treaty Port." 
Still further east again where the Shan States, that 
were declared to be part of British India in 1886, or 
have since then been placed under British protection, 
project across the Salween to the banks of the Mekong, 
we have the French as our immediate neighbours. W e  
had in a weak moment agreed to cede to China under 
a Convention signed at Pelring on March 1st) 1894, 
"all the suzerain rights in and over the States of 
Mullglem and Kiang H u n g  formerly possessed by the 
Kings  of Ava concurrently with the Elnperors of 
China," on condition, however, that China should never 
cede any portion o$ those territories to any other nation 
Ilis@sn*sts which dimlly 
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without our consent. In 1895, a s  the part reward of 
their share in the joint intervention of France, Germany, 
and  Russia, which restored the Liaotong Peninsula 
to  China after the Japanese war, the French obtained 
from the Chinese Government the cession of those 
territories in flagrant breach of its engagements towards 
us. Two years later, after ~rotracted negotiations, we 
acquiesced in return for other concessions, and now the 
Melrong river forms the boundary for about 150 miles 
between the British Indian Empire and French Indo- 
China. To the south of the Shan States again, British 
Burmah, which is rapidly growing to be one of the most 
prosperous and wealthy provinces of o u r  Indian Empire, 
is to a great extent covered by Siam, whose independ- 
ence and territorial integrity, as far as the central valley 
of the Menam is concerned, have been, it may be hoped 
permanently, secured by cornlnon consent of the British 
and French Governments. 
But we must nevertheless bear in mind that France 
is working steadily up from her base on the Pacific 
towards the interior of the Continent, and that her 
possessions are already a t  one point divided only froin 
ours by the width of the Mekong. She has pushed 
her railways up from Tonking to the Chinese frontier 
of Yun-nan, and under a guarantee of the French 
Government, a large loan has been raised for the pur- 
pose of carrying them up to the capital of that province. 
She is rapidly pegging out extensive clainis in Sze- 
chuan-perhaps naturally the richest, as  well as  the 
most populous, province of the Chinese Empire. In  
no very remote future, if nothing occurs to impair her 
energies in that direction or to check the advance of 
Russia southwards from her Siberian base, we may see 
France join hands with her northern ally on the eastern 
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T H E  YANG-TSZE AGREEMENT 
borders of Tibet, at  the head of the Yang-Tsze Valley 
xvhich we were taught not so long ago to regard as the 
sphere specially reserved to British iniluence in China 
under the famous " Yang-Tsze Agreement," concluded 
, . in 1898 between Si r  Claude MacDonald and the Tsung- 
li Yam$n a t  Pelring. Seven years ago, when writing on ' 
the Far Eastern question, I ventured to point out that 
[ :~+~II:~!ss~o~s,  and now the
we should witness before long a French advance from 
tk~r). for about 150 miles the south designed to meet a Russian advance from the 
lnjlin: and French Indo. north, and since then the progress made in both 
h;an St;ltes again, British directions has been even more marked than could at 
iir1.4~ to bc one of the most that time be reasonably anticipated. Given the universal 
c , ~ f  our Indian Empire, momentum which is impelling every civilised power 
p Si:nm, whose independ. towards colollial expansion, such developments are 
s far as the central valley probably inevitable, and it may not lie within our 
vt! h e n ,  it may be hoped power to avert them. If so, it is all the more necessary 
~ r ~ n  consent of the British that we should reclron with them, and shape our own 
policy so that they shall at  least not take us by surprise. 
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her 1):lse on the Pacific 
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CI-IAPTER XXX 
THE QUESTION OF TIBET 
T HE interests which directly connect British India with the Central Asian regions Iyillg beyond the  
Himalayas on her north-eastern frontier may not be 
of primary importance compared with the interests we 
possess in the regions lying beyond the north-western 
frontier, but they are of sufficient importance to  forbid 
our regarding the future of Tibet, or even of Chinese 
Turkestan, with indifference. Since Japan pricked the 
great Chinese bubble L 1894 the prestige of Peking 
has unquestionably waned in Tibet and in Chinese 
Turltestan, as well as in other parts of the Chinese 
Empire, and though Lhasa has hitherto shown no signs 
of abandoning, as far as we are concerned, the policy 
of self-isolation which it originally adopted in deference 
to the wishes of the suzerain power at Peking, there is 
little 1ilreIihood of a renewal of the aggressive tactics to 
which the Tibetans used from time to time to  resort 
unless they receive encouragement from other quarters, 
On the other hand, if the influence of China has waned, 
that of Russia has increased. That  Russia was bent 
upon establishing her ascendency in the Central Asian 
dependencies of the Chinese Empire became patent in 
Igor, when in the original draft of the first Manchurian 
Agreement, negotiated at Peking with Li Hung  Chang 
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whilst the: c:onferrnce of nlinistcrs was discussing the 
terms of the: 1)car:e 1)rt)tot.ol after the Wost:r troubles, 
R u s ~ i : ~  ; L ~ ~ c I I I [ ) I ~ ~ c I  lo illtr( ~~111(:tf a c:lause securing to 
herself spcc:ial ~)rivilt~gc.s in RIon;;olia xntl Chinese 
Tuskctsti~~~, '1'll:~l ~ * I ~ I I I s ~ ~ ,  i t  will t ) ~  remcmht:red, was 
dropptbd :it LIic timc4, :inti tllc <:ourl, undcs pressure 
froin tlic: I'aag-'l'szt* vic*chrl )y.s as ~ o l l  as fronl Japan and 
Ellglantl, ulti1n;it t.1,' clt.cblillc'rl t o  ratify llic C:onvcntian 
in  any tcrrrtl as t111.n cir:~l'cr(l. I3ur what Russia was 
ullablc for tflct  n~ornc*nt t o  [ I t ,  di~~lomalic;ally she has 
since clont: ~)r:ii:tic.:tlly by steady local prussurc. 
Cllincse 'l'uskt+stan 1ic.s entirely at Iier mercy. When 
Russia, i l t  scAtusll firr an i n d c ~ ~ ~ n i l y o f  E~,po,cmo,  agreed 
in ISSI to tAv;Lc:lIatc: fiuiclja, which shc h:rd only occupicd 
cluring tiit: ilsur1)ation of S;rkllb Ucg in I<ashgar., she 
was (:arcfill to  draw t l ~  ~rrovisions of thc treaty, signed 
by Marqtiis 'rscng at  St, I'etersburg, so as  to secure for 
her frontier oflicc:rs LL 1)ractit:;~lIy free t1311d wit11 regard 
to delirrritotitrn. C;c(rgri~pl~y is an rlccult science to tlie 
Chinese, and  when, in the fu1nc:ss of time, I-Iung-kiin, 
wlto had bccornc: 'Tscng's successor at St. Petcrsburg, 
was prest:ntcd by thc 1Ciissian Government with an 
elaborate map on n largc! scale in which the Kusso- 
Chinesc frontier was marked uut in accordance with 
the recornmendations of [kc Russian military experts 
on the spot, thtt C:hini:sc: iliplo~natist, in order to "save 
his f:ici:,"l~lad no t~ption but to accept n document 
he was inral~ablt* c ~ f  c1isc:ussing. I-Inng-kiin returned, 
by the way, in cltiu c+clilrsto to I't:liil~g as a member of the 
Tst~lig-li Yami.tl, nrirl wlicn Count Cassini arrived 
tlierc i n  I%JI a s  Itussiart Ministt:r, hr? initiated his 
memorcll)lt: t(!titlrl: trf thrit posl by cot~gratulating the 
Tsung-li YatlrL;n, in tlic pcc!sence uE the presumably 
111ushing I$ung - K i i n ,  on  possessing as  one uf its 
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members a statesman whose ltnowledge of intricate geo- Mongolia, Chines 
graphical questions had elicited universal respect and by that of Russia 
admiration in Russia I During the Pamir negotiations not as open, a g1 
between Great Britain and Russia, British diplomacy of the Chinese 
tried without much success to galvanise tile Chinese 
into talrillg some interest in the question. Even the pro- Nor is  that  all. 
ceedings of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission significance that 
on the Parnirs, though its work along a certain ~os t ion  her sphere of infl 
of the line directly touched up011 Chinese territory, 
failed to stir their apathy. Perhaps from their own point 
of view they were right. No frontier, however admirable 
on paper, is of much use, unless to the natural, but territory, a n d  are 
seldom insurn~ountable, obstacles it may present, are Russian influent, 
superadded the determination and the power to make it most valuable all 
inviolable. Even across the Sarikol range there is, of Urga. S o m e  
according to Sir T. Holdich, an open way by the Beyik to t h i s  potesltate 
Pass into the Tagduinbash and thence down into the delivered before 
Yarkand plateau, and to the north of the Beyik there 
are other passes much easier and more direct. It is 
needless to say China herself does notbing to guard had undertaken 01 
them. In fact, the Russian outposts are being con- journey of explora 
stantly shifted at the pleasure of the Russian authorities regions of North- 
on the spot, whose action Peking ratifies on demand. 
The Russians are pushing on their railway eastward 
from Samarltand to Andijan, and not oilly do their in importance of 
military posts elltirely dominate the Chinese frontier, coming after the 
but they have actually established one, called Pamirski Pantshen Lama of 
Post, well inside Chinese territory on the Murghab position i n  the 3 
between Kashgal- and Chitral. The Chinese Governor the popes of medi 
in these circumstances is naturally nothing inore than cal title i s  Claept 
the humble servant of the liussiail Consul-General, originally confern 
who, with his Cossaclr. guards, can at: ally momcnt make A. D.. r653 on a son 
Russian ascendency supreme, in name as it  already is the first Bogdo, w: 
in fact, from Yarkand to Kuldja. Further 11ort11, in and is ' known  ili 
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p,longc~lia, (:l~iric'scl tiuthtrr~ty is 1)cinp: ste:idily displaced 
11y that of ICu..;si:i, xrfllci is gradually getting as sure, if 
1lot 3s op~*ii ,  :F grip of  ill1 tll~st: outlying clcpendcncies 
of ttic: C:hint:hcn l:m[)irc as she has already got of 
hIa11c:huria. 
Nor is that all. 'L'IIL*Pc :ire indit*atii)lls of 110 slight 
signiiic.:l~tc.ch tlr;lt sllc is nlrc~atly dr;living 'I'ibct within 
ll(:r s l~ l~cr r*  OI i~il luc~rt~u.  Russia11 cliplomacy has been 
fully ;ilivi* t t )  thtr ci~rl)crrtur~itics it possesstbs of opcning 
111' rcl:ltior~s wit11 I , h a s ~  t t i~.ougl~ the. 1Juddliist tribes, 
whc~ live tm, ttr ill inlc~~i*~liiltt: pruxinlity to, Iiussia11 
territory, nrlrl art:, tht'r(!for~', 1110r(t casily amenable to 
ICussian influ(:rrc:~, I t  Itas t~nquestirrni~bly found a 
most \r;~lui~l,l(! :lily in the: 'I'ariinatll-I,arna, or Ilogdo, 
of ;IJrgn. Strnlc: in~crcstiiig ink1rnlatir)n with regard 
to this pott:ntatc! 1~3s fiivell this summer it1 a lecture 
delivr:recl briore tlle Iiognl C;etrgraphical Society by 
Mr. 6'. IV, Ca~npbdl, Chinese Stl.cretary of thc l3ritish 
Legation at T'cking nncl a tiistinguisliecl scholar, who 
had unrlt*rtakttrx on  his Itway homi: on leave an i~nportant 
jcrurnlry of cxp1t:~ratisn through some t ~ f  the least known 
regions o f  Xorth-Eastcrn Blr~ngolia. The  Bogdo, he 
tells us, i:; the pctnciff of the Lamaistic Church in 
North h4c>ngc~lia, is popularly vencratcd as the third 
i n  impt)rtrtncc! of rht: great avatars, or  "living gods," 
corning after thcb IIaIai Lalna of Lhasa and the 
Pantshcin 1,arnn sf 'I'nskiilunpo, ant1 occupies a political 
position i n  thi* Mongol world analogous to that of 
the p(qlt1s of ~ncdire*rll Christendom. Tbe ecclesiasti- 
cal titln is C'/sel)t.t+rdpt .&m(lrr lt.t.hutukhlu, which was 
originally cr,nfcrrt:d by tht: Ilalni 1,arna of 'ribct in 
n.1). rtsf;,? u n  a son of tht: Tushctu Kllan. This prince, 
thc first 13trgdr1, was tht! St. 13~111 of Motigol Lamaism, 
; ~ n d  is kl~own in hfilongu1 I~is tury as Undur Gcgcn. 
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Under his advice the Khalha tribes gravitated to china ,  Their chief intermediary fol 
rather than to Russia, in 1688, when the attacks of the Siberian Buriat, by name D 
Kalmucks under Galdan threatened their existence. He ivitll recommendations froin 
is the "Grand Lama Houtoul~tou" who figures so tailled access as  a zealous BU, 
largely in Gerbillon's description of the assembly of the Dalai Lama himself. After 
Khalha princes held by the Chinese Emperor Kanghsi the Sacred City he  went tc 
at Dolon-nor in 1691. Ever since his death in 1723, the mission in 1899, returning I 
Urga pontiffs have come from Tibet, and the present to Lhasa. T h e  object of hi 
Bogdo, the eighth incarnation " living in  Mongolia, from t h e  fact t h a t  a t  the  en 
is the son of a steward in the Court of the Dalai Lama Russia, this t i m e  with a fl  
of Lhassa. He  was born in 1870, and was invested of which the h e a d  was ofli 
and brought to Urga when a child of four. Mr. as " t h e  Senior  Tsani te  Kh 
Campbell does not seem to think that the BogdoJs Lama of Tibet." T h i s  mi 
education had fitted him to fill the position of a living October,  goo, a n d  was  re 
deity with dignity or wisdom, and since he passed from by t h e  Tsar at Livadia. 
tutelage the demands of his Court on the purses of the fatigable Dorjieff, who had 
Kl~alhas have become a burdensome tax. I was a to repor t  progress  a t  L l~as ;  
trifle surprised," Mr. Campbell adds, " to learn that a Tibe tan  mission, a n d  prc 
he was married, and openly appeared at festivals with St. Petersburg, where,  as t 
his wife and child, Devout Mongols who are asked letter from t h e  Dalai  Lama 
to explain this mode of life, singular in the head of by the Tsar  at Peterhoff. 
a celibate church, assert that it is a subjective hallu- through Centra l  Asia by ; 
cination only apparent to the unfaithful. But there number of intelligence ofi 
is a large proportion of ' unfai thf~~l '  Mongols, and then several  R u s s i a n  mis: 
amongst then1 it is a common opinion that the present 
Bogdo will be the last of his line." guards which invariably 
I11 the meantime, however, he is still a factor of 
considerable political importance in Mongolia, and the 
Russians, who are supreme a t  Urga, naturally hold one of the attractions whi 
him in the hollosv of their hand. But their efforts to enterprise. Pri jevalsky 
extend their influence over the Buddhist church even 
in Mongolia would hardly have been so  successful 
had they failed to gain at the same time the goodwill 
of the fount and source of spiritual authority at  Lhasa. have at the  present  mo 
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Their chief intermediary for this purpose has been a 
S i b e r i a ~ ~  Uuriat, by nune Dnrjiefl; who reached Lhasa 
with recommendations frorn Lhc Hogdo, and soon ob- 
tailled access as a zealous lluddhist Lo the cvu~lcils of the 
Dalai Lama llimsc*lf. Aftcr n fc~v  years' rcsidellce in 
the Sacrcd CiLy hc ~vcnt to Iiussia on a confidential 
mission in 1899, returning earty in the following year 
to Lhnsa. 'I'llu ol~jt:ct r t f  11is il~ission may be inferred 
from the fact that aL Lhc c~lcl of 1900 he was agaill in 
Russia, this timc with ;L E U ~ I - I ~ ~ U W I I  Tibetan mission, 
of wliich tllc hr:arl was officially described in Russia 
as " the Senior 'l'sani~e Kho~nba attached to the Dalai 
Lama of l'ibct." l ' l ~ i s  ~nission arrivccl a t  Odessa in 
Octobcr, rgoo, anrl was reccived in solemn audience 
by the Tsar a t  Livndia. In June, 1901, the inde- 
fatigable Dorjicfl, whu llad becn back in the meantime 
to n:port progress at Lhnsn, appeared once nlore svith 
t Ic-am that a Tibetan mission, and proceeded on this occasion to 
s t iva l s  with 
are asked 
.he head of 
xivc hallu- 
But; t here  
,ngols, and 
the present 
a factor of 
~l ia ,  and the 
:urally hold 
:ir efforts to 
~ l ~ u r c b  even 
3 successf~~l~ 
. f i e  
t y  at Lhasa. 
St. Pu~crsburg,  w'here, :LS the bearers of a n  autograph 
letter frorrl the Dalai Lama, the envoys were welcomed 
by the Tsar at; I'etcrlloff. They were escorted home 
through Central Asia by a Russian force to ~vhicli a 
number of intelligence officers were attached. Since 
then sevcral Iiussian missions, which arc, no doubt, 
officially doscribed a s  scientific, ill spite of the Cossack: 
guarcls which invariably acconlparly them, have been 
allowerl to tr:~vel, not merely in the outlying provinces 
of Tibet, with u~~wontecl Ireedom. Gold is undoubtedly 
one of the attractions whicli Tibct presents to Russian 
enterprise. I'rijcvtllsky is ltnown to have once told 
the present 'I'sar lliat 'l'ibct would bc a scconcl California, 
and this is what rnany liussians lirmly belicvc. They 
havc bcerl pruspocting for gold for scveral years, and they 
llave at  the preseat moment an expedition in Eastern 
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Tibet engaged mainly in such work. Little, as  a rule, 
is said about these expeditions in public in Russia, but 
Professor Zybikoff, also a Buriat by birth, who has 
a chair at  the St. Petersburg University, has recently 
been allowed to give an account of a journey in Tibet 
from which he had just returned. In the course of his 
travels he reached Lhasa, and appears to have resided 
there for some time unmolested under the guise of a 
Lama. According to him there are half a million 
Buriats, Mongols, and Kalmulrs in the Asiatic do- 
minions of Russia, who, as Lamaistic Buddhists, 
receive their priests from Tibet and send some of their 
youths to be trained at Lhasa, thus keeping up steady 
intercourse with the seat of Buddhism. Russia has 
not neglected such admirable opportunities for pro- 
moting her political purposes at Lhasa, and the gates 
of the Sacred City have remained by no means her- 
metically closed against her patient policy of peaceful 
That, in the event of Russia acquiring absolute 
control of the Central Asian dependencies of China, lrade of 1972 amountt't2 tr j  
the trade which is now carried on with them from India and seven and a quarter i d  
would disappear seems inevitable. Already, according some portion of thc consit 
to the trade report for the year ending March 31st, and Nepal, amounting tt 
1902, drawn up by the British Political Officer at exports, represents incli.fr 
K a s l ~ ~ a r ,  Russian competition in Chinese Turlcestan ever that may be, t h r b  tcrtl 
is pressing heavily upon the cotton trade. " English Himalayas is small, and 
goods,'' Mr. Macartney says, "are now restricted to 
manufactured cottons in the form of muslins, handker- upin Tibet, it is ncit froin 
chiefs," and certain Indian specialities. In chintz, 
the demand for which is practically unlimited because 
it is used by the natives in everyday clothing, we have 
had to cede the place to Russia, whose factories have 
obtained the monopoly of supplying Turkestan with 
that class of K O ( ) ~ S . "  130rllaps the most noteworthy 
feature i n  Mr. hIac:~rtncy's report is the statement tllat 
the bnlnncc of tr;~tle, whicli is all i l l  favour of India, is 
made ul' h). ~ 1 ~ 1 '  t*sy)~lrtulion of trt':~surc froln Chinese 
Turkestal~ ttr tile vilIuC of Illrce arltl rl half lakhs, allnost 
the wholc a r n o u ~ ~ t  of ~ v l ~ i c h  goes to India in the shape 
of I<ussi;ln xolcl cc9ins ancl currenr:y ~ ~ o l c s .  Tlie otller 
cllici t:sl>r)rt from (.:r:lltral Asia is a drug called Chnr(zs, 
a resin w1lic.h naturally esrldcs from the flowers and 
leaves of the Ilcnrr~p ~~ lan l .  I t is an intoxicating stimulant 
used fur s r n c ~ k i ~ ~ g ,  ;l~id tl1o~1g.11 C O I I S ~ ~ ~ P C ~  less Ilarrnful 
than , ~ ~ z I I , ~ I ,  ;~~i;ordirlg tc, the reports of the Indian 
Hem11 I)nlgs Commission, an import tax of IOO per 
cent, \\?\.as j~l:ici:d upon it thret? years ago i n  the Punjab 
in order to cl~ecli tlw ct~nsumption by the native. 
I\ieverthclcss, tlle value of Chu~us brougllt into India 
tlirougll Ladakll in ICJOI -02 amountcd to over four lalths 
out of a total import  tmck uf 1z,h'o,668 rupees. The 
exports fro111 India by the sarne route amounted to 
i r,74,402 rupees. Uetwctcn I3e1igal and Tibet the direct 
trade of 1cp3 at~loulltcd to about eight laklis for imports 
and scven and a quarter lakhs for exports, and probably 
somu portion of  the considerable trade between Bengal 
and Nepal, arnuun~ing to 36-0 lalths for imports and 
exports, represents indirect trade with Tibet. How- 
ever that may be, the total volume of trade across the 
Hirnalayu is stnall, and though it is capable of great 
clevelopmenr, especially if rich golclficlds are ever opened 
up in Tibet, it is noL frutn the comtncrcial point of view 
that wc need cllielly to concern ourselves about events 
on the otllcr sicle of tliu wntcrshed. 
What  it ~vould be impossible to view witlzout some 
concern would 1,c the ascendcncy of a foreign and 
pvssibly I~ostilc puwer a1 Lhasn, controlling the policy 
.~ ~. 
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of a great politico - religious organisation whose in- 'jib a po~verful t leighbour 
fluence can and does make itself appreciably felt all ;lete our frontier is frin 
along the north-eastern borderland of India. Lhasa 'itire states, over which c 
is the stronghold of Lamaistic Buddhism, a debased zdnly upon the hitherto 
form of Buddhism largely overgrown with tantric i ~ e r i a l  power  i n  Asia. P 
philosophy. Of the five great Avatari Lamas, in whose Pass to-morrow into tl 
successive reincan~ations its spiritual authority is !t3rS ~ o u l d  elapse before 
vested, the Dalai Lama, who resides at Lhasa, is the north-east frontier, atlc 
chief. Two others live in Tibet. There is one in ~hl'sical difficulties, it is 
Bhutan, and I have already referred to the  Taranath !icection that she wonld 
Lama of Urga in Mongolia. But they all derive their inreal earnest. But there  
sanction from Lhasa. Lhasa is, in fact, the Rome of Freence would sootl  nlab 
Central Asian Buddhism, and the many-storied Po-ta-la i~stance, d r a w  away from 
on the hill to the west of the city is its Vatican, whence ?aterial for which we ann- 
its influence radiates through innumerable lamaseries ailitary power  controlled 
or Buddhist monasteries, not only into Turkestan ihrough which a T i b e t 0 4  
and Mongolia and Western China, but across the span IChatrnandu ? Coulc 
Himalayas into the frontier states of our Indian Tibetan raids down thc 
Empire. Corrupt and degraded a s  i t  is, it is still 3 mere local incidents or 
unquestionably a power, and just because it is corrupt rie have h i the r to  d o n e  
and degraded it might lend itself the more readily to Russia instead of C h i n a  i 
become for a con side ratio^^ the tool of Russian ambi- Our own relat ions with 
tions. Rigidly orthodox at home, Russia displays golVerned in  the past ma 
abroad singular flexibility in adapting her yoke to "latent p o w e r "  of Chi 
the religious peculiarities of Asiatic peoples, and the Far, was o n e  of  the fu 
spiritual authority of the Lhasa theocracy in alliance statesmanship in Ccntra 
wit11 the Great White Tsar would enjoy under Russian went events i t  seems ; 
tutelage a n  amount of material support which it has ~ards  of t w e n t y  ycars 01 
ceased to derive from its allegiance to Peking. Tibet a great e s t e n t ,  built u p  
as a Russian dependency would, at any rate, no longer inhence might be pro 
be a pcca7ztitk'nkgZ~enbZe, and our north-east frontier, counterpoise to that  of 
naturally formidable as it is, t v o ~ ~ l d  require to be llr. h l a r g a r y  i n  Yun-na 
watched, just as every civilised country has to watch tardily exac ted  f rom t h  
its frontiers, whatever they may be, where they marc11 paration of such an ou 
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3 l-~oworful nt:igl~hour, nnrl rnrjst of all in India, 
where our frontier is frin~t:tl  ~ \ ~ i t l l  selni-independcnt 
native starus, ovcbr lvttictl our  ;iuthvrity is collditioned 
mainly nprjrl 111t: lljllii!~*to unrjv;~llerl 1)rcstjgc of our 
Imperial pcrivcr in Asia. N o  cloul~t, cven if Tibet were 
to pass t o - n ~ o r r r ~ ~ v  i n t o  the llands of Russia, many 
years ivould claps(: bibfore shct cc~uld actually threatell 
our r l o r t l ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ t  fi'c~tilier, anti, c:onsideritig thc ellormaus 
physical dillit:t~fric.rs, i t  is 11ot presu~nably from that 
direr:lion that s l ~  woultl r?vcr atlornpt to strike a t  us 
in t'caal chnrncbst, I3ut tlz~!r.c' a r c  otl1t:r ways in which her 
p r ~ ~ s c ~ ~ c t :  \voulti soon 111:~kc itself ft:lt. Coulcl we, for 
instnncc, d ~ ~ u ~ v  away from Nepal the splendid figIltillg 
n1ntc:rial for which wc annually indent upon it if a great 
military power c+c~ntrollccl thc: alrproacllcs to the passes 
thrungll \r*liicll i1 '1*ibtato-Cl1inc:se nrrny once descended 
upon IChatrnantlu? Cuulcl Tibetan intrigues in Siklcim 
or Tibctnti raids down tlic Chumbi valley be disn~issed 
as merc local incideties or disposcd of as summarily as 
we have liithcrto drjnc if Tibet owned allegiailce to 
Russia insteati c ) f  Cll in t~?  
O u r  own relations with Tibe t  havc unfortunately been 
governed in the p:tst mainly by that fond belief in the 
"latcnt powcr " of Chirin tvliich, until the Japanese 
war, was one of the f i i~~darncntal  clogmas of British 
statcs113anship in Ckntrnl Asin. In  the light of more 
rccent (:vents i t  sc:t:rns almost incrcdiblc that for up- 
wards of t\venty Yuilrs o u r  Central Asian policy was, to 
a great estcbnt, Imilt u p  on thc? cIclusion thnl Chinese 
i~ifluuncc might be pro[~i!rly regi1rdt:d as an effectual 
cou~ltcrpoisc to tll:~t OF Kussia. After the rnurcler of 
Mr. hiInrgary in Yun-n:in i l l  1875, one of the conditions 
tardily exactcrl from tllc Chinc:se Government, i n  re- 
paration of such an uulrage committed up017 a British 
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official with the connivance of the provii~cial authorities 
under whose protection he was travelling in the dis- 
charge of his duties, was that facilities should be given 
for a British mission to enter Tibet and visit Lhasa. 
But years were allo.rved to pass without any effect being 
given to this supple~nentary article of the agreement 
concluded by S i r  Thomas Wade with Li Hung-chang 
at Chefoo on September 13th, 1876. In 1884, however, 
the Indian Government returned to the cbarge, and the 
assent of Peking was obtained to its request that Mr. 
Macaulay should receive all necessary facilities for 
proceeding to Lhasa with a commercial mission from 
India. Mr. Macaulay himself visited the Chinese 
capital, and obtained from the Tsung-li-YamCn, to- 
gether with his official passports and letters of recom- 
mendation to the  Chinese A7nbnlz at  Lhasa, all those 
assurances of support and goodwill of which Chinese 
officials are always prodigal. But whilst the Chinese 
Government was lavish of pl-oinises during his stay in 
Peking, Mr. Macaulay had no sooner turned his baclr on 
the Celestial capital than Chinese diplo~nacy was a t  . 
work in Tibet to defeat the objects, and if possible 
prevent the departure of his mission. T h e  Tibetans 
responded with alacrity, and the Chinese were soon in 
a position to intimate to the British Government that 
the news of Mr. Macaulay's impending mission had 
created much popular excitement and apprehension in 
Tibet, and that there was every reason to fear i t  would 
meet with an unfriendly, possibly even with a hostile 
reception. As in  the meantime the Burmah campaign 
had talren place, and in view of the annexation of 
Upper Burmah i t  was deemed necessary to propitiate 
the Son of Heaven, who claimed certain shadowy rights 
of suzerainty over the kingdom of Ava, we were at 
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last induced to countermand the Macaulay Missioll as a 
graceful concession to Peking, ancl its abandonment, 
6 L i n a s ~ n u c l ~  as inquiry into the circumstances by the 
Chinese Govern~nent has shoxvn the existence of many 
obstacles," was formally placed on record in the Anglo- 
Chinese Convention of July 24th) 1886, by which Great 
Britain furthermore undertook to sanction the con- 
tinuance of " the customary decennial missions" 10 
Peking frorn Uurmah in return for an acknowledgment 
by China that " England shall be free to do whatever 
she thinks iir a~lcl proper" in Burma11 itself. I have 
already recorded the irnnlcdiate results of that graceful 
concession on llle Tibela11 border, the incursion of 
Tibetan forces into Siklcim, ancl the Calcutta Convention 
by which, after their ejection, China had to recognise 
the British protectorate of Silcliim. Though the Chinese 
Amban :~t  Lliasa came clowu in person to sign that 
agreement with the Viceroy-an act of supreme, if 
reluctant, conclesccnsion of which even the Tibetans 
might have been supposed to understand tlie significance 
--Tibetan obstruction was only temporarily cl~eclted. 
Tlle detailed regulations for frontier trade and grazing 
rights on the border were, it is true, drawn up and 
agreed to in 1893 between the British ancl Chinese 
Commissioners in accordance with Article VII. of the 
Calcutta Convention, but the Tibetans have generally 
treated them as waste paper. Another and, it is to be 
hoped, a more serious attempt is now being made to 
deal with the Tibctans and put an end to the lawlessness 
in which they have hitherto indulged svitli far too much 
impunity, Ct31oneI Y~unghusba~ ld ,  one of the most 
experienced poli~ical ofliccrs of the Indian Government, 
whosc cxploratic~ns in Central Asia, including Tibet, 
have given him all almost unrivalled lcnowleclge of the 
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country and the people, has been appointed, together 
with Mr. White, the Political Officer in Silrkim, to  
meet Chinese and Tibetan representatives at Khamba- 
Jong, on the Tibetan side of the frontier, and discuss 
with them the various questions in dispute. The 
British Commissioners, who were accompanied by an 
escort of zoo men of a native infantry regiment, with a 
reserve of 300 men, across the Sikkim border at Tangu, 
arrived a t  Khamba-Jong last July, and though no 
official information has been given with regard to the 
progress of negotiations, it may be assumed that the 
Indian Government will not withdraw its comlnissioners 
until our relations with Tibet have been placed altogether 
on a very different footing from the past. 
If any faith can be put in the assurances given by 
Russia that, in spite of circumstantial reports which 
have found credence, if they have not actually origin- 
ated, in Russian circles, she has concluded no con- 
vention with Tibet or in regard to Tibet with China, 
the obstructive attitude in which the Tibetans appear 
to have so far persisted is hardly lilrely to  be main- 
tained. For there can be no doubt from the language 
which both Chinese and Tibetan officials have openly 
used of late years that they have hitherto believed 
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they could count upon Russian support. Otherwise they 
would hardly have overlooked the fact that the long- 
suffering patience we have so far displayed cannot be put 
down to our inability to bring material pressure to bear 
upon them. The mountain barriers which nature has 
interposed between British India and Tibet are all on 
our side of the frontier. The actual passes into Tibet 
are extremely easy, and as soon as  they are crossed 
the country lies perfectly open right away to Lhasa. 
After the Tibetan raid into Sikkim the British punitive 
I 
exl)cditic)n in rSS8 or~cupic!d tlic Chumbi valley, wllich is 
ollly half 'l'i11c:lan ant1 [>sojcc:ls liltc a wcclgi: illtu British 
territory I)i:t\t.cc~l Si1;kirn atid I;huti~n. We sllould 
have 11ocn thorougllly justifictcl it1 retnining possession 
of it nt th ;~ t  titilt!, ;ls Inany I r i c l i : ~ ~ ~  autlioritics strongly 
reconlmcticIcd, tlntl \vt: c~ i~( ;~ l i l t t~ t l  it solely ou t  of 
exaggt!r;ttcd clc*ft~rcocit to Cliiriese susceptibilities. 
Thcsc, at ally rntch, tvcb sliould hartlly take into considera- 
tir,1l on tlie I)rc4sr:nt oc:c':~sion, for tllc! Cl~inese have 
sho\vn tlicmscl\rt*s :~l~solutcIy inc:npable of Iinlding the 
Tibetiins e c ,  lht.  ctlg;LgrrtniAnts colitr;u:tccl o n  their behalf, 
and tlluclgh lmvc n o  ivish to "spoil the facc" of 
the I'ckitig C;ovc*rnlnt:nt, it is ufitf1 the Tibetans we 
hnvc to deal, nacl i t  is of t l ~ e  t~tmost importance we 
shotlIcl noC :ig;iin tlirc)\v away the opportunity oE sham- 
ing them th;it, \vliilst K C  wisli for ~iotl i i~lg bettcr than 
friendly rclatio~is wit11 tliihrn, wc Incan to liulcl tllcrn to 
the letter tirid thr: spirit of t11c engagements upon 
which cmr relations ~ v i t l i  thciri arc: based. 
CHAPTER XXXI 
OUR POSITION IN INDIA 
B EFORE attempting to draw any general conclu- sions from this survey of the hostile or rival 
influences which, to borrow Lord Curzon's metaphor, 
are creeping up to the very rainparts of our Indian 
Empire, it may be well-nay, it is indispensable-to 
cast a glance at  the condition of India itself. 
Never before in the world's history has any nation 
made itself responsible for the safety and welfare of so 
large a proportion of the human race, alien in race, in 
religion, and in language, as  we have in respect of 
the 300,000,000 people who have been brought under 
the British ruj in India. Nor has any nation ever 
entertained so generous a conception of its duties 
towards the populations over whom it rules by right of 
conquest. W e  may not always have acted'up to this 
conception, for nations, like individuals, are but 
human, and, as such, are apt from time to time to 
lapse from the high standard they have, with the utmost 
sincerity of purpose, set before them. But it is not an 
idle boast that the British people, on the whole, do 
regard themselves in relation to India less as the 
masters of a subjugated dependency than as the 
trustees for the moral and material interests of their 
Indian fellow-subjects. There may be differences of 
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opinion alllongst us as to the ef l ic ic~lc~ with xvhicll we 
discharge oilr national tliriigations towards India. Some 
have, n o  do t~b t ,  I l O n ~ ~ t l y  convirrccd tllernsclves that 
British rule h:~s tfrndt!ck tc~ substitute new and Inore 
serious, if less glaring, c?vils for  those xvl~ich were in- 
dissolubly C ~ P Y I I ~ C G ~ ( : ( ~  wit11 the  ancient systcms of native 
government wc disl~laccd. Somc was irnpatierlt at our 
failure to train th(3 [)(:i,pIf: of India within threr: or four 
gne rn t ions  to thtrsrt muthrxls of self-government ~vllich 
arc with oursclvc:~ tllc outr:omc of ccnt~lrics of laboriot~s 
discipline. O n  thc* otllcr I ~ : ~ n c l ,  thcre may bo in some 
quarters a n  csc:css of c~lrtimism, a n  ingrained tendency, 
especially in tlu: ofiic:inl mintl, to l ~ o l i  nxvay from the 
dark spots in a sr~ci:ii systcrn wllich is cer ta i~~ly not free 
fram nlatly serinirs hlenlishrs, to ignore inevitable 
failures and to dwctll exclusively upon the brighter side 
of the picturc. Hut few, if any, will be fr~uncl nrnongst 
the bitterest critics--native or European-of British 
administration in India to contend that, in the interests 
of the Indian pccrplc, there is any p~+actical alternative 
to the rnaintenan~:c! of British rule, o r  amongst the 
warmest apologists of our systern of government to 
p r e r c ~ ~ d  that thcrc is no room for  improvement in its 
methocls. 
It would be prc?sumptuous on my part to venture to 
assess the rdative rncrits a n d  dcinerits of Anglo- 
Indian administration, or to dogmatise upon such a 
complicated qtic:stion as tl~at: of the actual condition of 
the pcopIe of India under 13ritisli rulo. But tllere are 
a few indisputnblc Facts wliich cannot fail to strilrc any- 
one who has, at various pcriods, actually visited different 
parts of India, or who cvetl has merely studied India in 
books. Orye is the irnnlcnsc size and variety of India. 
We arc apL to picture Inditr to oursclves as one country 
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presenting much the same features of homogeneity 
that we associate with most countries, in Europe or 
elsewhere, united under one conlmon name. India is 
in reality a continent rather than a country, and it 
embraces scarcely less numerous and distinct varieties 
of natural configuration and climate as well as of race, 
religion, and customs than our European continent 
itself does. From Bombay to Calcutta is nearly as far 
as from Paris to Constantinople, and from Peshawar to 
Cape Comorin is further than from St. Petersburg to 
Lisbon. There is more difference both of race and of 
temperament between the Pathan of the north-west he llc, d~rt!!, l r l ~ r  t 
frontier and the Tamil of the Madras Presidency, or Ttlacq,ljrcd, tjlc tr i i i id i t ! t i ' l$ 
between the Bengali Baboo and the Moplah of the ;hemost of tl1ost: n?ii.,r~ri:r'%. : : I  
Malabar coast, than there is between Norwegian and hclast f e ~ v  yt i l rSF l ~ l i l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  drrtt 
Magyar, or between Greelc and Scotsman. No religious ,ihcruel intensity, ntral a i r k l r ~  
differences divide European races to-day-except, per- occurri:ai:t: irr iirl* 
haps, Christians and Jews in Russia and Rumania-as Ihemefllor)l evt:tr ,g,rTkb:tlttr .L,
they still divide in India Hindus a ~ l d  Mussulmans, not mitigate thc S C Y I : ~ . ~ ~ ) '  4 sl 
or even, amongst Mussulmalls themselves, Sunnis I,esent, Tlic t.1111~ c : c ! t ~ ~ l i r t i l i .  
and Shias. Even in the matter of language Russian has greater cl1crgy brrcn tiih] 
and Portuguese, or English and Hungarian, are not 
further apart than Telugu and Pashtu or I-Iindustani 
and Tamil. Apart from the unique barrier of caste, 
for which we should seek in vain for any parallel in lar lnore cnicicrlt in tht 1st: 
Europe, the ordinary distinctions between rich and i under direct Rritish adminis 
poor, between the toiling masses and the  few who sit are still sol~jcct t lr  nirtivi: ; 
in the seats of the mighty, are no less clearly defined own ruling chiefs, St.jr dru 
in India than in the most aristocratic or autocratic : or to explain wsay thrc t t ~  
of European countries, though the lines of cleavage 
ofeconon~ic vitality i r r  ;t f be different. Yet be the shortcomings of British s?ch widespn,:art c;ala tnitia: administration what they may, we have devised a 
~ntinued, v;ititout ;illy vxct system of government which serves as  a common 
uninterruptetlly, ilnd ill1 t i t i  denominator for all these heterogeneous and fluctuating 
10 illdicat~ ;LII i~l,.~I:;ist- I';L 
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aid  often ~011flicti11g cluantities, and  it has proved in 
good times and in had times to be a workillg system 
which at least gives security of life and property to all. 
That is certainly in itself 110 nlean achievement. The 
intcrrlal peace of India has remained undisturbed since 
the great convulsion of 1857. The poverty of the 
India11 people is unquestionably great, for India 
itself is, or\ 111e whole, a poor country, in some parts 
seriously overcrowded, and, in general, but scantily 
e~ldowcd with the ordinary resources of nature. More- 
over, the rlative of India, patient and hard-worlring 
though 11c be, does not as a rule possess, and has not 
yet acquired, the  trained inteIligence necessary to rnalre 
the most of those resources, such as they are. During 
the last few years, plague and famine have visited India 
with cruel intensity, and though similar visitations are 
of chronic: occurrence in the annals of Indian history, 
the memory of even greater sufferings in the past does 
not mitigate the severity of such an ordeal in the 
present. T h e  only consoling features a re  that never 
has greater energy been displayed in relieving public 
misery, and-though this is perhaps a consideration that 
may snvour of ilational self-righteousness-that the 
machinery applied to  that purpose has generally proved 
far more etlicient in those parts of India which are 
under direct British administration than in those which 
are still subject to native administration under their 
own ruling chiefs. Nor does it seem possible to deny 
or to explain away the existence of a great reserve 
of economic vitality in a country where, in spite of 
such widespread calamities, the public revenue has 
continued, without any exceptional pressure, to expand 
unintcrruptcdly, and all the ~isual tests have continued 
indicate all increase rather illan a decrease in llle 
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aggregate of material prosperity. Against the ex- 
aggerations of theoretical pessimism, as well as against 
the more tangible facts of appalling mortality and 
acute suffering within certain areas, the Indian Govern- 
ment is, at  any rate, entitled to set off the equally 
tangible fact that after such a series of black years it 
has been able to give the whole of British India a con- 
siderable reduction of taxation with every prospect of 
permanency, and that the vast system of railways, irriga- 
tion canals, roads, and other public works with which 
it has gradually endowed the country, though still 
demanding large extensions and improvements, actually 
possesses a marlretable value that covers to-day the 
whole indebtedness of the State. 
Though the Western and the Eastern mind are never 
lilrely to meet on the same plane, some at  least of the 
artificial barriers which are keeping them apart are 
gradually weakening, and the benefits of British rule 
receive recognition even from those who most loudly 
resent its methods. Such recognition, i t  must be 
admitted, is too often less articulate than the malevolent 
criticism which finds daily expression in the columns 
of many native newspapers. But the freedom which 
the Press enjoys, even if it degenerates a t  times into 
licence, may itself be taken as  a proof of the confidence 
which the Indian Government entertains in the stability 
of existing institutions. Hostile criticism, moreover, 
proceeds in many cases from natives who have lost 
touch with their own people, and still find themselves 
excluded from full communion with the Western world 
into which they consider themselves intellectually quali- 
fied to enter. The social aspect of the race problem 
as between European and native is a very difficult 
and delicate one, especially in regard to the natives 
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whom education has divorced from their own traditions, 
customs, and beliefs. To the native who reinaills in 
all essentials untouched by Western thought it prob- 
ably does not present such difficulties as his self- 
constituted champions sometimes assume. A French 
writer, who was at  first shocked at  the exclusiveness 
practised by Anglo-Indian society towards natives of 
all ranks and classes, remarks, shrewdly enough, as 
the result of subsequent observation, that in a country 
accuston~ed to such rigid lines of social demarcation 
as the caste system has drawn, the new European caste 
may well be regarded as merely one more course super- 
imposed upon the older courses of which the Indian 
'social fabric has been coiltinuously built up, and that 
as a matter of fact the exclusiveness of the Anglo- 
Indian is by no means so one-sided as it appears ; for 
if natives are never admitted on a footing of complete 
equality illto European houses, the great majority 
amongst them would also never thinlr of admitting 
Europeails into the intimacy of their own l~omes, whilst 
some would sooner starve than eat food over which the 
shadow of a European had cast defilement. 
Nevertheless, in spite of limitations which are under- ~ t r  lrttudom which 
stood and respected by both sides, very real friendship 
does exist, and exists far more frequently than one 
bills in the stability is at  first inclined to believe, between natives and 
Europeans. The  cordiality of the personal relations i tiris~n, mureover, 
which many British oficials establish with the natives *t+s who have lost 
of high as well as  low degree among whom their duties ill t i r~ t l  themselves 
r lac i\l't:stern world throw them at different periods of their careers, is a 
factor of which it is dificult for us at  home to realise 
the full value. In the public services of India those 
relations are often inherited from generation to gener- 
ation. For instance, one day at Delhi during the 
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Durbar celebrations, I met a distinguisl~ed British 
official on his way to a great native ruler, at whose 
accession he had, years ago, represented the Govern- 
ment of India, while his father before him had officiated 
in the same capacity at the accession of the late ruler. 
On the same occasion I attended one evening an enter- 
tainment given by four brothers, who had themselves 
met at Delhi for the first time, all four together, since 
they joined the Indian Army, to some sixty or seventy 
native officers who at different times had served with 
distiilction under one or other of them. Nothing could 
be pleasanter or more significant than the spirit of 
healthy, self-respecting enma?-ade~ie which prevailed on 
both sides. 
There has been some tendency at home, as well as 
in certain circles in India, to depreciate the value of the 
great Coronation Durbar at Delhi and to decry it a s  
a merely wasteful display of barbaric pomp. What, 
it is asked, ~vill be the abiding results of its magnificent 
but ephemeral pageantry? The people who ask that 
question entirely misapprehend, I thinlr, the Oriental 
temperament, Like the children of Israel in the 
wilderness of old, the East always asks for signs, and 
such pageants as  those witnessed a t  Delhi bring home 
to the Indian mind, steeped as it is in symbolism, the 
majesty of the Crown and the power of the Empire 
with a force which it is difficult for 0cciden.tals to 
realise. The share that India thus took in solemnising 
the accession of a new Sovereign to the throne of the 
British Empire appealed straight to her imagination. 
Second only to this was the impression produced by 
the conspicuous part which the great feudatory princes 
were invited to take in the Delhi celebrations. I t  con- 
veyed, not only to them and their immediate subjects, 
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but to the 1\'hole people, in whose eyes they represent 
the chcrislied Lraclitions of the great historic past, a 
fresh and solemn assurance that the aim and purpose of 
the paramuunt I 'n~t~cr  is to preserve and not to disturb 
the stls:ial fr~llric of its Indian dependency. In  this 
respect, the visit of the Duke of C<)nnaught enormously 
enhanced clrc.! t:lhbct of th(> Durl~ar .  Few Orientals are 
aklc: to grasp the ir1e:t of delegated authority, and the 
11reseric:c~ of 11112 King-Izmpcror's brother at  the side 
o[ tlre King-Emperor's ofiicial representative invested 
thc cc1t:braliotls ~vi th  tl11 added solerllnity and moral 
cogency they c.i~illd oll~erwise never have possessed. 
?'he pi:r%j~l:il ~ L c L I ~ c  of loyalty which the presence of 
tllo I~ id ian  princes and ruling chiefs betolceiled was 
assurcclly with thc great majority no empty form. 
'They rule over tcrriti)ries in inany cases larger than 
Uelgiu~n o r  I-Iolln~id, some of them approaching the 
area of the first-class I<uropean Powers. Less than 
two-tbircls of our  Ir~diarl Ernpire is to-clay sul~ject to 
direct British administration. More than one-third 
relnait~s under the rule of Its own princes, who, within 
the lirnitatiuns o f  Inipcrial policy, enjoy complete in- 
dependence in the government of their own subjects. 
T h e  splendour of their jewels, the magnificence of 
their robes, the profusion of their camps and retinue 
a t  I)clhi afforded abundant evidence, according to 
Orieritnl standards, of their wealth, power, and prestige. 
Still thest: a re  assured to tllern, and assured to them 
only, t ~ n d c r  t11n authority of the paramount Power. 
hIorc than Lhat, if they scan the pages of their 
lxistc>ry, Icw uE them can doubt that it was the establish- 
rnellt of 13ritish ruIe in  India which saved them from 
impending ruiIi. Wlien the Moghul Empire was crum- 
bling away and the wl~ole of India was torn by inter- 
z c 
386 OUR POSITION IN INDIA 
necine warfare, when even the proud Kajputs appeared 
to be a t  the mercy of Mahratta adventurers, it was the 
strong hands of Englishmen like Clive, Hastings, and 
Wellesley that stayed the storm. Unlike other waves 
of conquest which pourecl over India from the north 
like desolating floods, levelling all things, the British 
conquest of India arrested the progress of internal 
disintegration which had already set in ; and as soon 
as the initial work of pacification was accomplislled and 
the direct control of Indian policy had been assumed in 
great measure by the British Government, it  was to the 
task of preserving as far as possible the social and 
political fabric of the Indian depeadency from further 
decay that the statesmanship of its greatest British 
rulers was directed. In the confidence which that 
policy, in spite of occasional and more or less unavoid- 
able lapses, has on the whole engendered, lies the 
secret of the loyalty to which the princes and peoples 
of India gave emphatic expression at the Durbar, and 
of our ability to hold so many millions alien to  our 
race, our religion, and our customs contentedly subject 
to our peaceful sway. 
Still, though we may rightly claim on the whoIe to 
have brought peace rather than the sword to India, 
it is by the sword that we brought peace, and by the 
sword that we must yet loolr in the last resort to main- 
taining it. I t  was this aspect of the British majwhich 
the procession of the Mutiny veterans round the Durbar 
amphitheatre symbolised with a force and pathos which 
it is allnost hopeless to attempt to convey to those who 
have not been privileged to witness it. They were but 
a small band, composed in about equal proportions of 
Europeans, Eurasians, and natives, all well stricken 
in years, and some visibly bowed down under their 
THE MUTINY 
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weight, grey-l~airccl, white-bearded. A good many 
seerned to have regained for the nollce their youthful 
elasticity of step, but the oldest and most infirm could 
only limp :und totttir bravely on to  the once familiar 
strains uf ;L st irr ing  military march. Most of the 
Eurol)t:a~ls wvrc i n  p1:lin mufti, but some wore uniforms, 
for th(* grc:~t~:r part fifi~dccl and tarnished fro111 long clis- 
use. Of tllr: ntitivrs, the majority clearly belonged to 
111c humh1r:r c:l:lsscs, for their long, flowil~g garments 
were phi11 ancl unaclo~.ned. T h e  rear of this battered 
colurnn was brougiit up by a party of withered old 
G l l ~ ~ r l i a ~ ,  whose faltering steps were tenderly borne 
up by young sturdy fellows of their regiment. There 
were abuut six hitnclred altogetl~cr, a strange medley 
of mces arlcl types, time-worn a n d  weather-beaten, with 
n o  show of  p0111p and  circtlmstance to arrest the eye. 
But, more superbly than in s l ~ i ~ ~ i n g  raiment or in 
lustre of gnlcl and silvcr, these rnen were clothed in 
the glory of as splc~ldid nlernories as the records of 
our E~llpiro can boast. They represented the remnants 
of those slender, isolated forces of stout-hearted Britons 
and loyal natives who, forty-six years ago, cut off for 
months from the outer world under the flaming sun 
of an Indian sumnler, in the stress of battle and the 
Inore deadly stress of pestilence, through physical 
hardships of every kind and worse hardships of the 
soul, held India for t h e  Empire on the Ridge of Delhi, 
in the Residency a t  Lucknow, and on many another 
bloody iield, nrllen the  sttdden tempest of revolt, though 
it proved to bc as local and shortlived a s  a tropical 
tornado, seemecl to shako the whole fabric of British 
I power to the very foundations. 
As  they r?ntercd the arena one common emotion, more 
overpowerillg, [nore universal, more spontaneous than 
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at any other mornent, thrilled the whole of the vast 
assemblage. Princes and people, natives and Euro- 
peans, soldiers and civilians, men and women, all rose 
as by one in~pulse to salute that band of heroes, and 
many an eye was dimmed and there was a choke in 
many a throat as we gazed upon that pathetic remnant. 
There was one thought in every mind. But for them 
and such as them, humble fighters though they were, 
who, to borrow the terse and eloquent inscription on 
He~ l ry  Lawrence's grave at Luclrnow, had just "tried 
to do  their duty," where might be all the pageantry 
of that fleeting day, where all the promise of a splendid 
future ~vllich still lies before our Indian Empire? 
Amongst the abiding memories of that meinorable 
fortnight, surely none will be deeper, none more 
stimulating, than that vision conjured up in such 
surroundings out of the tragic but glorious past. 
One other iiicident I shoulcl like to recall from those 
days at Delhi which illustrates the peculiar ties of 
sentiment that bind the peoples of India to our rule- 
ties of ~vhich, with our cold Western habits of thought, 
we are apt to overlook or underrate the value. Of all 
the peoples of India none, perhaps, has accepted 
British rule with more unreserved loyalty than the 
Sikhs, for to them, probably, alone it represents the 
fulfilment of prophecy. Two hundred and twenty-eight 
years ago one of their greatest religious leaders, Teg 
Bahadur, ninth Guru, was put to death at Delhi by 
Aurungzeb for refusing to embrace Islam. According 
to Sikh tradition, Teg Bahadur had come to Delhi and 
surrendered himself into the MoghuI Emperor's hands 
with full knowledge that he was about to lay down his 
life for his people. He had himself preached, "Be 
faithful even unto death to  them that have put trust in 
%"and he -was ready to sacrif 
athat  the sacrifice w a s  rcq 
W t h e  pledges of loyalty gi 
"~ghul dynasty un to  the st 
hasten t h e  release of tht 
;[Aurungzeb hesitated to kill 
"induce him by a l te rna te  pr 
sb~ace t h e  faith of Mahorn 
4~vour.s proving useless, 're 
?before the &Ioghul Emperor  
ked his eyes from the p r i s  
dews of the Imperial z e u a n  
this meant death, but 1 
"If I raised my eyes in the d 
not to look upon its fort 
nd them into the West, -r 
aired race pouring fort1 
hall tear down thy purd 
e." After t h e  last Khal 
eld of Gujarat the S i k h s  
supreme fulfilment of '1 
from that time have not 
sh rule, but in the trying 
ery war waged s i n c e  the 
ties of their race t ins t in t  
t the suggestiorl of the v 
whom no Punjab chief1 
ect, the Sikhs determin 
se of the deep significi 
mn act of worship :tt 1 
tyr who foretold in the 1 
he British-Indian Emp 
hadur's son, Govind S i l  




' r  a~ld 
rkv in 
tl l i l l lt .  
thvm 
\Vt'TtL, 








r t .  
thcae 
i c s  of 
rulrt- 
rug11~, 






I l r i  by 
~rtf ing 
l r i  and 
lrands 
,VIl  his 
* '  Lk! 
u.st ia 
nlltl 111' Ira.; ready 1(1 sncrilicc his own life in t h e  
llulief tllat 1ht4 !;nc.rifil:c! w;is rcquircd i n  order to dis- 
cllasgc the I ) ~ C C ~ ~ C S  r r f  loyalty givell i n  earlier tilnes to 
tile AIoghul 1lyn:lsty unto the scveutll generation, ancl 
thus to Ilastcil the st*libnst: of  the people fro111 its yoke. 
I'lut h~rrung;zf1t) I~ctsil:ltc~cl to l i i l l  llilll, and sought rather 
to inclu{:v 11iin t ) ~  itlt(:1*1li1t~ j~rolnists 111ld threats to 
e ~ n l ~ m c ~ c  thth ftiitll or il1;illoinet. At last, all such 
ende:ivuurs [in jving usc:less, 'l'tlg I3nhndur was 11rought 
111) bcforc tIlck Alogliul 131npr:ror 011 the charge of having 
raised his tlyc.c; f rom rht; prison walls to the latticed 
rvindows of the I~nl)c,!rial zenana. 'The holy nlan Icnem 
that this rnca~lt dcnrll, I~u t  lle n~lsnrerecl fearlessly : 
If I r:lisi:cl 111y ilyc!s i n  tlie clirection of thy zenana it 
was not to loiil; ul)on its iorbiddcn ~vindows, 13ot far 
bcyoutl thcm into tlli* $Vest, \vhence I saw arinies of a 
fair-haired rrice pc luring fort11 frum beyond the seas 
who shall tuns clown thy 1)urdahs and overthrow th ine  
empire." After rhc! last Khalstl army was shattered on 
the f eld of G ~ ~ j a r a t  the Sil;hs sccognised in their defeat 
tllc suprcrtle fulfilrncnt of T e g  Dahadur's prophecy, 
and from that tirnc llavc not only sub~uitted loyally to 
I'lritish rule, but in the trying times of the  Mutiny and 
in every war ta,:igcd since then hare  placed the martial 
qualities of  their race unstintingly at its service. 
At the suggestion of thc venerable Iiajah of Nablla, 
than \~~*flom nci 13iilljal~ chieftain cnjoys rnore universal 
respect, the Sikhs detertnil~ed to l~ la rk  their peculiar 
sense of the dei~p sigrlifrcance of tllc Durbar by a 
solelnn act or \vorship at  the shrine of t he  propl-let- 
martyr who ftrrctold in the Jiuur of death the greatness 
of tllc I3ritisll-Indian Empire. 'Vhc birthday of Teg  
Tjahaclur's sorr, Gotlind S ingh ,  last of the ten Gurus, 
under ~vhose IcrrJersttip the Sikh religion was reduced 
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into the final shape which it still preserves, occurred 
during the Delhi celebrations, and offered an excellent 
opportunity for this spontaneous demonstration of 
loyalty from the Silrh people. Early one morning the 
Sikh princes and people wended their way to the slnaIl 
shrine in the Chandni Chauk, which occupies the site 
of Teg Bahadur's prison and execution. The sacred 
Granth, the lloIy book of the Silch religion, was carried 
in pomp into the sanctuary, followed by a brilliant 
cortkge of Silch chieftains, amongst whom old Nabha 
alone, with nothing to mark his noble station but the 
dignity of his features and his snow-white' beard, trod 
barefooted as if in protest against the luxury and self- 
indulgence of younger generations. There, in their 
holy of holies, the great Silch chiefs renewed in each 
other's presence their vows of feaIty to the Sovereign of 
that Empire from the West whose power had been 
foretold to them of old. 
If the proclamation of the Imperial title has invested 
the ties which unite the ruling chiefs to  the British 
Crown with a personal or pzrasi-feudal character, which 
in many cases appeals very directly to their most 
cherished traditions, we have set before them in the 
territories subject to direct British administration a n  
example which few of them have hitherto succeeded 
in emulating. For the good government of a popuIa- 
tion six or seven times more numerous than that of 
the British Islands depends, in the long run, at  least 
as much upon the great Civil Service of India as  upon 
the high administrators temporarily deputed to repre- 
sent the Crown a t  Calcutta and in the chief Presidencies. 
For integrity, efficiency, and public spirit the Indian 
Civil Service stands absolutely unrivalled, and that 
splendid army of civiIians scattered over the length 
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and breadth of the vast Inclian continent cat1 boast, 
perhaps, an even nol~ler, if less brilliant, record than 
our solcliers, for it is too often only a thanlrless record 
of hard but obscure battles fought year in ,  year out, 
against anc:ient traditions of corruption and oppressio~l, 
against popular ignorance and Oriental apathy, against 
famine and pestilcnc,e, i n  whole-hearted clevotioll to 
tlie \jest interests of the alien ~tlillions co~nmitted to 
their charge. It is a record, roo, in ~v l~ i ch  t e natives 
of India I~avc their part, and no inconspicuous part, 
together with the ruling race, for we have gradually 
acl~~iitted illto rhc judicial anrI other branches of the 
public service an increasing nu~nber of competent 
natives whose loyalty is as utlquestionable as their 
ability, The problcm of native education-elementary, 
secondary, rt11r.I University-presel~ts formidable difi- 
culties, moral nnd material, which have so far been 
only very partially overcome. The  present Viceroy 
has ad~llittecl that " our educational systems 
i n  India arc faulty i n  the extreme.'' But under his 
impulse the sul~jcct is receiving closer attention than 
has generally been paid to it, ancl such experiments 
as Aligurh arc  tliere to stlow that, in the higher 
branckles, at any rate, the problem can be solved. 
Agricultural education, though it unfortunately seems 
tu appeal but little to t l ~ e  native classes rnost receptive 
of TVc!stern instruction, is probably far Inore important 
tl~ari rnany othtir and Inore showy branches of educa- 
tion, for the poverty of the vast peasant population 
of India is certainly clue ill no small measure to their 
listlessness and ig~lorancc and to tlieir obstinate ad- 
llercnce t r~  antiquated mcL11ods of cultivation. With 
regard to colnlnert:c ;i~itl industry, collsiclerable as the 
developments ul the! last half-century have been, lnclia 
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stands to-day on the threshold of a fresh period of 
productive expansion, which, if it fulfils the expecta- 
tions of even the most cautious observers, will open 
u p  the  natural resources of the country on a scale of 
hitherto unprecedented magnitude. 
At the same time the more deeply convinced one is 
that, in the language of Lord Curzon at the Coronation 
Durbar, "the India of the future will, under Provi- 
dence, not be a n  India of di~niilishing plenty, of empty 
prospect, or of justifiable discontent, but one of ex- 
panding industry, of awakened faculties, of increasing 
prosperity, and of more widely distributed comfort and 
wealth" ; the more one shares his faith in the con- 
science and purpose of the British people and in the  
almost illimitable capacities of India ; the more firmly 
one must also hold with hiin that, under no other 
condition can that future be realised save under the 
unchallenged supremacy of the paramount Power, and 
under no other controlling authority can it be main- 
tained save under that of the British Crown. 
From this point of view the problem of political 
defence against the dangers which may threaten the 
peace and security of India from without is one which 
concerns not only our interests but our duty as a 
nation. Opinions differ as to the share of Imperial 
burdens which the people of India should be called 
upon to  bear. But if it can be fairly argued that i t  
is not a t  present excessive, it is also generally admitted 
that it cannot be indefinitely increased. As India rises 
under our z g i s  in the scale of civilisation, she will 
surely and rightly demand that a larger and not a 
smaller proportion of her revenues shall be applied to 
the development of the moral, intellectual, and material 
resources which make for peaceful progress. T h e  
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military expenditure indisl~cnsable to thc maintenance 
of internal and  esternal peace in a country such as 
India [nust always be heavy. It  is already hard to ' measure the  cost to India of the political changes 
tvhich havc talcen place during the last fifty years 
beyond hcr  frontiers in the heart of Asia. We shall 
have failed 1nrni:nt:~bly in our duty towarcis her if we 
neglect through want of duel diligence a n d  of timely 
energy to i~nticipntc.: ancl, as far as  lies with us, to avert 
furthcr ch:~~igt:s in t l i ~  littitre t\fliich would impose upon 
her still Iiea\ricr hurdcns. 
CI-IAPTER XXXII 
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
R EDUCED to its simplest expression, the Middle Eastern Question, of which I have sought to 
define a few of the most salient features, may be briefly 
forlnulatecl as follows :-How is the position we were 
able to acquire, and have hitherto held, in Asia by our 
control of the sea to be upheld uncler new conditions, 
in which land-power is tending to become a factor only 
less essential to its retention than sea-power? Indin is, 
and must remain, the lrey of that position. More than 
that ; it has grown to be, if not the corner-stone of the 
British Empire, at least one of the chief bascs of its 
security. Equi-distant, roughly, from Australia ant1 
from South Africa, India balances, to the north uf thc 
line, our two great colonies in the southern heinisphurc. 
Neither the enterprise of British merchants, nor thc 
valour of British soldiers, nor the statcsmanship of 
British rulers, would have availed to builcl up thc fabric 
of our Indian Empire had not the British Navy secured 
for thein immunity from outside interference. With no 
neighbours beyond its land frontiers possessing any- 
thing like our material resources or our methods of 
organisation, India, in the state in ~ v l ~ i c l ~  wc found it,  
was bound to be absorbed by our superior r:ivilisation 
as so011 as we established our command of the seas, 
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From the monlent Ivhcn thc cumpeting sea-power of 
France h:rd to yield to our own, our Indian dependency 
was for all plactical purposes as securely isolated 
against fureigll aggrcssiorl as our own islallds at home. 
For noal.ly n century afterwards lherc! see~ned to be 
little prospect that India would ever lose the advantages 
of that qc((r.si-insular position. 
When Inclin ~)assccl undcr llle dirc!c;t administration 
of the Crown, after ~ h c  great Mutiny of 1857) we wcre 
for all prat:ticnl ~ ~ u r p o s c s  th(: only European power in 
Asia. Of our riv;~ls in the grc;tt struggles of the 
sixteen111 a n d  sitvcnt~~unth centuries, I-Iolland alone 
retained, t l l a ~ ~ k s  m;~inly to our generosity after the 
Napoleonic ivzlrs, important colonial possessions in the 
East 111dian ;~rchipclago; but sllc had, and still llas, 
no foothold on the mainland, and there was no Pan- 
Germanism in  thosc days to  urge the claims of Teutonic 
kinship upon the possessors of Java and Sumatra. 
The new Gennan Empire and its world-policy were 
still unborn. France had only preservccl in India 
itself a few harnlless relics of a buried past, and she 
had not cvcn begun to found her new Indo-Chinesc 
Empire i n  tlie Pacific. 111 the Far East the Arnur 
district and Vladivostok, Ict alone Manchuria and Port 
Arthur, s t i l l  belonged to China.  No "outer barbarian" 
challcngcc1 her supremacy in her Mongolian and 
Turkestan provinces, or sought to disturb her relatio~ls 
of suzerainty with Tibet. Iiussia's dominion in Asia, 
though it already covered a vast area, was confined to 
the then inllc~s~litah[e steppes of Siberia and the still 
Inore inhospitable coast of the Northern Pacific. Its 
southern frontior ran round the northern and north- 
eastern shores of the Caspian in an easterly direction to 
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the Sea  of Aral, skirting its western and northern shores 
to the mouth of the Syr  Daria. Thence, after curving 
to the north for a short distance, it ran almost due east, 
till it reached the Chinese frontier near Kuldja. North- 
Eastern Persia, Afghanistan, and India were separated 
from Russia by a belt of territory averaging some 500 
miles in breadth, over which the nomadic tribes and 
independent Khalls of Central Asia held undisturbed 
sway. 
Russian policy in Asia was still professedly governed 
by the principles solemnly laid down in a famous 
despatch from Count Nesselrode, elicited by the firm- 
ness of Lord Palmerston in 1838 : " Both Great 
Britain and Russia," wrote Count Nesselrode to the  
Tsar's Ambassador in London, "must have the same 
interests at heart-the maintenance of peace in the  
centre of Asia and the avoidance of anything that 
might cause a general conflagration in those vast 
regions. To prevent such a misfortune the tranquillity 
of the intermediate territories which separate the 
Russian and British possessions must be sedulously 
preserved. T o  consolidate order in those countries, 
to avoid fomenting their jealousies, to confine rivalry 
to commercial competition, not to become involved in 
a struggle for political influence, and above all to 
respect the independence of the  countries which 
separate us ; that is, in our opinion, the system which 
both Governments are equally interested in pursuing 
in order to avert the possibility of a conflict between 
two great Powers who, to remain friends, must avoid 
friction or collision in the heart of Asia." 
Most excellent principles indeed, but how has Russia 
carried them out in practice? How can they be recon- 
ciled with the changes which have already so pro- 
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foundly altered the whole situation in Asia and are 
still prO(:eedillg with ~vcr - increas in~  rapidity? Russia 
has not only advanced right across the Continent of 
Asia to lh(: Pacific, and consolidatecl her dominions 
by thc construction of the greatest trunk railroad in 
the world, but  she has moved southward all along the 
line with gigantic strides. In the west the Black Sea 
is, except in name, a liussian lalre lilre the Caspian, 
and in the casl a fortress more formidable than 
Se~ra.l;to~x)I ever was is growing up at Port Arthur 
to command tlic enlrance to the Gulf of Chi-li. 
The Ccntrnl Asian Khanates and tlie Turcoman tribes 
have beer1 swallowed up. The Trans-Caspian Rail- 
way sliirling tlie nurlh-eastern frontier of Persia runs 
through JIcri- to tho boundary stoiles of Afghanis- 
tan, and ?'ashlicnd will shortly be connected by rail 
with the Siberian Itailway, LZS it already is with the 
Caspian. Nor is the oilward march of Russia to be 
measurecl 111crely by the tens of thousands of square 
miles tvliich have been brought under direct subjection 
to her rule. S h e  l~olcls thc Shah and the Central 
Govern1nt:nt of Persia in tlle hollow of her halld by 
the twufold power of the sword and of the purse. In 
the northern provinces she is supreme in all but name, 
and she rrtnkus no secret of 11er intention to carry her 
ascendency clown to tho Persian Gulf and the Indian 
Ocean. fI~!r fruiitier marches with thal: of Afghanistan 
~vllere t i ~ c  Inttcr is nlost vulnerable. Further east, in 
Clli~lesc 'Turkcslan nnd hlungolia, hcr po~vcr waxes in 
prol~ortion as that of Peking wanes, and all these out- 
lying dcl~~ndcrzcicls of the Cl~illese Empire are goillg 
the wag that 8lanchuria has already gone. Even 
Tibet, ttlc Ft,r\>iddcn Land of Buddhism, shows signs 
of yicldiltg to ller irisistence. At her present rate of 
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expansion not many years are likely to elapse hefore 
she is in  a position t o  join hands with France, who is 
p u s h i i ~ g  up steadily into the interior from her base on 
the  Pacific, not merely up the v:~llcy of the hlelrongr, 
where she is already corllcrrninous wit11 Upl)c:r R ~ r m a l l ,  
bu t  through Yun-nan into Sze-chu:ln ant1 rln to the 
upper waters of the Yang-tsze. Germany is  iirmly 
establislled in the Shantung peninsulrt i l l  the: Far  East, 
alld if shc  is not actually cahting. al)r)ut for anotllcr 
I<iao-cl~au in the Persian Gulf, she cleclrly intends to 
push her irlflue~lce down to its waters along the* tritcl; of 
the Baghdad liailway. 
The  significance of sui:h vast ~ I I : U I ~ C S  1111lst ht* patent 
to anyone ~ v h o  takes thc troubl(1 to  rcct)rlstitutc the  
map of Asia as it was fifty ycf~ss :lgo and cSomI>art: i t  
with what it  is to-day, Ict alone what it may bt: within 
another generation. Other changes I Ilavc! already 
notcd which must be taken equally irltrj at:i:ount. Our 
suprelnacy i n  the Persian C h l f  is no Iong:.tAr. unc:on- 
tested. Fri~nce has treaty rights in lIusc*at. It is 
dil'fic~tlt to believe that Germany has  n o  11olitic:al uwiilri, 
$clzs~k i r r  thc combinations 131)" whic:h sl~r; is i!ndt*:~vour- 
i n g  to carry tho Anatoliarl Itailway elr~ivn ttlct valley of the 
Euphrrltes and l ' igris LO tllu Gulf. iVr: havct ;itluwed 
7'urkey and I'ersia ti) c:onvert (heir rlc~nzinal sovercigrity 
over c:onsideri~hle scctiuns of its shores irltcj an cffecrivc 
authority, w11ir:h is consistt:ntly rx~:n,isccl l o  tllt: cletri- 
rncnl of 13riLisll i~ltcrasts. O u r  influc~lrc* wit11 the stmi- 
ind(:penclcti~ tcibc!s 01 Southern 13c*rsiu has rliminished 
in propurtir~n :IS tllil Imwcr of tllc* C:rntr;ll (;ovcrnment 
has incrcnsi~d ---an inc:rense whic.11 ivo~tlcl li;~vc been 
i~npossik~lt:, in rrlariy cbast:s, without our artual help, 
and, i 11 nil (.itscks, wirhoui clur t:a.sy-gc,ing ac:cluicbscence. 
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centralisr8rl military state, ecluip~~ecl, for cl(tfenc:e at 
least, ~vitli  iLrrn;&rnr!nts sc*art:ely less formiclablc than 
thc  mcturitain l)t~l\varlis with wl1ic.h naturc has ~)rovided 
her. ifr(! r n q  rtia.sotial)ly Ilolje tllat tlfglianista~l's 
s t r e~~gt l !  will I)I* ~ ~ I I I -  t,trt~~igfli, l ~ ~ i t  it \viIl 111: so orlly 
i f  \vta ~ I O \ V  tit~rbtdv~*:, htro11;;- -for i ~ i  tlic! I<:lst s t r ~ : ~ l g t l ~  
govs i t )  htrt6ti$i~. lIo\v oftvr~ iri tl~t! 1):1st 1i;is not the! 
\t~th;tkriths.c, o i  11ltli;l 1 ~ ~ 1 l t 1  11 th 1)[11)ortti11ity of tlle f l fg l~ans?  
And ih i t  rl t  rt all .+\fglian provcrt, tlrnt says, Al\v;~ys 
kcel) tr \v:~ti.11 1111 fhc: frit:t~iI of  to-tl:~y~ l ~ s t  hc be the 
cric:lny OS tc b-nltrrrr nr " ? 'I'll(: Clii 11c:st: Eln pirc, upon 
~vliost* " I ; L ~ C I I L  j )o \ t  t!r" o t ~ r  Asi:~tit, 11olicy Ix~ilt so much 
cluring thra tnitldlt* tli*c*;~dus of ~111: I;wt Iialf-c:entury, is 
sinkirig into :r dt:c*lini., ;lncl its c~strerni~ius are t~lrcady 
rotting iLW;L)., ll10uj411 t i i c b  vit:~lity o f  tlic Clii ncsc race 
Itlay survivv i n  t t i i 4  1ic:lrt o f  tlic 15igliteen 1'rovinl:os. 
Siilni 11;~s t,t.t*n &;LV(A(I for 1111: j)rt's(:rIt by tile Ariglo- 
Frcnch A g r i v ~ n t ~ t l t  trt'  1fii10, l)ut it cLan bt: saccd pcr- 
tliarlurllly r.mIy I J ~  its ou.11 t~ft'orrs, and  \vlietlier those 
c!fforts will tlt. c:t~nli~lutit~s and c:Sftlctual i t  woulcl be a 
msh thing tct prcqrlicsy. 
'I'hc grlrwth r ~ f  rival ~~uli t ical  influcr~ccs lias rcactcd 
at r h ~ ~  snlnc r i m  :~pprctti:~bly upun llle domain of corn- 
mcrcu. I t1  Asia, as clscwl~erc, url: liarc I~ad :L t:hicl 
share in the va:,c r l e v e l u ~ ~ r n c ~ ~ t  of tracle and industry 
which the lahr 1i;ilf-t.a:~itury 11;~s \vitncssed all the world 
over, Hut rmr c:onirncrcial pre-eniinence, which for- 
merly arttou~ltcd almost to a nlotiopoly, is no longer 
t~ncl~allengi*d. Its iicld has I~cen circurnscrihcd. ICussia~ 
has practir;~lly i~usttlcl U r i ~ i s l ~  trndc from tlze wlzcblc of 
Central *ksii~ Ijy ii plrlic:y of rigid cxcltlsivcncss. The  
c:trnlrnt*rt:ial err;lty slic Ilas ~.i.cc~ztly imposed u p o n  
hersia htis t,t*t*rx ~l i i l ful ly iritrnt1rl to the same ~'lury~c~se. 
, . 1 lit* rtsulth i)f Frer1c:Il protecticj~iisrn in Indo-China 
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have been allnost equally d e t r i m e ~ ~ t n l ,  I n  spite trf a 
nominal acceprsrlcc of tlie doc.trint1 c ~ f  rllth " O I J ( * I I  t l(~trr," 
every continental power that ar:ctuinls :L ~ P I * ~ I I  f ~ r t t l ~ o l d  
in Asia is bent  u ~ ~ o n  i fnproving  thc ol)i)orltl~lity t o  
secure preferential tlclvantagcs for iiscIE *1'111# t-ori- 
struction of r:iilu.nys has, :~ht,v(. all, 11t:1~11 ~+xl)Ic,~tc*ci 
wit11 s ingi~lnr  ingc~iu i ly  for Lllnt [)urlr( ,sia, l l ' l i t ~ t ~  t u r  
cornrt1ert:c still holtls tilt- f i c a l t l ,  forvigll c.t~r~ll~tL"itic~li I I ~ S  
e n v r m o ~ ~ s l y  r e ~ l ~ ~ c c ~ c i  ~ I i t :  111;~rgitl t r f  1)rolit. '1 l t t *  1 r t l ~ l l l ~  
of our  t r d !  t : o r ~ t i ~ ~ u v s  L I J  j l~cr~xist*, l ~ t  it5 rt*tI\tlll~rit- 
t ivc~lcss no I o n p a r  inc:rt*;lstds ill t l ~  s;rmc- ~~r 'c~li ter t i r~n,  
and i n  many dirt:c:tions it is Llcirlg t~uthtri[rljr*tl ty httrne 
of our  younger rivclls. I\vcn iu ~ l l t *  c.urryislg t rade 
we no lu l~gc r  cnjoy s ~ n t ~ n t ~ j s e ~ l y ,  uncl, iiitlctl i ~ y  ;I lavish 
systern of b o u n t i ~ s ,  Cicrrnnrl, l;rcl~lc*ll, ;ind I - V V I I  litibsian 
lillcs a r e  displacing thc red ensign t ) f  our rnr*rt*:ir~tiIe 
marine. 
W h a t  is t l ~ e r e  tu I](: ~?lac:cd 011 thi! c.trlrt,!r siclt* of  
the balancc-sheet? Ft'ith o~lc: not;~blc.r cxr:ctptirlrl, i t  is 
within t11e c:onfines of India alunc tlliit r . i ~ t ~  !dl* fc~und 
what may hc callcd our gains, ' I ' i ~ k t  ux~:t?l)tirr~~ is, of 
course, ttlc rise trf J a ~ ~ a n  s it great: rlavnl, rt~ilii;iry, ; iod 
(;un~rncrcinl power, arl~nittrtd, nrld tlcst:r\~ctdly ;rtlr~~ibtttd, 
to t he  conlity of civilistrd natior~s. 'I'lrr: A ~ I ~ I ~ I . . J ~ ~ ~ K I ~ c s c  
;illiat~c:c Ilas given defioilc and Ixtrmitrlt:nt r"?cjrrc:shic.rn 
t o  a c:omrnuiiity of cc.~nsc:rvarivt irlkcrcstn w&ric*l~ 11;td 
alrc.:ady rt:cctivt:d prat:ticz~l illustratitrli r i u ~ i r t g  i h t *  last 
crisis i n  ehc: l;or 1Case. H u t ,  tl~t,ugll t11c. ;~lli;lrrrrx. must  
i~ltlircl.:tly allftvdt rllt: pctlitir:;ll situnrion rlrrcn~~:lltr\~t stsiit, 
its dirc!c:t i ~ l > l ) l  it::~titrn is  rhr!c:c*ss;irily t:iruul~lr;t*ril)ctel. I n  
Intliit is the  ,stunt of r ~ ~ r  [rt~\t*t:r, illit1 tit!rtk ;kt lttast 
fifty years t d  trl*fi,r.t hast! ~~s1c~t1t-*siic1rri;~k)1y cIc*c*p~~~~:d,  
~ :x~~: t~dt : t l ,  i t  lid ( : I  ) t l ~ , t ~ l i ~ l ; ~ t t ~ d  it. ' I ' l~ t*  ;~~lrat*x:tt i ~ j r i  of 
Zlurninl~, t l l o l ~ g t ~  1111(I~*rt;~kit11 I I I ~ L ~ I I I ~  L t r  ft~rt+?ik:ill rival - 
IE sg3iDe of a 
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ambitions, has addcd to our Indian EInpire a provillcc 
of vast resoLlrccS alld increasing wealth, and, under 
Lord C~lrzon's adminis~ration, the frontier policy of 
thc Indian Government within the territorial limits of 
its authority, direct and indirect, has been laid down 
on lines which ~ h o ~ l l d  assure consistency in the fLlture. 
' Lord Kitchencr's n ~ i l i t a l - ~  adlninistratioll is visibly 
destined to bear equally perillanent fruit. The  native 
army, of which the  Mutiny con~pletely shattered the 
framcworl;, has long since been reconstituted on a new 
and sounder basis. It call never be an absolutely 
homogeneous force, as  it has to be recruited amongst 
a variety of heterogeneous races. But, by steadily 
wcediiig out the Iess desirable elements, a more uni- 
for111 standard of iighting efficiency call be established. 
This process has long been in progress, and when 
it has beell completed, our Indian Ariny will be more 
than ever worthy to stand shoulder to shoulder with 
its British comrades. Another task which the new 
Commancler-in-Chief has already taken up is that of 
the redistribution and  concentration on more intelligent 
lines of our tnilitary forces in India, which are to a 
1 great extent scattered about the country in small de- 
I tachlnents on exactly the same lines as were laid down 
I immediately after the Mutiny, although the develop- ment of railways and other meails of communication, together with Inany other new conditions, have entirely 
I altered rile situation in the course of half a century. 
The Imperial contingents placed at the disposal of 
the Indian Government by the ruling chiefs already 
constitute an addition to our fighting force, of which 
the material as wcll as the moral value cannot be over- 
looked. On tbc north-west frontier, upon which our 
attenti011 has hitherto been concentrated, we hold a 
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position of which the natural strength for purposes of 
defence has been enhanced at vast cost by every device 
of military science. So long as the British Navy retains 
its pre-eminence, India call have nothing to fear in t h ~  
shape of a hostile descent upon its shores. Powerfill 
fleets, it is true, are now maintained in Asiatic waters 
by other countries besides ourselves, but neither Russia, 
nor France, nor Germany has hitllerto acquired any- 
thing like the facilities for actual warfare wc possess in 
the coaling stations and naval bases of our world-wide 
Empire. 
If our position ill India itself is so satisfactory, why 
not, it inay be aslred, rest contented with it as a more 
than adequate set-off against the decay, if clecay there 
be, of our influence beyoncl its frontiers? Let: us go  
011 strengthening our position there by every means, 
so as to be thoroughly equipped against future aggres- 
sion, but do not let us scatter our forces and fritter 
away our energies by going out to challenge superior 
odds in mere anticipation of hostile designs which may 
never mature. This is the view actually taken by 
some whose opinion is fully entitled to respect. Others, 
however, whose judgment is at least equally respect- 
able, hold a diametrically opposite view. They con- 
tend, first of all, that we have interests beyond the 
frontiers of India 'which are Imperial rather than purely 
Indian, and that, independently of Indian considera- 
tions, we ought not to surrender them. Further, they 
contend that, strong as our position may be in India, it 
has been largely built up on our prestige as  an Imperial 
Power, hitherto unrivalled in Asia, and that we cannot 
allow that prestige to be impaired under the watchful 
eyes of subject races, many of thein clecply itnbued with 
traditions of martial pride, without ~ o ~ ~ ~ l ~ r o ~ n i s i n g  our 
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hold t~pon  their i~nngination-a hold at least as forceful 
as any rnaterinl hold we havc over them. The mere 
stages of the IXussian advance llave, more- 
over, alrc!acly iml?os@cl heavy military burdens upon the 
revenucs of I i~dia.  TeIow, they ask, mill it be possible 
to mccht tlicr incal(:ulal7le strain which will have to be 
put L I ~ O I I  ~ E I C I ~ I  I V ~ ~ C ? I I  tlu: very frontiers of India march 
with those of n great rnilitary power? W h y  shoulcl we 
invitc: such n c.ot~summation by an attitude of mere 
passive rcasign:~tion? It is not suggested that we 
slloulcl :~dvc:nturc any :~ggressive opening, but merely 
that, likc c;~ulious chess players on tlie defensive, we 
should watch our antagonists' play, and instead of shift- 
ing our  pieces ai rnlussly baclc~vards and forwards over 
the board, as  has too freyucntly been the case in the 
past, we s l~ould reply to their inove step by step, with 
S L I C ~ ~  ~ o ~ ~ n l ~ r - ~ n ~ v e s  11s are necessary to strengllien our 
defence. If otlicr pourers are free to build up their 
influence in regions where, a few decades ago, it was 
an unknown qualltity, by an active policy of peaceful 
penetri~tion, why should we refrain from consolidating, 
by a similar policy, the influence of which past gener- 
ations of British enterprise have laid the foundations? 
1 have already put the case into the concrete shape it 
may be expet:ted to assume first of all in the Persian 
Gulf alld i n  Eastern Persia. Arc we to surrender the 
political ascenclency I V ~  have established in the Persian 
Gulf 1)y a r:ent.ury of costly effort as guardians of the 
public pcacc it1 its \vatcrs, or are we to make it clearly 
understood that, whilst the Gulf is open to the pacific 
enti!rl~rise of other nations, it must: remain closed to 
their territc~rial arnl~ition'r' Or  are we, after our dis- 
agreeable o~puricnr:cs of co-operation with Germany in  
China, to favour tlte importation of her influence into 
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the Gulf whilst still seeking. to exclude that  of other 
powers? Are we to run the rislc of seeing Eastern 
Persia converted into another Mai~churia, with a 
military railway, on the Manchurian model, running 
down to another Port Artllur on the Gulf or on the 
Indian Ocean, and turning the flanlr of Afghanistan 
and British Baluchistan, or are  we to draw a line at 
which, by mutual consent or otherwise, Iiussia's policy 
of peaceful l~enetration from the  north shall be met by 
a British policy of peaceful penetration from the south? 
After a prolonged period of hesitation tlle British 
Government have made a formal declaration of policy 
with regard to the Persian Gulf and to British interests 
in the adjoilling regions, which shows them to have 
realised the importance of the Imperial issues wit11 
which we stand confronted. I t  still remains for them 
to put into practice the principles of policy they have 
laid down. It will doubtless be urged that, if we pus- 
sue a policy of peaceful penetration from the south 
whilst Russia pursues a similar policy fro111 the north, 
the moment must come when the  two policies will clash 
and cease to be peaceful. I t  is a specious argument, 
but it would ill become those who hold, reasonably 
enough, that there is room in Asia for both Iiussia and 
ourselves. And what is perhaps l-nore t o  the point, 
there is nothing to give force to it in the  history of 
Russian expailsion in Asia. Wherever Iiussia has colne 
into contact only with what may be called the lower 
orgallisms of political life sllc has advanced steadily 
and relentlessly. To our periodical protests in such 
cases, that her aclvance threatcnecl our interests, she  has 
replied, in effect, You have done nothing to  materialise 
your interests. I cannot take lleecl of mere 'dog-in-the- 
manger '  protest." Hut wlicl~ $ 1 1 ~  11;~s I x e n  brollgllt 
el71 t t  # 11:1vL! 
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face to f:~cc: wit11 sul)st:tntisl intcresls to ~vliich wc were 
prel~arccd to strind, sllrt has rccogniscd the expediency 
of corning to :L clircsc:l: unc1crst;Lntling with us, as  ill the 
Pamirs and with ref(:rc~lce to thc nortlicrn iro~z~iel-s of 
Afgh:~~?istatl. As regnrtls the I'crsittn qucstion, though 
the ~nethuds  llc has employed a re  in many ways open 
to criticism, and 1210~1gli her ultimate slims seriously 
threaten oiIr i ~ i t c r ~ s t s ,  IVI! liavc not, I submit, so far, 
any right to complain, bixausc we have not nurselves, 
so far, talccn up any  well-tlofinecl ~ ~ o s i t i o n  with regard to 
it. W l l i ~ ~  Lorcl IJalrnerston conr:civecl I3ritish interests 
to bc thrcntcnc~cl Ily the  action of Russia i n  Persia and 
Afghanistan, hc* dicl not: hesitate to :tddrcss himself 
directly to St .  1'ctc:rsburg. " S L I C ~ , "  he wrote to the 
British A1nhass;ldor in an [~sliauslive survey of the 
situation as il t l~i*n prc.scntud itself, "were the pro- 
fessions and cleclarntions of the 12~1ssia11 Government 
a t  St .  Petersburg ; 11uL very difl'erent have been the 
proceedi11g.s of its agents" ;  and hc added: "The  
Rritisll Govcrnmcnt: c:onsiders ilself entitled to aslc of 
thc Cabinet of St. Petersburg wlietllcr the intentions 
and the policy of I i t~ssin Lornards Pcrsia and towards 
Greal Britain arc: to bc dccluced from the declarations 
of Count bicssclrode and M. Rodofinikin" (the re- 
sponsible mouthpieces of the liussian Foreign Office), 
' ' or from the  acts of Count Sirnonicli and M. Vicovich " 
(the Iiussiali agents ~viiuse conduct was uncler dis- 
cussion). 1,orcl Palmerston concluded by saying that 
" I-Ier NIajcstyls (;ovc:rnment is pcrsuadcd that the 
Cabinet of SL, Pctersburg will sce in this commu- 
nication a fri?sll proof of tllc anxious desire of 
the E3ritish C>overnmenl to ~ l l a i ~ l t a i ~ l  unimpaired the 
ftietldly rclatio~ls which so happily subsist: between 
the two countries and to which it justly attaclzes so 
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great a value ; because explanations sought for with 
frankness and in a friendly spirit tend to remove 
misunderstandings and to preserve harmony between 
nations." And Lord Palmerston was r ight ;  for his 
firmness promptly elicited from Count Nesselrode the 
declaration of which I have already quoted the most 
important passage, and Inany years elapsed before 
Russian policy was tempted to depart from the lines 
upon which it was framed. W e  have preferred of 
late years to play a game of hide-and-seek with 
Russia behind the Shah's Government, and it is a 
game which naturally suits her, as she can pull the 
wires of the Shah's Government to suit her convenience. 
She has taken every advantage of her opportunities, 
and small blame to her. But if ever she is brought 
up in Persia against substantial British interests to 
which we are prepared to stand, there is no reason to 
assume she will prove less amenable to the logic of 
facts than elsewhere. Only they must be facts, and 
not diplomatic fictions. The danger is that we may go 
on toying with diplomatic fictions until she has all the 
facts on her side, and then, of course, we shall be 
finally, and not undeservedly, put out of court. Then, 
also, when her policy of peaceful penetration has 
brought her down to the gates of India, we shall 
realise too late what the proximity of a great military 
power must mean on our Indian borderland, and the 
effect it must produce on the minds of our Indian 
population. And even if the Russian Governmellt 
may be trusted never to einbarlr upon those schemes of 
universal Asiatic dominion, which, nevertheless, already 
find favour in some influential circles in Russia, can 
we expect that Russian statesmen would not avail 
themselves of the advantages of close proximity to 
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India to exert. irresistible pressure upon us at any 
moment of international crisis, or that ambitious 
Russian agcnts, military and political, would resist 
the temptations which such a vantage-ground would 
ofkr to their frce-lance propensities? 
I have given prominence to the Persian question 
because 1 believe it to bc the most urgent, and I have 
dwelt :Lt lenglh u p o n  its irnporlance from the Indian 
point of view I~ccausc that aspect is apt to be lost 
sight of in England. At the sarne time I have, I 
 rust, ~nrtdc it u~~dcrs lood that it is only part of t l ~ e  
larger question of the security of our position as a n  
Asiatic power, Its relative imporlar~cc i n  relation to 
that larger clirestion can, I admit, be gauged only by 
those who are in a positioll to appraise the resources 
and the rcquirernents of our Empire as a whole in con- 
ncction with thc Far  East and the Near East, as  well 
as t l ~ e  Middle East. I have no wish to usurp in that 
respect the f~unctions of the Coln~nittee of National 
Defencc. Rlly c~bjeject llas been to describe to the best 
of my ability the present situation, as 1 believe it LO 
l ~ c ,  and not as  we, and naturally Cabinet Ministers 
most of all, would wish it to be ;  to indicate the 
lines upon whicli it tnay be reasonably expected to 
develop; and to lay down certain principles which 
can be deduced from past experience for our future 
guidance. In Asia, perhaps, rnore than elsewhere, 
in view of tlie pcculiar conditions under which we 
hold our Indian Empire, we need a consistent and 
continuous policy, nloderate i r l  its aims but unflinch- 
ing in its cxecutic~n, bascd upon a careful co-ordination 
c ~ f  all the rnoral alld rnatcrial forces at our coinrna~ld, 
and upotl a dispassionate csti~natc of those which may 
bc arrayed against us. Wc are at a parting of tllc 
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ways. W e  have tu steer clear equally of that "dog- 
in-the-manger" policy with which we have been, not 
always unjustly, reproached in the past, and of a 
wholesale and hasty surrender of legitimate interests, 
which would precipitate rather than avert the dangers 
inseparable from the transformation of the Asiatic 
continent into a field of contiguous European ambitions. 
Above all, we should avoid the alternations of irritating 
protests and graceful, or rather graceless, concessions, 
the mixture of bragging and nagging, and the futile 
exchange of assurances, given and talren in conscious 
disregard of all underlying realities, which, in the 
absence of any well thought out policy, have hitherto 
often caused much unnecessary friction, without in any 
way promoting our real interests and prestige. 
The part of a critic is supposed to be an easy one. 
I t  is certainly not a pleasant one, and it is therefore 
with all the greater satisfaction that I feel able to turn 
in conclusion from the somewhat depressing retrospect 
of lost opportunities and energies frittered away in the 
past to the prospect of a better future, more in conso- 
nance with our Imperial traditions, interests, and duties, 
which, in spite of inany grievous revelations of national 
weakness in other departments, the growing vigilance 
and energy of the British Government with regard to 




TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN H E R  MAJESTY THE QUEEN 
OF THE U N I T E D  KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
IRELAND AND H I S  MAJESTY THE SHAH OP PERSIA. 
SIGNED, IN THE ENGLISH AND PERSIAN LANGUAGES, AT 
PARIS, MARCH 4TH, 1857. 
[Ratifications exchanged a t  Bagdad, May znd, 1857.1 
In  the name  of God, the Almighty, the All-Merciful. 
Her Majesty the Q ~ ~ e e n  of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty, whose standard is the 
Sun, the  sacred, the august, t he  great  monarch, the absolute 
king of kings of all the States of Persia, being both equally 
and sincerely animated by a desire to put a stop to the evils 
of a war, which is contrary to  their friendly wishes and dis- 
positions, and  t o  re-establish on a solid basis the relations of 
amity which had s o  long existed between the two exalted 
States by means of a peace calculated for their mutual 
advantage a n d  benefit, have appoiilted as their plenipoten- 
tiaries for carrying into effect this desired object the following, 
that is to  say  :- 
Her Majesty the Queen of the United I<ingdom of Great 
Sritain and Ireland-the Right Honourable Henry Richard 
Charles, Baron Cowley, a Peer of tlie United I<ingdoin, a 
Member of I-Ier Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, 
Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the 
Bath, Her Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and pleni- 
potentiary t o  His Majesty the Emperor of the French, etc., 
etc., etc. 
And His Majesty the Shah of Persia-His Excellency the 
abode of greatness, the favourite of the king, Ferolrh Khan, 
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Ameen-001-Moolk, the grcat ambassador of tile mighty State 
of Persia, the possessor of the royal portrait and of the 
blue cordon, the bearer of the diamond-studded girdle, etc., 
etc., etc. 
Who, having exhibited and exchanged their full powers, 
and found them to be in due form, have agreed upon and 
concluded the following Articles :- 
ARTICLE ~.-From the day of the exchange of the ratifica- 
tions of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace 
and  friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on the one part and 
Hi s  Majesty the Shah of Persia 011 the other, as  likewise 
between their respective successors, dominions, and subjects. 
ARTICLE 2.-Peace being ttappily co~lctuded betweell their 
said Majesties, i t  is hereby agreed that the forces of Her 
Majesty the Queen shall evacuate the Persian territory, 
subject to conditions and stipulations hereafter specified. 
ARTICLE 3.-The high contracting parties stipulate that all 
prisoners taken during the war by either belligerent shall be 
immediately liberated. 
ARTICLE 4.-His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages, 
immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of this 
Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all 
Persian subjects who may have in soy way been compromised 
b y  their intercourse with the British forces during the war 
from any respoilsibility for tlieir conduct in that respect, so 
t ha t  no persons, of whatever degree, shall be exposed to 
vexation, persecution, or punishment 011 that account. 
ARTICLE 5.-His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages 
further to take immediate measures for withdrawing from 
the  territory and city of Herat, and from every other part of 
Afghanistan, the Persian troops and authorities now stationed 
therein ; such withdrawal to be effected within three months 
from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this 
Treaty. 
ARTICLE 6.-His Majesty the Shah of Persia agrees to 
relinquish all claims to sovereignty over the territory and 
city of Herat and the countries of Afghanistan, and never to 
demand from the Chiefs of Herat, or of the countries of 
Afghalristan, any marlcs of obedience, such as the coinage, 
o r  '' Khootbeh," or tribute. 
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I-]is Majesty fur ther  cng:lges t o  abstain hereafter from all 
interference with t h e  internal affairs of Afghanistan. 14is 
Majesty ~ ro r l l i s c s  10 rccognise the independence of ~~~~t 
and of t he  whole of Afghanisttin, ancl never to attelnpt to 
interfere with tile independence of those States. 
I n  c;lse of cliffcrcllces arising betweell the golrernment of 
Persia  ztrid ihc countries of He ra t  and Afghanistan, the 
Pcrsi:in govcrrlmcut cngages  t o  refer them for adjustment 
to t he  fi-icntlly U I G C ~ S  of the  British Government, and llot to 
tnlro up  : ~ ~ . r r ~ s  ulllcss tllose Fric~ldly offices fail of effect. 
T h e  liriiish C;ovcr~lmcnt, on thcir part, engage at  
times l o  excrt  ihcir influence with the States of Afghanistan, 
to prcvcnt iilly c:luse of umbrage  being given by them, or by 
a n y  of Lhcrn, 10 t h e  I'crsinn government ; and the Britisll 
Government, whctl :lppe:~lcrl to by the Persian government, 
in t l ~ c  evcut  of dificultics arising, will use their best en- 
de i~vour s  t o  conlpose s ~ l c h  differences in a manner just and 
honourable to I'ersio. 
AIZTICI.E 7.-In case of any  violation of the Persian 
fronticr by any  of  the S ta tes  referred to above, the Persian 
govcrl~lrlerlt  shnll have t h e  right, if due satisfaction is not 
given,  t o  undertake military operations for the repression 
and punishment of the  aggressors  ; but i t  is distinctly under- 
s t ood  :ind agreed  to t h a t  any military force of the Shah 
which m a y  cross thc frontier for  the above-mentioned pur- 
pose shnll retire within i ts  own territory a s  soon as its object 
is accomplished, stncl that t h e  exercise of the above-mentioned 
r ights  is  no t  t o  be  made  a pretext for the permanent occupa- 
tion by Persia, o r  for the annexation to the Persian domin- 
ions, of :rny tolvn o r  portion of the said States. 
AIZTICLE 8.---The Persian goverliment engages to set a t  
liberty without  ransom, immediately aftcr the exchange of 
t h e  r:ltificaiions of this Treaty,  all prisoners taken during the 
operations of the  Persian troops in Afghanistan, and all 
Afghans who may be detained either as  hostages or as  
captives on polilical groullds in any part of the Persian 
dominions shall, in like manner,  be set free ; provided that 
t hc  Afghans, 011 their part ,  s c t  a t  liberty, without ransont, 
t h e  IJcrsinn prisoners and captives who are in the power of 
tllc Ar'hans. 
Con~rnissiollers 011 the par t  of the two colltracting powers 
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shall, if necessary, be named to  carry out the provisions of 
this Article. 
ARTICLE 9.-The high contracting parties engage that ,  in 
the  establishment and recognition of Consuls-General, Con- 
suls, Vice-Consuls, and Consular Agents, each shall be 
placed in the donlinions of the other on the footing of the 
most favoured nation; and that the treatment of their 
respective subjects and their trade shall also, in every 
respect, be placed on the footing of the treatment of the 
subjects and commerce of the most favoured nation. 
ARTICLE 10.-Immediately after the ratifications of this 
Treaty have been exchanged the British mission shall return 
to  Tehran, when the Persian government agrees to  receive it 
with the apologies and ceremonies specified in t h e  separate 
note siglled this day by the plenipotentiaries of the high 
c o n t r a c t i ~ ~ g  parties. 
ARTICLE 11.-The Persian governtnent engages,  within 
three months after the  return of the  British mission t o  
Tehran, t o  appoint a Commissioner, who, in conjui~ction 
with a Con~missioner to  be appointed by the  British Govern- 
ment, shall examine into and decide upon the  pecuniary 
claims of all British subjects upon the  government of Persia, 
and shall pay such of those claims as  may be pronoul~ced 
just, either in one sum or by instalments, within a period not 
exceeding one year from the date of the award of the Com- 
missioners, and the same Con~missioners shall examine into 
and decide upon the claims on the Persian goverllment of all 
Persian subjects, or the subjects of other powers, who, up 
t o  the period of the departure of the British missioll from 
Tehran, were  under British protection, which they have not 
since renounced. 
ARTICLE 12.-Saving the pl*ovisions in the latter part  of 
the preceding Article, the British Gover~lment will renounce 
the right of protecting hereafter any Persia11 subject not 
actually in the employment of thc British tnission, or of 
British Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, o r  Consular 
Agents, provicled that  no such right is accorded t o  or  exer- 
cised by any other foreign powers ; but in this, a s  in all 
other respects, the British Gover~ l~ l~e l l t  requires, and the 
Persian government engages, that  the snmc privileges and 
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elljoycd by the British Cioverllment, its servants and its 
:lrrcl that  the same respect and consideration shall 
bc s l io~v~z ibr tlienl, :~nd ~11:~11 be enjoyed by them, as are 
conrerrcd up011 c~i.joy~cl by ancl shown to  the most 
favourccl roraign goifcrllmcl~t, its servnllts and its subjects. 
Ai~r1c1.1: I:,.-Thc high contracting parties hereby rellew 
the agrecnlcnt clltcrctl into by tlzerll in the month of August 
1851 (Sh:~w:ll 1207) Ibr thc suppression of the slave-trade in 
the Persian C;~l l f ,  :rrld cng:lge ftlrther that the said agreement 
shall contini~c i l l  forcc i~f tcr  the datc a t  which it expires, 
tllnt is, :ll'tcr thc nlonth (IT .%ugust 1862, for the furtiler 
sp:lce of tcn yc:lrs ;111d for SO 1011g :iftcrwards a s  neitller of 
thc: high contr;~c:tillg partics shall, by 21 formal declaration, 
annul it ; sucli tlcclar:itiol~ not t o  tn lx  cfyect until one year 
after it  is m:ltlc. 
AIZTICI.IS ~+.--Illll~ledi:~tely OII thc cxc l~a~ lge  of tile ratifica- 
tions of this 'I'rc:lty, the  British troops will desist from all 
acts of hostility against  l'crsi:l, :~nci tlzc Uritisll Government 
eng:lgcs rurthel tli:~t a s  soon as the stipulations in regard to 
the evacuation by the l'crsian troops of I-Ierat: and the 
Afghan territories, :ks well :IS in regard t o  the reception of 
tlie Uritisli mission a t  Tchran, sh:lll have been c:irried into 
full effect, the  Ijritish troops sh:ill, without delay, be with- 
drawn from ill1 ports, places, and isla~~cls belo~lgilzg to Persia ; 
but the British Ciovcrtunent ellgages that, during this inter- 
val, llotlli~lg sII:LI~ bc (lcsig~~edly done by the Commander of 
the Uritish troops to  nenkell the c~llegiance of the Persian 
subjects towards the Sh:~h, which :~llegiance it is, on the 
col~trary,  their earnest desire to confirnm ; and further, the 
I3ritish Government engages that ,  as far as possible, the 
subjects of 1'crsi:l shall be sccured against inconvenience 
from the prcsencc of the British troops, and that  all supplies 
which m:ly bc retluired for the usc of those troops, and 
which the l'ersian gover~zment engages to  direct its autbori- 
tics to :~ssist  them in procuring, sh;lll be paid for, a t  the 
fair m;irket-price, by the British Comnlissariat immediately 
on delivery. 
ABTICI.I: I 5.-The present Trcnty shall be ratified, atld the 
ratifications cxchangctl at Bagdad in the space of three 
months, o r  soolier, i f  possible. 
I n  witllcss wllereof thc respective plellipotel~tiaries have 
414 APPENDICES 
signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their 
arms. 
Do?~e at Par-is, ilt gzlaa'7'z/jlicate, this fourth dty of fhe 7lz07zth 
of March, igr the year af our Lord one thousand e&ht hzr7tdrPed 
n7zdJif&-seve/~. 
(Sd.) COWLEY. 
(Sd.) FEROICII (i?~ Pe7,sintt). 
COMRIERCIAL CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND PERSIA. SIGNED IN FRENCH AND 
PERSIAN AT TEHERAN, FEBRUARY ~ T H ,  1903. (TRANS- 
LATION PROM THE FRENCH TEXT.) 
His Majesty the  Icing of Great Britain and Ireland, 
Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, 
animated by the same desire to consolidate the Commercial 
relations between the two friendly Countries, have judged 
i t  expedient to  modify and complete the arrangelnents con- 
stituted by the second paragraph of Article IX. of the  
Anglo-Persian Treaty signed a t  Paris on March 4th) 1857, 
a n d  for this purpose have nained as their Plenipotentiaries, 
VlZ. :- 
His Majesty the  Icing of Great Britain and Ireland, 
Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Hardinge, Knight Commander 
of the Order of St.  Michael and St. George, His Envoy 
Extraordinary and Millister Plenipotei~tiary to the Court of 
Persia ; and 
I-Iis Majesty the Shah of Persia, His First Minister, the 
At ta  Bek Azam Ali Asg-har Khan Amin-es-Sultan ; alld 
M. Joseph Naus, Minister of State, Administrator-General 
of Customs and Posts ; 
who, duly authorised for that purpose, have agreed a s  
follows :- 
ARTICLE I. -Merchandise of British origin imported into 
Persia by British subjects, and, likewise, produce of Persia 
exported by British subjects, shall be subject to the Customs 
duties laid down in the detailed Tariffs (A) and (C) annexed 
t o  the present Declaration. 
ARTICLE 2.-Merchandise of British origin imported into 
Persia (see Article I) shall be liable to the payment of 
Customs duties in c 
on its entry into P 
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1 Customs duties in conformity with Tariff (A), once for alk, 
on its entry into I'erskl, and  shall not thereafter be sub- 
jected to  the p:lyment of :lily other Custolns duty, or other 
charges, with tlic cxccptioll of those provided for by 
Article 5 of the present Declaration. 
I t  is formally stiplrl:~ted that  Britisll subjects and imporks 
into 13cl.sin, :W well as l'ersi:l~~ subjects and Persian imports 
into thc Urilish Ell~pire, sh;~ll  continue to  enjoy utlder all 
conditions most-f:lvo~tred-llatiotl treatment ; it is understood 
that n British Colony, 11:~viug n special Customs TariEF, and 
whicl~ may ceasc to grant most-favonred-uation treatment 
to Persian imports, will no longer have the right to claim 
the siunc trentmeut for its own imports into Persia. 
Persian products cxported and destined for the United 
I<ingdon~ sh:lll pay Customs duty on their entry into the 
Pattcr, in ;iccordance with the General Tariff in force; 
subject to tllc reserv:itiot~ that suclr imports shall always 
bave the benefit of most-f;l.rroured-~~atiol~ treatment. In the 
event of the United I<illgclom establishing duties in its 
general Tariff, without previous agreement with Persia, on 
the Persian products enumerated in Tariff (B) applicable to 
Pcrsian i~npor t s  illto Russia (and annexed ad wzc~noua7z&~nz 
to the present Dcclarntion), other than those now existing 
in the above-mentioned general Tariff, and highcr than the 
duties laid clow~i in the said Tariff (B), Persia shall have 
the right to impose, in its turn, corresponding duties on 
articles of the s:lmc description coming from tbe United 
I<ingdoa~. A special Conventiol~ should be negotiated for 
this p~lrpose  ; in dcf:luli: of agreement the present Declara- 
tion would become void, and both parties would again 
become subject to the former system laid down by Article IX. 
of thc Treaty  of Paris. 
Thc  Regulatior~s imposed, o r  t o  be imposed a s  regards 
products, the importation of which is ~rohibi ted  into the 
United Kingdom, and also :is regards the export duties of 
the United I<ingdom, shall be applicable t o  Persian trade 
in the  latter. 
ARTICLE 3.-.-The export duty of 5 per cent., hitherto in 
force in Persia, 011 cxported merchandise and products, is 
entirely abolished, ~ v i t h  the cxceptioil of the export duties 
imposed by TariFF (C) on the  products therein mentioned. 
British :~nd  I'el-si~ul merchandise may, under the stipula- 
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tions of the present arrangement, be freely exported from 
one to the other of the two States, with the clearly under- 
stood exception of the prohibitions and restrictions already 
imposed or to  be imposed by each of the two High Con- 
tracting Parties, either in the interests of public safety 01- 
preservation, or with a view to eventually prevent the ex- 
portation of products of the soil which it may, for the 
moment, be necessary to retain in order to secure the public 
supply of food. 
ARTICLE 4. -The Persian Goverllment undertakes to  
abolish all " rahdari " taxes now levied for the main- 
tenance of caravan roads, and not to allow the establish- 
ment of other road or barrier taxes elsewhere than o n  
carriage roads, including coilstructive works for which con- 
cessioil has already been, or may be, granted by special 
Firinan. In the latter case, the rate of the taxes to b e  
levied by the " concessionnaire" would be fixed by thc  
Persian Government, who shall inform His Britannic 
Majesty's Legation thereof, such taxes not exceeding, per  
farsakh, those of the Resht-Tehran Road ; their levy call 
only begin aftcr the completion of the road, o r  a t  least of 
its principal branches betweeii important localities, and i n  
no case exceeding, in the case of British merchandise, t he  
rates levied on merchandise arriving from elsewhere. 
ARTICLE 5.-The system of farming out the collection of 
Customs duties in Persia, which it is necessary to abolisll 
entirely, shall be replaced on all the frontiers of the kingdom 
by the establishment of Government Customs offices, organ- 
ised and administered in such a way as to  secure for traders 
equality of collection and a fair treatment of their rnerchan- 
dise. 
The Persian Goverillnent will take all necessary steps t o  
secure generally the safety of merchandise during its deposit; 
in the Customs ofices, and assumes direct responsibility f o r  
the integrity and proper preservation of rnerchalldise which 
may be deposited in the warehouses of the Customs offices. 
Consequently, the Persian Government undertalres to  h a v e  
built as soon as possible, and in any case not later t h a n  
the period specified below in clause (n.) of this Article, in 
the ofices indicated for that purpose by a Regulation referred 
to hereafter, warehouses, properly secured and sufficiently 
large to provide for the storage of the quantity of merchan- 
dise usually importe 
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disc usually imported ; in all other o&es suitable provision 
shall be made in accordance with the lleeds of the trade 
passing t h r o ~ ~ g h  t en]. British traders shall elljoy, under 
the conditjons laid dow11 by the same Regulation, the right 
of storagc in bond for twelve months, dating from tile day 
of the arrival o f  the ~nerclri.itldise, without the paymellt of 
any dues or t:lscs for stor:lgc. 
A Gcr~eraI I:cg~~lation, tlrnwn up by the Custonls Adminis- 
tration, :uid wlricll slinll be established in agreement with the 
Britisli Leg:ition : ~ t  Tehr:~n, sllall settle, as  sooll as possible 
aftcr the coming into forcc of the prese~lt Convei~tion- 
( (1 . )  Thc classilic;ltion of the Custolns ofices and their 
firnctions, thc points on the land and sea frontiers, and the 
roads open for tlie import and export of merchandise, as 
well as the organisntion of the warehouses a t  the Ctisto~ns 
ofEces and tile date  :lppointed for the commencetnellt of the 
working of thesc oniccs and warehouses ; 
( B . )  The  form:llities to be observed by traders for the 
import and esport of merchandise; 
(c.) Thc  storagc regul:~tions to be applied to British 
mercl~nndise du~.ing tivelve ~nonths  dating from its arrival 
at  one of the ofices open to this trailic; 
((1.) The charges to be levied on trade while ~nercllandise 
remains in Custo~ns wnrehot~ses, or for any other services 
rendered by the Customs to traders ; 
(e.) The Custorns procedure a s  regards the checking of mer- 
challdise liable to specific duties and the calculation of those 
imposed trll z~~t lor~crn~,  a s  well as the fines to be imposed in cases 
of fraud or of violation of the formalities and rules laid down. 
As regards thc  CusLo~ns procedure applicable to merchan- 
disc entering or being exported from the United Kingdom, 
Persian s t lb j~cts  shall be under the laws in force, or to be 
put into Force in the said kingdom; but the provisions of 
the latter sh:~ll t~o t ,  in ally manner whatsoever, sanction less 
favourable nrrangcments as  regards the trade of Persian 
subjects thau those iipplicable to traders of countries which 
enjoy most-filvoured-nation treatment. 
ARTICLE (i,--The payment of import duties in the United 
Kingdorn sl~nll  bc nlude in the currency sanctioned in that 
country for the payment of Customs duties. 
As regards thc  application of Tariffs (A) and (C), the 
Persia11 batman of T;tbreez sl~srll be calculated a t  640 Persian 
2 B 
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miscals, equivalent to  2.97 French lrilogralnmes ; and 100 
Persian lrrans shall be calculated at the equivalent in Eilglish 
money of 48 French francs io gold. 
In the event of the rate of the lrran in relation to the franc 
falling more than 10 per cent., and remailling a t  that rate 
more than one month, the Persian Governmellt shall have 
the right, after verification of the fact by the principal banlrs 
and previous notice to His Britannic Majesty's Legation, 
to raise proportionally the amount of the specific duties laid 
down in Tariffs (A) and (C). The notification respecting the 
increase of the duties shall be made by the Persian Govern- 
ment to the British Legation a t  Tehran a t  least two weelrs 
before such increase shall be put into force. 
In the event of a rise in the value of the lcran exceeding 
10 per cent., and remaining a t  that rate for morc than one 
month, the British Government shall have the right to demand 
a proportional reduction of Tariffs (A) and (C), and the Per- 
sian Government shall be bound to grant the said reduction. 
ARTICLE 7.-The Persian Government undertakes to apply 
the terms of the present Convention, together with Tariffs 
(A) and (C) with the ~nodifications laid down in Article 6, to 
all the frontiers of the Iringdom. 
The present Declaration, of which, in case of dispute, the 
French text shall be binding, shall be ratified, and the 
ratifications shall be exchanged a t  Tehran. I t  shall be pub- 
lished by the two Governments, and shall come into force on 
a date to be agreed upon. 
Done in duplicate, in French and Persian, the 9th 
February, 1903. (L.S.) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE. 
(L.S.) NAUS. 
The Persian text is stated to have been also signed by the 
Atabeg-Azam. The Tariffs A, B and C referred to in the 
above Co~lveiltion were signed on the same date and in the 
same manner. 
TREATY OF TURILMANCHA'I BETWEEN RUSSIA AND 
PERSIA, 1828. 
In the name of Alinighty God. I-Iis R4ajesty the Most 
High, Most Illustrious, and Most Powerful Emperor , 
and Autocrat of all the Russias, ant1 I-Iis Majesty the 
Shah of Persia, equall: 
to put a period to the c 
their mutual wishes, an( 
the for~ller relatiolls of 
between the two States, 
cotnprisi~lg in itself the 
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Shah of I'c4rsia, cqually anilnated by a sillcere desire 
to pul :I 1)':riorl 1.0 tllc cvik of a war entirely contrary to 
their 11111l~:l~ lvi.silcs, ;lnd to rc-est;lblisb on a solid basis 
thc f~)l.Ill~l. r~l:ltiOlls ou good neighbourllood and amity 
bet!r.c!ctl tllc t!FO  still^^, th1'011gh tile medilIln of a peace, 
corn[iri,sib~~ it1 il.s(!lf L ~ c  guaralltee of its duratioll, by the 
N!nI~lv:ll OL' ill1 (::LIISGS of flltilre difl+ercllce alld rnisunder- 
st:tndi~lg, ~ ~ I V C  :lp[)ointcd the fbllowillg I'lcnipotentiaries 
ch:lr~ctl rvilli Ll~c csccution of this si1lutal.y worlr, namely 
. . . W ~ I ~ I ,  ilt'l<'r h;tvi~lg niet : ~ t  Dclcharg:.anc and cxcllanged 
their full pow[!l.s ~rllicli rvcre found in good a ~ ~ d  clue form, 
IILIVC :I(I~)[>LCCI ;11i(1 ~011cI~ldcd ~ I I C  followillg Articles :-- 
Alcr'~c:~.rr I .  -Thcrc sh:lll be established fiaon1 this day 
pcacc, :~nlity, : I I~CI  I )CI .~CCL i~ l~clers ta~~di l~g bet~veen His Majesty 
ttic E~npc!ror (11' ;111 t l ~ c  Iiussias on the one part, and I-Iis 
Mi~jcsty the SII:III of I'ersia on thc other part, their heirs and 
successors, their rcspeclive States a l~d  subjects, in perpetuity. 
ARTICI.IS 2.- Con~idering tll:~t the hostilities between the 
high con t rnc t i~~g  parties, now happily terminated, have 
caused tha  suspension o l  the obligations imposed on them 
by the Trc:~ty of lhlistan,  I-Iis Majesty the Emperor of all 
the Russi;ls aud I-Iis Miljesty the Sliall or Persia have 
deerncd it proper t o  replace the said Treaty of Gulistan by 
the prcsenl clauses mid stipula~ions, which are intended to 
rcg~rl:lte consolidate more and more tlre future relalions 
of pcacc :~nd atlti~y between Russia ancl Persia, 
ARTICLI; 3. --I-Iis M:ijesty the Shah of Persia, as well in 
his own nilme as in that of his heirs a l ~ d  successorsJ cedes in 
full right and property to thc Empire of Russia the I<hanat 
of Erivan on eithcr side of the flraxes, and the Khanat of 
Naclehtchiv;~~~. I n  co~~scquencc of this cession, His Majesty 
the Sh :~h  cug:lgcs to cause the delivery to the Russian 
i~uthoritics witjiili thc spacc of six months a t  farthest from 
the s ig~~; i tu re  of the present Treaty of alL the archives and 
public tlocurnelrte; concerning the ad~ninistration of th$ two 
I<l~anats above mcntianed. 
ARTICLIZ '1 defitics the line of demarcation. 
ARTICI.E s,--fiis Majesty the Shah of Persia, ill testimoll~ 
of his sincere friallclship for His Majesty the Emperor of all 
Russia$, solemnly recognizes tho presellt Article, in his 
own llanlc :rnd in that of his heirs and succassors to the 
Throne of l'crsia, the nppertai~~ment for ever to the Empire 
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of Russia of all the countries and the islands situated between 
the line of demarcation indicated by the ~ r e c e d i ~ l g  Article on 
one side, and the ridge of the Caucassall Mountains and the 
Caspian Sea oil the other, as  also the wailderillg tribes who 
inhabit those territories. 
ARTICLE fj.-With a view to conlpensate for thc consider- 
able sacrifices which the war betweell the two Slates has 
occasioned to the Empire of Russia, as well a s  the losses 
and injuries which have resulted therefrom to Russian sub- 
jects, His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages to make good 
these by the payment of a pecuiliary indetnnity. It  is agreed 
between the two high contracting parties that the amount of 
this indemnity is fixed at ten crores of tomans, or thirty 
millions of silver roubles, and that the mode, time, and 
guarantee in respect to the payment of this sun1 shall be 
regulated by a separate arrangement. 
ARTICLE 7.-Ilis Majesty the Shah of Persia, having 
deemed it expedient to nominate, as  his successor and heir 
presumptive, his august son the Prince Abbas Mirza, His 
Majesty the Emperor of all the Rassias, with a view to 
afford to His Majesty the Shah of Persia a public testimony 
of his amicable disposition, and of his desire t o  contribute 
towards the coilsolidation of this order of succession, en- 
gages to recognize henceforward in the august person of His 
Royal Highness the Prince Abbas Mirza the successor and 
heir presumptive of the Crown of Persia, and to coilsidcr 
him as  the legitimate Sovereign of that kingdom from the 
moment of his accession to the throne. 
ARTICLE 8. - Russia11 merchant vessels shall enjoy as  
formerly the right: of navigating in freedom the Caspian Sea, 
and of landing on its coasts. They shall find in Persia aid 
and assistance in case of shipwreck. The same right is 
granted to Persian merchant vessels of navigating on the 
n?zcient footi7zg the Caspian Sea, and of landing on the 
Russian banks, where in case of shipwreck the Persians 
shall receive aid and assistailce reciprocally. With respect 
to ships of war those carrying the Russian military colours, 
being ab antiqzro the oilly vessels which have had the right of 
navigating the Caspian Sea, that exclusive privilege is for 
this reason now equally reserved and secured to them, so 
that, with the exception of Russia, no other power shall be 
able to have ships of war in the Caspian Sea. 
ARTICLE 9.-His Maje 
and H i s  Majesty the S1 
drawing closer by ever 
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dors, Ministers, and Cha 
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ARTICLE 9s-I-Iis Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias 
and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, cordially desirous of 
drawing closer by every means the bonds so happily re- 
established between them, have agreed that the Ambassa- 
dors, Ministers, and  Charges d'Affaires who may be recipro- 
cally delegated t o  the respective High Courts, whether on a 
telnporary lnission, or for the purpose of residillg there 
perrnanelltl~, shall  be received with the hol~ours alld dis- 
tinctiolls due t o  their rank, and suited to  the digllity of the 
high colltl*flclil1g parties, as well as to the sincere friendship 
which unites them and the usages of the countries. 117 this 
respect the ceremonials to  be observed on both sides shall be 
agreed upon by means of a special Protocol. 
ARTICLE 10.-His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, 
and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, consideri~lg the re- 
establishment and  extension of the commercial relatiolls 
between the two States as one of the principal benefits which 
the return of peace should produce, have agreed to regulate 
all the  arrangements rclative to the protectioll of commerce 
and the security of their respective subjects, as stated in a 
separate Act hereunto annexed, concluded between the 
respective Plcnipotentiaries, and which shall be considered 
as forming an integral part of the present Treaty of Peace. 
His Majesty t h e  Shah of Persia reserves to Russia as 
formerly the right of appointing Coilsuls or Commercial 
Agents wherever the good of colninerce may require, and he 
engages to allow these Consuls or Agents, each of whom 
shall not have a suite of more than ten individuals under his 
protection, the  enjoyment of the hotlours and ~rivileges due 
to their public character. 
His Majesty t h e  E~nperor of all the Russias ~romises on 
his part to  observe a perfect reciprocity in regard to the 
Co~lsuls or  Commercial Agents of His Majesty the Shah of 
Persia ; in the event of any well-grounded complaint on the 
part of the Persian Govcrn~neilt against ally one of the 
Russia11 Co~lsuls or Agents, the Minister or Char& dlAffaires 
of Rzlssia, residing a t  the Court of His Majesty the Shall, 
and uilder whose immediate orders they shall be placed, will 
suspend hiln from his f~~ulctions and confer the charge Pro- 
visionally an whomsoever he may thitlk proper. 
ARTICLE 11.-All the affairs and demands of their respec- 
tive subjects, suspended by the event of the war, shall be 
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resumed and settled conforn~ably to the principles of justice 
after the coilclusion of peace. The debts which their respective 
subjects inay have contracted among themselves shall be 
promptly and wholly liquidated. 
ARTICLE 12.-The high coiltracting parties agree with a 
view to the interests of their respective subjects to fix a term 
of three years in order that those who possess simultaneously 
immovable property on either side of the Araxes inay have 
the power to sell or to exchange the same freely. His Imperial 
Majesty of all the Russias excepts, nevertheless, from the 
benefits of this arrangement (as far as it respects them) the 
late Erivan Sirdar Hossein Khan, his brother H a  Jnu Ichan, 
and Icurreem Khan, former Goverilor of Nacktchivan. 
ARTICLE 13.-All prisoners of war made on either side, 
u~hether in the course of the last war or before, a s  well a s  
the subjects of the two Governmeilts who may have fallen 
into captivity a t  any period whensoever, shall all be freely 
delivered over within the term of four months, and after 
having been supplied with provisions and other necessary 
articles, they shall be sent to Abassabad to  be there made 
over to the Cominissioners respectively deputed t o  receive 
them and to take measures for their conveyance to their 
homes. The high coi~tracting parties will adopt the  same 
course in regard to all prisoners of war, and all Russiail and 
Persian subjects reciprocally found in captivity who may not 
have been restored within the term above mentioned, either 
by reasoil of the distance at  which they .may have been, or 
owing to any other cause or circumstance whatever. The 
two Governments expressly reserve to themselves the un- 
limited right of claiming them a t  ally time, and they bind 
themselves to restore them reciprocally, a s  soon as  they 
shall present themselves, or shall be claimed. 
ARTICLE 14.-The high contracting parties shall not demand 
the surrender of refugees and deserters who inay have passed 
under their respective dominations before or during t l ~ e  war. 
With a view, however, to prevent mutually the prejudicial 
consequences which might result from the commuilication 
which some of these refugees may maintail1 with their old 
compatriots, the Persian Government engages not t o  tolerate 
within its possessions situated between the Araxes and the 
line formed by the River called Tehan, the Lalte of Aroomiah, 
the River of Djikaton, alld by the River narned Hizri Ozane, 
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as far as its co l l f lue~l~e  with the Caspian Sea, the presellce of 
the intliviclu:lls who shall be designated by nalne now, or 
who Itlay SO indicatecl hercafter. 
Elis M:~jcsty the Emperor of all the Russias promises 
equally on his part not to permit Persian refugees to settle 
in thc 1Cllnll:lts of ICarabngh alld Nacktchivan, as well as in 
the  ort ti on of the I<hanat: of Erivan situated on the right 
b:lnli of the Araxes. It  is understood, however, that this 
clause is not, and shall not be, obligatory except in regard to 
individ~lnl~ invcsted with a public character, or of a certain 
dignity, silch as Kll~lns, Begs, and Spiritual Chiefs or 
~ ~ l l ; ~ h s ,  whose persolla1 example, instigations, and clandes- 
tine communicntions 111igllt have a prejiidicial influellce on 
their old oon~patriots. As far as  concerns the mass of the 
p ~ p ~ l l a t i o a  it1 the two countries, it is agreed between the high 
contracting p:vtics that their respective subjects who might 
have alre:ldy passecl, or who may hereafter pass, from one 
State into the other, shall bc free to settle or sojourn wherever 
the Government under whose authority they may place thern- 
selves shall deem proper. 
Ar r~c r . s  15.-With the benevolent object of restoring 
tranquillity to their States, and removing from their subjects 
all that can aggravate the evils inflicted o t ~  them by the war 
to ~vhich the present Treaty has so happily put an  end, His 
Majesty the Shall grants a full and entire amnesty to ail the 
inhabi tnnts and functionaries of the Province called Azerbijan. 
Nonc of them without any exception shall be persecuted or 
molested for his opinions, acts, or conduct, either during the 
war, or  during the temporary occupation of the said Province 
by the l i ~ l s s i a l ~  troops. There shall be granted to them 
farlher the term of one year from this date to remove freely 
with their families from the Persian Dominions into the 
Russian Stntcs, to export or to sell their property without 
the slightest opposition on the part of the Government, or the 
local authorities, o r  the imposition of any duty or fee on the 
effects or  articles sold or exported by them, With regard to  
their immovable property, a period of five years shall be 
granted to them for its sale or disposal, according to their 
pleasure. 1:rom this amnesty are excepted those who may 
be gl~ilty,  within the period above mentioned of one year, of 
any critnc or misdelueanour liable to penalties inflicted by 
thc tribunals. I 
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ARTICLE 16. - Immediately after the signature of the  
present Treaty of Peace, the respective Plenipotentiaries 
shall lose no time in transmitting to every quarter t he  
necessary advices and instructions for the immediate cessa- 
tion of hostilities. 
The present Treaty drawn up in two parts of the s a m e  
tenor, signed by the respective Plenipotetltiaries, impressed 
with their seals, and exchanged between them, shall be con- 
firmed and ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of all t h e  
Russias and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, and the solemn 
ratifications bearing their own signatures shall be exchanged 
between their Plenipoteiltiaries within the term of ~OLII* 
months, or earlier if possible. 
Signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting 
Parties, Canlp Turlrmanchai, the 21st February 1828. 
SEPARATE COMPACT (RELATIVE TO COMMERCE AND THE 
SECURITY OF RUSSIAN AND PERSIAN SUBJECTS 
RESPECTIVELY) REFERRED T O  I N  ARTICLE X. O F  TI-IE 
TREATY OF TURKMANCHAI. 
The two high contracting parties, desirous that their 
respective subjects shall enjoy all the advantages resulting 
from freedom of commerce on both sides, have agreed upon 
the following articles. Russian subjects provided with pass- 
ports in due  forin shall be allowed to trade throughout the 
whole extent of the kingdom of Persia, and also to proceed . 
to  the States acljoining the said lringdom. In return for  
which Persian subjects shall be allowed to import their mer- 
chandize into Russia either by the Caspian Sea or by the 
frontier land separating Russia from Persia, to barter them 
or to  make purchases for exportation ; and they shall enjoy 
all  the rights and privileges accorded in the States of His  
Imperial Majesty to the subjects of the most favoured friendly 
powers. In the event of the death of a Russian subject in 
Persia, his movable and immovable property, as belonging 
to  a subject of a friendly power, shall be entirely inade over 
to  his relations or  partners who shall have the right to dis- 
pose of the said property as they may thinlr fit. In default 
of relations or partners the disposal of these same goods 
shall be entrusted to the Mission, or to  the Consuls of Russia 
without any opposition on the part of the local authorities. 
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ARTICI,IS 2.---C~1llt T C I C ~ S ,  bills of ex~hal lge ,  securities and 
other cugiigeinents p:lsscd in writing between the respective 
subjects iu cc~rl~~cclican wilh thcir busillcss trallsactions shall 
be rcgistcrcd bcfort: the Russian Consul alld before the 
l jakim (Civil Judgx:), :lnd in places where there may be no 
Consul, bcl'cjrc tlle I l a k i n ~  :~loile, s o  that  in case of dispute 
beL\\lceo tht: t\vo parlies il may be possible to lllalre the 
necess:lry i~lvc.sli~:lliOll with :I view to decide the diflereilce 
in oo~~ft)rrni  ty \villi juslicc. I f  one of the two parties, jv i tho~t  
bciag prnvitlctl wit11 tiocumcnls drawn up anrl legalized a s  
mcrilionl:tl :tl>t~~(:, wl~icll ~11:lll  be valid before either Co~l r t  of 
justic:c:, sl~trulcl wish to illstilule at1 action against the other 
by simply protluc:ir~g ~~i l r rcssos ,  such claims shall not be 
:~drnittr:tl ~lr~lc.;s lhe tlcfendant l~itnself should acknowledge 
r I l i t  b:vi:ry cng:lgelnent contracted between the 
ruspcctivt: sul)jr:c:ls [of tllc two powers] in  the forms above 
pi~escril~c!rl sl~;lll 111: sr:rupulously observed, and every refusal 
to :~bitlc tiy it thilt inight occasion loss to one of the parties, 
sliall I)(: visitc:cl with :l proporlion:ite indemnity from the 
other p:lrly. I n  cnst: of the failure of a 12ussian merchant 
in I'ccrsi:~, 11ih C I . C C I ~ L O T S  sh:lll be paid out of the goods and 
efr1:cls uE tl~r: i11so1vt:nt ; but Llie Minister, the Cliargk 
d1,IF&-es, o r  the Gcrnsul of Russia shall not refuse their 
good otIicc*s, i f  nwcl be, to asccrtuin if thc insolvent has not 
left: in l t u s s i :~  clispos:~blc property which might serve to 
satisfy tlic said crecIitors. The  friendly stipulations in the 
prcscnt Article shall be reciprocally observed with regard to 
Pe~-sinn subjects who trade in Russia under tlie protectioll of 
the laws. 
Ar<~rct-is 3, --In order to secure to the commerce of the respec- 
tive sul~jcc ts  Llie :irlvantages which form the  subject of the 
foregoing stipulnlions, it is agreed that  the merchandize 
importetl into Persia or  cxporled from that  Iringclom by 
Russian sul~jccts,  ;uid in like manner tlie produce of Persia 
irnporrctl irilo Russia by I'ersiatl subjects either by the 
Caspian S c a  or I)y lllc frontier lancl between the two Stales, 
as j ~ e l l  :is Kus.si:iir ~ncrchnndize which Persian subjects inight 
exporb Erorn tlie Jlrnpirc: by the s:unle routes, sliall be liable as 
hcrclofore to :I duty of Rvc per cent. levied once for all a t  
their ctntrancc or exit, ancl shall not  thereafter be subjected 
to thu pilynlcrlt of sny other customs duty. If Russia 
should deem it llecesvary Lo malce new custo~ns  regulations 
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and new tariffs, she nevertheless engages even in that case 
iiot to increase the duty of five per cent. mentioned above. 
ARTICLE 4,-If Russia or Persia should be involved in war 
wit11 another Power, their respective subjects shall not be 
prohibited from with their merchalldize through the 
territories of the high contracting parties in order to proceed 
to the States of the said power. 
ARTICLE 5.-Seeing that, according to the existing usages 
in Persia, it is difficult for foreign subjects to find houses, 
lvare-rooms or proper places for the storage of their mer- 
chandize to let, it is to Russian subjects in Persia 
not only to rent, but also to acquire, by every right of 
ownership, houses to dwell in, a s  well a s  ware-rooms and 
places in which to deposit their merchandize. The servants 
of the Persian Government shall not be allowed to enter by 
force the said houses, ware-rooms or places without having 
recourse, in case of necessity, to the authority of the 
Minister, or of the Chargk d'bffaires, or  of the  Consul of 
Russia, who shall depute an  officer or  dragoman t o  be present 
a t  the inspection of the house or of the merchandize. 
ARTICLE 6.-In like manner, if the Minister or ChargC 
dlAffaires of His Iinperial Majesty, the servants of the 
Russian Mission, the Consuls and dragomails should find i t  
difficult in Persia to purchase suitable materials for their 
clothing, or several other necessary articles of consumption, 
they shall be allowed to send for, on their own account, free 
of duty and other charges, all goods and articles which are 
destined exclusively for their private use. The public Agents 
of His Majesty the Shah residing in the States of the Russian 
Empirc shall enjoy perfect reciprocity in this respect. Persian 
subjects forming part  of the suite of the Minister or Charge 
d'bffaires, or Consuls, and i~ldispeilsable for their service, 
shall enjoy, so  long as they may remain with them, their 
protection equally with Russian subjects ; but if it should 
happen that one among them should commit some mis- 
demeanour, and should thereby incur the penalty of the exist- 
ing laws, in that case the Persian Minister or  the Hakim, 
and in his absence the competent local authority, shall 
immediately apply to the Minister, Charg& dlAffaires, or 
Russian Consul in  whose service the accused may be, in 
order that he may be delivered up to justice ; and if this 
application be founded on, proofs establishing the guilt of the 
accused, t h e  Minister, C: 
make no difficulty whatel 
~RTICLE 7. -All lawsuit 
iubjects shall  b e  submittc 
sd decision of t h e  Missi 
enfornlity wi th  t h e  laws a 
Eoalso shall d isputes  and 
!rbjects a n d  t h o s e  of an01 
rial1 consent t o  such a ,  cc 
l~~suits shal l  a r i se  betwt 
lie said l awsui t s  o r  d i s ~  
Hakirn or  Goverilor,  an 
bided except  i n  the  p! 
!lission or  of  t b e  Collsulz 
id suits s h a l l  n o t  be  
lime, If, however ,  circ 
:aiure as to render  a SI 
lake place w i t h o u t  previi 
!linister, o r  t h e  C h a r g e  d 
mdin tliat case t h e  actior 
inthe Dufter,  t h a t  is  to  
Shah at T a b r i z  o r  a t  T e h ~  
Dragoman of t h e  Mission 
ARTICLE 8.-In case  o. 
mitted a m o n g  Russian 
dccision of t h e  c a s e  shall 
the Minister or C h a r g e  ( 
iirtue of t h e  jurisdiction 
wuntrymen. I f  a Russ  
implicated w i t h  individui 
i t ,  he s h a l l  not b e  p r  
uithout proofs  of his par.  
Latcase, as in  t h e  one ir 
tharged w i t h  d i rec t  culpr 
{hall not be c o m p e t e n t  t o  
ol the cr ime e x c e p t  i n  
Jlission o r  of  the liussial 
none on t h e  s p o t  i n  whicl 
local autliorit ies shal l  tal 
place where t h e r e  i s  a Co: 
The evidence b o t h  for  aq 
Iully taken by the Hakim 
ti~;it C:IS~ 
~ i l ) O \  (!,
tvi i l l  ay;lr 
t l l  11ot I,c 
sotl!;ll the 
( J  [)rucecd 
Ilk: 1Is:lgcs 
ul I ~ I ~ I I ~ C S ,  
tl1c:ir nic!r- 
t ill 1 '1 '~hi~ 
: riqht of 
.tK#:lls ;111cl 
1- .sc'r\';ints 
6 1  caltcr by 
)tit .  Il:ivi~~g 
ty uf the 
t '1~115111 of 
! i ~  prcserrt 
I/('. 
or C11:1rg6 
: k <  of the 
I ~ L I I ~  Iir~tl it . f i~r  their 
~:st:mption, 
i'oit~lt, free 
\vl~i( : l~  arc 
Idi t :  Aqents 
L iic Rilssi:ln 
1 2 ,  l 'er~ia~l 
or (;harp! 
r ir  service, 
tI~t.rn, their 
if i t  .should 
- t t ~ ~ t i t :  mis- 
i~l'thr cxistv 
[!I(: II:~kim, 
vl~ i ty ,  \hall 
: l t i i i l * c t ~ ,  or 
t ~ , ~ y  be, in 
;,13,j if this 
guilt ~f the 
ilccusetl, t he  kl'lillistcr, (;ll:lrgc! til!ifraircs, or Consul shall 
m:ll;c no rlitlicltlly n.lr:ilt:vc~r in co~nplyiug- ii~itli it. 
I 7. !Ill I;i~vsiiils :11ltl iili;g:ltiolls betwccll Russiall 
subjt:(: ~ 1 1 ; i I l  h ~ :  .r~ll)rnittcd (:scl~lsivcly to  the illvcstigntioll 
an(l tlc:ci\io~l of thl. hIissio11 01. of tlie Consuls of Russia in 
co~lformity wit11 Ilie I:ln. .; :ir~d eustonis of the Russian Empire, 
So :~l.so sll:lll tli\l>~il(~.; :mtl I:livsuils arising betweell Russian 
subjc~:ts :wtl 1111).1(. c ~ f  :~tiolh(:~ I'~twt:~., in case the two parties 
slinll c t ~ ~ ~ s t : ~ ~ t  to z l t r l ~  :Iscourse. TVll(!~lcver :illy clisputcs or 
lawsuit.; s11;1ll :iris[! I)t~l\vceli 1tursi:ln :11lc1 1'0rsia1l s~~b jec t s ,  
s;litl I:~n..;uils or. tlisplltcs sli:~II bc brought before the 
I.I:~liim or (;~~vi'rrior, ;111tl sllall not be invostignted and 
Jecidcci csc:rdlrt i l l  Ilic I)re.selicc of I.hc Dragoman of tlle 
hlis.sioti or c~f tlic Consu1:lLr. Once judiciously disposed of, 
such s u i ~ s  !.11:111 not I)(: :illowctl to be instituted a seco~ld 
time, I f ,  howcvcr., circumsta~icos should bc of such a 
ni~lurc g1.s tu rc4utlt'r :I sc:contl tri:il Ilccessnry, it sl~nll not 
t:llie pl;lct! tvillio~lt ~ ) r i : v i o ~ ~ ~  i itilll:~tic)~i being given to the 
Ministc~r, or lh(* C:h;lrg$ rl'.\if:iirt!s, or the Consul of llussia ; 
alld in that c : l ~  tht. :rctioo sh:lll bc broug-lit :und decided only 
i l l  tl~c: I)~~ftc!r, th:it is to  sgiy, i l l  the Supreme Court of the 
Slinh :it T;~I,riz or :it T~: l~cr i i r~ ,  likcivise in the presence of a 
L)r:lgumall o f  the. 1li.ssio11 or of the Russian Consulate. 
I 8,  111 C:LSI: of 11111rrlt:r or m y  other cr in~e com- 
mittor1 :ttnong 1IZ1rssi:~n s~tbjects, thc investigation and 
decision of thc c:~\t: s11:lll be within the exclusive province of 
the Mi~ i i \ t~ : r  or C:lr:ll.gd tl'.\H';iircs, or Con9ul of Russia, in 
virtu(! of the jurihrlictiur~ rle1eg:ltcd to  the111 over their own 
courltrqrlrlcbrl, If :L I<IISS~;LII sul>ject should happel1 to be 
implicated \villi intlividi~:il.; of another nation in a crilninal 
suit, lie sh:ill clot: bc proscouted nor molested in any way 
without prouft, of his p;lrticip:~tion in the crime ; and cvcn in 
t11:it: e:~4c, :IS ill the 011c ill wliicll :i ltussi:l~l s~ll>jcct should be 
chargcrl with tlil-cct cull)nbility, 11io tribul1;~ls of the country 
sli;~ll nut IN! curnl~ctcnt o ~~roct:ecl wit11 the tri:ll nllcl judgment 
of tlie (:rim(. cxcepl ill tlic prcsoncc of :t clelegntc of the 
Mission 01. of tllu 1tussi:in Consul:~tc, and iT there should be 
riorle on the spol  ill n.llirl1 111c crirntt llas l~een  cotnmittcd, the 
loc:~l :i~tlltrritics .cl~;ill t;ll;c steps to scritl tlie clolinquenl to a 
placc wlierc: t l~ t :~ .~"  is it Co11su1 or :i co~l~t i t l l tcd  IZ l~~~i i l l l  Agelll. 
'Tl~c eviilcllcc t~otll fijr :lnd :lgniust the accused shall be fnith- 
fully take11 by the* II;lkim and by the Judge of thc place, and 
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attested by their signature : transmitted in this form to  the 
place where the offence is to be tried; this evidence shall 
constitute a record or authentic summary of the proceedings, 
unless the accused should clearly demonstrate the  falsity of 
the same. When the accused shall have been duly convicted 
and the sentence passed, he shall be handed over t o  the 
Minister, or Chargk d'Affaires, or Consul of His Imperial 
Majesty, who shall send him back to Russia, there to receive 
the punishment awarded by the law. 
ARTICLE 9.-The high contracting parties shall take good 
care that the stipulations of the present Act be strictly 
observed and fulfilled, and the respective Governors of their 
provinces, Commandatlts and other authorities, shall not 
allow themselves t o  infringc them on any account, under 
pain of incurring a grave responsibility and even dismissal 
on clear proof of a repetition of the fault. T o  this end we, 
the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor 
of all the Russias and of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, 
have arranged and concluded the stipulations contained in 
the present Act, which are the result of the . . . Article of 
the principal Treaty concluded on the same day a t  Delthar- 
gane, and which shall have the same force and weight as if 
they were inserted therein word for word and ratified. 
In consequence whereof the present separate Act, in dupli- 
cate, has been signed by us, impressed with our  respective 
seals, and exchanged. 
CONVENTION BETWEEN PERSIA AND RUSSIA DEFINING 
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES EAST OF 
THE CASPIAN SEA (ARHAL-KHORASSAN BOUNDARY). 
SIGNED AT TEHRAN DECEMBER, 1881.l %, 
[Ratifications exchanged at Tehran, March, 1882.1 
In  the name of God the  Almighty. 
His Majesty the Shah of Persia and His Majesty the 
Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, ack~lowledging 
' This Convention was laid before Parliament in 1882, with corrc- 
spondence respecting the affairs of Central Asia, and formed an enclosure 
in the following despatch :- 
"Mr. Tl~ontso7z to Ear2 Gmnville-(Received 6f7z Marclr). 
" M Y  LORD, "Tehran, zgrdJa?tuary, 1882. 
" I  have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's in- 
formation, translation of the Akhal-Khorassan Boundary Treaty, lately 
necessity of 
Rrlerialls east ' ~ ~ ~ 1 r a t  
lhtrtill )ecurity $F the 
n c l l ~ ~  for t 
plellipote~rtiaries : ht p u r l  
His Bl;~jesty the 
L Klri~n, Mot, S bah 
jfiirs ; hm~a-tl 
His ar~jesty the 
&-pet 
,,I the otlier, 1vqp Zello 
llinister l'le~lipol~ 
Shall ; Qtiary 
Who, having kchan; 
foulld in good alla 
jrticlcs :- 
ue f 
~RTICI .E  1,--Tbe ollE 
the Russia11 Empice alld 
fixed as tbllows :\ 
Begitrning at the as a 
hlrek scrvcs as the frollt 
frontier-lioe follobs itl a 
of Ihc Sallgo~~ Dagb an( 
northwartl to the ~h a n d  
, .  . 
"Tl~iy tr;u~slation h, be 
Stephcn. Conipa r i~ l~  it wit 
leres crllflloy~d in article V 
the Russiati lcxt it is stated t 
10 lilt d ~ ~ ~ l ~ p l l l ~ l l t  of cam r l l c ,  
province ; I I I ~ I  < h o ~ . a s s ~ ~ ,  t o c, 
lor [he co~~slrucLion f w a g g l  
riflers ; \vlicrua.s in the P e r s  
ordcr to fiicilitnte c o m m c r c i  
provinces iuld that o f  I C h o r a  
a5 rc!gnr~ls l l l e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
clnsdirc l~etweci~ t h e  a f o r e s  
as may bl! of mutual advant: 
"l'lie Jli~lietcr for Foreign 
td.Dowlcli, who was  forn-er 
andlnt~:ly ill thc M i n i s t r y  of 
drticlc 11, of ~ l ~ i s  C o n v e r ~ t i c  
Ironticr, on tlic basis a g r e e d  
1tli.i ILmm tu tI. 
s c:vitlc~~cc sllall 
1111: pru(:t:6!di11gs, 
~ t c  tlic: falsity of 
~ I I  rluly convicted 
ltlcr~ r,vc!r l o  t t ~ c  
ejt" 1 I i s  11\\pi:ri:\l 
, tlic:rc: to receive 
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the ilecessity o f  accurately defining the  frontier of their 
p o s s e s s i ~ l l s  C;lSL of the Caspian Sea, a n d  of establishitlg 
therein securi ly  a n d  Lrzinquillity, have  agreed t o  collclude a 
Convc:~ition I'or eha l  purposc, a n d  have  appointed as their 
Plenipole~ztiuries : 
I-Iis Iv1:ijcstp the Sh:lh of Persia, on t h e  one hand,  Mirza 
Said Rb:in, Mout~111id-ul-Mulk, his Minister fo r  Foreign 
AK:lirs ; 
I-Iis R4;i.jcsty t h e  Emperor  a n d  Autocrat  of all the  Russias, 
on t.11c olhcr ,  I v ~ i n  % c ~ ~ o v i e f ,  l ~ i s  Eiivoy Extraordinary and  
Minister 1'lcnipolcnli:iry :it thc Cour t  o f  His Majesty the 
S l l a l ~  ; 
Who, h a v i n g  exc1l:ulged their  respective full powers, 
found in g o o d  aucl duc fonn, h a v e  agreed  on t h e  following 
Arlicles :-- 
AIIT~CI.~: 1.---'The fronlicr-line between the  Possessions of 
the Russ ian  K ~ n p i r c  a~lcl Pcrsia, e a s t  of  the C a s p i a ~ l  Sea, is 
fixed :IS follo\vs :- 
Dcginning :it t h e  E iosa i~  Kuli Gulf the course of the River 
Atrek se rvos  :IS t h e  frontier :IS f a r  as Chat .  F r o m  Chat  t h e  
frontier-line follows in :i riorth-easterly d i rec~ion  the ridges 
of tile Songou Ilngh :~nd Si~gir i i l l  ranges,  thence extending 
northward to [be Ch:~ndir  Rivcr, reaching t h e  bed of  hat 
cuncludcd I,ct\vclcu Iit~ssia :lnd Persia, as reported in my tclegratn of the 
4th Jar~u:rt*y. 
"This tr;~~l\l:~liurl llac been nliulc from the Russian text by Mr. 
Stephen, C~ol~llxuit\g it with the Persian version I observe that the 
tcrnlv enlr)lovcd in Arliclc V. arc ~ i o t  thc snmc in  both languages. In . - 
the Russia11 text it is ht:~~cd that hot11 Governments engage, with a view 
to the d c ~ c l o ~ ~ r ~ l e ~ ~ t l  ol. cumrilcrcii~l iiltcrcoltrsc bctween the Trans-Caspian 
provirice arld IChorassn~l, to come to a rnuttlalIy ndvanlageo~~s agreement 
for thc const~.uctio~l of ~vnggorl-roads hclwecn tlie above-mentioned pro- 
\~it~cos ; whcrc;i\ in tbc: P c r s i : ~ ~ ~  vcrsior~ of this clalise it is said that, in 
orcler to fi~cilitntc c.o~nnlerci;~l opcl-;ltions between the Trans-Caspian 
l)'.uvincc~ ;tntl t l~at  of Iil~urnssan, the two Contracting Powers engage, 
as trh.i~nlr t l ~ c  ~on+t~~rcctior~ of \v:iKgon-roads for thc transl~ol't of mer- 
clla~irliec l)ctwoc~~ the :~fort:said cuurltrics, to nlalce such arrangements 
iLS nli~y IJI! ot' rllutuill ; ~ d v a n t a ~ c  to thcm. 
" 'Shc Ministcr for Forcign i l f i i rs  has int'ormed me LIlat the Nasseer- 
ccl-Uowlcll, who was f o r ~ ~ ~ c r l y  c~nploycd i r ~  ihe I-'elasian Foreign Office, 
;\tld lirtcly i l l  the hliriistry of Justice, will be rlanlcd Co~nrnissioner under 
Article 11, ol' thin C:onventio~l for the local demarcation of the line of 
tiontier, or1 tlrc basis c~greed up011 in Article 1. 
" I h:tvc, &c., 
/;dl rL k.t'llll?l~//b. 'I RONALD F. THODISON." 
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river a t  Tchakan Kale. From Tchalran ICale it runs ill a 
llorthet-ly direction to the ridge of the mountains dividing the  
Chandir Sumbar valleys, and extends along the ridge of 
these in an easterly direction, descellding to the 
bed of the Sumbar at the spot where the Ach-Agaian stream 
falls into it. Fronl this poir~t eastward the bed of tile 
Sunlbar marl;s the frontier as far as the ruills of Medjet 
Dain6. Thellce the road to Durrun forms the frontier-line a s  
far as the ridge of the Icopet Dagh, along the ridge of which 
the frontier extends south-eastward, but before reaching the 
trppcr part of the Giamab Pass turns to the south along the 
moui~tain heights dividing the valley of the Sulnbar from 
the source of the Giamab. Thence taking a south-easterly 
direction across the sulnmits of the Misillo and Tcboubest 
Blountains, it reaches thc road from Giamab to Rabab, 
passing a t  a distance of I verst to the north of the latter 
spot. From this point the frontier-line runs along the ridge 
of the mountains as far as  the summit of the Dalang 
Mountain, whence passing on the northern side of the 
village of Ichairabad it extends in a north-easterly direction 
a s  far as the boundaries of Geok Keital. From the bounda- 
ries of Geolr Keital the frontier-line crosses to the gorge of 
the River Firuze, intersecting that gorge on the northern 
side of the village of Firuze. Thence the frontier-line talres 
a south-easterly direction to the summits of the mountain- 
range bounding on the south the valley, through which 
the road from Askabad to Firuze passes, and runs along 
the crest of these lnountains to the most easterly point of 
the range. From here the frontier-line crosses over to the 
northernmost summit of the Aselrn range, passing along its 
ridge in a south-easterly direction, and then skirting round 
to the north of the village of Iceftechinar it runs to the point 
where the Ziri ICou and ICizil Dagh Mountains join, extend- 
ing thence south-eastward along the summits of the Ziri Kou 
range, until i t  issues into the valley of the Baba Durmaz 
stream. I t  then takes a northerly direction, and reaches the 
oasis a t  the road from Gavars to Lutfabad, leaving the 
fortress of Baba Durmaz to the east. 
ARTICLE 2.-Whereas, in Article I of the present Conven- 
tion, the principal points ,are indicated through which the 
frontier between the possessions of Russia and Persia is to 
pass, the High Contracting Parties are to appoint Special 
Commissioners with a 
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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l i s s i o n e r ~  with :L view of accurately t rac i~lg  on the spot 
the frontier-line, ; ~ n d  of erecting proper b ~ u n d ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ .  
The date and p l x c  of meeting of h e  said Coimmissiollers shall 
be m~ttuallq' ngrcl:tl Upon by the Igigh Contracting Parties. 
ARTICLE 3 . - - - ~ ~ h ~ r l f : I ~  the  i'orts of Ginmab and Kulkulab, 
in tho gorge  lhrough which the stream watering 
the soil of Lhc Tr:Ll~s-Caspian province passes, lit to the 
of the line n7hich, in virluc of Article I of the presellt 
Conventioll, is to sc:rvc :LS tile boundary between the terri- 
tories of Lhc tnru I I igh  C o n ~ r ; ~ c t i n g  parties, thc G o v e r l ~ m e ~ t  
of His M:ljcsty thc Shall eng:ige to evacuate the said forts 
willlin the sp:lce of one year from the date  of the exchange 
of the r:~tific:ltiolls of the present convention, but  shall have 
the right during the said pcriocl lo remove the  inhabitants of 
Giam:ib nncl Iillllculab to within the  Persian frontier, and to 
establish thcm there. 
On its p : ~ t  the  Government of the Emperor of All the 
Russias engage not to erect fortifications in these said 
localities nor t o  cst:lblish any Turcoman families therein. 
ARTICLE 4.---Wherc:~s the  sources of the  River Firuze, a s  
well as of other slre:un~s watering the soil of the  Trans- 
Caspian province c o n l i g ~ ~ o u s  to the Persian frontier, lie 
witllin the Persian territory, the Government of I-Iis Majesty 
the Shnh engage on no account whatever to  permit the es- 
tablishment of fresh settlements along the  course of the said 
streams ant1 rivulets from their sources to  the point where 
they leave IJcrsi:ln territory, and not to  extend the  area of 
land a t  prcsent under cultivation, arld under n o  pretence 
whatever to  turn off the water i l l  larger quantities than is 
necussarjr for irrig:lling the  fields now under cultivation 
within the  Porsinll territory. With a view t o  the immediate 
obser\r:lncc and fuHiln1ent of this stipulation the Government 
of IIis Mi~jcsty the Shah  engage to appoint a sufficient 
lll~rnber of competcnl Agents, and to subject any infringer 
thereof t o  scvcrc punishlrient, 
AIY~ICI.I~ 5.-With a view to the development of commer- 
cial intercourse between the T~daos-Caspian province and 
Khorassan, both LIigh Contracting Parties engage to come 
to :i mutu:dIy :~dv;intagcous agreement 21s soon a s  possible 
for thc constructio~r uC waggon-roads suitable for commercial 
Lrallic betwct.11 the above-mentioned provinces. 
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ARTICLE 6.-The Government of His Majesty the Shah 
of Persia engage to  strictly pohibit  the export from His 
Majesty's dominions, along the whole extent of the frontier 
of the Provinces of Asterabad 2nd Ichorassan, of all arms 
and war and likewise to adopt nleasures to prevent 
arms being supplied to the Turcomalls residing in Persian 
territory. The  Persiall frontier autl~orities shall :lfforcl the 
most effective support t o  the Agents of the linperial Russian 
Government, whose duty it shall be to watch tlmnt nrnms are  
not exported from the Persian territory. The Government 
of His Majesty the E~nperor of All. the Russins on its part 
engage to prevent arms and war material being supplied 
from Russia11 territory to Turcomans living il l  Persia. 
AI~TICLJI 7.-With a view to the observance and fulfiln~ent 
of the stipulations of the present convention, and in order to 
regulate the proceedings of the Turcomans residing on the 
'rn eror Persian frontier, the Government of I-Iis Majesty the C p 
of All the Russias shall have the right to llomillate Agents 
to the frontier points of Persia. In all questions concerning 
the observance of order and tranquillity in the districts con- 
tiguous to the possessions of the ll igh Contracting Parties, 
the appointed Agents will act as intermediaries in the rela- 
tions between the Russian and Persian authorities. 
ARTICLE 8.-All engagements and stipulations contained in  
Trcaties and Conventions concludecl up to this tinle between 
the two High Contracting Parties shall remain in force. 
ARTICLE 9.-The present convention, done in duplicate, 
and signed by the Plenipotentiaries of both parties, who 
have affixed to it the seal of their nrnms, shall be confirmed 
and ratified by His Majesty the Shah of Pcrsin and His 
Majesty the Ernperor and Autocrat of A11 thc  Russias ; the 
ratifications to be exchanged between the Plenipotcntinries of 
both pnrtics : ~ t  Tehran within the space of four ~llontlts, or 
earlier if possible. 
Done : ~ t  Tehran, the ;:;December, 1881, which correspollds 
to the hlussulman date  of the 23th Mi~harram, I299. 
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RUSSO-PERSIAN COMMERCIAL CONVENTION 
Sa Majestk 1'Empereur de toutes les Russies e t  s a  Majest6 
le Scbah de Perse, animks du  nlPme dCsir de faciliter le 
dCveloppement des relations cornmerciales entre les deux 
pays voisins e t  amis, ont jug6 opportun de  modifier e t  de  
compldter les dispositions Ctablies par  1'Article I11 de l'acte 
additiollnel coilclu entre la Russie et  Ia Perse a Tourkment- 
chai le 1o/zz Mvrier 1828 e t  ant uommk a cet effet pollr 
leurs pl6nipoteutiaires, savoir : sa  MajestC 1'Ernpereur de 
toutes les Russies, son E~ivoyC Extraordinaire e t  Ministre 
PlCnipotcrltiaire pr&s la cour d e  Perse Conseiller privk Argyro- 
pouto et Ic Co~lseiller prive Valenti~l Goloubew, membre du 
C o ~ ~ s c i l  du Ministre des Finances ; e t  sa Majest6 le Schah 
de Perse, son Premier Ministre, L'Atabek-Adam Mirza Ali 
Asghar I<han Amin-es-Sultan, e t  le sieur Josepl~ Naus, 
Adrniilistrateur GdnAral des Douanes, lesquels dCiment auto- 
risds 3 cet effet sont convenus de ce qui suit : 
ARTICLE I.--Les marchandises irnportkes en Perse ou 
exportees de ce Royaume par les s ~ ~ j e t s  russes et pareille- 
rnent les productions de  la Perse importees en Russie soit 
par la mer Caspienne, soit par la frontikre fle terre entre les 
deux Eta ts  par les sujets persans, de  m&me que les mar- 
chandises russes que les sujets persans exporteront de 
1'Ernpire par les rnemes voies, seront soumises non plus !-L 
la taxation prevue p a r  l'article I11 d e  l'acte additionnel du 
10/22 fkvrier 1828, mais des tarifs dCtaill6s (A. B. C.) qui 
s e  trouvent annex4s A la prksente Dkclaration. 
ARTICLE 11.-Les marchandises exportdes de Russie (voir 
article I) seront sournises a u  payement des droits de douane 
conformC~nent a u  tarif A une Eois pour toutes leur entr6e 
en Perse et ne seront assujetties ensuite au payement d'aucun 
autrc droit de  douanc ou d'autres charges, sauf celles prdvues 
par  l'article V de la prkscnte Declaration. 
Les  produits persans exportds en Russie (voir article I) 
payeront les droits de  douane A leur entrde en R ~ ~ s s i e  con- 
forrndment a u  tarif B e t  ne seront assujettis & aucun droit 
cle sortie ou nutre charge h leur exportation de Perse, sauf 
2 F 
APPENDICES 
les exceptions prCvues dans les articles 111 et V de la prksente 
DBclaration. 
Toutes les marchandises et objets d'exportation persans 
non dBnornnlBs dans le tarif B seront soumis en Russie au  
payement des droits d'entrke stipulCs par les tarifs applicables 
aux provenances des nations les plus favorisdes, sauf les 
tarifs Btablis ou d 6tablir pour les produits d'exportation de 
la Chine et d'autres pays asiatiques voisins. 
Les rkglements 6dictBs ou d 6dicter pour les produits 
prohibCs d l'importation en Russie et aussi pour les droits 
de sortie de la Russie seront applicables au trafic persan en 
Russie. 
ARTICLE 111.-Le droit de sortie de 5% existant jusqu'd 
present en Perse sur les inarchandises et produits exportks 
est totalement aboli, d l'exception des droits de sortie 6tablis 
par le tarif C sur les produits y dBnomm6s. 
Les marchaildises russes et  persanes pourront aux con- 
ditions du pr6sent arrangement &tre librement exportkes 
de l'un dans I'autre des deux Etats sous la rkserve, bien 
entendu, des interdictions ou prohibitions dBjd Btablies ou 
d Btablir par chacune des deux Hautes Parties Contractantes, 
soit dans un intBr&t de sBcuritB ou do prkservation sociale, 
soit pour emp&cher Bventuellement l'exportation de produits 
du sol qu'il serait mon~entanBment nkcessaire de rCserver 
afin d'assurer l'alimentation publique. 
ARTICLE 1V.-Le Gouvernement Persan prend l'engage- 
ment de supprimer toutes les taxes de maghdari perques 
actuellernent pour l'entretien des routes et de ne pas per- 
mettre l'ktablissement d'autres taxes de routes ou de bar- 
ribre ailleurs que sur les voies carrossables comportant 
des travaux d'art dont la concession a dBjd 6tB accordtie ou 
serait accordCe par firmans spdciaux. Les taux des taxes 
d percevoir dans ce cas par les concessionnaires seraient 
fixes par le Gouvernement Persan qui en donnera connais- 
sance A la LCgation Imperiale de Russie, ces taxes ne 
devant pas d6passer par farsakh celle de la route Recht- 
TBhBran ; la perception ne pourrait commencer qu'aprks 
l'achbvement de la route ou du moins de ses principaux 
tronqons eiltre des localitBs importantcs et  ne ddpasserait 
en aucun cas pour les marchandises russes les taux pt-Clevks 
des marchandises d'une autre provenance. 
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PERSIA 
ARTICLE V.-Le systdme de  fermage pour la perception 
des droits de  doua~le  n Perse devant &re aboIi a jalnais sera 
remplac6 !I toutes les fronti&res du Royaulne par llinstitution 
de bure:lus de  douane gouvernementale, organisds et  ad- 
ministr6s dc  manihrc il assurcr aux commerqants 1'6galitk 
des c t  1.111 bon traitement de  leurs ~narchandises. 
I,e C;ouvernement Persan prendra toutes les mesures nkces- 
saires ~ O L I ~ .  assurcr d'ulle manikre gBnkrale la s&curitk des 
mnrclx~ndises durant leur sejour dans les bureaux d e  la 
Douane c:t it assume la responsabilitt! directe de l'intdgritk 
et de  1:~ bonne conservation des marchandises qui seront 
d&posdes d:ms les magasins des bureaux de la Douane. En 
cons&qucnce, le Gouvernement Persan s'engage A faire con- 
struire, aussitdl clue possible et  en tout cas pas plus tard 
qile cc l :~  est  indiquc! ci-dessous dans la clause a de cet article, 
d:ms les bure:iux dCsign8s A cet effet par un rbglernent prkvu 
ci-aprbs, des nlagasins dGment cldtur&s et  assez vastes pour 
y assurer l 'emn~agasinage des quantitks d e  inarchandises 
habituellement importkes ; dans tous les autres bureaux il 
devra Gtre t5tabli des installations convenables en rapport 
avec lcs besoins du trafic de passage. I,es commerqants 
russes jouiront, dans les conditions fixkes par le m&me rkgle- 
ment, d u  droit d'entrepbt pendant douze mois A dater du 
jour d e  l'arrivke des marchandises sans payer aucuils droits 
ni taxes pour la mise en  entrepbt. 
U n  rGglernent gCnbral, arr&t& par !'Administration des 
Dounlles dlaccord avec la Lkgation de Russie h TCbCran, 
fixera avant la rnisc en vigueur de la prksente convention : 
a)  la classification des b~lreaux de douane et leurs attribu- 
tions, tes points des frontibres de  terre et  de  mer e t  les 
chemins ouverts pour I'importation e t  IJexportation des mar- 
chandises, ainsi que l'organisation des magasills des bureaux 
de la Douane et  la fixation des ternles illdiquant l'inaugura- 
tion des  op&rations de  ces bureaux e t  magasins ; 
)3) les formalit&s h observer par le commerce pour I'im- 
portation et l'exportation des marchandises ; 
c) le regime de llentrcpbt applicable aux rnarchandises 
russes pe~ldant  douze mois partir d e  leur arrivke dans un 
des bureaux ouverts B ce traiic ; 
d) les payements 21 imposer au  commerce pour le skjour 
des marchandises dans les magasins de la douane ou Pour 
tous autres services rendus par la douane aux comnlerFa1lts ; 
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e) la procedure douanibre concernant la ~Crification des 
marchandises frappCes de droits spkcifiques et l'kvaluation 
de celles irnposkes ad vaZolsenz, ainsi que les amendes appli- 
cables au  cas de fraude ou de violation des formalitks et 
rkgles Btablies. 
Pour ce qui concerne la procCdure douanikre applicable 
aux marchandises 2 i  llentrCe ou A la sortie du territoire russe, 
les s ~ ~ j e t s  persans seront soumis aux lois CdictCes ou Cdicter 
par  I'Empire, sans que les dispositio~~s de celles-ci puissent 
de quelque maniCre que ce soit consacrer A. l'egard du com- 
inerce des sujets persans des dispositions mains favorables 
clue celles qui sont applicables aux cornmerqants des pays 
jouissant du traitement de la  nation la plus favorisee. 
ARTICLE V1.-L'acquittement des droits d'entrhe en Russie 
d'aprbs le tarif B annex& A. la prksente Dhclaration sera 
effectuk en monnaies admises pour Ie paye~nent des taxes 
douanibres dans tout l'Ernpire, calcul6 sur  la basc du poud 
Cquivalant A 40 livres russes, A 16,38 ltilogrammes franqais, 
A 5,s batmans de Tauris de 640 miskals persans. Pour 
l'application des tarifs A e t  C le batman persan dit de Tauris 
sera calculC A. 640 misltals persans Bquivalant B 7'27 livres 
russes et A 2,g7 kilogralnmes franqais, et les IOO lcrans 
persans seront calculCs B 18 roubles russes ou 48 francs 
franqais en rnonnaie d'or. 
Dans le cas oh le change du kran par rapport au rouble 
russe viendrait & baisser de  plus de 10% et s e  maintiendrait 
tel plus d'un rnois, le Gouvernement Persan aurait la facultk, 
aprks la constatation du fait par les principales banques et 
notification prkalable A LBgation Imperiale de  Russie, de 
hausser proportionnelleinent les taux des droits spCcifiques 
inscrits dans les tarifs A et C. La  notification relativement 
A 1'ClCvation des droits devra &re faite par le Gouvernement 
Persan A la LCgation de Russie A TChCran au moins deux 
semaines avant que cette Clkvation soit appliquBe. 
Pour le cas d'une hausse dans le cours du kran dkpassant 
10% et se  maintenant tel durant plus d'un mois, I'initiative 
de l'abaisserncnt proportionnel des tarifs A et C appartien- 
drait  au  Gouvernement Imperial de Russie et Ie Gouverne- 
ment Persan serait tenu d'accorder le dit abaissement. 
ARTICLE VI1.-Le Gouvernement Persan s'engage A. appli- 
quer ti toutes les frontikres du Royaume les dispositions de 
la prksente DCclarz 
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la ~rdsel l te  DCclaration ainsi que les tarifs A et C avec les 
modificatiolls prCvues par I'article VI. 
La ~ r d s e n t e  DCclaration, dont, en cas dc contestation, 
le texte [ ranpis  pr&vauclra, sera ratifiCe et les ratifications 
en seront Cchal1g6es ?i TQhCran, aprks quoi elle sera pro- 
mulguke par les deux I-Iauts Gouvernements et entrera en 
viguenr B la date qui sera fixCe d'un cornmull accord le jour 
de 1'Cchange des ratifications. 
Fait double, en franyais et  en persan, le z;r octobre de I'an 
1901, el: le 26 Redjeb 1319 de l'HCgire, it TBhdran. 
(sign&) Argyropoulo (L. S.) (sign&) Atabek-Azam (L. S.). 
(sign&) Goloubew (L. S.) (signd) Mouchir-oud- 
Dovleh (L.S. J. 
(sign6) Naus (L.S.). 
The three tariffs A ,  B, and C annexed to this Convention 
bear the same date. 
PROTOCOLE. 
Nous soussignr5s nous ktant rkunis ce sanledi le 13 ddcem- 
brc 1902 (le r a  Ra~nazan 1320) avons procddk k l'dchange 
des exelnplaires de In D6claration, sign6e h TBh&ran le 
27 oct-obre/g novea~bre 1901 (le 26 Redjeb 1319 de 1'HCgire) 
ratifike par Leurs Majestes 1'Empereur de Russie et le Schah 
de Perse et  avons, confo~mCment- aux dispositions prdvues 
par l'art. VII de la dite DBclaration, fix6 la date du 1/14 
f&vrier 1903 pour son entree cn vigueur. 
En foi de quoi le present protocole a 6tk dressk en deux 
exernplaires et s i g n &  par nous. 
(sign&) Atabek-Azam. (sign&) P. Wlassow, 
(L. S.) 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
RUSSIA WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTEGRITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF PERSIA. 1834-1888. 
I n  1834, on the  occasio~~ of the notnination by the Shah of 
Persia of Mahommed h/Ierza as his successor, an ''Under- 
standing" was come to between the British and Russian 
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Governments to respect the Integrity and Independence of 
Persia. No formal Treaty has been concluded on the subject, 
but this understanding has since been coilfirmed on several 
occasions, the last occasior~ being on the 12th of March, 
1888. It  was first recorded in a despatch addressed by 
Viscount Palmerston to H.M.'s Ambassador a t  St. Peters- 
burg on the 5th September, 1834. 
The following is a copy of that Despatch :- 
Viscount Palmerston to Mr. BZ&lz. 
Forekrz Ojice, Se$tenzBer stlz, 1834. 
IN acknowledging the receipt of your despatch of the 6th 
August [respecting the Affairs of Persia and Afghanistan], 
I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of ex- 
pressing to the Russian Government the satisfaction of 
His Majesty's Governinent a t  the decision which has been 
taken by the Shall of Persia to nominate Mahommed Merza 
as the successor to his throne ; an event which, it is to be 
hoped, will avert the danger of civil war in Persia on the 
next demise of the Crown; and you will also say that His 
Majesty's Government are gratified to find that the Govern- 
ments of Great Britain and Russia are acting, with regard 
to the affairs of Persia, in the same spirit, and are equally 
animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the 
internal tranquillity, but also the Independence and Integrity 
of Persia. 
His Majesty's Government will, a t  all times, find a real 
pleasurc in CO-operating wit11 that of Russia for such 
purposes ; and instructions havc been sent to the British 
Resident a t  Tehran to communicate confidentially with the 
Russian Representative, in f~~rtherance of the common views 
of the two Governments. 
In November, 1838, Russia alluded to the "happy agree- 
ment of views and actions " which the two Governments had 
so much a t  heart to form in 1834, and a copy of the fore- 
going despatch, written by Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bligh 
in September, 1834, was forwarded from St. Petersburg to 
the Russian Ambassador in London, in order that he migl~t  
show it to Lord Palmerston, with a n  assurance that the 
same desire which then influenced the Russian Government 
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to have a friendly understallding with Englalld upon the 
affairs of Persia still existed, and a n  expression of regret 
upon thc part of Russia that the good understanding 
had existed between the Court of London and that of Tehran 
was disturbed for the time. 
Lord Palinerston expressed his entire satisfaction at re- 
ceiving this declaration that the Russian policy with regard 
to Persia remained unchanged, and that it was the same 
w l~ i c l~  the two Powers had agreed to adopt in 1834. 
The following are extracts from the correspondence which 
passed in 1838 :- 
COTLII~ Nmel7,o~le to Count Poiwo di Burg~.-(Conzmz~nicated 
.4v Count Pomo di Borga, Novenzber I I.) 
 ransl slat ion.) 
(~x t r ac t , )  St. Pclemb1~rg/~, October 20 (November I), 1838. 
IT will not be without advantage, M. le Comte, to place 
again before Lord Palmerston a t  the present time the 
despatch, which a t  that period he addressed to the Minister 
of England a t  St. Petersburgh, and which the latter was then 
directed to coinmunicate to us. 
Your Excellency will find a copy of it annexed. With 
this document in your hand, you will have the goodness, 
M. I'Arnbassadeur, to make lrnown to Lord Palmerston that 
the same sentiments which guided us in 1834, and which 
led us a t  the time to desire a friendly understanding with 
England upon the affairs of Persia, are now also the motive 
of the present step, and inspire us with the full confidence of 
seeing it lead to results fully as satisfactory as that which 
preceded it. 
Assuredly, it will rest with that Government alone to 
re-establish between the Missioils of Russia and of Great 
Britain a t  Tehran that happy agreement of views and of 
actions which we had so much at heart to form in 1834, and 
which had a t  that time been attended with coilsequences so 
beneficial for thc consolidation of the internal tranquillity of 
the Persian Monarchy." 
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ViScoz~7zt Palmerstou to Count Posso di Borgo. 
(Extract.) Forezg?~ Ofice, Decelnber 20, 1838. 
THE despatch from Connt Nesselrode which your Ex- 
cellency has communicated to me contains upon these points 
assurances the most full and complete; and Her Majesty's 
Government accept as entirely satisfactory the declarations 
of the Imperial Cabinet that it does not harbour any designs 
hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India; that its 
own policy with respect to Persia remains unchanged, and 
is the same which in 1834 the two Powers agreed to adopt. 
The understanding of 1834 was again alluded to in the 
foIlowing Russian despatch written in January, 1839 :- 
C O U ~ L ~  NesseZrode to Cozrnt Porno dz' z'orgo.-(Comnzz~nicated 
by Cozrf~t Po.zm di Borgo, Febrz~ary 25 . )  
(Translation.) 
(Extract.) St. Petersburgh, J~n7zuary 29, 1839. 
THE Government of Her Britannic Majesty has received 
from us the formal assurance that i t  in no wise enters into 
the views of our Cabinet to desire to direct the slightest 
hostile combination against the security of the English 
possessions in India ; and that, far from that, our policy, 
in respect to Persia, has invariably remained the same as 
it was in 1834, a t  the time when a perfect understanding 
was so happily established on this matter between Russia 
and England. 
In return for this clear and precise declaration, we con- 
sider that, on our part, we may rely upon the intention and 
upon the desire which the British Cabinet has, on its part, 
expressed, to  the effect of replacing the order of things in 
Persia on its ancient footing, by re-establishing its relations 
of friendship and good understanding with that country. 
These despatches were laid before Parliament in 1839, 
with other papers relating to the affairs of Persia and 
Afghanistan, and the passages quoted above are to be found 
a t  pages 3, 191, and 192. 
In June, 1873, the Persian Government inquired what 
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r e s p e ~ t i ~ ~ g  the maintenallce of the integrity of Persia, when 
;t was informed of what had passed in 1834 and 1838 in a 
llote which was addressed by Earl Granville to the Sadr 
Azem, of which the following is a copy :- 
Foye&p Oflce, July 2, 1873. 
YOUR Highness, in your letter of the 30th June, has 
expressed R wish to be made acquainted officiallJ, with what 
may have passed between Great Britain and Russia in regard 
to the maintenance of the integrity of Persia. I have the 
honour, in reply, to state to your Highness that, although 
no formal Treaty or agreement exists by which the two 
countries inutually agree to  respect the integrity of Persia, 
yet that, in the, year 1834, an understanding was arrived at  
between the two Governments on the occasion of the nomi- 
nation of Mahonled Meerza a s  successor to the Throne of 
Persia. Tha t  understanding was based on the sincere desire 
of the two Governments to  maintain, not only the internal 
tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia; 
and in the year 1838 Count Nesselrode adverted to the 
agreement entered into by the two Governments as still 
subsisting in full force, a s  it was also aclrnowledged to do 
by I-Ier Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
Her Majesty's Government, as they recognise for thern- 
selves the principles which guided the general policy of Great 
Britain and Russia in favour of the independence and in- 
tegrity of Persia in the year 1834, have reason to believe, 
from information which they have received from Lord Loftus, 
Her Majesty's Ambassador a t  St. Petersburgh, that the 
Russian Government refer with satisfaction to the mutual 
assurances which were made on this subject in 1834 and 
1838. Her Majesty's Governlnellt coilsider that the best 
mode of confirming both Powers in those sentiments is, that 
Persia, while steadily maintaining her rights as an illdepen- 
dent Power, sl~ould studiously fulfil in all respects her Treaty 
engagemellts with each, and s o  insure the continuance of 
the frielldsllip which both Powers, ever1 for their own 
interests, sl1ould desire to maintain with her. 
Count Brunnow was also told of the communication which 
had been made to  the Persian Government, a t  which he 
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expressed his satisfaction, a s  wiH be seen ii-otn the following 
extract from a despatch addressed by Earl Granville to  Her  
Majesty's Ambassador at St.  Petersburg on the 10th July, 
1873 :- 
Zarl GmnvilZe to Lord A. Lofilrs. 
(Extract.) 3oreipz Oflce, JZL@ 10, 1873. 
I ALSO informed Count de  Bruntlow, as  he had broached 
the subject of the Shah's visit, that the Persians had in- 
quired as to the nature of the engagemetlts which subsisted 
between Great Britain and Russia as  to the  integrity of the 
Persian territory, and that I had told the Grand Vizier that,  
although no formal Treaty or agreement existed by which 
the two countries mutually agreed to respect the  illtegrity 
of Persia, yet that in the year 1834 an understanding was 
arrived at between the two Governine~lts on the occasion 
of the nomination of Mahonled Meerza a s  successor t o  the 
Throne of Persia; that that uilderstaudiilg was based on 
the sincere desire of the two Governments to maintain, not 
only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and 
integrity of Persia; that in the year 1838 Count Nesselrode 
adverted to the  agreement entered into by the two Govern- 
ments as still subsisting in full farce, as it was also acknow- 
ledged to do by Her Majesty's Secrctary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and that Her Majesty's Government, a s  they recog- 
nized for themselves the principles which guided the general 
policy of Great Britain and Russia in favour of the inde- 
pendence and integrity of Persia in the year 1834, had 
reason to believe, from information wliich they had received 
from Lord A. Loftus, Her  Majesty's Ambassador a t  
St .  Petersburgh, that the Russian Government referred with 
satisfaction to  the mutual assurances which were made on 
this subject in 1834 and in 1838; and that I-Ier Majesty's 
Government considered that the best mode of confirming 
both Powers in those sentiments was that Persia, while 
steadiIy maintaining her rights as an independe~lt Power, 
should studiously fulfil in all respects her Treaty engage- 
ments with each, and so insure the continuance of the 
friendship which both Powers, even for their own interests, 
should desire t o  maintain with her. 
Count de Brunnow expressed satisfaction. 
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O n  the  23rd December, 1874, M. de Westmanil, the 
Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, again assured 
Her  Majesty's Ambassador a t  St. Petersburg that he fully 
admitted the  existence, at that  time, of the uilderstallding 
a t  in 1834 and 1838. 
T h e  engagements entered into between Great Britain and 
Russia to respect and promote the integrity and independ- 
ence of Persia were renewed and confirmed in 1888 by an 
exchange of Notes, from which the following are extracts :- 
The Marqzcis of Snlisbzbry to Sir R. Morykr. 
(Extract.) Forc&gz Ofice, Februnry 2 I ,  1888. 
T HAVE noticed in the extracts from the Russian press 
which you have forwarded to this ORice that there is a 
tendency t o  at tach importance to Sir H. Drummond Wolff's 
appointment as Her Majesty's Minister at  Tehran, and to 
loolc upon i t  as evidence of an endeavour on the part of 
Her  Majesty's Government to obtain predominant influence 
in Persia, to the  detriment of Russia. 
H e  [Sir 1-3. Wolff] will be authorised to give the Shah 
the  strongest  assurallces of the continued desire of Her 
Majesty's Government to respect and promote the integrity 
alid iiidepel~dence of Persia, and it would be satisfactory if 
h e  could b e  enabled to  state that Her Majesty's Government 
had ascertained, by an exchange of views with that of 
Russia, t ha t  t h e  agreement arrived at  on this subject in 1834 
and  1838, and  renewed by mutual assurances on several 
subsequent occasions, remaius in full force. 
T h e  reply of the Russian Government is recorded in the 
following despatch :- 
The Marqlcis of Sal2bu.q to Sir R. Morier. 
in independent Power, j 
ts hcr Treaty engage- 1 (Extract.) .Foyeig,z O$ce, March 12, 1888. 
le continualice of the M. DE STAAL called here this afternoon and read to me 
b r  their own interests, a despatch from M. de Giers. His Excellency was not 
1 t o  leave a copy of it. The despatch was written 
action. 1 i n  very friendly terms. 
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After briefiy recapitulating the interview which he  had 
with your Excellency, and in which he had stated that he 
would convey through M. de Staal the definite conclusions 
of the Russia11 Government on the several points touched on 
in the despatch, M. de Giers went on to mention and discuss 
those points. 
In the first place, as regards our  desire for a n  assurance 
that the engagement between the two Governlnents to 
respect and promote the integrity and illdependence of 
Persia is considered by the Russian Government as  remain- 
ing in full force, M. de Giers states that, although, in their 
opinion, there are no present grounds fox- apprehending any 
danger to Persia, and although they have received no  com- 
munication on the subject from Tehran, yet the Russian 
Goverrzment have no  objection to placing again on record 
that their views on this point are  in no way altered. The 
Persian Government, his Excellency adds, have on more 
than one occasion had tangible proof of this ; and he alludes 
to a military demonstration made a t  the request of the Shah 
in  1880 on the Caucasian frontier, when a portion of the 
Province of AzerbaYdjan was suffering from the illcursions of 
bands of Icurds. . . . 
I have expressed to M. de Staal, and I request your 
Excellency to offer M. de Giers, my best thanks for this 
franlr and courteous communication of the views of the 
Russian Government. I t  has been highly satisfactory to 
Her Majesty's Govern~nent to learn that those views a r e  so 
much in accordance with their own;  and they owe their 
aclrnowledgments to 14. de Giers for enabling Sir H. D. 
Wolff to inaugnrate his mission by an  assurance to  the 
Shah that the engagements between Great Britain and 
Russia to respect and promote the  integrity and independ- 
ence of the Persian kingdom have again been renewed and 
confirmed. 
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AR'I'ICLE XVIII. 01: TIIE COMMERCIAL TREATY 
Ilr.:TwoEs C;ICIIMANY .\Nn I'EIZSIA. SIGNED AT 
13EIE1,IN ON JUNE GTa, 1873, IW PRINCE BISMARCK 
n m  ~ I I H Z A  I.IUSSISIN KIIAN. 
An*r+rc.r-r: 13.  --ICn CilS cle gilerrc dc l'une des puissances 
con1r:lct:lntcx :ivcc uric ailh,c puisstlnce, il nc sera portk, 
pour cc:ttu heulc c;~usc,  attcintc, prtijudicc ou :~lt&ration h la 
bonl~c inL~:lli~,.ctn~:i: c t  h l'nniitid sincbrc qui doivcnt existcr h 
ji111i:lis ol~trc! ](AS h:\utc:s p:irtics oontraclnntes. Pour Ic cas oil 
la I'crsc: st:r:~it ilnplicl~r4c dnns un diffbrcnd avcc uue autre 
pi~issancu, ltb gouvcrni:mcnt imp6ri:tl allemand sc d&clare pr&t 
h crnploycr, su1. 13 tlem:l~iclc du gouverncmcnt dc S. M. I. le 
Sl~illl, scs t~olis  onices poilr c o ~ ~ t r i b i ~ e r  ii iiplanir Ic diffdrend. 
IIUSSO-liI~IISIhN TRIIIIB STATISTICS, TABLE SIIOW- 
IXG (;I~AI)UAI. ~cl t l : . \ s~ OF  USSO SO - PERSIAN TRADE 
I->~JKINC; THI: LAST I'\VIINTY \ 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  TOGBTI-IER WIT11 
R \ l ~ c n , i ~ ~ s  I:nK EACH I~BCADE.  
Rtrssiclta int#or.fs f).om Persia. 
Itoublcs. 
. . ro1800,wo 
. . 9,800,000 
, . rI,~00,000 
T l~c  average value of the Russia11 paper rouble in 1890 
was zs, ~ ~ r i ,  I t  fell i n  1891 to as, rd., and i n  1892 to 2s. I t  
rose :ig:iin in 1893 to  as. r r J , ,  and since M. Witte took the 
first steps to cst:iblish a gold currctlcy in 1894 it h a s  varied 
very little. In oflicial c:~lct~lations 947  roubles are now 
titkc11 rcgirlarly as cquiil to  thc pound sterling. 
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The followi~lg tables of Russian trade wit11 Persia in 1900 
have been coinpiled from the best available sources. No 
.later statistics giving details of imports and exports have 
yet  been published. 
Rzrssina e.z$orts t o  Persin. Russia7r i?irfiorlsfror?z Persia. 
Roubles. Roubles. 
W h e a t  . . . 8g,ooo Grain . . . 11g,o00 
Barley . . . 81,000 Wheat . . . 53,000 
Wlieaten flour . . 1,064,000 Rice . . . 1,480,000 
Salt ,  refined , . 51,ooo Fresh fruits . . 30,000 
S u g a r  , . . 8,784,000 Oranges and lemons . 128,000 
T e a  . . 477,000 Blaclc plums . . 29,000 
Vodlca . , . 30,000 Dried fruits . . 4,045,000 
Hemp yarn . . ~o,ooo Nuls . , . 1,601,000 
R a w  sillc . , . ~g,ooo Cut tobacco . . 26,000 
Silk yarn . . . 25,ooo Hydrome1 (mead) . 40,000 
Cotton yarn . . 8,000 Butter . . . 27,000 
I ron . . 201,ooo Pickled fish and caviare 299,000 
Steel . . . 41,000 Salt  fish . , . 666,000 
Crude naphtha . , 56,000 Domestic cattle . . 313,000 
Kerosene . , . 485,000 Hides, leather, a n d  slcins 1,382,000 
Naphtha residue . . 23,000 Timber , . . 347,000 
Colours and coloi~ring Peat and charcoal . I 14,000 
matters . . . 31,000 Colours and colouring 
Horses . . . 62,000 matters . . . 182,000 
China  . , , 30,000 Cotton, raw . . 4,592,000 
Pottery . . . 176,000 Silk, raw, and cocoo~ls 5g,o00 
Glassware . 408,000 Wool, uncombed . . 288,000 
Mirrors . . . 11,000 Cotton yarn . , 32,000 
Tinsel  wares . . 39,000 Cotton fabrics . . 420,000 
Copper ,, . . 156,000 Silk stuff and manufac- 
I ron  ,, . , 213,000 tures v . . 792,000 
Steel  ,, . . 6,000 Woollen materials, carpets g03,ooo 
Wooden ,, . . 92,000 
Pape r  . . . 95,000 
Ropes and cables . 27,ooo 
Linen, fine and coarse .  ~go,ooo 
Silk material . . 43,000 
Woollen ,, . . 20,000 
Cloth . . . 41,000 
Cotton fabrics . . 5,z75,000 
Stearine candles . 107,000 
Matchcs . . . 82,000 
Rbs. zo,64g,ooo Rbs, ao,qrg,ooo 
In the origi~la1 sources all above figures are given in 
thousands of roubles, so that the adding up  of the items 
does not always agree with the totals which are given in full. 
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It  will be lioticed that the principal cxport froln Russia to 
persia is sugar,  which has increased enormously of late 
years, owing chictly, of course, to the return of the excise 
duty (bounty) on exported sugar. 
Next collie cotton fabrics, upoil which the duty paid on the 
materials used in the lnanufacture of these goods, namely, 
011 the imported cotton and dyes for prints, is also returned 
to the exporters a t  rates from Rs. 4.65 to Rs. 6.40 per pood 
of 36 lbs. Russia herself grows only about a third of the 
cotton she  requires. 
Down to 1880 the overturn of Russo-Persian trade, that 
is to say, the exports and imports taken together, for many 
years did not arnoullt to nlore than five to six inillion roubles 
per annuin, whereas it now reaches about forty millionroubles. 
I t  is interesting to note that, besides the part which 
English techilical sliill, e~nployed so largely in the manage- 
ment oE nearly all Russian cottoll mills, has played in the 
developlnent of the export of Russian cotton goods to Persia, 
the largest English woollen and cloth mill in Russia, owned 
entirely by Englishmen, has now joined with a number of 
large Russian Arms in establishing a wholesale depBt for the 
sale of their nlallufrictures a t  Teheran. 
Thrce of the Russian transport companies of St. Peters- 
burg have arranged to co-operate in establishing agencies at 
the Persia11 ports and in the towns of the interior-at New 
Ardebin, Urmi, Morag, Teheran, Resht, Astara, Djulfa, and 
Tabriz. 
The chief Russo-Persian trade routes are- 
Trans-Caucasus : Shahtakhta-Djulfa-Tabriz. 
Caspian : Astara-Ardebil-Tabriz. 
,, Enzeli-Resht-Teheran. 
Trans-Caspian : ~shkabad-Dushalr-Mesbed-Subsivar. 
Last  year (1302) the new Russian road to Teheran from 
Resht on the Caspian was used to the extent of 3 , g 4 8 , 0 ~ ~  
foods of exporls to Persia and z,tiqr,ooo poods of imports 
fro111 I'crsia (63,677 tous and 42,612 L'~?LS respectively). The 
valuc of these goods is unfortunately not given. 
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CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE INDIAN GOVERN- required to  admit an E 
MENT AND THE AMEER OF AFGHANISTAN (1880- for convenience of ordi 
1883). two adjoining states, it 
Under instructions addressed to Lieut.-General Sir Donald 
merit a Mahornedan a 
Kabul .  
Stewart. Commandine the forces in Northern and Eastern . . - 
Afghanistan, by the Viceroy of India in Council (Lord Ripon) 
r 
on July zoth, r880, Mr. (afterwards Sir Lepel) Griffin com- - - 
n~unicated the following message to  the Anleer Abdurrahlnan 
Khan on his recognition by the Afghan Sirdars a t  1Cabul:- 
(After compliments.) 
I am commanded to convejr io  you the replies of the 
! Government of India to the questions you have aslced. 
' Ri~st,&, with regard to the position of the ruler of Kabul 
in relation to foreign powers. Since the British Government 
I admit no right of interference by foreign powers in Afghan- 
istan, and since both R ~ ~ s s i a  and Persia-,are -pjldge$ to 
abstain from all political interference with Afghan affairs, 
it is plain ihat  the Kabul ruler can have no political relations 
~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ n j ~ f o ~ r e i g n  power e-x~egthe English ; and if ally such 
foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, 
1 and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression 
on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be  pre- 
pared to  aid him, if necessary, to repel it, provided that  he  
follows the advice of the British Government in regard to his 
Second&, with regard to limits of territory, I am directed 
to say that the  whole province of Kandahar has been placed 
under a separate ruler, except Pishin and Sibi, which are 
retained in British possession. Consequently, the Govern- 
ment is not able to enter into any negotiations with you on 
these points, nor in respect to arrangements with regard 
448 
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to the north-west frontier, which were concluded with the 
ex-Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan. With these reservations 
the British Government are willing that you should establish 
over Afghanistan (including Elerat, the possession of which 
cannot be guaranteed to you, though Government are not 
disposed to hinder measures \vhicl~ you may take to obtain 
possessioil of it) as complete and extensive authority as  has 
hitherto been exercised by ally Amir of your family. The 
British Government desires to exercise no interference in 
the internal affairs of these territories, nor will you be . 
required to admit an English Resident anywhere ; althougli, 
for convenience of ordinary and friendly intercourse between 
two adjoining states, it may be advisable to station by agree- 
ment a Mahornedan agent of the British Government a t  
Kabul. 
The following correspondence took place in 1883 between 
the Viceroy of India (Lord Ripon) and the Ameer 
Abdurrahman :- 
The Vice7oy of Indilz to the A~izeer of Afghaszistan. I 
(After compliments.) Siml~z, June 16, I 883. 
Your Highness will remember that, at Sir Lepel Griffin's 
interview with you a t  Zimma on the 31st July, 1880, be said 
that the Government of India could only start your Adminis- 
tration by giving you a grant to pay your army and officials 
and your immediate expenses ; and that, having recognized 
you as Ameer, it was alixious to see you strong; but after 
yop had taken possession of Cabul, you must rely on your 
own resources. 
I have always interested myself so much in your Highness' 
success, and have felt so great a desire for the establishment 
of a strong and friendly Power under your Highness' auspiccs 
in Afghanistan, that I have on various occasions gone beyond 
the determination then conimunicated to you, and have from 
time to time aided your Highness with sums of money and 
arms, besides devoting some lalrhs a-year to the support of 
Afghan refugees atid detenus, whose presence in Afghanistan 
is, I understand, regarded by your Highness as  dangerous 
to your power. Still my view of the relations to  each other 
of the two countries has throughout been that, in matters of 
internal policy and finance, India should not scelr to interfere 
2 G 
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with Afghanistan, but  should confine herself to the par t  of a 
friendly neighbour and ally. On these conditions, i t  would 
be in accordance with the practice of nations that Afghanis- 
tan should regulate her own finance and bear her owl1 
burdens, a s  she has always done heretofore. 
As regards matters of external policy, your Highness was 
, informed in the conlmunication fro111 the Foreign Secretary 
to the Government of India, dated the 20th July, 1880, a n d  
again in my letter of the zznd February, 1883, that if any 
foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, 
and if such interference should lead to  unprovoked aggression 
on the dominions of your Highness, in that  event the British 
Governme~~t  would be prepared to aid you to  such extent and  
in such manner as might appear t o  the British Government 
necessary in repelling it ; provided tha t  your Highness follows 
unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard 
to your external relations. 
On consideration, however, of your accounts of the  con- 
dition of your north-west frontier, I have been satisfied that  
your Highness has to  contend with exceptional difficulties in 
that quarter. I have uilderstood that, owing to various un- 
toward circumstances, your Highness has not yet been able 
to reduce the  important frontier province of Herat t o  the  
orderly and secure condition so essential for the protection of 
Afghanistan a s  a whole ; and therefore that, for the settle- 
ment of the affairs of that frontier, some friendly assistance 
may be needful to you. I further observe, with satisfaction, 
your Highness' assurances of good faith and loyalty to  the  
British Government ; and your Highness' language convinces 
me that  you realize how much it is to the interest of Afghan- 
istan to maintain friendly relations with the Government of 
India. 
Impressed by  these considerations, I have determined to  
offer to your Highness p e r - a l l y ,  as an aid towards meeting 
the present difficulties in the management of your State, a 
sabsibyof  12 lalrhs of rupees a-year, payable monthly, to b e  
devoted to t h e  payment of your troops, and to the  other 
measures required for the defence of your north-western 
frontier. I feel that I may safely trust  t o  your Highness' 
good faith and  practised sltill to devote this addition t o  your 
resources to objects of such vital importance as  those which 
I have above mentioned. 
(Translation. j 
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I have announced the glad tidings of your Excellency's 
deternlinalion, which is calculated to conduce to the well- 
being of the British Government and of the people of 
~ f g h a n i s t a n ,  and to put in order and keep going my affairs 
to the people of Afghatlistal~ a t  large, who all offered up 
thanlrs, saying : " For many years we, the Afghan nation, 
have been suffering from innumerable calamities. Thanks 
be to God that a glorious Governmellt like this (British 
Government) has befriended us." 
God willing, the people of Afgllanistan will never allow 
their heads to swerve from the line of friendship to the 
illustrious British Government, and so  long as I live I will 
not thinlr of making friends with any one but with the illus- 
trious British Government. I have offered my prayers to 
God for the  (increased) glory of that powerf~~l  Government. 
THE AMEER'S SPEECH AT THE RAWAL PINDI DURBAR. 
In 1885 the Ameer and Lord Dufferin met a t  Rawal 
I'indi, when the Viceroy again coilfirmed all the assurances 
previously given to the  Ameer. At the great Durbar held on 
April 8 th  the Ameer Abdurrahman spoke as  follows :- 
" In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready with 
lny arms and people to render any services that may be 
required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British 
Govertlment has declared that it will assist me in repelliilg 
any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan 
should unite in Lhe firmest man~ler  and stand side by side 
with the British Government. " 
APPENDICES 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIS HIGHNESS AMIR ABDUR 
RAHMAN KHAN, G.C.S. I . ,  AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN 
AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, ON THE ONE PART, AND SIR 
HENRY MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., 
PART. 
Whereas certain cluestions have arisen regarding t h e  
frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas 
both his Iiighness the Amir and the Government of India 
a re  desirous of settling these questions by a friendly under- 
standing, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres 
of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference 
of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it 
is hereby agreed as follows :- 
(I.) The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness's 
dominions, from W a k l ~ a n  to the Persian border. shall follow 
the  line show11 in the map attached to this agreement. 
(2.) The Governinent of India will a t  no time exercise 
interference in the territories lying beyond this line on t h e  
side of Afghanistan, and his Highness the Amir will a t  no 
t ime exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this  
line on the side of India. 
(3.) The British Govern~nent thus agrees to his Highness 
t he  Amir retaining Asrnar and the valley above it, a s  f a r  
a s  Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, t h a t  
he  wili a t  no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or 
Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The 
British Government also agrees to leave to his Highness 
t h e  Bir~nal tract as show11 in the detailed map already given 
t o  his Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of 
t h e  Waziri country and Da~var.  Ii is Highness also re-  
linquishes his claiin to Chageh. 
(4.) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down i l l  detail  
and- -demarcated, wherever this may be practicable a n d  
desirable, by  Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, 
whose object will b e  to arrive by inGual understanding at 
a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible 
exactness t o  the line shown in the map attached t o  t h i s  
agreement, having due regard to the existing local r igh ts  
of villages adjoining the frontier. 
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(5.) Wit11 reference to the question of Chainan, the Anlir 
wilhdraws his objection to  the new British Calltonlnent alld 
concedes to the British Government the rights purchased 
by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. A t  this part of the 
frontier the line will be drawn as  follows :- 
From the crest of the Ichwaja Arnran range near the Psha 
Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run 
in such a direction a s  to leave Murgha Chamall and the 
Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and lo pass half-way 
betweell tlle New Chainan Fort and the Afghan outpost 
known locally a s  Lasblrar Dand. The  line will then 
pass half-way 1)etween the railway station a l ~ d  the hill 
lrnown a s  the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, 
will rejoin the IChwaja Arnran range, leaving the Gwasha 
Post  in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to 
the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. T h e  
British Government will not exercise any interference 
within half a mile of the road. 
(6.) T h e  above articles of agreement are  regarded by the 
Government of India and his Highness the  Amir of Afghani- 
stan a s  a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal 
differences of opinioil which have arisen between them in 
regard to the  frontier ; and both the Gover~~ment  of India 
and his Highness the Amir undertalte that  any differences 
of detail, such a s  those which will havc to be  considered 
hereafter by the  officers appointed to denlarcate the boundary 
line, shall be settled in n friendly spirit, s o  a s  t o  remove for 
the future a s  far a s  possible all causes of doubt and mis- a 
understanding between the  two Governments. 
(7.) Being f~illy satisfied of his Highness's goodwill to . 
the Urilish Government, and wishing t o  see  Afghanistan \. 
independent and strong, the Government of India will raise $ 
no objection to  the purchase and import by his Highness ,) 
of munitions of war, and they will thetnselves grant  him ; 
some help in lhis respect. Further, in order t o  mark their f 
sense of the friendly spirit in which his Highness the Arnir 
has entered into these negotiations, the Government of 
India ~mdertake to  incrcasc by the sun1 of six lalrhs of 
rupees a year Lhe subsidy of 12 lalrl~s no\v granted to his 
I-Iighness. 1-4. M. DURAND. 
AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN. 
Kabul, Novenlber 12, 1893. 
APPENDICES 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN TIIE BRITISH AND RUS- 
SIAN GOVERNMENTS RESPECTINGT~IE EXCLUSION 
OF AFGHANISTAN FROM THE RUSSIAN SPHERE OF 
INFLUENCE. 
In  view of the successive steps by which Russia has  
<luring the last half-century reduced the area of those 
"intermediate regions separating the British and Russian 
possessions in Central Asia," of which Couilt Nesselrode 
in 1838 affirmed the necessity of preserving the tranquillity 
and maintaining the independence ‘tin ordcr to  prevent t h e  
possibility of a conflict between two great Powers, who, t o  
remain friends, must avoid friction or collisioil in the heart  
of Asia," the British Government has from time to time 
elicited from the Russian Government a series of assurances 
that the  latter, whatever its action in other respects m a y  
have been, regards Afghanistan a s  entirely beyond its sphere 
of action. 
In  March, 1869, the Earl  of Clarendon, then Secretary of 
Sta te  for Foreign Affairs, informed the British Ambassador 
a t  St. Petersburg that having lately, and on more than one  
occasion, spoken to Baron Brunnow respecting Central Asia 
and the  rapid advance of Russian troops, he had received 
communication of a despatch addressed by the Russian 
Cha~lcellor, Prince Gortchalroff, to  the Russian Ambassador 
in London, containing the following declaration :-- 
You may repeat to H e r  Britannic Majesty's Principal 
Secretary of State  the positive assurance that His Imperial 
Majesty loolrs upon Afghanistan as completely outside t h e  
sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise 
her influence. No intervention or interference whatever, 
opposed to the indepei~dence of that State, enters into h i s  
intentions. 
I n  November of the same year Prince Gortchalroff infortvled 
the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, with respect to t h e  
inexpedieilcy of either English or Russian officers going t o  
Afghanistan, that he saw no objection whatever to English 
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officers visiting Kabul, though he agreed with Lord Mayo 
that Russian agents should not do so. 
In 1874, after the annexation of Ichiva to the Russian 
dominions, Earl  Granville wrote on January 7th as follows, 
to I-Ier Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburg, summing 
up the previous correspondence which had passed between 
the two  Governments :- 
LSn7.2 GmnviIZe to Lord A. Loftzzls. 
(Extract.)  fore@?^ O$ice, Jau. 7, 1874. 
I-Ier Majesty's Government see no practical advantage in 
examining too minutely how far these arrangements [between 
the Russian Government and the Khan of Ichiva] are in 
strict accordance with the assurances given to inc in January 
last by Count Schouvalow as to the intentions with which 
the expedition against Rhiva was undertalren. They are 
not disposed to share in the exaggerated apprehensions 
which have a t  times been expressed in this country as to the 
danger t o  British rule in India which may arise from the  
extension of Russian illfluence in Central Asia. 
At the same time each step of that progress renders it 
more desirable that  a clear an> franlt u&erstandillg should 
continue to exist between the two countries a s  to the relative 
position of British and Russian interests in Asia, and it is 
with that  object that  Her  Majesty's Govern~nent think it 
right on the  present occasion to  review the coinmu~lications 
which have passed 011 the subject, and the position of affairs 
as they s tand in respect of the f ~ ~ t ~ ~ r e .  I11 so  doing they are 
fulfilling the  wish expressed by Prince Gortchalrow, in con- 
versation with Sir A. Buchanan, 013 the 2nd of November, 
18Gg, when he  begged that  Lord Clarendon might be told 
that, " as both Governi~lents are free from all ar~z2~~e-$~e77sdes, 
ambitious views, or  unfriendly feelings towards each other, 
the more fully and frankly all questions conilected with 
Central Asia are discussed between them, the more effectually 
will the 'mis t s '  be blown away which, through the misre- 
presentations of over-zealous subordinate agents, may a t  
any time hang  over thcm." 
In the spring of 1869 Lord Clarendon, in several con- 
versations with Uaron Brunnow, drew attention to  the rapid 
progress of the Russian troops in Central Asia, and made 
a proposal for the " recogtlitioll of some territory as  neutral 
between the possessions of England and Russia, which 
should be the limit of those possessions, and which should 
be scrupulously respected by both Powers." 
Prince Gortchaltow, to whom Baron Brunnow had com- 
municated Lord Clarendon's suggestions, replied that " the 
idea of maintaining between the possessiotls of the two 
Empires in Asia a zone to preserve the111 from any coiltact" 
had always been shared by the Emperor, and he authorized 
Baron Brunnow to "repeat to Her Britanllic Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State the ~ o s i t i v e  assurance that His 
Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely out- 
side the sphere within which Russia may be called upon 
to exercise her influence. No intervention or interference 
whatever, opposed to the independence of that State, enters 
into his intentions." 
Her Majesty's Government gladly talte this opportunity 
of again acknowledging the frietldly and conciliatory spirit 
showll by the Imperial Government in the acceptance by 
thein of the views advanced on the part  of Great Britain, 
as to the frontier line of Afghanistan. Those views were 
stated, as you are aware, in m y  despatch to your Excellency 
of October 17, 1872, and the assent of the  Iinperial Govern- 
ment to the definition of the Afghan fronticr as therein laid 
down, will be  found in Prince Gortchaltow's despatches to 
Baron Brunnow, of December 7, 1872, and January 19, 1873. 
Such was the agreement arrived a t  between the two 
countries. 011 their part, Her  Majesty's Government may 
fairly claim that it has been faithfully executed to the full 
extent of their power. 
I t  is unnecessary to retrace the series of circumstances 
which, in spite of the  reluctance of the Russian Government, 
led to  the recent expedition against Ichiva. I n  the face of 
these events it would be unwise not to contemplate the 
possibility that considerations of self-defence, or the necessity 
of punishing acts of plunder and hostility, may eventually 
give occasion for a Russian expedition against the Turko- 
man tribes. 
In face OF the agreement which exists between the two 
countries, it is unnecessary for Her  Majesty's Government 
to make any profession of their conviction that Afghanistan 
is perfectIy secure from any hostile designs on the part  of 
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Russia. They thinlr it best, however, to bring the fears 
entertained by the Ameer to the  knowledge of the Russian 
Government, and to express their earnest hope that the 
question of any further expedition against the Turkoman 
tribes may be carefully considered, in conjunction with the 
results which the Ameer of Cabul apprehends may ensue 
from it. They thinlr it right to state candidly and at  once 
that  the independence of Afgl~anistan is regarded by them 
as a matter of great importance to the welfare and security 
of British India and to the tranquillity of Asia, 
Prince Gortchakoff replied on January 21st, 1874, to his 
Ambassador in London :-- 
Pvilzce Go~tc7zaX.o~~ to C O T L ? ~ ~  Brt~?tno~v (co~~t~~t~~~ticnte'ed o Ewl 
Gra7rville by Cozuzt Bil-u?~?to.iv, Feb. 17). 
(Extract.) St. Petersbirrg-, ]mi. 21. 
I have expiessed to the British Ambassador the entire 
satisfaction which we feel at the just view talren by Her 
Majesty's Government with regard to the questions which 
w e  are  called upon to treat together in Asia. 
In my opinion the understallding is complete. It rests 
not  only up011 the loyalty of the two Governments, but upon 
mutual political advantages which are palpably evident. So 
long a s  they shall be animated by a spirit of mutual good- 
will and co~lciliation, no political misunderstanding is to be 
apprehended between them. 
For  our part, we remain constantly faithful to the pro- 
gramtne traced by mutual agreement, as resulted from my 
interviews with Lord Clarendon and as developed and de- 
fined by the com~nunications between the two Cabinets. 
I have repeated to Lord A. Loftus the positive assurance 
tha t  the Imperial Cabinet continues to consider Afghanistan 
as entirely beyond its sphere of action. 
If on either side the two Governments exercise their 
ascendency over the States placed within the range of their 
natural  influence in order to deter them from all aggression, 
there  is reason to hope that no  violent collision will occur 
t o  disturb the repose of Central Asia and interfere with the 
work: of civilisation which it is the duty and the interest 
of the two great Empires to bring to a favourable issue. 
Be good enough to communicate these observations to 
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Lord Granville, and to repeat to his Excellency our con- 
viction that the two Governments have an equal interest 
in not allowing their good relations to be disturbed by the 
intrigues of Asiatic Khans, and that so long as they both 
ac t  together with a feeling of mutual confidence and good- 
will, the tranquillity of Central Asia will be sufficiently 
guaranteed against all eventualities. 
On January 28th, 1874, the British Ambassador a t  St. 
Petersburg reported to Lord Granville a further assurance 
given to him by the Russian Chancellor :- 
Lord A. Lofitl~s to 3 ~ ~ 7 %  Gralzuillc. 
(Extract.) St. Petersb7t..i.g, ~ J L .  I 9, I 874. 
As regards Afghanistan, his Highness repeated to  me that 
the Imperial Government considered that kingdoln to be 
beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen 
what might, in the internal state of that country the Imperial 
Government would not interfere. 
In 1876, after the occupation of IChokand by the Russians, 
Prince Gortchalroff instructed the Russian Ambassador to 
con~municate the following despatch to Her Majesty's Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs :- 
Prince Gortchnkow to Count Schlcvnlof (connnunicated to the 
Earl OX D ~ h y  by .COM?Z~ S C ~ U V L ~ ~ O ~ ,  Felr. 25, 1876). 
(Extract.) St. Petcrsbz~lyh, Febmaly &, 1876. 
HIS  Majesty the Emperor has learned with much interest 
the contents of the Memorandum accompanying a despatch 
from Lord Derby, which Lord A. Loftus read, in my absence, 
t o  the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
I inclose herewith a copy of this document, which is a 
reply to  the Memorandum dated the 11th May, 1875, which 
your Excellency was instructed to communicate to  the 
Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty 
regarding the relations of the two Governments in Central 
Asia. 
Our august Master has learnt with satisfaction the friendly 
desire, therein expressed, to prevent, by frank explanatiotls, 
any cause of misunderstanding between the two Cabinets. 
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His Majesty appreciates likewise the breadth of view with 
which Lorcl Derby puts on one side cliscussioos of detail and 
restrictions which are illapplicable in view of the ill-defined 
condition of the countries over which the two Governments 
have to  exercise their influence. 
Have the goodness to inform his Excellency, by order of 
our :~ugus t  Master, that we entirely agree in the concIusion 
that, while maintnining, on either side, the arrangement 
come to  3s regi~rds  the linlits of Afghanistan, which is to 
remain outsidc tllc sphere of Russian action, the two 
Cabinets should regard hs ter~ninated thc disc~~ssions relative 
to tlic interlnedi:itc zone, which llnve been recognized as 
unpractical ; that, while retaining entire frcedom of action, 
they should be guided by a mutual desire to pay due regard 
to their rcspcctivc interests and t~ccessities, by avoiding, as 
far a s  possible, ally immediate contact with each other, and 
ally collisiolls bctwecen the Asiatic States placed within the 
circle of their intluencc. 
W c  a r e  collvinccd that by lieeping to this principle, and 
cultivating feelings of equity and reciprocal goodwill, the 
two Cabinets will succeccl in consolidating the friendly 
relations so  happily established between them, for the 
advantage of the general pcace in Europe and Asia. 
Your Excellency can renew to Lord Derby the assurance 
that he may reckon on our frailli co-operation for this 
purpose. 
The attention of the Russian Goverllment having been 
callecl :it the  end of the same year to the correspondence 
exchanged between General ICaufmann and the Ameer of 
ICabul, the British Ambassador was able to transmit the 
following f ~ ~ r t l ~ c r  assurance from the Russian Government :- 
AT. [I(> GBrs Zo Lord A. Lof t / [~.  
The Imperial Government entircly share the opinion of 
the British Govcr~iment hat n frank nllcl cordial interchange 
of opinions on the questioll or  Central Asia cannot clo other- 
wise than contribute to the maintet~ance of the good and 
friendly relations a t  present establislled between Russia and 
Englancl. 
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With  this  view they felt ready to give, in the Notes of 
the  ~~~n~ and the December, to which your Excellency 
refers, t h e  assurance that  Russia had not endeavoured to 
conclude a n y  arrangement, commercial or political, with the 
Ameer of Cabul, and that the rare relations of our authorities 
in Central Asia with the latter had never borne any other 
character than that of pure courtesy, in conforinity with 
local usages  in the East. While now renewing these assur- 
ances, t h e  Imperial Government hope the British Govern- 
ment will recognize tha t  practically we have never swerved 
from them, whatever may have been the erroneous inter- 
pretations placed by the native Asiatic Goverilments on the 
coininu~~icatioils of General Kaufmann, and whatever false 
importance may have been attributed to  the method of 
transmission adopted by him. Misunderstandings on this 
subject were nearly inevitable, considering the uncertain 
character of the native populations of Central Asia, and 
their inveterate inclination t o  intrigue; the only effective 
way, i n  ou r  opinion, of meeting this danger, lies in  the good 
faith a n d  loyalty which, we are glad to think, will never 
cease t o  influence, on either side, any interchange of views 
between u s  and the British Cabinet. 
A Russian Mission, under General StolietoR, having been 
i~evertheless sent  to Kabul a t  the time of the Russo-Turkish 
War ,  when the relatioils between Great Britaiil and Russia 
were seriously strained, the Russiau Goverilment undertook 
to  withdraw it after the Congress of Berlin had removed 
all danger  of war. The following Notes were exchanged 
between the Russian Ambassador in London and Lord Salis- 
bury before Genera1 Stolietoff's final recall from Kabul:- 
C'OTLIG~ S C ~ T L W C X ~ O ~ ~  10 ~ J L C  Jlarqui.~ of Snlisbz~?y. 
hndor t ,  Decerher =$-, I 878. 
YOU have expressed surprise on learning that the Russian 
Mission, which you thought had left Cabul, was still there. 
You reminded me of the declaratiol~ made by M. de Giers to 
the British Cbargtl: dlAffaires concerni~ing thc provisioi~al 
character of this Mission, which was despatched under ex- 
ceptional circumstances, and at: a time when i t  was to be 
feared t ha t  war might break out  between England and 
Russia. 
I have received ; 
which he charges m 
between Russia an( 
t he  despatch of the 
in the correspondent 
two cabinets, are a 
' and whether they 
character. 
His Majesty the 
observe all the arrr 
ciuded between Ru: 
ately the Mission p 
IN reply to your 
to your Excellency t 
Mission a t  Cabul is 
understanding beta 
correspondence whk 
ject of Afghanistan 
Missioi~ is withdrav 
sider that all enga, 
those countries rEtc 
In 1882 the positil 
discussed in connec 
and Lord Granville i 
despatch to the Briti 
THE Russian An 
by appointment. I 
ported to  his Gover~ 
we had had on th 
Governments in Asii 
Prince Lobanow 
I had commenced 1: 
between Russia and 
it was desirable t 
AFGHANISTAN 
I the Notes or 
lour Excellency 
mdeavoured to 
liticai, with the 
our authorities 
orne any other 
onformity with ' 




nments on the 
whatever false 
le method of 
dings  on this 
the uncertain 
:ral Asia, and 
only effective 
:s in the good 
fr, will never 
.nge of views 
having been 
Lusso-Turlrish 




nd Lord Salis- 
I Rabu1:- 
wry. 
ley &, 1878. 
a t  the Russian 
vas still there. 
RI[. de Giers to 
le provisioilal 
hed under ex- 
it was to  be 
England and 
I have received a telegram from Prince Gortchacow, in 
which he charges me to ask you whether the arrangements 
between Russia and England, such as  they existed before 
the despatch of the Mission, and such as they are recorded 
in the corresponde~lce exchanged on this subject between the 
two Cabinets, are maintained by Her  Majesty's Government, 
'and whether they retain in their eyes their obligatory 
character. 
His Majesty the Emperor is disposed, on his part, to 
observe all the arrangements relative to Central Asia con- 
cluded between Russia and Eugland, and to recall immedi- 
ately the Mission which is a t  Cabul. 
The ~l/ln~qzris oJ Salisbt~ry to Coultt Sc/~uvalo$; 
Porei,o-u Ofice, Decenzher 19, 1878. 
IN reply to your letter of this day's date, I have to state 
to your Excellency that the continued presence of the Russian 
Mission a t  Cabul is the sole obstacle to a Cull revival of the 
uilderstanding between the two Powers expressed in the 
correspondence which has passed between them upoil the sub- 
ject of Afghanistan and Central Asia ; and when the Russian 
Mission is withdrawn, Her RIajesty's Government will con- 
sider that all eilgagen~eilts on both sides with respect to 
those countries retain their obligatory character. 
In 1882 the position of the two countries in Asia was again 
discussed in conilection with the Russian advance to Merv, 
and Lord Grailville addressed on February zznd the followi~lg 
despatch to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg :- 
Earl GmnvilZe to S ~ Y  E. TIzo~~zton. 
Foreig~z Oflce, &7ebrua~y 22,  1882. 
THE Russian Ainbassador called upon me this after110011 
by appoiiltment. His Excellency told me that he had re- 
ported to  his Government the substailce of the conversatioil 
we had had on the 2nd instant on the policy of the two 
Governments in Asia, as reported in iny despatch of that date. 
Prince Lobanow said that he had told his Government that 
I had coinmenced by stating that the present good relations 
between Russia and England offered a n  opportunity, of which 
it was desirable to take advantage, for coming to some 
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further understandir~g a s  to the positio~l of the two cou~~t r ies  
in Central Asia ; that he  had thereupon suggested a renewal 
of the agreement formerly inade with Prince Gortchacow by 
Lord Claretldon and m e ;  that to this I had replied tha t  I 
looked upon that  agreemelit a s  still existing in full force, but  
tha t  it left certain matters undecided which it would be well 
definitely to settle;  and that I had finished by proposing a 
delimitation of the Persian frontier from Baba-Durmaz to  a 
point in the neighbourhood of the Heri-Rud. 
He had now received the reply of his Government. They 
aclrnowledged the contir~ued validity of the agreement 
formerly entered into by Prince Gortchacow, by which 
Afghanistan was admitted to  be beyond the sphere of 
Russian influence. That  agreenlent was, however, as I had 
said, inco~nplete ; and they were ready to supplement it by a 
settlement of the frontier of Afghanistan, from the point 
where it had been left undefined as  far as Sarakhs. 
I11 1883 the followiilg correspondence tool< place :- 
BarZ GmwuiZZe to &i. J. G. Kennedy. 
Foreign O p e ,  October 2 ,  1883. 
A REPORT has reached Her  Majesty's Governmeilt of an 
intended visit of a Russian to Cabul bearing a letter from the 
Emperor of Russia to the Ameer. 
Sucll a proceeding on the part of the Russian Government 
would be inco~lsistenl with the assurances which they have 
given to  Her Majesty's Government from time to time on the 
subject of Afghanistan. 
I have to  instruct you to inquire a s  to the truth of this 
report, and to  inform me of the result by telegraph. 
Mr. J. G. I<e~t?zedy t o  Earl GranviZZe. 
St. Petersburgh, October 3, 1883. 
I WAVE the honour to state that on receipt to-day of 
your Lordship's telegram of the 2nd instant I immediately 
waited on M. de  Giers a t  the Foreign Department, and in- 
quired of his Excellency whether there was any truth in a 
report which had reached Her  Majesty's Government tha t  
a Russian intended to g o  to Cabul, furnished with a letter to 
the Ameer from the Emperor. 
M. de  Giers a t  once replied that such an event was irn- 
possible. Thl 
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possible. The Einperor was most unliltely to give ally letter 
addressed to  the Ameer to  ally one. No such letter could 
be written without M. de Gier's knowledge, and he could 
positively and solemnly assure me that  no such letter had 
been written by His Imperial Majesty. 
M, de Giers further states that so anxious were the 
Ernpcror and hilllsclf to avoid all suspicion of Russian 
con~n~unication with Afghanistan that strict orders had been 
sent to  the  Goveruor-General of Turltestall to desist from 
the tr~~nstnission of letters of ceremolly or even of letters of 
recornmendation 1:o the Ameer in favour of travellers. In 
fact, all possible steps were talcell to  prevent illtercourse 
between Iiussin aild Afghanistan, which latter country was 
considered to he in England's " orbit." 
In reply to a suggestion of mine, M. de Giers stated that  
no such letter could have been written during the Moscorv 
Coronation festivities, a t  which period the Emperor had been 
nlost guarded in all his dealings with the various Asiatic 
potcntates there assembled. 
M. de  Giers also promised to inform me a t  once whenever 
any intention existed of such an improbable event as the 
transmission of a lettcr from His Imperial Majesty to  the 
Ruler of Afghanistan. 
In  1884, in view of inquiries made by the British Govern- 
mellt :IS to the  reported despatch of a liussian Agent to 
Meimeneh, within the frontiers of Afghanistan, M. de Giers 
communicated on April 3 to the British Ambassador at: 
St. Petersburg a Memorandum on the situation in the Merv 
region, containing the following passage :- 
The Imperial Ministry can, on the other hand, state that 
no agent has been sent to  Meimeneh. According to  the 
terms of the arrailgeineilt come to between the two Powers, 
Mcimeneh is included in the country of the Ameer of Afghani- 
stan,  :ind the Government of His Majesty the Enlperor is 
resolved to scrupulously respect, as it has done in times 
past, all thc cngagcments it contracted in virtue OF the 
arrangement in question. 
In 1885 further disquieting reports having arisen with 
regard t o  the proceediligs of the Russialls on the Afghan 
frontier, the following Memorandum was comnlunicated by 
the Russian Foreign Ofice to the British Ambassador a t  
St. Petersburg :- 
T H E  Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs has talcen note 
of the Memorandum which was trailsmitted by the English 
Ambassador on the 16th instant, and which contains the 
expression of the wish of Her Majesty's Government that  
the agitation raised in the two countries by the rumours 
about the preparations said to be in progress on both sides 
should cease. 
The same Me l l l~ r a i~du~n  states that, unless circumstances 
arise over which they have no control, and which might 
bring about sudden changes, the two Governments are in 
a position which would allow them to arrive a t  an arrange- 
ment satisfactory and ho~lourable for Russia, the Ameer of 
Afghanistan, and England. 
The Imperial Cabinet callnot do less than join in this 
desire of Her Majesty's Government. They have never 
cherished, nor do they cherish, aggressive views on Ilerat 
or any other part of the Ameer's possessions, and they only 
aim a t  contributing to the establishment of peace and security 
there. Resolved as  they are to respect scrupulously the 
rights of Great Britain, a s  well as  those of the Atneer, the 
Imperial Cabinet hope that Her Majesty's Government will 
display the same regard for the rights of Russia, and they 
are coi~vinced that the two Governments will thas succeed 
in avoiding everything which might interfere with a satis- 
factory solution of the question now under negotiation. 
St. Peters6z~vgh, lllnrclz r 8, I 885. 
In spite of the Penjdeh incident. the delilnitatio~l of the 
Russo-Afghan frontier was carried out in complete agree- 
ment betweell the British and Russian Governments in 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS GREAT 
BRITAIN AND RUSSIA WITH REGARD TO THE SPHERES 
OF 1NFLUENCE OF THE T W O  COUNTRIES IN 
OR THE PAMIRS, EMBODIED IN AN EXCHANGE 
O F  NOTES BETWEEN TIIE EARL OF ~(IMBERLEY AN,) 
M- DE STAAL. (LONDON, MARCH IITH, 1895.) 
As a res~l l t  of the negotiatioils which have taken place 
between our  two Governments in regard to the spheres of 
influence of Great Britain and Russia in the coulltry to the 
east of Lake Victoria (Zoc I<oul), the followi~lg points have 
been agreed upon between us :- 
I. The  spheres of influellce of Great Britaill and Russia 
to the east  of Lake Victoria (Zor ICoul) shall be divided by 
a line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its 
eastern extremity, shall follow the crests of the mountain 
range running somewllat to the soutll of the latitude of the 
lake as  far a s  the Benderslry and Orta-Be1 Passes. 
From thence the line shall run along the same range while 
it remains t o  the south of the latitude of the said lake. 
On reaching that latitude it shall descend a spur of the 
range towards ICizil Rabat on the Alcsu River, if that 
locality is found not to be north of the latitude of Lake 
Victoria, and from thence i t  shall be prolo~~ged in an easterly 
direction s o  as t o  meet the Chinese frontier. 
If it should be found that  Icizil Rabat is situated to the 
north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, the line of demarca- 
tion shall be drawn to the  nearest convenient point on the 
Aksu River south of that  latitude, and from thence pro- 
longed a s  aforesaid. 
2. T h e  line shall be marked out, and its precise configura- 
tion shall be settled by a Joint Comrnissioll of a purely 
tecllllical character, with a military escort 110t exceeding that 
which is strictly necessary for its proper protection. 
The Commission shall be composed of British and Russiall 
Delegates, with the necessary techtlical assistance. 
Her Britannic Majesty's Government will arrange with 
Ameer of Afghanistan as  to the manner in which His High- 
ness shall be represented on the C~mmission. 
3. The Commissioll shall also be charged to report any 
2 11 
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facts which can be ascertained on the spot bearing on the 
situation of the Chinese frontier, with a view to enable the 
two Governments to  come to  an agreement with the Chinese 
Government as to  the limits of Chinese territory in the 
vicinity of the line, in such manner as may be found most 
convenient. 
4. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Govern- 
ment of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to 
abstain from exercising any political influence or control, the 
former t o  the north, the latter to the south, of the above 
line of demarcation. 
5. I-Ier Britannic Majesty's Governrnellt engage that the 
territory lying within the British sphere of influence between 
the Ilindu Kush and the line running from the east end of 
Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier shall form part of the 
territory of the Alneer of Afghanistan, that it shall not be 
annexed to Great Britain, and that no military posts or forts 
shall be established in it. 
The execution of this Agreement is contingent upon the 
evacuation by the Ameer of Afghanistan of all the territories 
now occupied by His Highness on the right bank of the 
Panjah, and on the evacuation by the Alneer of Bolrhara of 
the portion of Darwaz which lies to  the south of the Oxus, 
in regard to  which Her Britannic Majesty's Government and 
the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia 
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
CHINA, SEPTEMBER I 3 ~ ~ 1 ,  876. 
Her Majesty's Government having it in contemplation to 
send a mission of exploration next year by way of Pelring 
through ILan-Su and ILoko-Nor, or by way of Ssu-chuen 
to Thibet and thence to India, the Tsung-li Yam&n, having 
due regard to the circumstances, will, when the time arrives, 
issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the 
high provincial authorities and to the Resident in Thibet. If 
the Missioil should not be sent by these routes, but should 
be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsung- 
li Yamen, on receipt of a communication to the above effect 
from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident 
in Thibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circum- 
stances, will send officers to take due charge of the Mission ; 
and passports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsung-li 
YamBn, that its passage be not obstructed. 
(L.S.) THOMAS FRANCIS WADE. 
LI  HUNG-CHANG. 
CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA 
RELATIVE TO BURMAH AND TIBET. SIGNED AT PEKING, 
JULY 24TH, 1886. 
ARTICLE ~,-Inasrnucl~ as i t  has been the practice of Burmah 
to send Decenl~ial Missions to  prescnt articles of local pro- 
duce, England agrees that the highest authority in Burmah 
467 
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shall send the customary Decennial Missions, the members 
of the Missions to b e  of Burmese race. 
ARTICLE 2.-China agrees that in all matters whatsoever 
appertaining to the authority and rule which England is now 
exercising in Burmah, England shall be free to do whatever 
she deems fit and proper. 
ARTICLE 3.-The frontier between Burmah and China to 
be marlred by a Delimitation Commission, and the con- 
ditions of frontier trade to  be settled by a Frontier Trade 
Convention, both countries agreeing to  protect and en- 
courage trade between China and Burmah. 
ARTICLE 4.-Inasmuch a s  inquiry into the circumstances 
by the Chinese Government has shown the existence of 
many obstacles to the  Mission to Thibet provided for in the 
Separate Article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents 
to countermand the Mission forthwith. 
With regard to the desire of the British Government to 
consider arrangements for frontier trade between India and 
Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after 
careful inquiry into the circumstances, to  adopt measures 
to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the pro- 
motion and development of trade. Should it be practicable, 
the Chinese Governlnent shall then proceed carefully to con- 
sider Trade Regulations ; but if insuperable obstacles should 
be found to exist, the British Government will not press the 
matter unduly. 
(L.S.) N. R. O'CONOR. 
CHING. 
SUN YU WEN. 
CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA 
RELATING TO SIKICIM AND TIBET. SIGNED AT CALCUTTA, 
MARCH IC/TH, 1890, BY THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, 
VICEROY OF INDIA, AND THE CIHINESE RESIDENT AT 
LHASA. 
ARTICLE I.-The boundary of Silrkiin and Tibet shall be 
the crest of the mouiltain range separating the waters flow- 
ing into the Silrkim Teesta and its afluents from the waters 
flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other 
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I 
rivers of Tibet. The line conlmeilces a t  Moullt Gipmochi on 
the Bhutan frontier and follows the above-mentioned water- 
parting to  the point where it meets the Nepal territory. 
ARTICLE 11.-It is admitted that the British Government, 
whose protectorate over the Silrkim State is hereby recog- 
nised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal 
adn~inistration and foreign relations of that State, and 
except through and with the permission of the British 
Goverlllnellt neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its 
officers shall have official relations of any lrind, forinal or 
informal, with ally other country. 
ARTICLE 111.-The Goverllmellt of Great Britain and 
Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally 
to respect the boundary as defined in Article I. and to 
prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the 
frontier. 
ARTICLE 1V.-The question of providing increased facilities 
for trade across the Silrlrim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be 
discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement 
by the  High Contracting Parties. 
ARTICLE V.-The question of pasturage on the Sikkim 
side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and 
future adjustment. 
ARTICLE V1.-The High Contracting Parties reserve for 
discussion and arrangement the method in which official 
cornillunications between the British authorities in India and 
the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted. 
I 
ARTICLE VI1.-Two joint Colnmissioners shall within six 
months from the ratification of this Convention be appointed, 
one by the  British Government in India, the other by the 
Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall 
meet and discuss the questions which by the last three pre- 
ceding articles have been reserved. 
ARTICLE VII1.-The present Collveiltioil shall be ratified, 
' and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as so011 
, as possible after the date of signature thereof. , 
The  Regulatioils above referred to were drawn up and < 
signed a t  Darjeeling by British and Chincse Coillmissioners 1 on December sth,  1893. They provided for the establishmeot 
1 
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of a trade mart a t  Yatung, on the Tibetan side of the 
frontier, to which British subjects were to have free access 
with the right to rent houses and godowns. The Chinese 
Government undertook to provide suitable buildings for the 
purpose, as well as a special residence for the officer or 
oflicers appointed by the British Government to reside a t  
Yatung to watch the conditions of British trade. Special 
provisions were made with regard to the importation and 
exportation of goods and the taxes leviable thereupon. 
Trade disputes were to be settled by personal conference 
between the Political Oflicer for Silrlrim and the Chinese 
Frontier Officer. Provision was also made for the forward- 
ing of official communicatioils between Chinese and Indian 
officials. In the event of disagreement between the local 
officials on both sides, the matter was to be reported to  their 
superiors, and ultimately to their respective Governmellts for 
settlement. After the lapse of five years the regulations 
were to be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed 
on both sides for the purpose. 
CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CI-IINA, 
GIVING EFFECT TO ARTICLE 111. OF THE CONVENTION 
01. JULY 24TH, 1886, RELATIVE TO BURMAH AND 
THIBET. SIGNED AT LONDON, MARCII IST, 1894.. 
The first three articles define the frontier line between 
Burmah and China up to 25" 35' Northern latitude, beyond 
which it is reserved for a future understanding. 
The most important of the other articles run as follows :- . 
ARTICLE V.-In addition to the territorial concessions in 
Northern Theinni, and the cession to China of the State of 
Kokang, which result from the frontier as above described, 
Her Britannic Majesty, in consideration of the abandonment of 
the claims advanced by China to the territory lying outside 
and abutting on the frontier of the Prefecture of Yung 
Chang and Sub-prefecture of Teng Yiieh, agrees to renounce 
in favour of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and of his 
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over the States of Munglem and ICiang Hung forillerly pas- 
sessed by the Kings of Ava concurrently with the Emperors 
of China. These and all other rights in the  said States, 
with the titles, prerogatives, and privileges thereto pertaining, 
Her Majesty the Queen-Empress renounces as aforesaid, 
with the sole proviso that His Majesty the Emperor of China 
shall not, without previously coming to a n  agreement with 
Her Britannic Majesty, cede either Munglem or  ICiang Hung, 
or any portion thereof, to any other nation. 
ARTICLE VI1.-It is agreed that  any posts belonging to 
either country which may be stationed within the territory of 
the other wllei~ the Commission of Delimitation shall have 
brought its labours to  a conclusion shall, within eight months 
from the date of such conclusion, be withdrawn, and their 
places occupied by the troops of the  other, mutual notice 
having in the meantime been given of the precise date at  
which the withdrawal and occupatioil will talce place. From 
the date of such occupation the High Contracting Parties 
shall each within its own territories hold itself responsible for 
the maintenance of good order, and for the tranquillity of the 
tribes inhabiting them. 
The  High Contracting Parties further engage neither to 
construct nor to  inaintain within '10 English miles from the 
nearest point of the  common frontier, measured in a straight 
line and horizontal projection, any fortifications or permanent 
camps, beyond such posts a s  are necessary for preserving 
peace and good order in the frontier districts. 
ARTICLE VIII. -Subject to the conditions mentioned here- 
after in Articles X. and XI., the British Government, wishing 
to  encourage and develop the land trade of China with 
Burillah as much a s  possible, consent, for a period of six 
years from the ratification of the present Convention, to 
allow Chinese produce and manufactures, with the exception 
of salt, to enter Burma11 by land duty free, and to allow 
British manufactures and Burmese produce, with the excep- 
ti011 of rice, to be exported to China by land free of duty. 
The  duties oil salt and rice so  imported and exported shall 
not be  higher than those imposed on their import or export 
by sca. 
AKTICLE 1X.-With a view to the development of trade 
between China and Uurmah, the Chinese Governtnent consent 
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that for six years from the ratification of the present Con- 
vention the duties levied on goods imported into China by 
these routes shall be those specified in the General Tariff 
of the Maritime Customs diminished by three-tenths, and 
that the duties on goods e~ported from China by the same 
route shall be those specified in the same Tariff dimiilished 
by four-tenths. Transit passes for imports and exports shall 
be granted in accordailce with the Rules in force a t  the 
  re at^ ports. 
ARTICLE XI1.-The British Government, wishing to pro- 
mote frontier trade between the two countries by encouraging 
mining enterprise in Yiinnan and in the new territorial acquisi- 
tions of China referred to in the present Convention, consent 
to allow Chinese vessels carrying merchandise, ores, and 
minerals of all kinds, and coming froin or destined for China, 
freely to navigate the Irrawaddy on the same conditions as to  
dues and other matters as British vessels. 
ARTICLE XII1.-It is agreed that His Majesty the Emperor 
of China may appoint a Consul in Burmah, to reside a t  
Rangoon; and that Her Britannic Majesty may appoint a 
Consul to reside at Manwyne; and that the Consuls of the 
two Governments shall each within the territories of the 
other enjoy the same privileges and immunities as  the Consuls 
of the most favoured nation. 
Further, that, in proportion as the commerce between 
Burmah and China increases, additional Consuls may be 
appointed by mutual agreement, to reside at such places in 
Burmah and Yanilan as the requirements of the trade may 
seein to demand. 
ARTICLE XV1.-With a view to improving the intercourse 
between the two countries, and placing the Chinese Consul 
at Ra~igoon in communication with the High Provincial 
Authorities in YUnnan, the High Contracting Parties under- 
take to connect the telegraphic systems of the two countries 
with each other as  soon as the necessary arrangements can 
be made ; the line will, however, a t  first only be used for the 
transmission of official telegrams and of general messages for 
and from Burmall and the Province of Yunnan. 
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been, or may hereafter be, accorded to the subjects of ally 
other nation. 
ARTICLE XVII1.-It is agreed that the commercial stipula- 
tions contained in the present Conveiltion being of a special 
nature and the result of mutual concessions, consented to  
with a view to adapting them to local conditions and the 
peculiar necessities of the Burmah-China over la~~d  trade, the 
advantages accruing from them shall not be invoked by 
the subjects of either Power residing a t  other places where 
the two Empires are conterminous, excepting where the 
same conditions prevail, and then only in return for similar 
concessions. 
ARTICLE X1X.-The arrangements wit11 regard to trade 
and commerce contained in the present Coilventioil being of 
a provisional and experimental character, it is agreed that 
should subsequent experience of their worlting, or a inore inti- 
mate knowledge than is now possessed of the requirelnellts 
of the trade, seein to require it, they may be revised a t  the 
demand of either party after a lapse of six years after the ex- 
change of ratifications of the present Convention, or sooner 
should the two Governments desire it. 
On proceeding to  the signature this day of the Convention 
between China and Great Britain, giving effect to Article 111. 
of the Co~lvention relative to Burmah and Thibet, signed a t  
Peki~lg  on the 24th July, 1886 : 
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare that, inastnuch 
as the present Convention has been concluded for the special 
purpose mentioned in the preamble thereof, the stipulations 
contained therein are applicable only to  those parts of the 
dolniniolls of His Majesty the Emperor of China and of I-Ier 
Britannic Majesty to which the said Convention expressly 
relates, and are not to be construed as  applicable elsewhere. 




ARTICLES RELATING TO SIAM, THE h4 ERONG VALLEY, 
AND YUNNAN AND SZECHUEN IN THE DECLARA- 
TION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE. 
SIGNED AT LONDON, JANUARY I5THJ 1896, BY TI-IE 
MRRQUE~S OF SALISBURY AND THE FRENCI-I AMBASSADOR, 
BARON DE COURCEL. 
I. The Gover~~rnents of Great Britain ancl France engage 
to one another that neither of them will; without the consent 
of the other, in any case, or under any pretext, advance 
their armed forces illto the region which is co~nprised in the 
basins of the Petcha Bouri, Meilrlong, Menam, and Bang 
P a  Kong (Petriou) Rivers and their respective tributaries, 
together with the extent of coast from h4uong Bang Tapan 
to Milong Pase, the basins of the rivers on which those two 
places are  situated, and the basins of tlie other rivers, the 
estuaries of which are  included in that coast ; and including 
also the territory lying to the north of the basin of the 
Menam, and situated between the Anglo-Siamese frontier, 
the Mekong River, and the eastern watershed of the Me 
Ing. They further engage not t o  acquire within this region 
any special privilege or advantage which shall not be enjoyed 
in common by, o r  equally open to, Great Britain and France 
and their nationals and dependents. These stipulations, 
however, shall not be interpreted as derogating from the 
special clauses which, in virtue of the Treaty concluded on 
the 3rd October, 1893, between France and Siarn, apply to a 
zone of 25 lrilom. on the right bank of the Melrong and t o  
the navigation of that river. 
11. Nothing in the foregoing clause shall hinder any action 
on which the two Powers may agree, and which they shall 
thinlr i~ecessary in order to uphold the, illdependence of the 
Kingdom of Siam. But they engage not to enter into any 
separate Agreement permitting a third Power to take any 
action from which they are  bound by the present Declaration 
themselves to  abstain. 
111. From the mouth of thq Nam Huolr northwards as far 
as  the  Chinese frontier the thalwcg of tlie Melrong shall 
form the limit of the possessions or spheres of influence of 
Great Britain a ~ l d  France. It  is ngreed that the nntionnls 
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1 dependents of each of the two countries shall llot exer- 
cise ally jurisdiction or authority within the possessio~ls or 
sphere of influence of the other. 
The  ~ o l i c e  of the islallds in this part  of the river which are 
sepatatcd from the British shore by a brallch of the river 
shall, so long as they a rc  thus separated, be intrusted to the 
French authorities. The  fishery shall be open to the in- 
l~abit:il~ts of both banlcs. 
IV. The two Governn~e~lts agree that all commercial and 
other privileges an4  advantages concedcd in the two Chinese 
of Yiinnan arid Szechuen either to Great Britain or 
Fr:lncc, in virtue of their respective Conventions with China 
of thc 1st March, 1894, and the 20th June, 1895, and all 
privileges and advantages of any nature which may in the 
future be conccdecl in these two Chinese provinces, either to 
G~.c:lt Britain or France, shall, a s  far as  rests with them, be 
cxte~lded and rendered common to  both Powers and to their 
~l:~tion:~ls and dependents, and they engage to use their influ- 
ence and good oRices with thc Chinese Government for this 
purpose. 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRlTAlN AND CHINA, 
;\lOI)IFYlNC; 'rEIE CONVENTION o n  MARCEX I ,  1894, 
I~RLATIVB TO BURMAH AND THIBET. SIGNED AT 
I'ICKING, I'EBRUARY 4TH, 1897, BY SIR CLAUDE MAC- 
~ I O S A L I I  'AND THE CIIINBSE PI~GNIPOTENTIARY, LI. 
In consideralion of the Government of Great Britain con- 
senting to ~v:iivc its objections to  the alienation by China, 
by the Convention with Prance of the 20th June, 1895, of 
territory forrning a portion of Kiang Hung, in derogation 
c~f the provisions of the Convention between Great Britain 
and C l~ in :~  of the 1st RIarch, 1894, it has been agreed between 
the Ciovcrllmcnts of Grcnt Britain and China that the follow- 
itig arlditions ;lnd ;~ltcr:ltions shall bc made in the last-named 
Co~lvcution, 11crein:lfter referred to as the original Con- 
vention :-- 
?Bc first t l~rce ;lrticlcs define the modified frontiers, and 
thc n ~ o s t  irnpor.Lant of Ihc otllec. articles run a s  follows :- 
Alrrrcr.~; V.-.It is agreed that China will not cede to any 
othclr 11:~tioll oithcr hlltng J,cm or nny part  of ICiang Hung 
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on the right bank of the Mekong, or any part of Kiang 
H u n g  now i n  her possession on the left bank of that river, 
without previously comiilg to a n  arrangement with Great 
Britain. 
ARTICLE 1X.-Add as follows :- 
In addition to the Manwyne and Sailsi routes sanctioiled 
by the Convention of 1894, the Governments of Great Britain 
and China agree that any other routes, the opening of which 
the Boundary Comn~issioners may find to be in the interests 
of trade, shall be sanctioned on the same terms as  those 
mentioned abovc. 
ARTICLE XI1.-Add as follows :- 
The Chinese Government agrees hereafter to consider 
whether the conditions of trade justify the constructioil of 
railways in Yiinnan, and, in the event of their coi~struction, 
agrees to  connect them with the Burmese lines. 
ARTICLE XII1.-Whereas by the original Convention i t  
was agreed that China might appoint a Consul in Burmah, 
to reside a t  Rangoon ; and that Great Britain might appoint 
a Coilsul t o  reside a t  Manwyne ; and that the Consuls of 
the two Governments sbould each within the territories of 
the  other enjoy the same privileges and ilnmunities as  t h e  
Consuls of the  most favoured nation, and, further, that, in  
proportion a s  the commerce between Burnlah and China 
increased, additional Consuls might be appointed by niutual 
consent to reside a t  such places in Burmah and Ynililail a s  
the  requirements of trade might seem to demand. 
I t  has now been agreed that the Government of Great 
Britain may station a Consul a t  Momein or Shunning-fu, 
a s  the Goverilment of Great Britain may prefer, instead of 
a t  Manwyne, as stipulated in the original Convention, and 
also to station a Consul a t  Ssumao. 
British subjects and persons under British protection may 
establish themselves, and trade a t  these places, under t h e  
same conditions as at  the Treaty ports in China. 
The Consuls appointed as above shall be on the same 
footing a s  regards correspondence and intercourse with 
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TI-IE BAGI-IDAD RAILWAY 
BAGHDRT) RAILWAY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE 
TURKIS13 GOVERNMENT AND TIIE ANATOLIAN 
RAILWAY COMPAN17. SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE, 
MARCII ~ T H ,  1903. 
Entrc  Son Excellence Zihni Pacba, Ministre du Conlmerce 
e t  des Travaux I-'ublics, agissnnt au nonl du Gouvernement 
1111prSrial Ottonian, 
d'une part, 
Monsieur Arthur Gwinner, PrCsident du  Conseil d1Adminis- 
tratio~z, Mr. le Docteur Kur t  Zander, Directeur-GknBral, e t  
Monsieur Edouard Huguenin, Directeur-Gkn6ral-Adjoint; du 
Che~nitl de fer Ottoman dlAnatolie, agissant au nom et pour 
compte de  la Soci@t& du Chelnin de fer Ottonla~l d'Anatolie, 
B Constantinople, 
d'autre part ; 
I1 a Qt& .arr&tB ce pui suit : 
ARTICLE I.-Le Gouvernement Irnpkrial Qttoman accorde 
la concession d e  la construction e t  de  l'exploitation du pro- 
longement de la ligne de  IConia jusqu'g Bagdad et Bassorah, 
en passant par ou aussi p r l s  que possible dcs villes de 
Karaman, Eregli, ICardach-Bkli, Adana, Ilamidi6, OsmaniB, 
Bagtschk, ICazannli, ICillis, Tell-Habesch, Harran, Resulain, 
NussibBin, Avniat, Mossoul, Tdkrit, SadijB, Bagdad, Kerbkla, 
Nedjef, Zubkir et Bassorah, ainsi que des embranchements 
suivants, savoir : 
I )  de Tell-Habesch B Alcp, 
a) d'un point rapproche de la ligne principale, 
dOterminer d'un colnmun accord, ii Orfa. 
Le Gouvernement ImpBrial nlaccordera, sous quelque forme 
clue ce soit, dc garalltie pour la construction de cet em- 
br;inchcment d 'u~ lc  longueur de 3 0  Irilom. environ, ni aucune 
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affectation, pour frais d'exploitation, mais les recettes brutes 
de toute nature d e  l'embranchement appartiendront exclusive- 
ment au Concessionnaire. 
3) de  Sadije il HanClrin ; 
4) de  Zub6ir un point du Golfe Persique A deter- 
miner d'un coinmun accord entre le Gouvernement 
Inlperial Ottoman et. le Concessionnaire, ainsi que 
de  toutes les dCpendances des dites lignes. La 
ligne principale et  ses embranchements devant suivre 
un  trace qui sera approuvk par le Gouvernement 
ImpCrial, 
& la Socikt6 du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie aux  
conditiolls suivantes : 
ARTICLE 2.-La d u d e  de cette Concession sera de  quatre- 
vingt-dix-neuf ans. Cette durde s'appliquera Cgalement aux  
lignes d'Angora et de IConia, et elle cornmencera & courir A 
partir de la  date de la remise du Firman e t  llCchange d e  la 
prCsente Convention. 
E n  ce qui concerne les nouvelles lignes, ce dClai d e  quatre- 
vingt-dix-neuf ans  cornmencera A courir, pour chaque Section 
distincteinent, A partir du moment o h  le Gouvernement Im- 
perial aura  delivre au Concessionnaire les Titres d'Etat en 
conformite de 1'Art. 35 de  la presente Convention. 
ARTICLE 3.-Ces lignes, prises dans leur ensemble, sont 
partagees en sections d e  zoo kilom. de  longueur pour ce qui 
concerne la prksentation des plans e t  projets dCfinitifs. Le 
Concessionllaire devra, dans un dClai de trois rnois h partir 
de  la  date de la remise du Firman de Concession et 1'Cchange 
d e  la pr6sente Convention et du Cahier cles Charges (et 
aprbs l'a~complissernent des stipulations d e  llArt. 35) prd- 
senter au  Ministere des Travaux Publics les plans et projets 
complets aprks Btudes definitives et conforinCmenl; aux pre- 
scriptions du Cahier des Charges de  la premiere section 
d'une longueur de zoo kilom., partant de Konia e t  passant 
par ou aussi prbs que possible d e  Karaman e t  d'Eregli 
confornlt5ment a u  trac6 de la ligne de  Bagdad. Quant aux 
autres sections, les plans et projets y relatifs seront presentis 
dans un dClai d e  huit mojs A partir de la  date A laquelle 
commencera le dClai de  Concession de  chaque Section par 
la  inise 21 exCcution des stipulations de 1'Art. 35 afferentes 
Ces plans I 
et, selon le 
lieu, dans le 
pr8sentation. 
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Ces plans et projets devront btre examinks par le Ministere 
et, seloll le cas approuvks tels quels, ou 1nodifiCs, s'il a 
lieu, dans le ddlai de  trois mois A partir de la dale de leur 
pr6sentation. Passk ce dklai, si le Gouverllement Imperial 
n'a pas  notifib sa dkcision a u  Concessionnaire, celui-ci pourra 
consid6rer comme approuvks les projets prksentks par lui et 
il procbdera A. l'exkcution cle ses travaux. Si  le Gouverne- 
ment ImpCrial apporte & ces projets des modifications de 
nature h entrai'ner des retards de plus d'un mois, dalls 
l'approbation d e s  plans, le dklai fix6 pour la construction sera 
prolong6 d'une pCriode &gale B celle du retard c a d  par 
l'exainen de  ces inodifications et l'approbation des plans. 
Les affectations spCciales destinkes A la premiere sectioll 
de  200 ltilom. par tant  de Iconia e t  passant par ou aussi pr&s 
que possible d e  Icaraman et  d'Eregli, sont dktermindes par 
l'annexe I (Convention Financikre) Eaisant partie intBgrante 
de la prdsente Convention. 
ARTICLE 4.-Le Coilcessionnaire s'engage commencer 
ses frais, risques e t  p6rils les travaux de  cette premibre 
section, dans u n  d d a i  de trois mois A partir de la date de 
l'approbalion d e s  plans et projets de  ces zoo premiers lrilom. 
e t  B les terminer, de  meme, dans un dClai de  deux ans au 
plus tard h par t i r  de  la mCme date. 
Le Collcessionnaire s'engage 5 commencer les travaux 
dans un ddlai d e  trois rnois A partir de la date  d'approbation 
des plans et  projets relatifs aux autres  sections, et  A terminer 
l'ensemble de  la ligne et ses embranchements, dans un dklai 
de  8 ans  A part ir  de  la date de la reinise du Firman et de 
llCchange de  la prdsente Convention. Toutefois, tous retards 
apportQ dans l a  inise A exkcution des stipulations de 1'Art. 
35 pour une section quelconque, c'est-A-dire tous retards 
apport&s dans l a  remise des titres par le Gouvernement 
ImpJrial au  Concessionilaire seront ajoutks au dit dklai de 
1111it annkes. Les  travaux devront &tre exbcutks conformk- 
m e ~ l t  aux rhg-les d e  l'art et  aux prescriptioils du Cahier des 
Charges ci-annex&, ainsi qu'aux dispositions des plans et 
projets approuvds ; toutefois, en cas de  force majeure, les 
&lais d'ex6cutioll seront prolongCs d'une durke &gale celle 
de Isinterruption des travaux, h l a  condition que le Con- 
cessiollnaire avisera immkdiatement les autoritks locales, 
ainsi que le Ministbre des Travaux Publics. 
Seront kgalemer1t collsid&rCs comine cas de  force lnajeure, 
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une guerre entre Puissances EuropCet~nes, ainsi qu'un change- 
ment capital dans la situation financikre de l'Allemagne, de 
1'Angleterre ou de la  France. .* 
ARTICLE 5. -Le Ministkre des Travaux Publics contr6lera 
les travaux par I'intermCdiaire d'un ou plusieurs Commissaires 
durant leur exkcution, A I'achkvement des Travaux e t  avant 
leur rCception. Ce  contrBle s'appliquera, de meme, & l'ex- 
ploitation et au bon entretiell des travaux pendant la durCe de  
la Concession. 
Le Concessionnaire dkposera chaque annke, k l'ordre du  
Millisthre des Travaux Pqblics, e t  B titre de frais de contrele, 
uile somme de deux-cent-soixante-dix Piastres or par kilom., 
payable mensuellernent, et ce, A partir de la dale fixde pour 
le commencement des travaux jusqu'g la fin de  la Concession. 
ARTICLE 6.-L'entreprise &ant d'utilitt! publique, les terrains 
ndcessaires A 1'Ctablissernent duc l~emin  de fer e t  de ses dCpead- 
ances, les carribres et les ballastikres nkcessaires au Chemin 
de fer et appartenant des particuliers, seront pris, con- 
formBment B la loi sur l'expropriation, toutes les fois qu'une 
entente ne pourra pas &tre Btablie entre le Concessio~lnaire e t  
les proprihtaires pour l'achat de ces terrains. 
Le Gouvernement fera prockder Q l'expropriation et A la 
remise auconcessionnaire des terrains nkcessaires B l'ktablisse- 
ment de la voie et de ses dkpendances, aprks que le tracC du 
Chemin de fer aura Btk approuvk et applique sur le terrain. 
Cette remise sera faite par le Gouvernement dans le dklai d e  
deux mois. 
Les terrains llkcessaires pour l'occupation ternporaire 
pendailt les travaux seront livrks au Concessionnaire par les 
Autoritks locales b charge pour lui d'en indemniser les pro- 
priktaires. 
Si dans les dits terrains nBcessaires h l't5tablissenient du  
Chemin de fer e t  d e  ses ddpendances, il se trouve des terrains 
dits Arazii-EmiriCi-Halik, ceux-ci seront abandonnks gratuite- 
ment au Concessionnaire. 
Si dans une z h e  de 15 Itilom. de chaque cGtC duchemin  
de fer, il se  trouve des terrains dits Arazii-EmiriBi-HaliB et 
que dans ceux-ci se  trouve des carrikres et ballastikes, le 
Concessionnaire pourra les exploiter gratuitement pendant 
la p6riode de la construction, B charge pour lui de les fermer, 
une fois les travaux achev8s ; dans le cas oh Ic Concession- 
rlaire dksirerait 
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naire d6sirerait faire usage de ces carrikres et ballastiCres 
pendant la p6riode d'exploitation, il devra se conformer aux 
rkglements rBgissant la matibre et  payer la redevance fixBe & 
cet Cgard. 
L'occupation temporaire de ces terrains, durant les travaux 
de construction, lui sera egalement accordCe 1 titre gratuit. 
ARTICLE 7.-Les lignes seront construites h une seule voie ; 
cependant les terrains seront acquis en vue de 1'Ctablissement 
d'une seconde voie. Aussitbt que les recettes brutes kilo- 
m&triques atteindront annuellement le chiffre de 30 ooo Frcs., 
le Gouvernement IrnpCrial aura le droit de rCclamer 1'Ctablisse- 
lnent de  la seconde voi que le Concessionllaire sera tenu de 
construire h ses frais. 
ARTICL~ 8.-Le mat&riel de lw voie et les matdriaux, fers, 
bois, houille, machines, voitures et wagons et  nutres appro- 
visionnelne~lts n6cessaires au premier 6tablissement ainsi 
qu'aux agranclissenlents et augmentatiolls en g&ndral du 
Chelnin de fer et de  ses dbpendances, que le Concessionllaire 
ac11hter:i dans 1'Empire ou qu'il fera venir de  l'ktranger, 
seront exempts de  tous ilnpats intdrieurs et de tous droits 
de  douane. La  franchise cles droits de douane est aussi 
accordkc pour la houille ndcessaire h l'exploitation et que le 
Concessionllairc ferait venir de 1'6tranger jusquiB ce que les 
recettes brutes de  la ligne et cfe ses embranchemeilts at- 
teignent 15 500 Frcs. par lrilom. De nl&me, pendant toute 
la durBe de  la Concession, le sol, fonds et revenu du 
Chemin de fer et de ses dkpendances ne seront passibles 
d'aucun impbt, et il ne sera perqu aucun droit de  timbre sur 
la prkseute Convention et le Callier des Charges annex&, 
sur  lcs Conventions addition~lelles e t  tous actes subskquents, 
ou pour le service des Titres d'Etat A Bmettre ; sur les 
moiltants cncaissBs par le Concessionnaire du chef du forfait 
d'exploitation, ni aucun droit sur ses actions, ses actions 
de prioritk et  ses obligations, comme aussi sur les Titres que 
le Gouverllemellt ImpBrial Ottoman delivrera au  Conces- 
sionnaire. 
L e  Concessionnaire sera soumis aux droits de  timbre pour 
toutes ses opBratiolls autres que celles pour lesquelles la 
franchise lui cst accordhe dans le prBsent Article. 
L e  Collcessionnaire formera une SociCte Anonyme Otto- 
mane, sous lc llom de  ,, SocidtC ImpCriale Ottornane du Chclnin 
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de fer de BagdadLL qui remplacera la Soci&t& du Cheinin de fer 
Ottomane d'dnatolie pour tout ce qui concerne la nouvelle 
ligne de IConia au Golf Persique, avec ses embranchements 
et qui sera rdgie par les statuts ci-annexks. 
La  SocidtC du Chernin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie s'engage 
A ne jainais cCder ni transfhrer L une autre SociCtC les ~ i - ~ l ~ e s  
existantes de Haidar-Pacha B Angora et A IConia. 
La SociCtC Im~driale  Ottomane du Chernin de fer de 
Bagdad, qui sera formCe, prend de m&me l'engagement de 
ne ceder ni transfdrer, les lignes k coilstruire de Konia A 
Bagdad et h bass oral^ et ses embranchements. 
ARTICLE 9. - Les matkriaux de constructioll ct autre 
nBcessaires pour la construction e t  l'exploitation de cette 
ligne et des ses embranchements, ainsi que les agents et 
ouvriers seront transportCs, seulement pendant la  d u d e  de 
la coilstruction et sous la surveillailce du Ministkre de la 
Marine, sur le Chatt el Arab, le Tigre et llEuphrate, avec 
des navires A vapeur ou A voiles ou autres embarcations qui 
seront procurkes ou loudes par la SociCtk. 
Ce materiel de transport jouira de l'exemption de droits de 
douane, impbts et autres. 
ARTICLE 10.-Les bois et charpants necessaires B la con- 
struction et A l'exploitation du Chemi~i de fer pourront &tre 
coup&s dans les for&ts des rdgions voisiiles appartenant 
lJEtat, conformiment au rkglement y relatif. 
ARTICLE 11.-Aussitbt que le Concessionnaire ilotifiera au 
Ministkre des Travaux Publics l'achhvemenl: des travaux 
d'une section, celui-ci fera inspecter les travaux ex6cutCs par 
une Conlmission technique nommhe A cet effet, e t  prochdera 
h la rCception provisoire, s'il y a lieu ; un an aprks la rhception 
provisoire, une seconde inspection des travaux sera faite par 
une Coinmissioil technique, et dans le cas oh il sera constatk 
que les travaux ont kt& exdcutds conforn~Bmeilt aux rbgles 
de I'arl: e t  aux prescriptions du Cahier des Charges, le 
Ministkre des Travaux Publics prononcera sur le rapport de 
la Commission la r6ception d6Rnitive. 
Le Cotlcessionnaire aura le droit d'ouvrir les lignes & 
l'exploi~ation par sections successives aprks leur r6ception 
provisoire. Les longueurs de ces sections achevCes, A partir 
de IConia, dlAdana, de Bagdad, de Bassorah, comme aussi 
des difldrents points intermkdiaircs, seront d'au moins 40 
ltilom. e t  devront aboutir !L une station. 
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I ARTICLE 12.-Dans le cas oh le Gouvernement ImpCrial 
dCciderait l'cxdcution d'ernbranchements reliant le Chemin 
de fer faisant l'objet de la prCsente Conve~ltion A la mer, 
en un point situd entre Mersine e t  Tripolis de Syrie, il ne 
pourra accorder la concession des dits embranchements, 
qu'exclusivement a u  Concessionllaire sous rCserve toutefois 
de sauvegarder les droits dkjh accord& h la Socit!tB du 
Chemin de fer de Damas-Hamah et Prolongements. 
Toutefois, si le Concessionnaire, dans un dClai maximum 
d'une ;innth comptt! h partir de la notiiication qui lui en 
\ serait faite par le Gouvernement IinpBrial, n'acceptait pas de 
construire le ou les embranchements en questioll aux clauses 
et conditions de la prksente Concession, ou qu'ayant acceptk, 
il ne les edcu ta i t  pas dans les dklais arr&tr!s entre le 
Gouverneinent Impdrial et- le Concessionnaire, ce dernier 
sera ddchu de tout- droit aux dits ernbranchements, et le 
Gouvernement Impdrial pourra en accorder la concession h 
dcs tiers. 
Le  Concessionnaire aura en outre le droit de prkfdrence h 
condilions kgales, pour les embranchenlellts suivants : 
a)  vers Marach ; 
b) vers Aintab ; 
c) vers BirCdjik ; 
d) vers Mardin ; 
e) vers Erbil ; 
f) du Diala vers Salahir! et  Touzkourmatli ; 
g) de El-Badj Hit. 
Ce droit de prcif8rence pour les sept embranchements 
specifids ci-dessus, pour &re valable, est subordonnC aux 
conditions suivantes, savoir : 
Si le Gouvernement Imp&rial dCcidait d'une manikre dd- 
finitive d'accorder 21 des tiers la concession d'un de ces 
embratlchements, le Concessionnaire est oblige dans un dClai 
de  neuf inois !L partir de la date de la notification qui lui en 
sera faite par le Ministhe du Commerce et des Travaux 
I-'ublics, de dciclarer au Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman s'il 
veut assumel. cette concessio~l aux conditions acceptkes par 
les tiers clont il vient dlfitre parlk. 
ARTICLE I 3.-LC Concessionnaire aura le droit d'Ctablir et 
d'exploiter sur la ligne, avec la permission des autoritbs 
locales, des tuileries et des briqueteries. Les machines et  
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outils destines aux dites fabriques, jouirollt des m$mes ex- 
emption~ accordkes au matCriel et outillage de Chemin d e  
fer. Le charbon qui sera consoinm6 dans ces fabriques 
jouira de la franchise du droit de douane. 
Ces fabriques feront gratuitement retour A 1'Etat h 
l'expiration de la Concession. 
ARTICLE 14.-Pendant toute la durde de la Concession, le 
Concessionnaire est obligC de tenir dans un parfait Ctat 
d'entretien A ses frais, le Chemin de fer et ses dCpendances, 
ainsi que son material fixe et roulant, faute de quoi, il sera 
proc&d& A son Bgard, conformCment 21 1'Art. 16 du Cahier des 
Charges. 
ARTICLE 15.-Le Concessionnaire est tenu de se conformer, 
quant A ce qui coilcerne la police et la sCcuritB de la voie, 
aux lois e t  r8glements actuellement en vigueur et h pro- 
mulguer, !L l'avenir, dans lJEmpire Ottoman. 
Le Gouverneinent Imperial prendra les mesures ndcessaires 
pour le maintien de l'ordre le long de la lig-ne et sur les 
clzantiers de construction. 
Dans le cas d'interruption du service des transports sur  
une partie ou sur la totalit& de la voie, par la faute du Con- 
cessionnaire, le Gouvernement ImpBrial prendra aux frais, 
risques e t  perils du Concessionnaire, les mesures ll6cessaire.s 
conformcimeilt 1'Art. 16 du Cahier des Charges pour assurer 
provisoirement l'exploitation. 
Article I&--Le Concessionnaire aura le droit de percevoir 
des droits de phage, conformCment aux tarifs du Cahier des 
Charges, B partir d e  la rdception provisoire de chaque sectioil 
du Chemin de fer jusqu'!~ l'expiration de la Concession. 
ARTICLE 17.-Le transport des militaires des Armcies de 
terre et de  iner, voyageant en corps ou isoldment, tailt en 
temps de guerre qu'en temps de paix, ainsi que du materiel 
et approvisioanements de guerre, des prisonniers et con- 
damnds, des agents de l'Etat, des valises postales, sera 
eKectuC conform81nent aux prescriptions du Titre V du 
Cahier des Charges. 
ARTICLE 18:-Comme garantie de l'ex8cution des prdsents 
engagements, le Coilcessionnaire devra, dans le dClai de trois 
mois B partir du jour oh la promulgation du Firman de Con- 
cession lui sera notifi6e ofliciellement, d6poser A une Banque 
de Consta~ltinople agrC4e par le Gouvernement, et h titre de 
cautioniiemellt 
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cautionnement urle solnnle de Ltqs. 30000 en nul~lkraire 011 
el1 Tityes d e  1'Etal ou d'une Sociktb Ailonyme Ottomane ou 
gar:tntic par l 'Etat, au cours du jour. 
Si lc dCp0t s e  fait en titres, la Bauque fera prendre 
l'eng:~gcrncnt de  parfake la diff&rence en css de baisse de  
prix. Aussitbt aprks le depat du  cautionnement, le Firman 
dc  Collcession sera remis au Concessionnaire. 
Le cautionnelnent ne sera restituC qu'8 la reception dk- 
Anitivc des travaux et proportioilnellemellt A la longueur des 
sections livrcies h I'exploitation; si dans le dklai de trois 
lnois prdcit8, Ic Co~~cessionnaire n'effectue pas le dkpbt susk- 
noncg, il sera ddchu sans aucune mise en demeure prkalable 
tfc tous droits A la Concession. 
Dans  le cas oil l'exkcution des stipulations de  1'Art. 35 
ne pourrait avoir lieu, le Concessionnaire aura le droit de 
toucher son cautionnement sans aucune formalit6 et sans  
qu'il a i t  !L demander lc consentement prdalable du Gouverne- 
ITlCll t . 
ARTICLE 19.-Le Gouvernemeut Impkrial Ottoman con- 
serve 1:1 facult& de  reprendre la Concession A quelque kpoque 
que celn soit de la ligne de Iconia B Bassorah e t  embranche- 
n ~ e n t s ,  rnoyennant le paiement a u  Collcessionnaire jusqu'h 
la fin dc In Concession, d'une somrne annuelle Cquivalente 
aux 50% des recettes brutes lnoye~lnes des cinq annkes qui 
prGcb cleront l'annde de la reprise de la Concession, sans clue 
l r i  ditc sonime annuelie puisse &re inf6rieure A Frcs. 12 ooo 
par kilom. Dans ce cas le Gouverilemellt Imperial Ottoman 
d e v r ; ~  rcrnbou~*ser entibremeilt et en une seule fois les Titres 
d 'Eta t  qui auront CtB accordes au  Concessionnaire e t  qui 
n'aurnient pas 4th amortis antdrieurement, et la  somme 
annuellc ti laquelle le Concessionnaire a droit en vertu du 
prtisent Article, sera diizlinuBe d e  l'annuit8 des dits Emprunts, 
!I savoir de  Frcs. 11 ooo par lrilom. Le Gouvernemetlt 
ilssurerei au  Coliccssionllaire le paieinent rkgulier aux 
rSpoclucs determinbes, du soldc lui revenant du chef de la 
rcprisc de Concession qui fera l'objet d'tune Convention 
spdciale. 
I1 scr;i proc&dC h la remise des lignes et de toutes leurs 
cldpcndanccs CLU Gouvernement, ainsi qu'8 l'achat par ce 
clerrlier du n~at&ricl, matCriaux e t  approvisionnemellts exist- 
arlts conformkmcnt 8 l'hrt. 19 du Cahier des Charges. 
En crts de reprise de  la Concession de la ligne, si le  
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Gouvernerneilt Imperial ne juge pas convenable &exploiter 
par ses propres agents, il n'ea cCdera pas l'exploitation B 
une autre Socidt6, mais il promet de la faire exploiter par le 
Concessionnaire par voie de bail. 
ARTICLE 20.-A l'expiration de la Concession de chaque 
section le Gouvernement Imperial sera substitue ?L tous les 
droits du Concessionnaire sur le Chemin de fer et ses dB- 
pendances, ainsi que sur le matdriel e t  materiaux et entrera 
en jouissance des produits y affkrents. 
I1 sera procBdd ?i la remise des lignes et de leurs d6pend- 
awes libres de toute dette et engagement, au Gouvernelnent 
ImpCrial e t  A l'achat par ce clernier du materiel et appro- 
visionnements co~lform&ment A 1'Art. 20 du Cahier des 
Charges. 
ARTICLE 21.-Les employCs et agents du Chemin de fer 
porteront la tenue qui sera fixke et adoptde par le Gouverne- 
ment Imperial ; ils porteroilt tous le fez et ils seront, autant 
que possible choisis parmi les s~ijets ottomans. 
Ciilq ans apres la date de l'ouverture ?i l'exploitation d e  
chaque section tout le personnel exbcutif de l'exploitation 
de chaque section, sauf les fonctionnaires superieurs, devra 
etre exclusivement compose de sujets ottomans. 
ARTICLE 22. -Le Concessionnaire pourra exploiter les 
mines qu'il aura ddcouvertes dans uile zBne de 20 lrilorn. d e  
chaque c6tB de l'axe de la voie, en se conformant aux lois 
et rkglements y relatifs, et sans que cela constitue pour lui 
un privilhge ou un monopole. 
11 pourra de m$me operer des coupes dam les for&ts 
avoisinant la ligne, soit pour faire du bois de charpente, soit 
pour faire du charbon, aprCs recours h 1'Administration 
compdtente et en s e  conformant aux rkglements rkgissant 
la matibre. 
ARTICLE 23.-Le Concessionnaire aura la facult6 de con- 
struire A ses frais A Bagdad, Bassorah et  au point terminus 
de l'embrancl~ement partant de Zubdir, des ports avec toutes 
les installations necessaires pour l'accostage Q quai des 
vavires, et l'embarcluement, le ddbarquernent e t  le magasi- 
Ilage des marchandises. 
L e  projet de ces ports devra &re prrSsent8 dans un ddlai 
maximum de huit ans, A partir de lJ6change de la prdsente 
Convention, et  les trilvaux de chaque port devront &re 
achev6s au plu 
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achcvcs :LU plus tard dans douze ails ?L partir de la date du 
commencement dcs travaux cle chaque section oh se trouve 
le port respectif. 
f lux projcts serollt joints les tarifs 21 appliquer. 
Ccs trois ports fcront partie intkgrante du Chemin de fer, 
et les rccettcs ncttes en seront versies au  compte des recettes 
brutlcs du  che~nin de fer. 
A I'cxpirntion dc la Concession, ces ports e t  leurs dd- 
pcnd:~nct!s ferollt gratuitemellt retour h 1'Etat. 
f):~ns le c:is oil le Concessionnaire n'ex8cuterait pas l'un 
on I ':l~~trc dc ces ports dans le dklai ci-dessus, le Gouverne- 
ment Imp6rial pourrn en accorder la concession !L des tiers. 
lSti tous cas le Concessionnaire pouua pendant la p6riode ' 
dc constrnction du Chemin de fer, Btablir en ces trois points, 
ainsi que d:lus le port de Castaboul, des installations pro- 
visoircs p o w  l e  d&barquement des niatkriaux destinds %U 
Chcmin clc fcr. 
Ces inst:~11:~tions devront, si le Gouvernement In~pArial en 
fait la demande,, Dtre supprimCes apres l'achhvement des 
travaux. 
ARTICLE 24. - I,e Conccssior~naire pourra, Bgalemet~t, 
Btablir c t  exploiter, Ih oh le besoin s'en fera sentir et sur 
lcs terraills faisant partie du domaiue du Chemin de fer, des 
ddpbts c t  magasins dont l'usage sera facultatif pour le public. 
Ces dAp0ts, magnsins c t  autres installations fixes devien- 
dront propriC1.B du Gouver l~e~~lent  h l'cxpiration de la Con- 
cession, en conformit4 de 1'Art. zo du Cahier des Cl~arges. 
Le Gouverncment aura une participatioll de  25% dans les 
recettes nettes de  ces dPlpBts et magasins. 
A R T I C L ~ ~  25.-Le Concessionnaire est autorisk h utiliser 
gratuiternent le long des lignes, les forces hydrauliques 
nalurelles dont le droit de jouissance n'appartient A personne, 
ou tt crhler, destinkes & produire 1'Qnergie 6lectrique pour la 
traction des trains, leur Bclairage e t  pour l'usage des differents 
services d e  l'exploitation. Les plans et projets des travaux 
h exCcuter dans ce but seront sournis A l'approbation du 
Ministbre du Commerce et des Travaux Publics. 
Ilans lo cas oh on ferait usage de cette knergie Blectrique, 
Ics 50% de 1'6conomie resultant de ce chef dans les frais 
d'exploitation seront portds au crddit d u  Gouvernement 
Imp6rial Ottoman* 
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Toutes ces installations feront gratuitement retour ti l'Etat, 
& l'expiration de la Concession. 
ARTICLE 26.-Le Gouvernement pourra faire Clever, & ses  
frais, des retranchements et travaux de defense sur les points 
de la ligne ~rincipale ou de ses embranchements et oh il le 
jugera nCcessaire. 
ARTICLE 27.-Les objets d'art et antiquitCs dbcouverts 
pendant les travaux, seront soumis aux rkglements regissant 
la matikre. 
Toutefois, le Concessionnaire sera dispensk de la formalit6 
de presenter une demande et d'obtenir u n e  autorisation pour 
les recherches. 
ARTICLE 28.-Le Concessionnaire est tenu de prisenter a u  
Ministhe des Travaux Publics un Btat mensuel de toutes les 
recettes ; ces Ctats seront dressbs conformement aux indica- 
tions de 1'Art. 17 du Cahier des Charges. 
ARTICLE 29.-Le Chemin de fer btant considCrb comme 
divise en sections de 200 kilom. de longueur, si le Con- 
cessionnaire, & moins d'un cas de  force majeure ddment 
constate, n'avait pas commence les travaux dans les delais 
fixes, ou s'il ne terminait pas les travaux d'une section d a m  
les dClais fixes, ou s'il interrompait le service des transports, 
ou enfin s'il n'exCcutait pas, pour une section quelconque, 
les autres principaux engagements decoulant d e  la prCsente 
Convention, le Gouvernement Impdrial fera au Concession- 
naire une mise en demeure indiquant lesquelles des susdites 
obligations restent A remplir par le Concessionnaire, et si 
ce dernier, dans l'espace de 18 mois partir de  la date de  
cette mise en demeure, ne lui a pas donne la suite qu'elle 
comporte, il sera dbchu de ses droits concessio~lnels pour 
toute section de ligne pour laquelle il aura 6th ddment 
constate en dlCfaut e t  il sera prockd6 ti son Cgard en con- 
formite de 11Art.;r8 du Cahier des Charges. 
I1 est entendu que tant que la ligne principale entre Iconia 
et Bagdad ne sera pas achevCe en son entier, le Concession- 
naire ne pourra pas mettre en exploitation les parties de la 
ligne de Bagdad & Bassorah qu'il aurait construites. 
Pendant cette periode de non exploitation des sections 
comprises entre Bagdad. et Bassorah, le Concessionnaire 
remboursera au Gouvernement ImpCrial & 1'8chbance des 
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int6rCts et amortissemel~t des Titres que le Gouvernelnel~t 
ImpBrial lui aura remis pour les dites sections, et il ne 
touchera naturellelnent pas les frais d'exploitation ; lnais ces 
clauses n'infrment en rien les autres droits du Concession- 
naire sur la ligne de Bagdad A Bassorah. 
L a  Vdch6ance prononcde sur une ou plusieurs sections du 
Chemin cle fer ne portera aucune atteinte aux droits du 
Conccssionnaire, quant au reste des sections des nouvelles 
lignes, non plus que quant k I'ensemble des anciennes lignes. 
ARTICLE 30. - Le Concessionnaire 6tablira gratuitement 
sur les points d6signds par le Gouvernement, les locaux 
n6cessaires aux bureaux des Comlnissaires Irnpdriaux du 
Chemin de fer et des employCs de la Douane, des Postes 
e t  de la Police. 
Le Concessionllaire dtablira d a m  les statiolls importantes, 
aprks entente avec le Ministere du Commerce e t  des Travaux 
Publics, deux chambres avec Water-Closet pour le service 
postal. 
ARTICLE 31.-Le Concessionnaire pourra Btablir, A ses 
frais, sur tout le parcours de la voie, des poteaux et des 
fils tti16graphiques ; cette ligne ne pourra pas servir aux 
correspondances privkes n'ayant pas trait l'exploitation du 
Chelnin de fer. 
Le Gouvernement Imp6rial se  rCserve le droit de faire 
contrbler h tout moment par des inspecteurs d616guds par 
le Ministere des Postes et Tdldgraphes, toute la correspond- 
ance t616graphique effectuCe par les fils de  la Sociktd. 
Le Gouvernernellt pourra faire usage des poteaux du 
Chemin de fer pour 1'8tablissement d'un e t  au besoin de deux 
fils tklkgraphiques, et les poteaux du Chemill de fer seront 
Btablis de faqon A pouvoir supporter ces deux fils supplB- 
mcntaires ainsi que ceux de la Soci6t6. En cas de  besoin 
lc Gowcrnernent aura le droit d e  faire ktablir Q ses frais 
d'autrcs potcaux sLlr le parcours de la voie, ou d'installer, 
en cns de rupture et de dkrangement de ses lignes, des 
t61kgraphistes dans les stations pour la transmission par les 
ligllas tdl&graphiques du Chemin de fer des d&p&ches officielles 
inlportarltes et urgentes, A la condition toutefois, de n'apporter 
ciucunc entrave au service du Chenlin de fer. 
ARTICLE 32.-Le Concessionnaire aura le droit de faire 
transporter, avec ses propres rnoyens de transport et sans 
payer aucune taxe 21 1'Adrninistration des Postes de llEmpire, 
Its correspondarlces et valises concernant exclusivement le 
service du Chemin de fel-; mais A la condition de les sou- 
mettre, suivant la rhgle, au contrble des agents de l'hdminis- 
tration des Postes. Les lettres du personnel seront 
soumises aux taxes postales. Le Concessionnaire ne pourra 
effectuer le transport de lettres de cettc nature qu'en s e  
soun~et tant  aux prescriptions du Rbgleinent int4rieur des 
Postes en vigueur dans 1'Empire. I1 aura Cgalement le droit 
de faire transporter et, sans leur appliquer aucune taxe, les 
objets et matibres de conson~mation, tels que houille, graisses, 
les mat6riaux et le matCrie1 nkcessaires A la construction, A 
l'entretien et h I'exploitation du Chernin de fer, tant sur les 
lignes existantes que sur les lignes faisant l'objet de la 
prdsente Convention, 
ARTICLE 33.-Le Gouvernement Imperial s'engage faire 
desservir par llAdministration de la MahsoussC la ligne de 
Haidar-Pacha 9 Sirkedji et au pont de Karalceuy par trois 
bateaux neufs ayant, en service, une vitesse moyenne 5 
I'heure d'au moins 14 Milles de 1855 mCtres. 
Si dans un dClai de un an comptC ;i partir le la date de 
1'8change de la prksente Convention, llAdministration de la 
Mahsoussd n'organisait pas le service dans les conditions 
indiauCes ci-dessus. le Concessionnaire aura le droit de  faire 
le transport des voyageurs et des marchandises entre les dits 
points, h la condition de choisir les equipages de ces bateaux, 
parmi les anciens officiers et marins de la Flotte ImpCriale 
ou parmi les Blkves dipl61nCs de 1'Ecole Navale ImpCriale. 
Les bateaux du Concessionnaire feront leur service au lieu 
e t  d a c e  de ceux de l7Administration de la MahsoussC, tout 
en restant exclusivement affect& au susdit service de trans- 
port, e t  le Concessionnaire versera annuellement & cette 
Administration, une somrne kgale aux 5% des recettes brutes 
affbrentes aux transports de voyageurs et de marchai~dises 
efTectuCs par lui entre les points susmentionnCs. 
De  11exc6dant des recettes brutes, on d6duira : 
I. 16s frais d'exploitation ; 
2. une annuit4 de gJ30% du capital de premier 6tablisse- 
rnent affect4 9 l'acquisition des bateaux ; airbs avoir dc5falquC 
les dites sommes, le restant sera port6 au cornpte des recettes 
brutes des nouvelles lignes garanties. 
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Le inuntailt du capital de premier Btablissell~ent sera arrGtt5 
apr&s l'achat des bateaux. 
I1 est bien entendu que si les recettes brutes d'une annke 
ne permettent pas de faire face aux fi-ais precites, la Socikte 
n'aura rien A rCclamer du Gouvernelnent Imperial. 
Par contre, elle pourra prblever le deficit sur Ies recettes 
des arlnkes suivantes. 
Les bateaux du Coilcessionnaire dtant considkrks cornme 
une section de la MahsoussB, ils jouiront des m&mes droits 
que celle-ci. 
ARTICLE 34. -La Societe Concessionnaire, et celle que 
cctte derni&re constituera dtant anoilyilles Ottomanes, toutes 
coiltestations et diffdrends qui surviendraient, soit entre le 
Gouverilement Imperial et le Concessionnaire ou la Socidte, 
soit entre le Concessionnaire ou la SociBt6 et les particuliers, 
par suite de 1'exCcution ou de l'interpretation de la presente 
Convention et du Cahier des Charges y annex8, seront 
dkf&r&s aux Tribunaux compt5teilts Ottomans, 
La nouvelle SociCte 6tant Ottoma;ne, elle devra corre- 
spondre avec les D&partements de 1'Etat en langue turque, 
qui est  la langue officielle du Gouvernement Iinp4rial 
Ottoman. 
ARTICLE 3.5.-Le Gouvernement Imperial garantit au Con- 
cessionnaire, par lrilom. construit et exploit&, une ailnuitd de 
Frcs. I I ooo ainsi qu'une somme forfaitaire de 4 500 Frcs. 
par annBc et par lrilom. exploit& pour frais d'exploitation. 
Cette annuitd de 11  ooo Frcs. sera representee par un Ein- 
prunt de 1'Etat Ottoman, portant 4% dJintkr$t et 0,087 538% 
d'amortissement, amortissable pendant la durde de la Con- 
cession. Le Concessionnaire aura donc droit & un inontant 
nominal de Frcs. 269 I I O , ~ ~  de cet Emprunt d'Etat, pour 
chaque kiloin. construit et exploit&, sans que le Con- 
cessionnaire puisse demander d'autres sommes de ce chef 
au Gouverneme~lt Imperial Ottoman. 
LAe n~ontant  otal no~ninal de Titres de l'fitat revenant au  
Concessioni~aii-e en collibrmitk de ce qui prdckde, lui sera 
remis par le Gouvernement Impdrial Otton~an, li. la signature 
dc chnquc Convention spCciale pour chaque section, mais le 
Concessionnaire devra bonifier au Gouvernement Impdrial 
Ottoman, les sommes que celui-ci aura payCes pendallt la 
&iode de construction, pour le service des Titres remis au 
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Concessionnaire, c'est-k-dire jusqu'b la date de la rCception 
provisoire de chaque section du Chenlin de fer. Ces sommes 
seront remises par le Concessionnaire entre les mains d e  la 
Dette Publique, pour le compte du Gouvernement Imp6rial 
ottoman. 
Le Gouvernement ImpCrial s e  rCserve le droit de ~nodifier 
A tout moment le systkme de paiement de I'annuitB kilo- 
mCtrique de 11 ooo Frcs. fixBe au I" alinCa du present 
Article, aprbs remboursement des Titres d'Etat Bmis en 
reprksentation de la dite annuitC. 
Aussitat que le developpement du trafic et  des recettes et 
la  situation financibre, permettrollt l'dmission de titres privBs 
par le Concessionnaire lui-tn&me, destinCs ?i remplacer les 
titres d'Etat qui lui auront CtB d6livrBs par le Gouvernement 
ImpCrial, le Concessionnaire se  mettra d'accord avec le 
Gouvernement ImpCrial pour proc6der A cet effet. 
Pour la premibre section de  zoo kilomktres au d e b  de 
Konia, le montant nominal des Titres ?i remettre par  le 
Gouvernenlent ImpCrial Ottoman au Concessionnaire, est 
fix8 B 54 000 000 de Frcs. Mais lors de l a  rCception dBfini- 
tive de cette section, et aussit6t que la longueur de la ligne 
exCcutCe sera arrCtCe, on Btablira le montant nominal exact 
des Titres, B raison de Frcs. 269 I I O , ~ ~  par Itilom. qui sera 
acquis au Coi~cessionnaire pour cette section. Le surplus 
du montant nominal, sera calculC au cours d'Bmission, plus 
les intCr&ts 4% courus jusqu'au jour du paiement, et sera 
versC en effectif, par le Concessionnaire, au TrCsor ImpBrial. 
I1 est bien entendu que ce calcul sera fait au rninitnum k 814%. 
L a  Socihtt! du Chemin de fer Ottoman dlAnatolie se porte 
garante v i s - h i s  du Gouvernement ImpCrial Ottoman pour 
l a  constructio~l de la dite premibre section de zoo kilom. 
jusqu'h l'ach8vement des travaux de cette section. 
Dans le cas ofi le Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman le 
jugera nCcessaire, il pourra aussi demander h la SociCt6 du 
Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie de  se porter garante pour 
d'autres sections et la SociCtC du Chemin de fer Ottoman 
d'Anatolie aura le droit de le faire. 
La somme forfaitaire pour frais d'exploitation, de Frcs. 
4 500 par an et par kilom. exploit&, sera garantie au Con- 
cessionnaire par une Co~lventioll spkciale pour chaque section, 
simultailBtnent avec la Convention qui rkglera l'annuit6 de 
I r ooo Frcs. 
En  ce 
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ce qui concerne la premikre section de zoo kilom. au 
delh d e  Iconia, cette somlne forfaitaire de 4 500 Frcs. par 
Itilonl. e t  par an, est garantie au Concessionnaire par les 
escSdents des garanties actuellement affectdes au lignes de la 
SocidtA du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie. 
L e  service des Titres de l 'ktat  h dmettre pour la dite 
allnuit6 kilometrique de 11 000 Frcs., sera assurd par les 
affectations s~ticiales, ddtermilldes d'un colnlnun accord avec 
le Gouver~lemcnt Ilnpdrial avant la mise A. executio~l de 
ch:lclu~ section. 
IZn outre,  la SociBtt5 Imphriale Ottomane du Chemiu de 
de Bagdad, de son cbt&, affecte en gage d'une facon 
irrdvocable et  inalidnable, aux porteurs de ces mCmes titres, 
1 ; ~  lignc d e  IConia au  Golfe Persique et ses embranchements, 
avcc l e u r  inat8riel roulant. Elle affecte pareillelnent et pour 
le ~ n ~ r n e  objet, s a  part  dans les recettes de cette ligne, aprks 
paicment  des frais d'exploitation, mais les porteurs des Titres 
n 'auront  uucun droit de s'iminiscer dam I'Administration de 
In Soci&t&. 
Ida d i t e  part des recettes, ddduction faite des frais 
tl'exploitation, tels que cette part et ces frais seront dtablis 
par les colnptes de la Socidt6, sera, en cas de besoin, verses 
annuellement par celle-ci A 1'Administration de la Dette 
I'ublique Ottomane, pour le compte du service des Titres. 
LC Go~ivernement Imperial Ottoman remboursera ti la Societe 
lus  solnrnes que celle-ci pourrait avoir fournies de ce chef, 
~ ~ o i i r  conlpte du service des Titres Bmis, Le Gouvernenlent 
Imp6rial Ottornall affecte encore d'une facon irrevocable et 
it~aliCn:tble, aux porteurs des Titres d'Etat prdcitds, la part 
lui revenant diuns les recettes brutes de la dite ligne. 
Si l a  recettc kilomdtrique brute de la ligne, d6passe 4500 
Vrcs., mais  sans dhpasser ro  ooo Frcs., l'excddent au delP de 
'1 500 Frcs .  reviendra entikrement au Gouvernement. 
Si l a  recettc kilomdtrique brute ddpasse roooo Frcs., la 
purtie jusqu'B ro ooo Frcs, devant toujours &tre ~ a r t a g e e  
cotnnlr: il est clit plus haut, les 60% de l'excedent au delP 
rlc ces 10 ooo Frcs. reviendront au Gouvernement Imperial 
c t  lcs 40';/, h la Socidt6. 
11 est bicn elltendu que si la recette kilomktrique brute 
I1':ltteint p s ~ ~  4 500 I;rc~,, la solnme ndcessaire pour parfaire 
13 diffilrellce de ce chiffrc sera pay6e au Concessionnaire 
p : ~  it: (;ouverncrncut en 1u2ine tenlps que l'annuitk de 
I7rcs. 11  ooo sur  les affectations sn&ciales h dkterminer d'un 
comlnun accord cntre le Gouvenlement Imp&rial el: le Con- 
cessiorinaire, avant la mise ?L cxkc~ltion par lc Concession- 
naire cles clauses de la prdseilte Convclltion alfhrente A 
chaque sectio11. 
TJes dites affectations seront encaiss4cs e t  pay&cs par les 
soins de 1'Administration de 13 Dette Publique Ottom:ul~e. 
Pour les Titres dlEtat 21 dn~ettre pour I'esdcution dcs 
diff4rentes sections du Chcmin dc fer, nlassc cotnmunc sera 
faitc dcs recettes revenant :lu Go~~verncnlcni Trnpkrial, de 
fayon h cc que le montant dispolliblc rcste affect6 h la com- 
mun:lutd dc ces mSincs Titrcs d : i ~ ~ s  la proportion dl1 ~nontant 
primitif nominal de chnquc 6mission. 
AussitOt aprGs le p;licmcnt dcs coupons c t  clc l'amortisse- 
ment des Titres dJEtat dmis, le surplus dcs rccetlcs appnrte- 
narlt au  Gouvernen~ent Zmp6rial Ottoman, sera versh h celui- 
ci chaque annde, a p r h  nccomplissemellt des formalites 
prkvues A I'Art. 40 de la pr6sentc Convetltion. 
ARTICLE 36.-Pour pouvoir dbterminer la moyenne des 
recettes l<ilomBtriques des nouvelles lignes de  Bagdad, il sera 
fait masse, au fur et: h mesure dc la lnise en exploitation des 
sections des nouvelles lignes, de  toutes les recettes affdrentes 
h toutes les parties des nouvelles lignes ainsi que dcs recettes 
nettes prOvues aux Articles 23 e t  33 de la prdsente Convcntion. 
La moyenne des recettes brutes Irilomdtriques ainsi obtenue 
servira de base pour d&terminer le montaiit des somrnes 2 
payer en conformit& cle 1'Art. 35. 
AW~ICLE 37. - LC Concession~l:lirc prend I'engngen~ent 
cl'esdcutcr ?I. ses fr:lis, sur lcs :~ncicnncs lignes dc H:~idar- 
1':lch:~ h Anpora ct Eski-Cheliir !I Konin ,  toutes Ics arnciliora- 
..I 
tions cxigdes par  l'introduction d'un scrvicc clc tr:~ins express 
et cc j~~sql i 'h  concurrence d'unc dhpense dc huit: ht i l l io~~s de. . 
Francs. 
E n  cornpclis:~tiol~ clc ces fr:lis c t  clcs nouvellcs c11:lrges 
1 
extraorrli~laires yu'cntrai'nern pour l'cxploitation, l'int~~ocluc- 
tioti clu scrvicc clcs tr;lills express, I c  i;ouvernemeut ImpCrinl 
rcconn3t :lu Concessionnairc. : 
I )  u t ~ c  : ~ l i n ~ ~ i t &  cle 3 ~ 0 o o o  I:rcs, 1)cnd:~nL trclite ans 
pcrnr le scrvict: clc I'intBrCt ct tle 1':lmortissomcnt clu 
c:lpiial clc l ~ u i ~  Millions dc IJrcs, ci-dc.. "xLI:;. 
Ccttc n1muit6 comnlericcr:l h colirir h p;~rlir du 
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2) uue annuit6 de 350000 Frcs. pour 1'Qtablissement 
des trains express. 
Cette dert~i&re an~luite ne sera exigible qu'h partir , 
du moment oh la ligne principale aboutira A Alep. 
Les annuites prkvues au present Article, seront 
payees i la SociCtk du Chemin de fer Ottoman 
d'Anatolie sur les affectations actuelles aux garanties 
de l'ancien rkseau, et de la m&me manikre que 
celles-ci. 
ARTICLE 38.-Le Concessionnaire s'engage A construire et 
A exploiter, aussitSt que le Gouvernernent IinpCrial lui en 
fera la demande, aux conditions de la prksente Convention, 
un embrancheinent partant de la ligile Iconia-Bassorah, e t  
aboutissant Q Diarbeltir e t  A Icarpout. 
ARTICLE 39.-Le raccordement Cventuel de la ligne de 
Damas-Ilamah et Prolongernents, avec le reseau faisant 
l'objet de la prksente Convention, aura lieu A Alep. 
ARTICLE ~ 0 . - L e  Concessionnaire remettra au Ministire 
des Travaux Publics, dans le courant du rnois de Janvier de 
chaque annke, les comptes des recettes prCalablernent v6rifiCs 
et approuv6s par le Commissaire ImpCrial sur  la base desquels 
les sommes revenant a u  Gouverneinent Imp6rial et ii la  Soci6tC 
seront d6terminkes en conformit6 de 1'Art. 35 de la pr6sente 
Convention. 
AussitBt que le montant de la part du Gouvernement dam 
ces recettes sera Btabli, la Socikt6 Imperiale Ottomane du 
Chemin de fer de Bagdad, en fera le versement pour le conlpte 
du service des Titres d'Btat & 1'Administration de la Dette 
Publique Ottomaile e t  celle-ci remettra ell effectif au Gouverne- 
merit Imp6rial tout surplus qui restera disponible a u  delh des 
soinmes exigees pour le paiement du coupon CchCa~~t le I er  
Juillet de 1'Exercice en cours. 
Le Gouvernelnent Imperial s'engage de son cBt6 B faire 
connaftre A I'Administration de la Dette Publique dans les 
deux mois qui suivront la presentation des comptes de re- 
cettes d'un Exercice, le rnontant des sommes reconnues ddes 
B la Soci6tB pour son paiement imm6diat. 
ARTICLE 41.--Le Concessionnaire aura la facult6 d'6tablir 
entre Harnidik et le port de Castaboul, un e~nbranchement 
provisoire pour transporter le materiel e t  les rnatkriaux 
ndcessaires au Chemin de fer. I1 est toutefois entendu 
qu'aprks l'achkvement des travaux faisant l'objet de la 
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pr6sente Convention le Concessio~lnaire devra, si le Gouverne- 
ment ImpBrial lui en notifie la demande, enlever les rails de 
cet einbranchetnent provisoire. 
I1 est bien entendu que durant cette exploitation provisoire 
le Gouverile~nent Imperial ne payera pour le dit ernbranche- 
ment, ni annuitd, ni frais d'exploitation. 
ARTICLE 42.-Les terrains et carrikres qui seront expropri6s 
co~lformCment & 1'Art. 6 de la Convention, seront de 1'8tendue 
strictement n8cessaire pour les travaux du Chemin de fer 
et de  toutes ses dCpendauces, e t  ne pourront pas &re d'une 
Btendue plus grande. Les expropriations se feront sous la 
surveillance du Ministkre des Travaux Publics. 
ARTICLE 43.-TOUS les inatkriaux et le matCriel nkcessaires 
pour la constructio~l des nouvelles lignes et de toutes leurs 
dBpendanccs, dont il est question dans 1'Art. 8 de la Con- 
vention, Ctant exempts de tous imptits e t  droits de douane, 
seront & l'arrivke, inspectCes co~lformk~nent I'usage, par 
les employes de la Douane. 
ARTICLE 44.-Les dBp8ts et les magasins ?L construire sur 
les terrains des stations, conforrnCment h I'Article 24 de la 
Convention, ne serviront qu'h l'emmagasinement des mar- 
chandises Q transporter. 
Ces dkp6ts et  rnagasins seront construits coilformement 
aux plans qui seront pr6sent8s par le Concessionnaire et 
approuvBs par le Ministere des Travaux Publics. 
ARTICLE 45.-Le Concessionnaire devra Ctablir b ses frais, 
e t  jusqu'h concurrence d'une dCpense totale de quatre Millions 
de Francs les stations militaires qui seraient reconnues 
ndcessaires par le Millistere de la Guerre. Le nombre, 
l'emplacement et  les dispositions de ces stations rnilitaires 
et leurs d6pcndances seront arrgtks aprks entente entre le 
Collcessionnaire e t  le Ministkre de la Guerre. 
ARTICLE 46.-Le Concessionnaire s'engage & verser an- 
nuelle~nent & 1'Asile des Pauvres, & partir de l'ouverture & 
I'exploitation de la ligne principale, une somme de 500 Livres 
Turques. 
L a  prksente Coilvention a Btk, conformbment & 1'IradB 
prornulgu6 par Sa  Majest6 Iinpkriale le Sultan, faite en 
double, signCe e t  Cchang6e B Coastantinople. 
La prksente Convention, Cahier clcs Charges' et le Firman 
The Galiier rlcs Chnyr:cs bears the same signatrlres and date as t h e  
Conventiot~. 
Imp6rial ser 
Charges  du 
F i rman  Imp 
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te as the 
ImpCrial seront CchangCs avec la Convention et  Cahier des 
Charges du 8/21 Jatlvier 1317 (1902) I T  Cheural 1319 et le 
Firman Imperial en date du 8 ZilhidjB 1319. 
Fait le 20 FBvrier 1318, 5 Mars 1903. 
Certifi6 confosme A I'original. 
Le Directeur du Bureau de Traduction 
du Ministere du Cornmet-ce eL des Travaux Publics. 
(s.) MOUHIB. 
(s.) ARTI-IUR GWINNER. 
(s.) K U R T  ZANDER. (s.) ZIHNI. 
(s.) HUGUENIN. 
STATUTES 01: THE L'IMPERIAL OTTOMAN BAGHDAD 
RAILWAY COMPANY" (1903) 
The following are the most important articles of the 
Statutes of the new Company :- 
ARTICLE I.-I1 est forme entre la soussignde et tous les 
propriktaires des actions ci-aprks crCCes, une SociCtB Ailonytne 
Ottomane ayant pour objet de construire, administrer et 
exploiter les lignes du Chemin de fer indiquees dans la 
Convention et Cahier des Charges CchangCs en date ~ L I  
5 Mars120 FCvrier 1903 (1318) etltre le Gouvernement Im- 
pCrial Ottoman et la SociCtk du Chemin de fer Ottoman 
d'bnatolie, conforinClne~lt aux stipulations de la dite Con- 
vention et Cahier des Charges. La  SociCtC pourra aussi 
slintBresser par achat de titres A des SociktCs nouvelles ou 
d6jB existantes de construction ct d'exploitation de cheinins 
de fer dans 1'Empire Ottoman. 
ARTICLE 2.-La SociCtC prend la d&llomination de : 
SociCtC ImpCriale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Bagdad 
et sera sounlise aux lois et r&glements de 1'Empire en qualitd 
de SocittC Ottomane. 
ARTICLE 3.-La SociktC a son sikge B Constantinople, et 
pourra Btablir des succursales dails toute autre ville de 
1'Empire Ottoman ou A 1'Ctranger. 
ARTICLE 4.-La durte de la SociCth est fixCe h gg annCes, 
sauf le cas de dissolution anticipCe ou de prorogation. Cette 
durCe sera prolongCe conformCment 21. 1'Art. 2 de la Con- 
ventioil en date du 5 Mars120 Fkvrier 1903 (1318). 
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ARTICLE 5. -La  Soci&t& du Chemin de fer Ottoman 
d'dnatolie apporte A la nouvelle SociCth, la concession qui Iui 
a CtC octroyde par le Gouvernen~ent Impkrial Ottoman, avec 
tous les droits, privilAges et avantages y attachCs ou en 
ddrivant, et la nouvelle Soci&tC devient titulaire et propridtaire 
de la dite Concession et se trouve substituCe tous les droits 
et obligatio~ls du Concessionnaire. Toutefois, la Soci6tC du 
Chelnin de fer Ottoman d1Anatolie garde pour son propre 
compte exclusif les droits et obligations qui ne regardent 
que les anciennes lignes et notamment ceux de ces droits 
et obligations qui dCcouleilt des Articles 2, 33 et 37 de la 
Convention du 5 Mars/ao Fevrier 1903 (1318). Retnise sera 
faite par la SociQtk du Chemin de fer Ottolnan d'Anatolie 
h la nouvelle SociCtC des Firman, Conventions, actes et 
documents quelconques concernant la Concession. 
ARTICLE 6.-Le fonds social se conlpose du capital-actions 
et des obligations qui seront Cmises ultkrieurement selon les 
besoins rhsultant de l'application des clauses et conditions des 
actes de concession. Le capital-actions initial de la Soci6tk 
est de Francs : 15 ooo 000.-, soit Mark : 12 24.0 000.-, soit 
Livres Sterling : 600000.- divisB en 30 000 Actions au 
montant nominal de Francs : 500.-, soit Mark : 408.-, soit 
Livres Sterling : 20.-, chacune. Le capital-actions pourra 
&tre augment6 de 50% par 1'AssemblBe GCnCrale. 
La Soci6td du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie souscrira 
10% du capital-actions ; ces actions seront inalihables et la 
SociktC du Chemin de fer Otto~nan dlAnatolie ne pourra pas 
s'en dessaisir sans le conselltemet~t du Gouverneme~lt Impkrial 
Ottoman. 
Le Gouvernement Impkrial Ottoman aura aussi le droit de 
souscrire jusqu'j~ concurrellce de 10% du capital-actions. 
ARTICLE 20.-Le Conseil dlAdministration a les pouvoirs 
les plus ktendus pour lJadministration des biens et affaires de 
la SociktB ; il peut mSme transiger et compromettre, il arr&te 
les comptes qui doivent Ctre soumis A 1'AssemblCe GAlQale . 
et propose Ies r6partitions de dividende. 
Le PrCsident du Conseil d'ddministi-ation renrksente, soit 
personnellernent, soit par un mandataire, la SocitStC en justice 
tant en demandant qu'en dkfendant. 
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displayed by, 327 
Hadda Mullah, the, result of his 
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nection with the Perso-British con- 
vention, 85, 88 
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-from Ahwaz to Isfahan, 146; journey 
of through thc Balrhtiari country, 
146 
Lynch Bros., Messrs.: granted a lease 
of premises at Ahwaz, 164 ; mis- 
understanding with the Balchtiari 
chiefs as to payment for the "Lynch 
Road," 156; refused the right of 
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